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NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT





Gene Reed

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Joachim Murat

Marshal and



of France.

King of Naples

High Admiral

NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT

A BIOGRAPHY COMPILED FROM
HITHERTO UNKNOWN AND
UNPUBLISHED DOCUMENTS

BY ALBERT ESPITALIER 

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PREFACE

IT was at Naples that this book was conceived. In that delightful region, neither terrestrial nor political upheavals have wrought any change in the wonderful surroundings that witnessed the evolution of Murat. Everything there recalls his image to our minds : the splendid bay where Caroline dreamed her dreams ; the Riviera of Chiaia where the King used to review his troops with the English bullets singing overhead ; the Royal Palace with its gallery leading to the theatre of San Carlo, and its windows looking out over what are now the floating docks to the open sea beyond—the sea over which Murat used to be afraid lest the English should come and hurl their shells into his very palace. Joachim it was who cut the beautiful road which leads to Posilippo ; it was he who constructed that other thoroughfare which runs out to Capo di Monte. Nay, even so trifling a detail as the Empire chairs covered with rich tapestry, which may be seen in that same palace, bring him before us in his habit as he lived.

Caroline was in love with her environment ; in her hours of *dolce far niente* she could appreciate to the full the magic of its rich and varied colouring, its brilliant and incomparable charm. Murat whose nature was less refined and less susceptible to the influence of the picturesque than hers, discovered attractions of a different order there. In that centre of “ *far figura*,” of artificial pose, his vanity thrived as in a hot-house. He was just

the king for such a people, and they welcomed him with open arms. His bearing, his outward style, were admirably adapted to the habits and ideas of his subjects. Following "Nasone," who may be far more accurately described as King of the *Lazzaroni* than as King of Naples, Joachim, heralded by an unequalled military reputation, came to them as a ruler of lofty lineage. His plumes took the fancy of these street loungers, these "gens de rue"; their acclamations won his heart. He could not resist their "vivas"; he was theirs heart and soul, and they, in their turn, numbered him among the great Kings of Naples. His name was synonymous with freedom and independence.

But are we to endorse this verdict? From the Italian standpoint there was perhaps much to be said for it. A king who ultimately took arms against France, a king beneath whose sway the idea of nationality arose and assumed definite shape, is not easily to be cast down from his pedestal. The great work of consolidation which took place during his reign, the ideas of independence which were promulgated alike within and beyond the confines of his kingdom, at an epoch when servitude was so universally prevalent; the sympathy displayed towards the champions of Italian unity—a sympathy sealed and ratified by an energy of action that was fraught with consequences of the deepest moment—all contributed to win for Murat a foremost position in the ranks of those who hailed the approaching dawn of Italian liberty. It was his to obsess with wonder and admiration the imagination of the Italian people. In 1814 the citizens of Bologna were gazing with amazement at the horse's head which, as the symbol of Freedom, adorned the Neapolitan flag. In Calabria "Gioacchino" is still a name to conjure with, and at Naples you may see popular prints in which, side by side with the exploits of Roland and the Knights of

the Middle Ages, are depicted—with a plentiful lack of proportion—certain episodes in the career of King Murat. Finally, the circumstances of his death shed the aureole of martyrdom around the figure of this warrior, this paladin, whose life at Naples was devoted to the ideal of “an Italy united and free.”

Such is the superficial aspect of the matter. If we look with a closer eye, if we study more carefully the part which Murat played, it will be evident that, even from the Italian point of view, he cannot be regarded as the leading champion of national independence. Whatever apparent enthusiasm he may have manifested for the cause of liberty was not inspired by any lofty desire for the renaissance and federation of a disunited people; he knew not the burning zeal which patriotism imparts. He came to Italy as a stranger, and his sole aim in fostering the ideal of Italian unity was to afford himself a means of gratifying his ambition and exalting his vanity—that vanity which the party of Freedom always knew how to exploit for the advancement of their cherished aims.

It mattered little to Murat personally whether Tuscans, Florentines, Romans and the rest should unite and form the powerful federation which present-day Italy exhibits. It was rather that in that movement, in which he was but a follower, he deemed that he would encounter an opportunity for self-aggrandisement, and for magnifying his own personal importance till it equalled that of his mighty brother-in-law; a case of the frog and the bull. But all men were not blind in the matter. Some there were who were clearsighted enough to recognise the personal character of the King's aims and some who were independent enough to declare what they saw. In 1814, while Graham was expressing amazement that an alien king should manifest so much zeal for Italian freedom, Pepe, the pale-mouthed apostle

of Liberty, was wrathfully complaining that he manifested by far too little.

In 1815, when his aims had become more apparent, Murat, in his progress through the states of Northern Italy, was not welcomed, save in the case of a few towns, with anything approaching the same ardour that had greeted him the year before. He essayed to revive enthusiasm by the proclamation of Rimini; but his efforts were received with coldness and distrust. Times had changed. To the first spontaneous outburst had succeeded the sober and reflective mood. Murat had been weighed in the balance. Once again the Tarpeian Rock was found in close proximity to the Capitol.

But in what light are we to regard the King's conduct if we look upon it exclusively from the French standpoint? Here no evasions will serve, no excuses can be advanced. For five years he refused to obey his brother-in-law, for five years he thwarted his plans and carried on an underhand warfare against him, till at last he emerged as an open and avowed traitor to his Emperor and to France. What sufficient reasons can be adduced to account for his defection? What apology can be offered for his falling away? Surely, none at all! Did he pretend, forsooth, that he was sovereign lord of his kingdom, and of his own actions? He knew well enough the hollowness of such a claim. Had not Berthier, as far back as 1809, enjoined upon him, in a memorable phrase, "to be his people's King but his Emperor's viceroy." The real position could scarcely have been more clearly indicated. It meant that if he found the mantle of obedience too heavy or too trying for his shoulders, he was at liberty to avow it to the Emperor and go his way; there were plenty to take his place. But even though his grievances against the Emperor had been real, was he free to go back on his word, to trample duty under foot? Could he, a son of France, turn his

back upon his country in her hour of deepest need? "When Murat's honour is at stake," said Campochiaro to Graham, "his own interests count for nothing." A careful examination of the King's conduct in 1814 would rather suggest a reversal of the proposition.

Such being the state of affairs, it will not be surprising to learn that the relations between the brothers-in-law were bitter, acrimonious and strained almost to breaking point. On the one side there was Murat, impatient of control, endeavouring to free himself from the suzerain's yoke; on the other there was the Emperor administering, in his irritation, stern and sometimes cruel rebukes to his recalcitrant subordinate. Many a time it needed the persuasive intervention of the diplomatic Caroline to ward off from her husband a punishment that would have meant nothing less than deposition. Nay, in 1811, even her intervention would possibly not have sufficed to parry the blow had it not been that circumstances were arrayed on her side. To arrive at a just appreciation of the crowning act of treason, to place the finger on the motive which induced Murat gradually to relinquish the French policy with which he had entered on his kingly duties in favour of an alliance with the Coalition, we must follow the development of his restless mind, we must weigh his hopes and fears, we must realise the hypnotic fascination that the prospect of conquering Sicily exercised upon his imagination. Then, on the other hand, we must bear in mind his disappointment, his disillusionment at the abortive result of the Sicilian expedition, and his readiness to give ear to other counsellors—counsellors who, at first, but whispered a few words about independence in his ear, but who, by their ever-growing influence, at length prevailed upon him, piqued as he was and shaken in his allegiance by the domineering and high-handed proceedings of Caroline, to dissociate his cause formally and violently from that

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NAPOLEON AND KING MURAT

PART I

CHAPTER I

THE "PROMOTION"

The signing of the Treaty—The hopes of the Grand Duc de Berg—Spain—The Emperor's letter—Murat's disappointment—Early causes of dissension between the Emperor and Murat—The Emperor's precautions—Murat in Paris—The Emperor's commands—Murat's departure—His journey and arrival in Naples—His first acts as King—Financial and political troubles—The Napoleonic Code—The taking of Capri—The Sicilian expedition—The plot between Fouché, Talleyrand and Murat—The Emperor's unconcern—Caroline: her hopes, her claims and her disappointments—Her attitude in government affairs—Saliceti—He abandons the Queen's party—Early troubles between Caroline and Murat—The King begins to grow jealous.

BEHOLD at length the moment of recompense had arrived. Spain was conquered and, if not pacified, was at all events subdued. Who then was to possess her? On whom should the Emperor bestow so splendid a gift but on the man who had borne the burden and heat of the conquest? A Marshal of the Empire, and Napoleon's Lieutenant-General in Spain, Murat was already, in a sense, the possessor of a kingdom. Before him the members of the Junta cringed low, and the rabble of Madrid trembled at his nod. Had he to reckon with any competitors for the vacant throne? Of a surety, no; since

all Napoleon's brothers and all his sisters had received their share of the conqueror's liberalities. Caroline alone, despite entreaties, tears, cajolery and indignation, had as yet failed to obtain for her husband the crown, the genuine royal crown, which they had so long and so ardently coveted.

But at length his turn had come. Over and above the incontestable rights which his brilliant services in Spain had won for him, Murat possessed, or so indeed he believed, the Emperor's formal promise of the throne. "When as Grand Duc de Berg he was commanding at Madrid in 1808, he undoubtedly had hopes of obtaining the crown of Spain, and even persuaded himself that he had the Emperor's promise to that effect. It was to bring matters to a head that he had provoked a rising in the heart of the capital which he forthwith repressed, but in a manner so remarkable that his conduct on that occasion can only be ascribed to widely different motives from those which he alleged as the grounds of his action. It is improbable that the Emperor definitely promised Marshal Murat the crown of Spain; it is more likely that he gave him a few vague words of encouragement which Murat doubtless interpreted, after his fashion, in the flattering light of his own ambitions." ¹

Be that as it may, the matter was already settled in Murat's mind when, on the 5th May, he received the letter which the Emperor had written to him two days earlier at Bayonne. "I intend," so the missive ran, "that the King of Naples shall reign at Madrid. Let me have a reply immediately saying what you think of this, for the thing must be done in a day. You will say that you would rather remain with me; but that is out of the question. You have several children, and, moreover, with a wife such as yours, you could absent yourself if war should summon you to my side, for she

¹ Beugnot, *Mémoires*.

is well able to be at the head of a Regency. Further, let me tell you, the kingdom of Naples is far preferable to that of Portugal, since Sicily will be united to it; you will then have six million subjects."¹ The Emperor had already thought out the details of the adjustment that would be rendered necessary, and, even at this stage, he was so confident of Murat's acceptance—an acceptance he would be in a position to force upon him if occasion demanded—that he had already completed a draft treaty. On the 5th May we find him sending word to Champagny saying that a list of the Duc de Berg's property would have to be sent to the Minister of Finance.² Napoleon was already beginning to carry out his schemes regarding Naples and Murat.

As he read the Emperor's letter, Joachim beheld the collapse of his hopes. Nevertheless he had not yet developed into the recalcitrant King of Naples of later years, and it was with true soldierlike obedience that he replied forthwith: "Sire, I am in receipt of your Majesty's letter of the 2nd May, and the tears stream from my eyes as I answer it. Your Majesty would have truly divined the wishes of my heart had you bid me remain at your side. I ask it, nay, I implore it as a favour greater than any I have ever received at your hands. Familiar as I am with your acts of kindness, accustomed to see you every day, to admire you, to worship you, to depend upon you for everything, how when I am alone and compelled to rely on my own resources shall I ever succeed in acquitting myself of duties at once so onerous and so sacred? I do not consider myself capable of the task. I beseech you therefore to suffer me to remain with you. Power does not invariably denote happiness. Happiness is only to be found in affection, and happiness was mine when I was with your Majesty.

¹ *Correspondence*, 13,810.

² *Correspondence*, 13,081.

"And now, Sire, that I have given expression to my grief and to my desires, I must go no further, and I place myself unreservedly at your commands. Nevertheless I will avail myself of the permission which you grant me of choosing betwixt Portugal and Naples, and say at once that my preference goes to the country in which I have already held command and in which I could most usefully serve your Majesty. Yes, I prefer Naples, and I must inform your Majesty that at no price could I accept the crown of Portugal.

"If I may be allowed to give expression to yet another wish, it is that I may remain as long as possible with your Majesty."

What an effort it must have cost him to write these lines, and how his feelings against his brother-in-law must have increased in bitterness as he indited, in language of forced effusiveness, his acceptance of so mean a realm. To have fostered dreams of the throne of Spain, of the empire of the Americas, and now to be compelled to accept with gratitude this mutilated remnant of a kingdom, part of which only he could call his own, while the acquisition of the other part—if, indeed, he ever won it—was only to be compassed at the cost of such infinite trials and vexations! After all, what manner of man was this Joseph—what greater title had he to Spain than he, Murat, whose lieutenancy had enabled him to gauge all its treasures, all its worth? In his heart there was generated a sense of bitterness against his overlord, of mortification at being compelled to play a subsidiary rôle, and at being forced to submit to what he conceived to be an act of gross injustice. With monumental self-conceit Murat regarded himself as a personage of only slightly less importance than the Emperor himself, whom he never forgave for the pettiness of the crown allotted to him. "One would imagine," Napoleon once said, speaking of Murat and Bernadotte, "that I had usurped

their place," and Murat, as we shall see, well merited the shaft.

Though, however, Murat accepted his new kingdom with mortified reluctance, we must not conclude that Napoleon bestowed the gift with alacrity. Far from it! It was a sacrifice which circumstances imposed upon him, from which there was no escape. All his brothers had been provided with kingdoms. His other sisters, even the most insignificant of them, had all been suffered to pluck a' more or less important branch of the Imperial tree. Yet Caroline, to whose merits and cajolery the Emperor was not insensible, had only received as her portion—or her husband's portion—that very unimposing fragment of the Germanic Federation known as the Grand Duchy of Berg. Is it then to be deduced that Napoleon had made up his mind to confer upon Joachim only what he was strictly obliged, the irreducible minimum, and, even that, with reluctance? It may have been so. Doubtless there were considerations to which the Emperor with his customary care and insight had given full weight. Murat, with all his brilliance on the field of battle, was no administrator. His conduct of the affairs of his Duchy, which offered a finished example of legal and systematic pillage, had demonstrated this to the full. He was no statesman. He lacked the breadth of view, the penetration, and the unwearying patience that such a rôle demands. His disposition, on the contrary, was restless and impetuous, the vainglorious nature of his ideas was reflected in the extraordinary magnificence of his costume, and, though the Emperor may as yet have had no inkling of his coming acts of treachery, his sagacity doubtless enabled him to foresee the efforts he would make to rid himself of the yoke. In the case of the Bonapartes their brother was doubtless prepared to show great indulgence. But Murat was not a blood-relation, and Napoleon's attitude towards him

grew harsh and unsympathetic. Here there were no ties of kinship to warp his vision, and the Emperor saw Murat as he really was; he saw, that is to say, that at the back of the *man* there was nothing that denoted the *King*.

From these early divergences there was destined to spring a long series of quarrels. The kingdom, grudgingly bestowed and churlishly received, was fated to be the cause of a latent hostility, a smouldering enmity, between the two men, and to bring about a sequence of disagreements and bickerings, which, carefully fostered by all the enemies of France, those of the North and those of the South, finally culminated in that notorious and deplorable rupture which perhaps brought both of them to ruin.

So heavy, so unlooked-for was the blow, that Murat was laid low with sickness. On the 22nd May, he was compelled to take to his bed. This was the first of those famous "attacks of fever" which were henceforth to announce with singular regularity the salient events of Joachim's reign, particularly his conflicts with his brother-in-law.

The Emperor, at Bayonne, immediately addressed himself to the task of restricting Murat's opportunities for mischief. In the first place he had recourse to Joseph, and in the second to a treaty. Prior to his departure for Naples, Joseph, who had kept his people waiting two years, formally proclaimed a Constitution. It was in all probability drawn up from beginning to end by the Emperor; at all events it betrays unmistakable evidences of his handiwork. "The Emperor guarantees the integrity of the Constitution which he has drawn up in conjunction with His Majesty, King Joseph, for the Kingdom of Naples and Sicily."¹ The date of this Constitution was the 20th June, and it was published

¹ *Moniteur Universel*.

at Naples on the 4th July, being preceded by a proclamation of King Joseph's, in which he declared, rather late in the day perhaps, that he was desirous of putting the finishing touch upon his work.¹

Thus Murat's hands were tied. It meant that matters could be thrashed out with him, and that it would be possible to dictate to his Minister what measures should be submitted to him for signature. Murat himself was still ill, or only convalescent, and, the direction of affairs in Spain having been taken over by Savary, he went off, like any little *rentier*, to take the waters at Barèges, whither he proceeded by way of Bayonne,² leaving the battle concerning his future throne to be waged by others. True, he had left a most capable substitute behind him, a substitute far more able than he to extort concessions and to parry unfavourable suggestions. We refer, of course, to Caroline. A vigilant defender of his prerogatives, it was at Bayonne that she began to foster those dreams of power to which she clung for eight years without ever succeeding in satiating her hunger for dominion. It was, in fact, to Caroline much rather than to Gallo that Champagny had to address his observations and Napoleon his commands.

However, concessions were few. Napoleon's plans were laid down; there remained no alternative but acquiescence. It was to his wife that Murat owed his kingdom and to his wife alone. In order that none might be in ignorance of it the Emperor caused the following to be inserted in the treaty: "This Princess (Caroline) who, by virtue of the present cession, made chiefly in her favour, establishes her descendants upon the throne. . . ."³ Then followed the treaty drawn up in terms of such great precision that every disputable point, every possible contingency seemed to be provided

¹ *Diario di Nicola.*

² *Moniteur Universel.*

³ Treaty of Bayonne, Article III.

for and regulated in advance. That it did not absolutely exclude the possibility of hair-splitting disputation will become evident as our narrative proceeds; nevertheless, taken as a whole, it provided a solid corner-stone in the future relationship between the two countries. In its composition Napoleon brought into play all the force and decision of his character. The conditions which he laid down were so clearly defined that against them Murat and his advisers subsequently found it useless to rebel. At the same time, this very display of autocracy proved a violent element of disruption. It dealt Murat such a rude blow, it inflicted so deep a wound upon his *amour-propre*, that between Joachim and Caroline all possibility of cordial agreement was immediately destroyed. The King's jealousy of his wife dates from the Treaty of Bayonne. The Emperor had been pleased to demonstrate that his power alone sufficed to make Kings and Queens of the members of his own family; but the demonstration dealt a heavy blow at Murat's pride, and Murat, though he submitted, never forgot.

When, on the 13th July, he received from Gallo the text of the newly-signed treaty, Joachim's first words were significant. "Nothing the Emperor could have done," he said, "would have given me greater satisfaction than the favour he has just conferred on Princess Caroline."¹ He had been struck in his tenderest part—his vanity! This fact is the real explanation of all that followed. It is true that when subsequent troubles began to arise in his relations with the Emperor we shall find Murat saying that the fever was upon him when he agreed to sign the Treaty of Bayonne, and that now he was well again there were a number of things to which he regretted having given his consent.² His letter to Gallo of the 15th July clearly indicates that, with the

¹ *Memoirs of the Duc de Gallo.*

² *Archives des Affaires Étrangères.*

exception of a few matters of detail, such as the proposed reduction of twelve regiments of twelve squadrons to ten and the pay of the Neapolitan foreign-service contingent, Joachim was quite ready to accept the Treaty as a whole. "Finally," these are his words, "though I am urging you to obtain the best terms you are able, it will none the less be necessary to submit to all the conditions on which the Emperor stands firm."¹ For example, Murat instructs his minister to obtain the Emperor's views on the question of national colours and to "request him to assign us our own special flag. Endeavour," he says, "to arrange for white. So long as this matter remains in abeyance the country will imagine it is to be absorbed by France"² Already he was showing signs of his incipient "separatism." Whence he was to derive the funds necessary for the maintenance of his army and navy is a question to which he did not trouble himself to find a solution. But there was one thing which he placed in the forefront of all his requirements, and that was independence. Side by side with the tricolour standard of Napoleon Bonaparte must float, and that without delay, the standard of Joachim Murat.

The Treaty was signed and ratified. It was therefore meet that the good folk of Naples should be informed forthwith that King Joachim Murat was henceforth to preside over their destinies. On the 21st July, Gallo, who was at Bayonne, forwarded to Ricciardi, the Neapolitan Secretary of State, the text of the King's first proclamation to his subjects, with the request that it should be transmitted to the several departments. He also sent a copy of the treaty, apologising for not sending the original, "a bulky volume bound in embroidered velvet and enclosed in a large silver casket engraved with the Imperial arms and ornamented with cords and

¹ *Memoirs of the Duc de Gallo.*

² *Idem.*

tassels of gold.”¹ The messenger reached Naples on the 31st July, and the Secretary of State immediately sent word to the Council, to whom were recited the King’s Proclamation to his subjects and a letter announcing that he would arrive in Naples about the 15th August to celebrate the Emperor’s birthday.²

In consequence of the indisposition which prevented Murat from proceeding to take up his duties as King, Napoleon, on the 23rd July, had sent orders to Maréchal Perignon, who had been appointed governor of Naples, to set out immediately so that he might be at his post on the 5th August, or earlier if possible. His instructions were to take whatever measures were necessary for carrying on the government pending Murat’s arrival.³ Perignon reached Naples on the 13th. Next day he summoned a Council of Ministers, by whom his authority was formally recognised. The command of the army was handed over to him by General Reynier. In this manner the succession was secured and the transfer of the various offices of State duly carried out.⁴ Henceforth the lazzaroni could cry “Vive le roi Joachim!” to their hearts’ content.

Though Caroline had been busily engaged on the Treaty at Bayonne, Murat had not been idle—albeit his activities took a different form. His illness had not prevented him from giving orders at Düsseldorf for everything possible to be moved, particularly the horses. Nothing was left behind. It was all done with such unblushing callousness that the Emperor himself was obliged to call Murat to order. “The news that reaches me from the Duchy of Berg is unsatisfactory,” he wrote on the 30th July. “Your agents are packing and sending everything across the river. Your stallions and brood-

¹ Gallo to Ricciardi. Naples. *Archivio di Stato*.

² *Diario di Nicola*.

³ *Correspondence*, 14,225.

⁴ Report of Neapolitan Ministers. *Archives Nationales*.

mares are filing in one long line across the Tyrol. Is it worth while to be so eager about trifles? Such conduct is ill-judged, and has a bad effect on the public."¹

The Emperor returned to Paris on the 14th August. There he found Joachim, who had at last recovered from the effects of his "Spanish" complaint. At the Tuileries the same evening he gave him a terrific rating on the matter of the Grand Ducal horses. Murat, in consternation, could find nothing to reply. On the following day, however, he sent the Emperor a letter in which he endeavoured to prove, in language of verbose humility, how utterly incapable he was of the misdemeanours of which His Majesty had so roundly accused him.² But this was a minor point. The Emperor despatched Beugnot to Düsseldorf to investigate matters and to set the affairs of the Duchy in order. Beugnot's eyes were considerably opened. He drew up a report and sent it to the Emperor. From Joachim it elicited a number of indignant recriminations but not a single valid excuse. On the eve of his departure for Naples he wrote a further letter, in which he bitterly complained that he had been called upon to render an account of his deeds, although as a Sovereign he was entitled to perfect liberty of action.³ Joachim appeared to hold the view that to rule was to indulge in unmeasured and unscrupulous rapacity, and it will be interesting to observe how far he applied this theory of government to the administration of his new kingdom.

The Emperor was back again in Paris, and Joachim had received his instructions. There was therefore nothing to hinder the latter from setting out. He considered it advisable, however, before making his adieux to play the obsequious and submissive vassal, and would not

¹ Lecestre. Unpublished Letters, No. 332.

² Murat to Napoleon. *Archives Nationales*.

³ *Idem*, August 22, 1808. *Archives Nationales*.

leave until he had informed himself of Napoleon's wishes, "since he was anxious to avoid taking any course of action that would be calculated to bring him into disfavour." He therefore accompanied his letter with a list of requests. There were not a few of them. To begin with he applied for the command of the Imperial Troops in Rome, and demanded that Miollis should be made subservient to his orders. He asked for instructions regarding the attitude he was to adopt towards the Pope. He also wished to know whether he ought seriously to entertain the idea of attacking Sicily when a favourable opportunity presented itself. Was he, he went on, to attempt to retake Capri and Ponza? Should he raise fresh troops? There were, in a word, seventeen questions or petitions.¹ With childlike simplicity he laid bare his hopes and his plans for increasing his power in the world. Of the real labour involved in organising a kingdom, of the genuine spade-work required for the successful creation of a sound and prosperous polity, he recked not the slightest. But a vast army, a reconquered Sicily, a base on the Ionian Sea, the control of the Papal States, such were the objects of his ambition.

A single letter from the Emperor sufficed to dissipate these ingenious plans as though they had been so many soap bubbles. "I have," he wrote, "given you the command of my Neapolitan forces. . . . You cannot see the Pope until he has recognised you. Before raising fresh troops you must find the money to pay them. There is nothing to be done with regard to the Archipelago, as we are on friendly terms with the Porte."² Thus all his aims received their quietus. There was no command in Rome; nothing to be done in the Archipelago; no raising of fresh troops; and, last but not least, not a word about Sicily. The Emperor refused to show his

¹ Murat to Napoleon, August 17, 1808. *Archives Nationales*.

² *Correspondence*, August 18, 1808, No. 14,260.

hand. Of all Murat's hopes not one remained. Naples was his and nothing more, and with Naples he had to rest content. Such was the Emperor's decision, and Murat, as might be expected, set out in high dudgeon. The Emperor had laid down the limits of his sphere of activity. No sooner, however, had he reached his own kingdom than he set about transgressing the Imperial commands, and, having regained possession of Capri, commenced, with scarcely an interval, to make preparations for the conquest of Sicily. Whether in the North or whether in the South, all Joachim's plans were lacking alike in method and in moderation, and they all had but one object—the glorification of their author. When it subsequently became certain that the much-coveted Sicily was not to be his, he turned his hungry gaze northwards to the Papal States, finally to extend it to the whole of Italy.

On the 21st August, Murat informed the Emperor that he was about to take his departure, and on the following day he quitted Paris. He reached Turin on the evening of the 27th,¹ and on the 29th he received the deputation that had been selected to welcome the new king on behalf of the people of Naples. Resuming his journey next day, he saw Eugène at Milan, Miollis at Rome, and at Terracini he met Saliceti, who had hurried thither to greet him.² At Portella, on the evening of the 5th, he gave an audience to the representatives of the province, and on the 6th he reached Aversa, where he received the Ministers and Ambassadors, finally arriving at Naples in the course of the same day. His reception was magnificent; enthusiasm was at white heat. Everywhere there were statues and decorations. In the Place di Foria, where he was presented with the keys of the city, a triumphal arch had been erected in his honour. The

¹ Gallo to Ricciardi. Naples. *Archivio di Stato*.

² *Diario di Nicola*.

streets were gay with bunting and thronged with people. Wild cheering broke from the multitude as he rode by—a moving mass of plumes. But whether it was due to disdain or to a desire to reproduce the effect of the Emperor's famous grey overcoat, the rest of his attire was a plain marshal's uniform. On the 7th he announced to the Emperor that he had taken possession of his kingdom, and on the 8th, after a solemn *Te Deum*, he assumed his royal duties.

First and foremost in Murat's mind was the desire to establish his authority over his own domains. He could not endure the thought of being perpetually kept on the alert by the English. Capri must certainly be attacked. How gloriously it would usher in his reign, he thought, if he could win back at the very outset the island which had defied Joseph for more than two years, and which even the people of Naples had come to regard as an English possession. The conquest of Capri would be a gain, a substantial gain, both in territory and prestige; but it would be more than that. It would be a first step towards the fulfilment of a design on which the King had set his heart. That design was the reintegration of the kingdom of the Two Sicilies. He calculated that if he could inform the Emperor of the success of the Capri enterprise he would be certain to sanction an attack on Sicily. Murat therefore wasted no time. On the 8th September, just two days after his arrival, he informed Napoleon that he had sent spies into Capri. "I am sanguine of being able to announce to your Majesty before long that the island has been recaptured."¹ Nor did he miss the opportunity of slipping in a reference or two to his favourite project, the expedition to Sicily and to the insurrectionary movement it was hoped to excite there. "It would," he added, "be a great misfortune for me if Your Majesty were to withhold your sanction for the

¹ Murat to Napoleon. *Archives Nationales*.

expedition, since, from the day of my accession, the people of Naples have regarded it as certain to take place."

To this first application the Emperor replied, on the 18th, as follows: "The capture of Capri would have a good effect. It would be a particularly happy way of marking your arrival, and at the same time produce the desirable result of inspiring the English with apprehensions regarding Sicily. I should be entirely agreeable to the Sicilian expedition taking place this winter, but it would first be necessary to find out what forces the English have in the island and the number of troops you would require."¹ This meant a free hand as regards Capri, but nothing definite concerning Sicily. Murat was not disheartened. He would risk the Sicilian adventure—some day. So eager was he to set to work that, without waiting for the Emperor's reply, he sent off another letter, on the 20th, in which he announced that he had determined to risk a *coup de main* on Capri. His preparations proceeded so rapidly that, on the 3rd October, General Lamarque's flotilla was able to open the attack. The plan of action was bold almost to foolhardiness. Joachim himself played no part in the actual fighting, but, taking up his post on the Punta di Campanella, contented himself, after the manner of Homer's heroes, with encouraging the assailants by word and gesture. On the 18th, Lowe surrendered, and the King of Naples won his first and final triumph.

Elated with his victory, intoxicated with the acclamations of his people, Murat was eager, as he always was, to follow up his success, just as, in days gone by, he had pursued the enemy as they fled in hopeless disorder from the field of Jena.

Capri having been won back for Naples, Murat immediately turned his attention to Palermo. He made public references to the matter, hurried on his preparations,

¹ *Correspondence*, No. 14,339.

mobilised his troops, and put his artillery *en route*.¹ On the 28th October, ten days after Lowe's capitulation, the scheme had so far developed that the French Ambassador sent home word that the King was about to leave for a tour in Calabria. "It is indeed pretty freely rumoured that an attempt will shortly be made to effect a landing in Sicily. Two regiments are already on the move from here. The King, in my hearing, touched on the matter in public. The project, in fact, is no secret here in Naples, and the King's departure is daily expected."²

The Emperor on his side appeared thoroughly to have made up his mind to sanction the enterprise. As early as the 25th October, before the news of the Capri success had reached him, he was holding out hopes. "Sixteen ships of the line, ten frigates and four good-sized transports could easily set sail from Toulon this winter and proceed to Reggio, where they would be able to safeguard the transport of twelve or fifteen thousand men to Sicily. Let me have your plan of campaign. How many gunboats and sloops have you to carry out the landing?"³ It would seem that for a moment the Emperor was forgetting with what sort of an individual he had to deal, forgetting that Murat was one of those men who always possess, at least in imagination, whatsoever is necessary for the realisation of their dreams. He declared that he would collect twenty thousand men at Scilla, and that he had all the gunboats, feluccas and small craft requisite for the crossing. The Emperor lost no time, for on the 17th November he instructed Decrès and also Clarke to write to the King for details of his preparations and of his plan of campaign, as well as for the number of vessels available, and the name of the port in which he intended to assemble them. He even fixed an approximate date

¹ *Diario di Nicola.*

² *Archives des Affaires Étrangères.*

³ *Correspondence*, No. 14,411.

for the expedition. It was to be the end of December or the beginning of January.¹

Joachim needed no stimulus. Preparations were pushed forward with redoubled energy. Large bodies of troops were marched into Calabria. Murat himself was announced as being on the point of setting out to supervise the completion of the preliminaries and to assume the direction of operations.² His mind was set on the expedition, and he was particularly anxious that it should take place, the more so as Monteleone, his Ambassador in Paris, had announced to him, in a cipher dispatch dated the 3rd December, that there was some talk of peace being concluded between France and England. "It is rumoured," he stated, "that Sicily may be ceded to Ferdinand, and though, in view of the repeated assurances of his Majesty the Emperor, I myself attach no importance to these stories, I think it my duty to put you on your guard."³

What, then, were the Emperor's real intentions regarding the proposed expedition? Was he, or was he not, disposed to sanction it? No one gainsaid the easiness of the task; no one disputed that the hour was propitious for carrying it out. Joachim, in great elation over his success at Capri, was burning to add to his laurels. What a rude awakening it would have been for him had he really known what was in the Emperor's mind; had he realised that he was a mere puppet; that the conquest of Sicily, which he fondly looked upon as at once so easy and so near, was but a ruse to divert the attention of the English and so relieve the pressure on the French forces in Spain and Portugal. Beyond all doubt the Emperor was not in favour of the plan, and, despite all his fair words to Decrès, he knew in his own mind that it would not come

¹ *Correspondence*, No. 14,480-14,482.

² Gallo to Monteleone, November 29, 1808. Naples. *Archivio di Stato*.

³ Monteleone to Gallo, December 3, 1808. *Archivio di Stato*.

to pass. He had already too many baffling problems on hand to think of adding to his difficulties. Beset with anxieties in Spain, where at the moment his forces were scarcely increasing their renown, uneasy concerning Austria, where the horizon was dark and menacing, he had little enough to encourage him to embark on fresh adventures. He knew, however, the extent to which Murat might be beguiled, and resolved to turn his vanity and stupidity to good account. When, therefore, he dangled Sicily before Joachim's eyes as the brightest jewel in the crown of Naples he was actuated by one sole motive, and that was to draw the enemy thither. In his instructions of the 22nd October, as well as in his letter of the 19th to Fouché, the Emperor dwelt upon the same theme: the English must be drawn to Sicily by the apprehension of losing the island. With that end in view troops were put under arms at Naples and sent into Calabria. Murat hoped to find the island free from British troops; Napoleon that it would be filled with them to overflowing.

On arriving at Naples, Joachim's first and principal concern was the extension of his territory. Nevertheless, circumstances demanded that he should give his attention to questions of civil government and endeavour to master the details of the administrative system. At the very outset Murat found himself at issue with the Emperor at all points. His administrative incapacity, his egregious tactlessness fanned into flame the discord that was smouldering between them. Notwithstanding the financial embarrassments which were the perpetual burden of his complaints, Murat embarked on a measure for increasing the facilities for female education. This immediately brought upon him the following rebuke from the Emperor: "Before setting up educational establishments and other institutions of the kind, a task which might with advantage be deferred till a subsequent and

more favourable opportunity, see that my troops are paid the arrears that are owing to them?"¹ Further offence was given because the news of the taking of Capri was conveyed to His Imperial Majesty through the medium of the Neapolitan Minister for Foreign Affairs. "This sort of proceeding is ridiculous," said Napoleon. "Capri having fallen to my troops, the intelligence of its capture should have been brought to me by my own Minister for War, to whom you should have furnished the details."² Yet again, the Emperor was created a Knight of the Order of the Two Sicilies, "at the same time as Eugène, the Prince Borghese, Berthier, Lannes, Cambacérès and Foucher" (*sic*). He refused the distinction on the ground that it had not been offered to him before the others.³ The order was also conferred on certain French officers, whereupon he was informed that the Emperor did not approve of distinctions being bestowed upon soldiers of his without his permission. Murat was obliged to express regret.⁴

But there were graver indiscretions than these on the King's part, and they provoked correspondingly sterner remonstrances from the Emperor. Murat had undertaken to make the Napoleonic Code operative in his kingdom. Nevertheless he betrayed an inclination to procrastinate, alleging unpreparedness on the part of his judges, laying stress on the time that would be required for the work of translation, a work which he purposely caused to be delayed. At last he sent the Emperor a version embodying modifications by Ricciardi. Napoleon searched its pages in vain for the Law on Divorce, and forthwith despatched from Aranda the following comminatory epistle: "The most important section of the whole Code is that which relates to divorce. It is, in fact, the very

¹ *Correspondence*, No. 14,485.

² *Correspondence*, No. 14,436.

³ Monteleone to Gallo, January 31, 1809. Naples. *Archivio di Stato*.

⁴ Murat to Napoleon, January 1, 1809. *Archives Nationales*.

basis of it. You must not tamper with it in the slightest ; it is the law of the country. I would sooner Naples were in the hands of the ex-King of Sicily than permit the Napoleonic Code to be mutilated in such a fashion.”¹ It was in vain that the Neapolitan magistrates drew the King’s attention to the difficulties that would attend the enforcement of the Code. A few preferred to resign their posts rather than attempt to administer the new law. But Murat recognised that the time had come to bow to the Emperor’s will, and on the 27th October he reluctantly brought himself to write in the following terms : “ Your Majesty will find enclosed a copy of an Order in Council decreeing that the clauses of the Napoleonic Code relating to Divorce shall be fully enforced from the date on which the Code is promulgated, that is to say, the 1st January next. Your Majesty’s Code will therefore undergo no modification of any sort in my realm.”² On the other hand, he introduced measures which displayed an extraordinary degree of shortsightedness. On the 21st October, immediately after the Capri success, thinking to gain a reputation for magnanimity, he issued an order authorising the return of the exiles and removing the sequestration on the property of the Sicilian *Emigrés*.³ Instantly there came a sharp reprimand. “ I have seen orders issued by you which are completely devoid of common sense. You are simply inviting reaction. Why recall these exiles ? Why restore their property to men who are actually in arms against you ? You must take immediate steps to rescind the measure.”⁴ Six days later Napoleon gave detailed instructions regarding the property to be sequestered. The list of owners included the Duc del Infantado. “ I am told,” he said, “ that

¹ *Correspondence*, No. 14,519.

² Murat to Napoleon. *Archives Nationales*.

³ *Moniteur Universel*.

⁴ Lecestre. Unpublished Correspondence, November 12, 1808.

half the kingdom belongs to these Spanish grandees ;" ¹ and he made, through his Ambassador, a request for an inventory of all such property. ²

There was, however, one cause which served beyond all others to kindle the Emperor's wrath. This was that Murat, himself a monument of administrative incompetence, never missed an opportunity of imputing fault to Joseph. Because he had found no funds in the Exchequer he imagined that he could din into Napoleon's ears a 'querulous and incessant indictment of his predecessor's management of affairs. As early as the 10th September he was becoming "increasingly cognisant of the unsatisfactory state of the country's finances," while on the 28th, fired with indignation at the criticisms on his conduct of affairs in Spain, which had reached him from Paris through the medium of Caroline, he fired off two letters to the Emperor without waiting a single day. These productions constituted a thoroughgoing impeachment of Joseph's administration. "About five millions of other monies have been paid to the various Ministers ; there are still fourteen millions of arrears, fifty millions of debt, six millions in notes of hand, fourteen of consolidated debt at five per cent., and three million florins to be paid to Holland. Such is the deplorable condition of our finances. It will be difficult for your Majesty to believe that, despite the counsellors of ability who surrounded him, King Joseph should yet have failed to establish his government on a working basis." ³

To these complaints the Emperor returned no answer. He was no stranger to the deplorable condition of the Neapolitan finances. He was aware of it before Murat,

¹ Lecestre. November 18, 1808.

² *Correspondance du Ministre des Affaires Étrangères. Archives Nationales.*

³ Murat to Napoleon. *Archives Nationales.*

and, though he may not have been acquainted with the exact figures, he was sufficiently familiar with the general situation to know in what brazier the gold had been melted. But Murat was King of Naples now, and it was his business to set his house in order. Joachim's next move was to put forward his financial embarrassments as an excuse for reducing the rate of interest on the public debt from five to three per cent. With unexampled ingenuousness he confided his intentions to his brother-in-law. To perpetrate follies at Naples, to accuse his predecessor Joseph of every possible administrative ineptitude, was not enough for Murat. He must needs propose with colossal effrontery that the Emperor should countenance the violation of the very Constitution which a few months earlier, at Bayonne, he had solemnly pledged his word to uphold. This brought matters to a climax. For the first time since his accession Murat hears the note of menace. "I have your letter," says the Emperor, "as well as those of your Minister. I have guaranteed the public debt as inscribed in the memorial of the Constitution, and I intend that it shall not be tampered with in any shape or form. I insist on your proclamation being revoked as contrary to the stipulations which I have sworn to maintain. I must also make known to you that I am extremely annoyed at the statements which are perpetually appearing in your decrees reflecting on the King, your predecessor. He had all the difficulties to contend with; you are reaping the fruits of his labours, and you ought to be eternally grateful to him. I am vexed to see that you recognise so imperfectly the extent of your obligation to me, and the grave impropriety of your conduct. As for the individuals at the Court of Sicily who are acting in hostility to me, you must confiscate their property, or I shall seize it myself as an indemnity for all that I have disbursed on the Kingdom of Naples. That Kingdom already costs

me several millions. It would have been better to employ the proceeds arising from the sale of these properties for the purposes of paying off the public debt rather than reduce the rate of interest. It is not with stupid and ridiculous phrases that one changes the face of Empires." ¹

In order that the whole matter might be categorically laid down, he commanded the French Minister to present official notes on all the points in dispute: on the public debt; on the removal of the sequestration on the property of the Sicilian *Emigrés*, which was to be reimposed on the 20th January following, at the latest; on the funds expended on roads and education; on the Napoleonic Code, which was to be introduced in its entirety, including the enactments relating to divorce.² There were thus altogether four notes.

Murat first of all received the Emperor's letter of the 15th December. In the circumstances he had no choice but once again to bow to the storm, to accept the harsh lesson. Chafing at the restraint, he replied on the 2nd January in the following terms: "Sire, I am in receipt of your Majesty's letter of the 15th. Your heart never dictated expressions which, since you refer to me as the most ungrateful of men, have also rendered me the most unhappy." At the same time he strongly denied that he owed anything to Joseph—gratitude least of all. To bow to the will of the Emperor was one thing; to cringe to Joseph quite another. "Sire," he went on, "I shall never be ungrateful either to your Majesty, to whom I owe all, or to King Joseph, to whom I owe nothing."³ On the 7th January he received the notes from the French Embassy and delivered himself of the opinion that Napoleon was under no necessity to convey his instructions through his Ambassador or to make them the subject

¹ *Correspondence*, No. 14,570.

² *Correspondence*, No. 14,559.

³ Murat to Napoleon, January 2, 1809. *Archives Nationales*.

of an official note.¹ But the lesson went home. Little by little matters resumed their ordinary course. On the 15th January 1809 he sent the Emperor a copy of his decree regarding the property of the *Emigrés*, and endeavoured to win his way back to favour. Henceforth he acted with greater prudence, and endeavoured, though not with conspicuous success, to avoid the necessity of rescinding his own enactments. But at the moment circumstances were in his favour. The Emperor had need of his services, and by playing the attentive and obsequious subordinate, Murat succeeded in obliterating the effect of his rebelliousness and once more regained the Emperor's goodwill.

Agar affirms that it was the discovery of a plot, in which Talleyrand, Fouché, and Murat were jointly involved, that, in the first instance, brought about the estrangement between Napoleon and his brother-in-law.² It appears that the conspiracy was directed towards putting an end to the empire in the event of Napoleon losing his life in Spain. We are told that the Emperor, on learning of the matter from Eugène, suddenly put a stop to operations in Spain, and hastened with all speed to Paris. The plot, although it may not have assumed the form indicated by Pasquier,³ undoubtedly did exist, since, in the course of the year 1811, the police discovered among the papers of Aymé, Murat's chamberlain and confidential agent in Paris, nineteen letters referring to the matter in the King's own handwriting. Napoleon too made an unmistakable allusion to it at Saint Helena. "He (Murat) had plotted with Fouché, prior to my second marriage."⁴

It does not appear that the strained relations between

¹ Murat to Napoleon, January 7, 1809. *Archives Nationales*.

² Comte Murat, *Murat, Lieutenant de l'Empereur en Espagne*.

³ Chancelier Pasquier, *Memoirs*.

⁴ Gourgaud, *Journal inédit de Sainte Hélène*.

Murat and the Emperor originated with the discovery of this intrigue. In the first place it did not come to light until after the difficulties between them had already arisen, since, at the earliest, the Emperor could not have been cognisant of it until the beginning of January 1809.¹ Yet as far back as the 15th December 1808, we find him sending strongly-worded complaints to Murat, and even these were the outcome of a long series of previous disagreements. How, moreover, did it concern the Emperor what took place after his death? What did it matter whether Talleyrand or another succeeded to his inheritance? He had no heir, he could not found a line, and since he had bestowed on every member of his family a royal or princely position, why should he trouble himself with considerations concerning a future of whose uncertainty he was well aware? Wherefore should he grow anxious concerning plans whose success or failure depended on the chance issue of the battlefield?

The key to the whole position is to be found in the circumstances in which Murat came to be placed upon the throne of Naples. Napoleon installed him with reluctance, and it was with reluctance that Joachim accepted his crown. Both men were dissatisfied—the one because he had bestowed so much; the other because he had received so little. Murat's hopes had soared to great heights. They had materialised in a petty kingdom. He was discontented, and made no effort to dissemble his feelings. He displayed his administrative incompetence, and though Napoleon knew of his shortcomings beforehand he became worried and impatient when every day brought him a fresh reminder of them. His own mind was capable of carrying out the vastest designs with the minutest attention to detail. No wonder that he grew exasperated

¹ See Napoleon's letter to Caulaincourt (Lecestre, No. 397), in which the Emperor writes: "When you are reading this I shall be in Paris." This was the first intimation of his departure.

at seeing a country of a few million inhabitants so grossly misgoverned. Why then, he asked himself, should he pander to a man who after all was not of his blood? Why not bring him back at once into the narrow way? The King was not at Naples to contravene his orders, and if he continued his present unsatisfactory line of conduct, then the Imperial system demanded that he should be rudely called to order.

Caroline thoroughly shared her husband's disappointment with regard to the rôle that had been allotted them; but being at once more astute and less vain than Murat, she not only dissembled her mortification but even made a considerable parade of gratitude. Reaching Naples on the 25th September, some days later than Murat, she was greeted with equal manifestations of enthusiasm. But no sooner had she arrived in the capital than she put aside all display. Determining that though Joachim wore the crown she would wield the sceptre, she willingly resigned to her husband the picturesque concomitants of sovereignty. While, white-plumed and white-sashed, Murat was dazzling the populace with his gorgeous uniforms, or indulging in the pleasures of the chase resplendent in his sixteenth-century hunting costume, his white-plumed bonnet *à la* Henri IV. and his yellow boots,¹ Caroline was industriously attending to the routine of government and giving audiences to Ministers of State. From the day she arrived in Naples she made up her mind to make her influence felt in the councils of the nation, and this influence she hoped would swiftly become predominant. Before long it grew evident that she possessed the secret of making herself the centre of a party and of strengthening the bonds between herself and her adherents. First and foremost among those whom she gathered to her support was her compatriot Saliceti, their common ambition furnishing, it may be, the grounds of a mutual

¹ *Archives des Affaires Étrangères.*



Lafond, jr., del. *Choubard, sculpt.*
JOACHIM MURAT AND HIS WIFE CAROLINE BONAPARTE,
KING AND QUEEN OF NAPLES

attraction. Whatever the reason that dictated it, her choice could not have been more fortunately exercised. Saliceti, the Minister of Police, owed his power and prestige not to the favour of the Emperor, but to the immense popularity attaching to his name in Italy.¹ Whether the duties which he now assumed appealed to his ambition or his dilettantism is impossible to determine, but, whatever his motives, Saliceti accepted the thankless office with alacrity and became the confidential agent of the Queen. So rapidly did his credit at the Court increase that, on the 30th November 1808, the French Ambassador was writing in the following strain: "Monsieur Saliceti is apparently obtaining great influence; there seems indeed no one in the King's party of sufficient weight to counterbalance him."² Thus jealousy soon took root. Murat knew—all too well—that Caroline's position was clearly determined by the Treaty of Bayonne. He felt that though his kingdom had been tossed to him as alms to a mendicant, he had suffered enough indignity, and that now, at any rate, he ought to be master. He therefore began to regard his wife with increasing suspicion. His outbursts of temper were numerous and violent, and before them, little by little, Caroline had to give way. Matters had gone so far that precisely two months, to the very day, after her arrival at Naples the French Ambassador was sending Napoleon a report on these early trials which his sister had to undergo. "The Queen," he wrote, "receives very few people. In the morning she is very busy in her own apartments. As a general rule her whole conduct, even in her relations with the King, is marked by a reserve that is both rare and remarkable in so young a princess. It might be thought that the excellent titles she possesses to take part in the affairs of government as heiress presumptive to the

¹ *Mémoires d'une inconnue.*

² *Archives des Affaires Étrangères.*

throne had given rise to a shadow of suspicion in the mind of a prince jealous for his authority ; but, as a matter of fact, she meddles so little in affairs of State, she acts with such studied caution and reserve, that those who may have been desirous of making capital for themselves out of every transient misunderstanding which their eaves-dropping brought to their notice, appear thoroughly baffled and disconcerted by the prudent reserve which she displays." ¹ Caroline's real plight, her trials and her vexations, may easily be discerned through the thin veil of courtly dissimulation. To be thrust aside, to have her sphere of activity limited to the discharge of domestic duties, scarcely coincided with the aspirations that had animated her in Paris. That her exceptional intellectual capabilities should be disregarded, that she should be suffered to take no part in shaping the destinies of the nation, that, despite the paltry bickerings which daily marked her intercourse with her husband, she should be compelled to display a dignified and unruffled countenance to the world, all this acted like gall upon her sensitive and imperious nature.

Thus at the outset we find Joachim on terms of hostility, first with the Emperor on questions of policy and administration ; secondly, with Caroline, with whom his quarrel derived an added bitterness from the twofold circumstance that it was unceasing and unavowed. Doubtless Murat was the creature rather than the creator of the circumstances. With a recklessness that was a part of his nature he went out of his way to make a parade of the weaknesses of his character. So prodigious was his vanity that he would not admit that any man was his superior in ability. Just so long as Napoleon's star was in the ascendant, just so long as Napoleon remained the dispenser of dignities and kingdoms, Murat yielded him a servile allegiance ; but no sooner did evil days dawn

¹ *Archives des Affaires Étrangères.*

for the Empire than he hastened to play the Judas, and denounced as a criminal the very man whom he had once almost worshipped as a god. But, as the Emperor used to say, he was, when all was said and done, a *bête*, and in his foolishness we shall find him employing shifts that deceive none but himself. We shall see how he was duped by all : in his domestic relations by Caroline ; in his public life by his favourites La Vauguyon and Aymé, by his Ministers Zurlo and Maghella, and by his *soi-disant* partisans, until to his crowning shame he finally fell a victim to the machinations of the Austrians and the English.

CHAPTER II

EARLY DIFFICULTIES

The fall of Saliceti—Murat's Ministers—Ambassadorial Questions—Rome and Murat—The Emperor's silence—His orders of the 16th March 1809—Why the Emperor chose Murat—The Roman Question—Saliceti's preparations—The King sets out for Rome—Asks permission to go to Austria—The Emperor's refusal—Murat's mortification—The English Expedition—Murat's departure for Rome—His hurried return to Naples—The King and Queen set out for Paris—Difficulties with the Empire before and after the Roman expedition—Dissensions with the Queen.

WHEN he arrived at Naples, Murat found but few on whom he could rely for initiation into the duties of kingship. All the French Ministers had taken their leave, either because they had elected to follow the fortunes of Joseph in Spain or because they had received the Emperor's command to return to France. With a single exception, therefore, Murat found no coadjutor of the front rank to pilot him through his difficulties. That exception was Saliceti. Now Saliceti was far from being destitute of talents, and he owed it to his abilities quite as much as to accident that he was able to obtain the simultaneous control of two of the most important offices in the government—the Ministry of War and the Ministry of Police.

But the Emperor was vigilantly watching the course of events. He noted the growing influence of the Minister and judged it proper to intervene. Whether he honestly believed the allegations to which he gave expression in his dispatch to Champagne, and sincerely credited Saliceti

with being the principal organiser of a system of contraband, or whether the charge was merely a pretext to justify the removal of a Minister whose increasing importance he regarded as possibly fraught with future danger to himself, is perhaps open to doubt. This much, however, is beyond question. He knew his Murat, and recognising how vain and, withal, how weak he was, he judged it expedient to keep him under his own control. Therefore it was that he took matters into his own hands and demanded the dismissal of the Minister for War.

On the 20th January, Joachim advised the Emperor of Saliceti's resignation, and Saliceti himself wrote to him as follows: "A letter from the Duke of Padua informs me that it is the desire of Your Royal and Imperial Majesty that I should resign my position as Minister for War. I have the honour to inform Your Majesty that your orders have been obeyed. I have this day tendered to the King of the Two Sicilies not only my resignation as Minister for War but also as Minister of Police." ¹

But when rumours associating him with traffic in contraband became rife, Saliceti, alleging private business, hurried away to Paris to meet the charge. ²

All this was little calculated to smooth Murat's path. From the very commencement of his reign his efforts to gather advisers around him had been unsuccessful. Of Neapolitans there was no lack; but Frenchmen there were none. Not knowing whither to turn, he was continually imploring the Emperor's assistance to resolve his difficulties. On the 18th December he explained that the offices of Finance and the Interior were both vacant. ³ Accordingly, for the former he proposed Agar, who had been his chief adviser in the Grand Duchy of Berg. He made the suggestion with diffidence, but with the hope that

¹ Saliceti to the Emperor, January 20, 1809. *Archives Nationales.*

² *Diario di Nicola.*

³ Murat to Napoleon, December 18, 1808. *Archives Nationales.*

the Emperor would have at length forgotten his distrust of the man. For the Interior he put forward Zurlo, Ferdinand's ex-Minister, and the very personification of intrigue. On the 20th January he bade farewell to Saliceti, and "could think of no one to take his place."¹ Napoleon remained dumb. No reply having reached him by the 2nd February, the King proposed that General Belliard should become War Minister. If the Emperor disapproved, Murat would have no alternative but to appoint a man who had given rise to a good deal of dissatisfaction, to wit, General Reynier.² We may gauge to what extremities Murat was reduced from the fact that Saint Martin Delamotte, the Senator, who arrived in Naples and was presented to the King on the 6th January, was forthwith included in the catalogue of possible Ministers. He was indeed proposed for the Interior in the list which Murat sent to the Emperor, together with his report on the Army, on the 4th February.³

By the 25th February his perplexities seem at length to have been removed. Reynier was Minister for War, Zurlo held the portfolio of Justice and Public Worship, Agar that of Finance, while Pignatelli was Secretary of State. If Saint Martin was denied the Interior, the post would be filled by Carignano.⁴

On the other hand, the discovery of comfortable and lucrative sinecures for Caroline's friends and his own demanded less consideration. In a letter from the French Ambassador we are told that "La Vauguyon, the King's aide-de-camp, who arrived here two months ago with the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel, was shortly afterwards made a Colonel, and has now just been gazetted a General of Brigade."⁵ There was even some talk of

¹ Murat to Napoleon, January 20, 1809. *Archives Nationales*.

² *Archives Nationales*.

³ *Idem*.

⁴ Murat to Napoleon, February 25, 1809. *Archives Nationales*.

⁵ Letters from the French Ambassador, March 3, 1809. *Affaires Étrangères*.

appointing him and General Compère to Captaincies of the Guard, with a view to their acting as adjutants to the Colonel-in-Chief. Three months later it was currently reported that they had been promoted Generals of Division. Happily the rumour was devoid of foundation.

On the 23rd April the Sieur Longchamps was created Superintendent of Theatres; a month later Arcambal, a Councillor of State, was made Intendant of the Royal Household, and, on the 16th August, Daure, who had filled the post of War Commissioner at San Domingo, became a Councillor of State, Director of Reviews and of Military Conscription, finally to receive, on the 10th September, after a brief trial of Reynier as War Minister, the portfolio of War and the Marine.¹

If in the task of government organisation Murat's progress was slow and unsatisfactory, it was far otherwise with the establishment of diplomatic relations with the other powers. Murat was vastly concerned with his prestige, and it flattered his vanity to have official connections with foreign countries. Scarcely had he mounted the throne when, on the 11th September 1808, he caused his Ambassador Monteleone to be presented, with his new credentials, to the Emperor, while Monteleone himself introduced the Duke di Mondragone, the future Neapolitan Ambassador to Russia.²

This ceremony accomplished, Joachim, assuming all the punctilio of a monarch of ancient lineage, professed himself astonished that the Emperor should have permitted his Ambassador to remain so long without his formal credentials, and requested that they might be forwarded without delay.³ Napoleon, responding in true princely fashion, immediately complied.

The next event was the appearance at the Court of Naples of the Envoy Extraordinary of the Principality

¹ *Moniteur Universel*.

² *Idem*.

³ Murat to Napoleon, September 20, 1808. *Archives Nationales*.

of Lucca. The Russian Ambassador, Count de Bibicoff, had been expected since October. In December Marescalchi announced that the Chevalier Tassoni had been appointed Italian Chargé d'Affaires at Naples.¹ The Russian arrived on the 29th January 1809 and Tassoni a few days later.

And so the Court filled up, nor was it Murat's fault that the process did not go farther. He sent a representative to Austria, but Austria did not return the compliment. For incurring this rebuff he received a reprimand from the Emperor. Further, he requested permission to renew relations with Denmark, a permission which Napoleon readily granted, though not without remarking on the expense that would be entailed.

Thus Murat gradually assumed his place in the world of reigning monarchs. He was at once so unsophisticated and so vain that he was never for an instant visited by any suspicions of the incongruity of his position, and it was with perfect self-assurance that he referred to the other European sovereigns as his brothers, and continued to behave towards them with a familiarity which, in some quarters, had once savoured of bad taste.

With one personage only were his relations marked by frigidity, and that was with his neighbour the Pope. In obedience to the Emperor's commands he refrained from visiting the Sovereign Pontiff when passing through Rome on his way to Naples. Since then the difficulties of the situation had become aggravated. He had also to refuse the Pope's annual present of a taper. At present he could not tell what turn events were about to take in that quarter; for Napoleon who, irritated with his brother-in-law, had left his letters unanswered, at length sent him not a reply but a command. On the 8th March he ordered him to get ready a division to

¹ Marescalchi to Monteleone, December 8, 1808. Naples. *Archivio di Stato*.

proceed to Rome with the object of relieving Miollis. On the 16th these orders were confirmed through Clarke, who was instructed to give particulars of the troops required.¹ At length, on the 5th April, he took Murat into his confidence and revealed to him the part he was to play. "I have given orders," he said, "that stern measures are to be put in force at Rome, and that that hot-bed of insurrection is to be destroyed. Moreover, it has been discovered that messages have been passing to and fro between the agents of the Court of Rome and the English, which prove that the Pope has been exerting his influence to produce unrest in Italy. On receipt of this letter send forward some troops to the frontier, in order that, when the moment arrives, they may be thrown with lightning rapidity upon Rome. I am giving similar orders in Tuscany. I intend Saliceti to remain in Rome to act as adviser to Miollis, who will form a fresh Government. You may state it as a fact that the Pope will remain a Bishop and meddle no more in temporal affairs."² Thus then we have Murat openly at war with the Pope, and general-in-chief of the Imperial troops whose objective is Rome. What, it may be asked, were the considerations that weighed with Napoleon in selecting Joachim for the command? Did he assume that because the Pope had refused to recognise him as king, Murat was entertaining hostile intentions against His Holiness? Did he thus think to compromise him in the eyes of the Pope? What end would it have served? Did he calculate that the prospect of temporal aggrandisement would blind him to the somewhat inglorious character of his mission? Or was it in order to remove all subsequent difficulty from Eugène's path? None of these hypotheses is tenable. The Emperor wrote to Murat in the following formal terms: "I have given orders that the troops of my Papal States should be

¹ *Correspondence*, 14,911.

² *Idem*, 15,018.

incorporated with my Neapolitan Army. You will command the combined forces, as the army of Italy has work to do elsewhere.”¹ Napoleon’s intentions thus become clearly manifest. Murat was appointed to the supreme command in Rome because the army of Italy and its chief were already hard pressed by the Austrians. Seeing, therefore, that he could dispose of the services of a man so eminently adapted to the task, the Emperor would clearly have been guilty of an error had he tied Eugène’s hands and compelled him to relinquish the operations upon which he was engaged. Though we may allow that he was not altogether uninfluenced by the consideration that the treatment Murat had received at the hands of the Sovereign Pontiff would considerably add to his zeal in humbling the Papal pretensions, Napoleon did not greatly concern himself with his brother-in-law’s ideas about the matter. Murat had to obey, that was the whole of the business ; and Murat obeyed.


Preparations for the Roman expedition were actively begun. On the 15th April Saliceti returned from Paris.² Two days later he set out with Maghella, the Prefect of the Naples police, to organize a government at Rome, the Pope having been deprived of all voice in public affairs.³ Azzia was also of the party. Evidently the hour was not propitious, for on the 28th Saliceti returned to Naples, having effected nothing. No one had displayed any desire to assist him. At this point commands stop short, and for three weeks the Emperor gives no sign. The menacing outlook in Austria and Eugène’s retirement upon the Piave were engrossing his whole attention. For a moment he seemed almost inclined to give Murat the supreme command in Italy.⁴ No sooner, however, had

¹ *Correspondence*, 15,018.

² *Moniteur Universel*.

³ *Diario di Nicola*.

⁴ See *Correspondence*, 15,144 and 15,150. These letters conclusively prove that on the 30th April the Emperor was in favour of giving the command of



C. V. Camuccini, pinxt.

PIUS VII

G. Balestra, sculpt.

events taken a more favourable turn than the stream of letters began to flow once more. On the 12th May the Emperor wrote from Schoenbrunn to announce the fall of Vienna,¹ and again, on the 17th, he sent a letter to Joachim explaining his wishes regarding the special conference at Rome in which Miollis and Saliceti were to take part.² At length, on the 28th, after having instructed Eugène to inform the King of Naples of his junction with the Grand Army, Napoleon himself sent further orders to Murat regarding the occupation of the Roman States. To assist his own movements he added, "I think, in view of the general situation, it would be well for you to stay on in Rome, at least for a time, in order to be near Upper Italy."³

Murat, who received Eugène's dispatch on the 6th April, was already in possession of the Emperor's letter. There seems to have been nothing to hinder him from setting out for Rome at once in obedience to his instructions, and, as a matter of fact, the date of his departure was publicly announced as the 11th June,⁴ the following notice being inserted, at his own command, in the *Monitore*: "The King, after inspecting the light cavalry and a portion of the household troops, set out for Rome accompanied by the latter."⁵ The announcement was false; Joachim was still in Naples, and remained there. The official explanation of this hitch, this unexpected delay, in carrying out the Imperial commands was an offensive movement on the part of the English. This was merely a pretext to deceive the multitude. The real explanation was that Murat had decided to disobey.

Murat, who had only accepted Naples with reluctance, the army to Murat. That this, however, was merely a momentary idea is shown by the fact that he wrote next day to Eugène urging him to follow up the enemy.

¹ *Correspondence*, 15, 193.

² *Idem*, 15, 225.

³ *Idem*, 15, 271.

⁴ *Diario di Nicola*.

⁵ *Moniteur Universel*, June 22, 1809.

saw in the war with Austria a possibility of exchanging his kingdom for one of greater importance. With the inordinate self-complacency that was characteristic of him, he wrote to the Emperor on the 25th January saying : " It has been repeatedly rumoured for some time past that I am leaving Naples in order to become King of Poland or Emperor of Austria." ¹ In this case, no doubt, the wish was father to the thought, and, conceiving that the campaign might have a far-reaching effect upon his own destiny, he followed with feverish anxiety the minutest details in its progress. On the 28th April he learned, even before the Emperor himself, that Eugène's army was in retreat. He immediately applied to Napoleon for an active command. He wished, he averred, to supersede no one, but begged that his application might receive favourable consideration. On the 5th May we find him still anxious to curry favour, for on that date he proclaimed an embargo on all vessels anchored in Neapolitan waters, and summoned all Neapolitan subjects in Austria to return to their country. These measures were purely spontaneous, for Napoleon had never made any such request. In spite of his denials, the report spreads throughout the city that Prince Eugène's non-success will compel " our Murat " to take over the command of the Army of Italy.

The 8th June came, but still no summons ; so Murat seized the occasion of the Emperor's victories to send him, together with a letter congratulating him on his successes, a formal request for permission to join him. This time he varied the pretext. Lannes was no more, and he was anxious to fill the gap that Death had made.² His whole letter was a petition pitched in humble strain, for he recognised that if ever he was to get away from Naples it must be now. His eagerness led him to commit himself to somewhat imprudent statements. " The

¹ Murat to Napoleon. *Archives Nationales*.

² *Idem*.

country," he said, "is tranquil, and nothing is to be apprehended from the English." This was undoubtedly rash, for, on the 8th June, when he received the Emperor's letter requesting his presence in Rome, we find that, though he could leave Naples well enough when his destination was Vienna, his departure was quite out of the question when his destination was the Papal States.

This letter of official congratulation and semi-official petition was far too important a document to be entrusted to an ordinary courier or estafette. A deputation, consisting of the cream of the Neapolitan nobility, the Duc de Saint Theodore, the Duc de Campochiaro, the Marquis di Sara and the Prince di Calabrano—the latter bearing the precious missive—must needs be commissioned to convey it to Vienna. But they bore with them something besides the letter. Murat in his anxiety to create a favourable impression on the Emperor sent him a Persian casket adorned with a representation of the Triumph of Constantine, "a genuine and highly considered work of art which could belong to no one more appropriately than to Your Majesty."¹ By this means he hoped to secure a welcome for the Ambassadors and their petition. He must also have confided his hopes of success to his friends, for rumour was already busy, and on the 8th June Nicola was writing as follows: "To-night the deputation starts for Vienna. . . . King Joachim will go to rule another kingdom, and we shall have a new sovereign here."

The letter and the deputation reach Schoenbrunn on the 17th June, and once again the Emperor brings Murat's dream-castles toppling to the ground. "I have received," he writes, "Your Majesty's letter of the 8th June. . . . I should very much like to have you with me; but, in the circumstances, it is desirable that you should not absent yourself from Naples. On another campaign,

¹ Murat to Napoleon. *Archives Nationales*.

when matters are thoroughly quiet in your quarter, it will be possible for me to summon you to the Army." ¹ On the 17th there came a further letter from the Emperor bidding him "urge forward affairs in Rome." ²

Thus Murat was compelled to remain in Naples, and so farewell to all his hopes! Few men would have dared to nourish such aspirations, and yet, considering the amazing vicissitudes of fortune that marked the times, such presumption need scarcely excite our wonder. His mortification was extreme, and, though he dared not disclose his feelings to the Emperor, he readily took advantage of the diversion most opportunely afforded by an offensive movement on the part of the English to relinquish to others the task of effecting the Emperor's work at Rome.

While he was at Naples waiting for a reply to his letter of the 8th June and making ready to set out for Vienna, the English, to whom no one had been giving a thought, Murat least of all, suddenly showed themselves off the coast. On the morning of the 24th, Naples awoke to learn that Ischia and Procida had been attacked by an Anglo-Sicilian squadron. On the 26th, a proud day in the annals of the Neapolitan navy, an attempt was made to break through the English lines. The *Ceres*, a frigate commanded by Bausan, succeeded in running the blockade and reached Naples, battered but triumphant. Murat went on board immediately, removed the cross which he himself was wearing, and, with his own hands, pinned it on Bausan's breast.

The efforts of the English to foment insurrection at Cape Miseno were completely fruitless, and nothing came of the enemy's attempts, aided and abetted as they were by traitorous confederates, to bring about a rising on the occasion of the Feast of Saint Peter and Saint Paul.³ The people remained unmoved. After the seizure

¹ *Correspondence*, 15,372.

² *Diario di Nicola*.

³ *Idem*.

of Procida and Ischia, the English squadron was obliged to return to Sicily. Equally abortive was the attempt to land troops in Calabria. On the 5th July an official notice was placarded in the streets of Naples stating that on the arrival of the forces under General Partouneaux the English had retired to their ships, taking with them a hundred prisoners.¹ On the 28th all danger was past. The English even abandoned the two islands they had captured. Only a few hostile warships remained to keep a look-out in the bay, adding to the Emperor's birthday celebrations the unexpected attraction of a harmless naval engagement, while the King in the Riviera di Chiaia was reviewing his troops, then, for the first time, arrayed in their brilliant Hussar and Polish uniforms.²

The British cruisers having disappeared, Murat again turned his attention to Rome. In obedience to Napoleon's reiterated commands, he kept pouring French troops over the border, also sending, at his brother-in-law's express request, a few Neapolitan regiments, knowing full well that the coffers of the Papal States would provide the wherewithal to pay them.

Apparently the Emperor's commands were punctually carried out, since he wrote Murat from Schoenbrunn recording his satisfaction. On the 15th October he sent word that peace had been concluded with Austria, while Caroline received a personal letter in which he said, "I have made peace with Austria"³ and I am setting out to-night for Paris. If you were nearer and the season not so far advanced, I should persuade Murat to come there for a couple of months. But you could not arrive before December, and that is a dreadful month, particularly for a Neapolitan. The visit to Fontainebleau must therefore be put off for another year. Be assured of my constant desire to afford you proofs of my affection."⁴

¹ *Diario di Nicola.*

² *Moniteur Universel.*

³ *Correspondence, 15,953.*

⁴ *Idem, 15,952.*

These amiable letters reached Naples during the second fortnight in October. Either Murat misunderstood their import, or was still sore over the disappointment of his hopes regarding Austria, for he manifested little eagerness to respond to the Emperor's appeal. However, on the 8th November, Saliceti left Naples for Rome, preceding the King, who left at five o'clock on the following evening accompanied by Pignatelli.¹ Reaching Rome at seven o'clock on the evening of the 10th, he proceeded to the Borghese Palace. On the 11th he saw the Authorities, held a review of the troops, and paid a visit to the fortress of St. Angelo.² During his brief visit he was continually occupied with the necessity of appointing a governor, and he deemed that in Saliceti he possessed a man who was endowed with every qualification for the post. It may be that he was desirous of availing himself of the opportunity to reward his services, though it is more probable that he hoped to rule in Saliceti's name. The fact that he considered himself a fit and proper person to administer the affairs of any country renders such a theory at least possible. At length, on the 16th, he departed for Gaeta to essay a *coup de main* against the islands of Ponza.³ On the evening of the 19th, however, Naples was startled to learn that the King had unexpectedly returned to the capital, and the report ran through the city that he was about to start for Paris. This time it was not an empty rumour. On the morning of the next day but one everything was in readiness for the journey. All kinds of conjectures were rife to explain the motives for the visit. According to some people, Murat was going to reign elsewhere, while Naples was to become a French province under the governorship of Beauharnais. This was flatly denied by others, who affirmed that Murat had merely

¹ *Diario di Nicola.*

² Murat to Napoleon, November 11, 1809. *Archives Nationales.*

³ *Idem*, November 16, 1809. *Idem.*

been invited to the fête which Napoleon was to hold on the 2nd December at Fontainebleau¹ in honour of the King of Saxony. All that was known for certain about the matter was that the King, with the young Duc de Regina and another of his chamberlains, was passing the time very comfortably and unconcernedly, when suddenly a messenger arrived in hot haste bearing a small packet from Paris. Dismissing his chamberlains, the King broke the seal, read the letter, grew thoughtful, put his hand to his brow, strode up and down the room after the manner of one beset with grave perplexities, commanded his carriage to be got ready to take him to Naples, and then began forthwith to prepare for a journey to Paris.²

What was in the mysterious letter and who sent it? Was it a reply to questions relating to Napoleon's letter of the 15th October, which Caroline had asked for? Was it one of those semi-official notes that Fouché so often sent to his friend Murat when he considered the latter's interests demanded it? Or did it come from the Emperor himself? Whatever its nature the matter was pressing, since the very moment he reached Naples he gave orders for everything to be ready for his departure on the next day but one. Caroline herself proposed to set out as well, though the weather was terrible and the Volturna had inundated the country. At seven o'clock on the morning of the 21st November the King took his departure. He travelled *incognito* as the Count of Calabria and, as the official explanation of the journey, it was given out that the King and Queen were desirous of personally offering their congratulations to the Emperor upon the memorable triumphs that he had won in the course of his recent campaign.³ The same day the Queen gave

¹ *Diario di Nicola.*

² *Diario di Nicola.*

³ Gallo to Monteleone, November 21, 1809. Naples. *Archivio di Stato.*

audiences to the members of the Diplomatic Body and the chamberlains of the palace, and in the evening set out in her turn.

It must not be supposed that any real cordiality prevailed between the two brothers-in-law. It is true that Napoleon's need of Murat's services brought about a settlement of many minor differences that had come into existence shortly after the latter's accession ; nevertheless, the fundamental causes of estrangement still remained ; nay, they grew daily more formidable. On the one side there was Joachim ever burning to play the mighty monarch ; on the other, the Emperor just as constantly compelled to keep him in his place. Though as yet no divergencies on questions of foreign policy had arisen to widen the rift, abundant occasion for dispute was, in the meantime, afforded by the internal administration of the country. Murat had been a Marshal of the Empire. He was essentially a fighting-man whose thoughts and dreams were eternally centred upon soldiers. Alas ! in his kingdom soldiers were few ; wherefore he strove by successive and not unsuccessful encroachments to increase their number, a policy which constantly brought upon him expressions of disapproval from the Emperor. As early as the 16th December 1808, the latter had instructed the French Ambassador to prevent any Frenchman transferring his services to Naples without the Imperial sanction, and whenever such a thing did occur to interpose a formal protest.¹ The King of Naples was anxious to have four hundred Frenchmen to form a Royal Guard and desired to select them from the Imperial regiments. "Make him understand," was Napoleon's answer, "that such a thing is out of the question. Tell him that I returned a like refusal in the cases of the Kings of Spain and Holland, but that to him, as to them, I will allot four hundred worthy conscripts who will

¹ *Correspondence*, 14,572.

learn discipline in his service.”¹ On the 24th January 1809 there was renewed trouble. “Write,” said the Emperor to Champagny, “and tell my Ambassadors in Naples and Holland that they must devote all their attention to preventing any Frenchman quitting my army or taking service elsewhere except with my express permission. You will inform Monsieur di Gallo that I am particularly annoyed with the King for having enticed Frenchmen to attach themselves to his army without orders from me. They must return to their posts without delay.”² But openly to beg troops of Napoleon and then, when the request was refused, to resort to underhand means to win them over, did not suffice for Murat. On the 7th March he set up a system of conscription by which two men were selected for the colours out of every thousand inhabitants.³ The measure was sanctioned by Napoleon⁴ and applied by Murat with such vigour that at the end of a month the process of enrolment was all but complete.⁵

Thus far the means to which Murat had resorted to increase his army and to add to the magnificence of his regal state had been, if not strictly defensible, at all events disguised. But such methods did not operate with sufficient rapidity to satisfy the King’s impetuous nature. Had it been within his power he would have conjured armed legions from the bowels of the earth. As it was, his army, despite every device to augment it, failed to attain the limits of his desires. Why, then, he asked himself, should he not take advantage of the Emperor’s present generous mood (this was in May 1809) and go to work in the open. Hitherto he had tampered principally

¹ *Correspondence*, 14,674, Napoleon to Clarke, January 10, 1809.

² *Idem*, 14,733. Napoleon to Champagny.

³ *Moniteur Universel*.

⁴ *Correspondence*, 14,944. Napoleon to Murat, March 22, 1809.

⁵ *Moniteur Universel*.

with the common soldiers or with officers of inferior rank. Henceforth he determined to extend the process of corruption to their leaders. This new tactical departure was first applied in the case of a foreign regiment stationed in the heart of Calabria. Overtures were made to the colonel to which he apparently lent a friendly ear, since his regiment, which set out from Naples eight hundred and fifty strong, could, a month later, muster no more than one hundred and fifty men.¹

A proposal was next made to the colonel of the regiment of La Tour d'Auvergne to the effect that he should recruit as many men as possible and then share them with the King's Guard. But he did not prove amenable to persuasion. Indignant at the suggestion that had been made to him, furious at the desertion of his men, he dashed off a formal complaint to Clarke, which the latter transmitted with some very strong comments to the Emperor. "The practice," he observes, "is apparently carried on too openly for the Neapolitan government to be in ignorance of it."² So flagrantly did this illicit recruiting proceed that scenes of the most amazing description were enacted in the most public manner. During a review of the Neapolitan Guards, La Vauguyon, who had recently been appointed to a colonelcy in the regiment, had a very hot dispute with the lieutenant-colonel of the 10th French regiment of the line, because the latter, who had observed some of his own men among the Guards, called upon them by name and summoned them to quit the ranks. However, the affair subsided, since Murat immediately undertook to reinstate the men in their old regiment.

During the whole of this period the Emperor had addressed no reprimand to the King of Naples. The

¹ La Feuillade to Champagny, July 31, 1809. *Archives des Affaires Étrangères*.

² Clarke to the Emperor, October 26, 1809. *Idem*.

sole expostulation was contained in a memorandum sent by Champagny to the French Chargé d'Affaires on the 5th November, requesting him to lodge the necessary protests in connection with the irregularities in the Auvergne regiment of which its colonel had complained. The reason of this silence was that the Austrian campaign was engrossing his attention, and that, where the fate of an Empire was at stake, the loss of a few soldiers was a matter of minor import. But with the restoration of peace, the hour of reckoning was to come, and it was in Paris, not in Naples, that Joachim was to undergo the castigation his delinquencies deserved.

But there were other points at issue, and these related to finance. If Murat, dissembling his dissatisfaction, had unprotestingly acquiesced in the arrangement regarding the duchies, the disposal of which the Emperor reserved to himself, it was merely because the Imperial intentions were so clearly laid down in the Treaty of Bayonne that no evasion was possible. On the 23rd January, Napoleon sent word to Naples that he was about to give effect to the provisions of the treaty which related to the founding of the said duchies.¹ Nevertheless it was not until the 15th August that Napoleon, then at Schoenbrunn, issued a decree for the "foundation and endowment of four duchies in the kingdom of Naples to be designated the duchies of Reggio, Gaeta, Taranto, and Otranto, the occupants of which were to be respectively Oudinot, Gaudin, Macdonald, and Fouché.² But by an error he fixed the amount of the endowments at 80,000 francs for each duchy, and this proved a fruitful source of future dissension.³

Disputes crop up regarding the money owed by Naples to the Imperial Treasury. The repayment of the funds

¹ Champagny to Gallo. *Affaires Étrangères*.

² *Archives des Affaires Étrangères*.

³ The Treaty of Bayonne assigns to each duchy a revenue of 60,000 francs.

that had been advanced hangs fire; the debt grows larger every day. Instead of payment, Murat proffers his one and only argument, the argument which he employed on every possible occasion, and which was summed up in the words "No money!" He even went further, and, assuming the offensive, declared through his Finance Minister that it would be necessary to subject the claims of France to careful scrutiny, that the figures submitted were open to question, and that certain expenditure had been unfairly charged to Naples. He added that he himself had numerous claims for compensation to present. He broke off the discussion in right royal fashion by stating that he would take an opportunity of laying his claims before the Emperor. Of that discussion Paris was to be the scene.

The continual reproofs addressed by Napoleon to the King did not produce any rapprochement between Caroline and the latter. Individually they were pained at the Emperor's remonstrances, but their mutual attitude underwent no modification. So far was Caroline from seeking to offer comfort to her husband that she looked elsewhere for her allies. It was at this juncture that La Vauguyon and his friends appeared on the scene and that Saliceti quitted it. Whether he was supplanted by the newcomers, whether he had fallen into disfavour, or whether he found it impossible to get on with men with whom he had so little in common, who grated on him so that he is said to have exclaimed, "What could one make of her with such popinjays about her!"—all this is somewhat in doubt. Nevertheless whatever the answers to these questions may be, affairs at Rome provided Saliceti with a convenient excuse for withdrawal, and it is possible, though not certain, that his first departure for Rome synchronised with the termination of his relations with the Queen.

His departure and the cessation of his influence appear

to have had no effect in dispelling Murat's jealousy. Matters soon reached such a pitch that the Queen, who was practically a captive in her own palace, had recourse to the French Ambassador in order to put before her brother a picture of the circumstances in which she was placed, and what a picture it was! "Until latterly," writes the Ambassador, "I had, in common with the whole Court, the honour of seeing the Queen at fairly frequent intervals. Indeed, she held receptions almost every day. For the last month, however, Mondays excepted, we have had no opportunity of paying our respects to her for more than a moment. Such is the will of the King, who grows daily more anxious that she should live in still stricter retirement. It was her custom of a morning to receive a few people, particularly those of French nationality; but the King does not approve of these receptions, and the Queen has been expressly forbidden to continue them. Her Majesty is so little mistress of her own actions that she may not have a woman to take luncheon with her. She passes her days in solitude with her books, her music, and her needlework. The measures taken by Your Imperial Majesty on behalf of the Prince of Lucca still further increased the King's jealousy, which since then has reached the proportions of an obsession, the result being that the Queen's most innocent actions are interpreted by him as forming part of a plot to obtain the upper hand in the Government."¹

"Jealousy regarding his position," wrote the Ambassador again on the 30th June, "is the King's one defect, but in this respect he is impelled to the point of violence in his attitude towards the Queen. The latter is therefore probably awaiting an opportunity of seeing Your Imperial Majesty. . . ."²

¹ La Feuillade to Champagny, June 8, 1809. *Archives des Affaires Étrangères*.

² *Idem*, June 30, 1809. *Idem*.

Here were definite charges, and they demanded an explanation. Champagny, probably on the Emperor's instructions, inquired of the Ambassador by what means he had been able to possess himself of such information. "I was instructed by the Queen herself," replied the latter, "and my two dispatches of the 8th and the 30th June, Numbers 124 and 141 respectively, were not transcribed until they had been read through to the Queen from beginning to end. I had two audiences of the Queen before sending Number 124, and two more before sending Number 141."

Thus Caroline took up a definite stand. She appealed to her brother for protection against her husband, and she forwarded her appeal through the official channel. But the Emperor was too fully occupied to listen to her complaints. He appeared, on the contrary, to take Murat's part since the French Ambassador, with whom the King had been on bad terms since the discovery of his collusion with the Queen, quitted Naples on the 22nd August 1809, scarcely one month after the voicing of Caroline's grievances. The Queen was thus left without a defender.

But to send messengers hieing along the road betwixt Schoenbrunn and Naples with missives of reproach or conciliation would have been to supply food for gossip. The Emperor preferred to postpone the matter till he had the belligerents beneath his own roof, where his eye could discern how the matter lay, and where his word was law. Thus it was at Paris that he was to listen to the recital of their grievances and restore peace between them.

CHAPTER III

MURAT IN PARIS

The King's journey—Rumours at Naples—The Neapolitan finances—The marriage council—Murat's demands—Commercial Questions—Contreband trade—Murat goes home—His journey and arrival in Naples—Prepares to go to Calabria—Counter-instructions—The Emperor's letter—Murat's reply—He again sets out for Paris—His arrival—Visits Clarke—His anxiety to leave—The Sicilian Expedition assured—Murat's departure—Caroline remains in Paris.

IT was a long journey from Naples to Paris and, upon a road, already thickly covered with snow and ice, which lay across the precipitous barrier of the Alps, Murat was pressing forward at top speed, continually urging his postilions to further efforts. Eleven days after his departure from Naples crowds were lining the streets of Paris to witness his arrival. It was on the 1st December, at four o'clock in the afternoon, that he drew up at the Tuileries and proceeded to take up his quarters in the Pavillon de Flore.¹ It was the occasion of the Emperor's birthday celebrations. On the 3rd December he was present at the singing of the *Te Deum* in the cathedral, where he appeared in the full dress of a French Prince and a High Admiral of the Empire. On the following day he went to meet Caroline, who had been in such haste to arrive that she had outstripped all the members of her suite. Scarcely giving herself time to discard her travelling-dress, she appeared at five o'clock in the evening, a few hours after her arrival, at the fêtes given by the city of Paris in honour of the coronation.

¹ Monteleone to Gallo. Naples. *Archivio di Stato*.

She too had a good eye for dramatic effect, and knew how to time her appearance on the public stage. Overcoming her fatigue she was present the same evening at the brilliant ball held in the Emperor's honour, and on the 12th she and her husband both took part in the hunting party and ball which Berthier had organised for Napoleon's entertainment at his château of Grosbois.

The rumours of a coming change that had been current in Naples while the King and Queen were still in their capital gathered strength after their departure. The abruptness of their leave-taking seemed to lend the colour of truth to the various conjectures. The Neapolitan imagination swiftly rearranged the map of Europe. Berthier would be Viceroy of Spain, Bernadotte of Portugal, Joseph would reign in Italy, and Murat in Illyria.¹ The rumours had been sufficiently persistent to reach the ears of Joachim before his departure. When, therefore, he had seen the Emperor and regained assurance regarding the stability of his throne, he immediately sent the following dispatch to Pignatelli: "I arrived here on the 30th November in good health. Do not be alarmed by malicious reports. There will be no change of any kind in my kingdom."² Thus the apprehensions of the Neapolitans were allayed, and they were able to await with equanimity the arrival of the dispatch which, ten days later, Champagny forwarded to Grosbois by the Emperor's instructions. It denied the rumour that the King was to be transferred to another kingdom, and authorised the statement that no change threatened the throne of Naples.³

Murat's serenity was restored. But permission to remain at Naples by no means implied liberty to play fast and loose with the Imperial system, and Napoleon

¹ *Diario di Nicola.*

² Murat to Pignatelli. Naples. *Archivio di Stato.*

³ Champagny to Grosbois. *Affaires Étrangères.*

took advantage of the fact that his brother-in-law was within his grasp to lay down the law regarding the points in dispute and to compel him to acknowledge the justice of the Imperial claims.

In order to be certain of his facts, the Emperor had an interview at Fontainebleau with Roederer, Joseph's ex-Minister, and asked him for information on thirteen definite questions regarding the Neapolitan finances. In the course of a detailed report which Roederer handed in on the 4th December,¹ it was stated that when Joseph left Naples the total revenue amounted to 61 million francs, while the expenditure aggregated 15,393,912 francs, including a sum of over $2\frac{1}{2}$ millions for the maintenance of the French army. There was, therefore, no scarcity of funds in the national treasury. Roederer's report was followed two days later by a statement from Gaudin which contained the assertion that the sums due in respect of the duchies had not been paid into the coffers of the Legion of Honour in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty of Bayonne, adding, however, that the King would take the opportunity of discussing the whole matter with the Emperor.² But Murat betrayed little eagerness to broach such delicate topics. On the 16th December, Napoleon left Paris for Trianon, and still the King had not broken silence. Every day he had to go to Trianon; every day he carefully avoided any discussion of the matters in question. At length Napoleon perceived that Murat was determined to say nothing despite his boasted intention of personally discussing matters with the Emperor. He therefore took the initiative himself, and it was to Caroline, most invaluable of go-betweens, that he voiced his complaints regarding Murat's non-observance of the Treaty of Bayonne. Joachim was by no means at a loss for specious arguments.

¹ Roederer to the Emperor. *Archives Nationales*.

² The Minister of Finance to the Emperor.

He affirmed that he had loyally fulfilled his obligations ¹ and that if there remained a balance still unpaid the fault was not his but the war's, adding that peace would bring with it additional sources of income. Yet, on the 27th December, without any sense of the incongruity of such a request, he asked Napoleon's permission to add the Swiss regiment to the number of his own troops. This time Napoleon found it impossible to restrain his indignation, and without a moment's interval he dispatched a stern and uncompromising reply. "I am in receipt of Your Majesty's letter of the 27th," said the Emperor, "and I insist that your liabilities, whether to the Treasury, to the Legion of Honour, or to the Crown, be rigorously discharged. Germany having been pacified, Your Majesty must lessen your expenditure by diminishing the number of your recruits, for a country's strength depends rather on the quality and loyalty of its soldiers than on mere numbers." Apparently he was anxious to drive the lesson home, for three days later the Emperor wrote to Champagny urging him to do everything in his power to impress on the King of Naples that, unless the debts were paid, steps would be taken to recover the amounts due. "Tell him," he concluded, "that the country is nothing but an expense to me, and that I am incensed at not being paid what is owing to me." Accordingly, on the 3rd January, Champagny addressed two notes, one to Grosbois at Naples, the other to Monteleone in Paris, demanding that Joachim should discharge his debt to the Emperor. Murat, by no means anxious to comply, undertook that a special messenger should be sent to Naples with an account of the claims made by the Imperial Treasury against the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, with instructions to obtain detailed information regarding the matter.

Next day Napoleon, his patience completely exhausted

¹ Murat to Napoleon. *Affaires Étrangères*.

by this subterfuge, wrote to Champagny as follows : " Inform the Neapolitan Ambassador that the amount owing to the French Treasury has been established beyond question, and that there is no need to verify it, since it was money advanced in France. The other liabilities date from the time I handed over the country. Tell him further that steps must be taken for an immediate settlement, or that it will come to this, that I shall give orders to my generals to obtain satisfaction by active means. Tell him also that obligations entered into with me are sacredly binding, and that I have the power to exact their fulfilment even from the mightiest princes ; that the payment of these debts is a necessary preliminary to settling the finances of the Public Treasury, the Legion of Honour, and other establishments ; there must be no endeavour to gain time, the matter must be terminated at once." ¹

On the arrival of this letter, Murat's self-assurance completely forsook him, and he who had once bragged so loudly about discussing the matter with the Emperor face to face was now only too anxious to seek refuge from the storm he had raised, beneath the sheltering wing of his customary protectress Caroline. As the result of an interview which she had with her brother on the 13th January, she succeeded in obtaining for her husband permission to state his case and the promise that he should not be harshly dealt with. On the morrow, the Queen having impressed upon him the dangers of prevarication and the futility of open revolt, Murat sent Napoleon an effusion marked by that pointless prolixity under cover of which he always endeavoured to extricate himself from a difficult situation. " Sire," he said, " Your Majesty's threats have troubled me, not so much because of the pain their fulfilment would inevitably inflict upon me, but because of the evidence they afford of your dis-

¹ *Correspondence*, 16, 118.

pleasure.”¹ However, he proceeded, and with perfect justice, to point out that the arrears on the duchies should, in accordance with the Treaty of Bayonne, figure at sixty thousand and not eighty thousand francs; and further that the claim was in respect of six duchies, whereas two were to be reserved till the conquest of Sicily. He also advanced some justifiable criticisms on other points.

Napoleon, appeased by Caroline and tranquillised by the excuses and explanations offered by Joachim, forwarded to Champagny his brother-in-law's letter, accompanying it with the following instructions: “I am sending you on a letter from the King of Naples. He will have to arrange matters with you. It seems to be the fact that there are only four Neapolitan duchies, and that the other two are Sicilian. It also appears correct that the amount of the endowment is in each case sixty and not eighty thousand francs. You will look into the documents. . . . I am anxious for a formal arrangement in order to avoid friction with the King of Naples. You will proceed clause by clause and arrange such terms that, although I do not want the money to-morrow, my brothers and brothers-in-law shall understand that what they owe me they do owe me.”²

Once again Murat's hopes were shattered. He had been looking forward to discussing the Neapolitan debt with the Emperor, to putting forward pleas for compensation, and all his representations had not resulted in diminishing the sum by a single sou, the only reduction allowed being in rectification of an error made by Napoleon himself. Murat's attitude after this conference was one of mortified dejection, but Napoleon, thanks to Caroline's unflinching tact and serenity, showed no resentment.

¹ Murat to Napoleon. *Affaires Étrangères*.

² Lecestre. Unpublished letters.

This controversy took place early in January, and it may explain the ardour with which Murat supported the Russian alliance in the Council which was held on the 27th of that month, an ardour which was stimulated both by Caroline and Fouché. He could not, moreover, have failed to feel flattered at finding himself, as it were, the mouthpiece of a party and at being asked for advice by a man from whom he had hitherto received nothing but commands.

No sooner did he find himself restored to the Emperor's good graces than he began to renew his importunities. It happened that some English merchandise had recently been seized, and that, instead of being burnt, it had, by the Emperor's authority, been exposed for public sale in Naples. The proceeds of course went to the Neapolitan Treasury. This was naturally a considerable windfall for the national exchequer. No sooner, however, had the Emperor given permission for this slight relaxation of his regulations than Murat evinced a desire to give free entry to all merchandise destined for Italy and France. Did he imagine that the Emperor would be blind to the consequences that would inevitably ensue from such an act? If merchandise were allowed to circulate in France and Italy, would not the licences, which Murat requested should be as unrestrictive as possible, ensure considerable profits for the kingdom of Naples from the opportunities for illicit trading to which they would give rise? Murat continued to display a lordly disregard of trifles. Let Napoleon only grant him his licences and trading permits, let him but raise the continental blockade in his favour and that of his country, and he would then condescend to allow that the Emperor had some little regard for him. But from the very beginning Napoleon had seen the snare and had no intention of doing him so great a favour. He was, however, so far willing to humour him that on the 8th February he consented to sign a permit allowing

goods confiscated prior to that date to be introduced, under certain restrictions, into France.¹ Almost immediately smuggling began to be practised on such an extensive scale that, first on the 28th February and again on the 16th March, the Emperor was obliged to impress upon Champagny the necessity for "a strict enforcement of the regulations."

From this first visit to the Emperor Murat had failed to gather the expected fruits. So far as military and financial matters were concerned he had been compelled to retreat all along the line. Only in one respect was the situation satisfactory: the Emperor appeared at last disposed to undertake the expedition against Sicily, since, with that object in view, he was about to give his Minister for War certain preliminary instructions regarding the French troops in Naples. This afforded him the means of soothing his wounded *amour-propre* with the thoughts of the glorious and profitable rôle he would play in the forthcoming invasion. True, nothing had as yet been definitely decided. The possibilities of the enterprise had yet to be investigated. But this was a task in which Joachim was in his element. His military instincts and his personal ambition combined to call forth his best efforts to achieve success. The mobilisation of his forces was carried out with efficiency and dispatch. All that was necessary to ensure a triumphant issue for the enterprise was that Murat should remember that he was a soldier and forget that he was a King. Then again it is probable that Caroline, between her husband and whom the Emperor had brought about a reconciliation during their Paris visit, had by this time gained some portion of that ascendancy which her own exceptional endowments, reinforced as they were by the iron will of her brother, were inevitably destined to win for her over a mind such as Murat's. In Paris, it may be, Caroline made a more

¹ *Archives des Affaires Étrangères.*

careful study of the vagaries and weaknesses of her husband's character, and that, realising with greater precision than hitherto how morbid was his vanity and how profound his ineptitude, she recognised the line of policy it would be necessary to follow if she and Murat were to remain in undisturbed possession of their kingdom. While Joachim was busily engaged in fitting out his expedition, while he went off to the wars on his own or other folk's behoof, she, remaining at her all-powerful brother's side, succeeded, by the skill with which she plied the arts of diplomacy and adulation, in securing the honours and the guarantees for which she craved. Hers it was to act as mediator, to stand between her husband, of whose capacity for imprudent action she was uneasily conscious, and her brother whom she credited with little inclination to deal indulgently with her "pauvre Murat." Her plan of campaign consisted of the conspicuously feminine devices of artifice and ambuscade, and the result of her manœuvring was to prove advantageous to all concerned. Her husband was able to leave Paris with a mind at rest, for his representative possessed more skill than he could boast of.

Joachim quitted Paris on the 1st February at three in the morning and arrived at Turin on the 5th. There he wrote to the Emperor and proceeded in due course to Rome, where he reviewed the troops, dined with Miollis, and visited the theatre. Thence he went on to Cardito, where he had arranged for a great hunting expedition to take place on the 13th. His object was to time his return to Naples for the 14th February, the anniversary of the day on which the French troops had entered the city with Joseph at their head, in the year 1806. His home-coming was marked by imposing state. Preceded by his principal officers, and surrounded by troops, he was greeted by the lazzaroni with cheers that the police had paid for in advance. For more than two days Naples was *en fête*.

There was a gala performance at the San Carlo to which invitations were issued by the Marshals of the Palace. The streets were illuminated and the fountains ran wine. The King was home again ! And from the, perhaps not wholly disinterested, manifestations of delight which greeted his return, it might have been imagined that his people had come within an ace of losing him. From the moment of his arrival those whose position enabled them readily to acquire information, became aware that his mission had proved a fiasco. People had been hoping that His Majesty had obtained some modifications or concessions regarding the arrears of pay due to the French troops. The dismal truth was that not only had his representations proved of no avail but that they had even aggravated the burden under which the country was already labouring.¹ There was consequently little enough cause for congratulation, slender enough excuse for a triumph, and the accounts which the sensitive and vain-glorious Murat gave to his intimates of the Emperor's high-handed procedure must have been plentifully seasoned with bitterness.

His home-coming was opportune. There was some talk of the disembarkation of four or five thousand men in the Calabrias. He considered it expedient to proceed to the spot under the pretext of taking action against the brigands. The 22nd February finds him at Capua where "he has to review the Neapolitan Artillery."² He was soon back again in Naples. On the 24th the news of the projected marriage of Napoleon and Marie Louise filled the Neapolitans with amazement. Napoleon the nephew of Marie Caroline ! What then will become of Joachim ?

Anxious as ever to hurry on the preparations for his expedition, Murat made ready to set out for Calabria.

¹ Bibicoff to Count Romanzoff. *Archives Nationales*.

² *Moniteur Universel*. The *Diario di Nicola*, notwithstanding its careful record of all the King's doings, makes no mention of this journey to Capua.

The news of his intended departure got abroad in the city, but whether the object of his journey was to make a tour of his dominions, to chastise the brigands or to prepare for the conquest of Sicily, was an open question. On the 2nd March he had made up his mind to begin his journey, and wrote to Pignatelli, his Secretary of State, as follows: "Having determined to make a tour of Basilicata and the two Calabrias, I purpose that the Ministers of War, the Interior and Finance should accompany me in addition to yourself. Inform them that my equipages are leaving to-morrow and that they should send on their horses with mine. You will also dispatch your own, if you have any." Thereupon he held a review of the French and Neapolitan troops and sent forward a detachment of his bodyguard.

But despite the fact that troops had been dispatched, that he had bidden his ministers hold themselves in readiness to set out, and that his coaches and horses had been sent on in advance, Murat remained in Naples. For on the 3rd or 4th March he had received a letter from Caroline confirming the news of the approaching Austrian marriage, and telling him that he would be summoned to Paris almost immediately to attend the ceremony. On this point he did not remain long in suspense, for on the morning of the 9th there arrived an express bearing the letter which Napoleon had written on the 26th February, requesting him to be in Paris by the 20th March.¹ There was nothing for it, therefore, but to recall his troops from Calabria.² He did not acknowledge receipt of the in-

¹ *Diario di Nicola*, ii. 518. "Un corriere arrivato questa mattina ha recato la notizia ufficiale del conchiuso matrimonio dell' Imperatore colla figlia dell' Imperatore d'Austria e fu Maria Teresa Borbone . . . e la chiamata subitanea del Re Gioacchino a Parigi, che partira fra tre o quattro giorni."

² The letter which the Emperor wrote to Murat on the 26th February is the letter of which Murat acknowledges receipt on the 12th March. It is not to be found among the *Correspondance*. But in view of the fact that Napoleon wrote on the 26th February to Jérôme, Eugène, the Grand Duchess

visitation until the 12th, thus allowing three days to elapse before starting on his journey. Possibly he was expecting to receive further instructions from Caroline. The latter had remained at the Tuileries until half-past eight in the evening of the 12th. She had sent several messages to her husband. The last, which would probably have reached Naples on the 12th, no doubt convinced him of the necessity of complying with the Emperor's invitation, and indicated the line of conduct he was to pursue in the difficult situation in which he would be placed.

That Murat's visit to Paris was regarded as certain to take place is evidenced by the fact that besides Napoleon's official letter and Caroline's recommendations, his former associate, Fouché, who had supported him in his opposition to the Austrian match, transmitted to him, through the new Ambassador Campochiaro, a formal summons to present himself in Paris without delay. "A Minister," wrote the Ambassador, "to whom His Majesty particularly recommended me, has strongly urged me to write to the King—dispatching the letter if necessary by special messenger—advising him in his name to be in Paris without fail for the celebration of the Emperor's wedding." That Fouché openly allowed his name to be associated with these counsels can hardly be explained save on the supposition that he was in possession of some knowledge of an exceptional nature. Is it possible that Murat, in the heat of his denunciation of the Austrian marriage, had given Fouché to understand that he contemplated disobedience in the event of the Emperor inviting him to attend the nuptial celebrations? The fact that he postponed his departure till the 12th, although the official notification had reached him as early as the 9th, lends

of Tuscany and the Prince Borghese, and also that the courier reached Naples on the 9th and not on the 12th, there is no reason to suppose that the Emperor, then on the best of terms with Caroline, did not write to Murat at the same time as to the other members of his family.

colour to this hypothesis. But on the 12th he did at last send off his reply. "I have just received," says he, "Your Majesty's letter commanding me to be present at the solemnisation of your wedding. Never, Sire, was order obeyed with greater pleasure. Nothing could legitimately prevent my being present on so important an occasion. . . . I am leaving here immediately and hope to be with Your Majesty by the 20th."¹ No sooner was this letter sealed than he started for France. With such lightning rapidity did he travel that his journey passed unnoticed. At seven o'clock on the evening of the 20th he arrived in Paris, having been eight and a half days on the road. The Emperor had left the capital at three o'clock, but Joachim immediately dispatched a messenger to inform him of his arrival. Murat betook himself straight to the Pavillon de Flore. His mind was harassed by vague misgivings. "These matrimonial plans," thought he, "may have induced Napoleon to modify many of his schemes; his ties with the House of Austria, his new kinship with Ferdinand and Marie Caroline may put a stop to his projects for invading Sicily, and have brought about a rapprochement as a result of which I alone shall go to the wall." Seeing that he had been just about to set out for Calabria in order to complete the final arrangements for his cherished expedition, he was eager to learn how the land lay and on what probabilities he could reckon. Pending his departure for Compiègne on the 22nd, he spent the intervening day in collecting information. His trusty Fouché was not exactly in a

¹ Murat to Napoleon. *Archives Nationales*. The very terms of Murat's reply sufficiently confirm the supposition that the letter which he received from the Emperor was identical with those written on the 26th February to Napoleon's other relatives. The concluding sentence of the Imperial letter, viz., "I am sending you word by this letter so that nothing may lawfully prevent your being in Paris by the 20th March," is quite in accordance with the reply sent by Murat, who knows of nothing that could lawfully prevent his leaving Naples and being in Paris by the 20th March.

position to afford him much enlightenment ; he therefore had recourse to Clarke, the Minister for War, who was cognisant of every movement of the Imperial Forces. Clarke probably had no information and could only pass on the question to the Emperor, and this he did immediately. The next day Napoleon wrote to Clarke from Compiègne, saying : " Tell the King that I am willing to carry out the expedition against Sicily, but that it cannot be done without increasing the number of troops, and that it will be necessary to provide for the needs of such additional forces." This set Joachim's mind at rest ; the Austrian marriage scheme had not caused Napoleon to modify his original plans, and the expedition was to take place after all.

But when he reached Compiègne a grim reception was in store for him. In the course of an interview which began with reproaches and ended in fury, Napoleon, in a storm of passion threatened that he would have Murat's head cut off. Murat therefore endeavoured to curtail as far as possible his stay in a place where his self-respect and his vanity were thus incessantly outraged. On the 24th, two days after his arrival, we find him giving expression to the great regret he felt at being called upon to relinquish his soldiers. Was it, he asked, the Emperor's intention to destroy at one stroke the brigade which had cost such pains to organise. And there followed a torrent of vows and protestations. His plight, it must be confessed, was an unhappy one. Everything helped to irritate and embitter him. The demand that he should give up his troops, the refusal of the licences which he had persistently demanded, the rumours from Naples which hinted that an arrangement had been arrived at with the Court of Palermo and obscurely suggested that there was some idea of restoring Naples to Ferdinand, completed his unrest. At the end of a fortnight he could contain himself no longer and appealed to his brother-in-law for leave

to return to Naples. Receiving no response, he repeated his appeal next day. Still the Emperor vouchsafed no answer. Murat grew nervous and irritable. On the 8th he presented what he termed his "final demands." These comprised proposals for an understanding in the matter of the debt, the suppression of certain offices of state, as well as requests for the promised licences, for permission to make commercial treaties and to send Ambassadors to Vienna and St. Petersburg; the whole set out in so disconnected and extravagant a manner as to suggest the random aberrations of a disordered intelligence. The climax of his sufferings was caused by this constant refusal of the Emperor to admit him to his presence, though he caused himself to be announced every day. Anxious though he was to return to Naples, Murat was thus compelled to chafe and chafe at the bit and to wait shame-faced and humiliated till the Emperor was pleased to make a sign, to linger there in full view of a crowd of courtiers and sycophants among whom he numbered enemies in abundance, with the disagreeable consciousness that every one of them knew of his disgrace.

On the 19th his trials came to an end. At last he obtained leave to return to Naples. He lost no time on the road, for he longed to be home again. He too would fain be surrounded by flatterers who would fawn upon him, by counsellors who would mislead him. He sped back at a gallop. Eleven horses dropped exhausted on the road. Only eight days were occupied on the journey, and those eight days included twenty-four hours in Florence. It was at one o'clock in the afternoon of the 27th April that he entered Naples quite unostentatiously in a post-chaise drawn by six horses and preceded by a single outrider. So swiftly had he travelled that every one was taken by surprise; French Chargé d'Affaires, ministers, soldiers and general public. But he was home once more, back again at last where he alone was master.

CHAPTER IV

THE SICILIAN EXPEDITION

Previous plans—The Emperor authorises the expedition to be carried out—Murat's delight—His departure—His progress through Calabria—Preliminary skirmishes—Napoleon's measures to prevent the expedition—The crossing—Grenier's position—The King's proclamation—He returns to Naples by sea—The Emperor's indignation—The proposals of 1811.

IT was true then ; Sicily was to be conquered at last ! After two years of waiting Joachim had returned from his last visit to Paris with the definite assurance that the expedition should take place. But in what light did the Emperor regard the matter ? It was not the first time that he had thought and spoken of Sicily. But to effect its conquest had never been his desire, and it would have been strange had he developed such a wish merely to please Murat, whom it was far from his intention to humour. The fact is that Napoleon had always regarded Sicily as a means of drawing the enemy, and it was ever when he found himself more than usually hard pressed by the English that he discovered the necessity of directing his efforts to Sicily, his object being to compel the enemy to come to its defence and so diminish their strength elsewhere. The enterprise of 1810 was then merely an incident in his struggle with England, and to appreciate its true significance it should be viewed as forming part of his struggle with Great Britain, of that conflict which had the whole of Europe for its battle-ground from Gibraltar to St. Petersburg. This view of the matter enables us the better to understand the nature of the complaints addressed by

Napoleon to Murat after the non-success of his attempt, and makes it evident that Murat's landing in the island never formed part of the Emperor's intentions.

As long ago as the 24th January 1808, when he had undertaken the expedition for the revictualling of Corfu, Napoleon had taken great pains to persuade Joseph to prepare to throw an attacking force into Sicily under cover of Ganteaume's squadron. The reason was that since taking possession of the Ionian Islands, ceded to him by the Treaty of Tilsit, the Emperor had been unwilling to allow Corfu to be wrested from him. To lose it, he said, would be the greatest misfortune that could befall him. To Joseph he gave lengthy instructions of a strictly secret nature.¹ He also sent two dispatches to Decrès within a day or two of one another. "If," he said, "the English endeavour to oppose the provisioning of the Seven Islands, let Joseph be ready, the expedition will take place." As it turned out no attempt was made to dispute the landing of the immense quantities of stores which Napoleon had sent to Corfu. The proposed invasion of Sicily had therefore no longer any *raison d'être*, and it was consequently abandoned.

A few months later, Joachim ascended the throne of Naples. His accession was marked by the vigorous offensive policy which resulted in the retaking of Capri. After this success he openly demanded that Sicily should be attacked. It happened that, at the moment, his wishes in this respect were by no means calculated to prove unwelcome to the Emperor. The recrudescence of British activity in Portugal made it highly desirable to create a diversion, and an attack on Sicily would, it was thought, prove admirably adapted to the purpose. The Emperor therefore held out every encouragement to Murat, and at the same time endeavoured, by causing

¹ *Correspondence*, 13,480.

rumours of the projected expedition to be circulated in the public press, to excite alarm in England. Simultaneously he made a request, through Clarke, for Murat's plan of campaign, and commanded Decrès to transmit orders to the Toulon squadron to hold itself in readiness to put to sea. Further he instructed Molitor and Boudet to proceed with their divisions to Lyons, possibly with the intention of sending them on to Toulon. Imminent, however, as the expedition appeared to be, it was once again fated not to take place, and though Napoleon urged Decrès to discuss the details of the plan of attack with the King, he postponed it without so much as fixing even an approximate date for its execution. He sufficiently revealed the object he really had in mind when he declared: "My aims are twofold. In the first place I wish to see whether such an expedition is really practicable, and in the second I am anxious to divert the English forces and to put them off the scent in regard to a more important task I have in mind for my Toulon squadron." This was all that came of the expedition of 1808. The Austrian campaign which was about to open was destined to postpone for some two years all considerations for carrying out an attack on Sicily. It will thus be seen that on two occasions when desirous of diverting the activities of the English the Emperor had recourse to this Sicilian scheme. In Joseph's time matters went no further than the discussion of a plan of attack. In Murat's, troops were actually set in motion. Notwithstanding his enthusiasm, Joachim's experience ought to have given him an insight into the real nature of the Emperor's intentions. As a matter of fact the English occupation of Sicily was a gain rather than a drawback to the Imperial plans. If the English were driven from the island it would inevitably result that the forces, already too numerous, by which the Emperor was opposed elsewhere, would be strengthened by the addition of the Anglo-Sicilian

contingents. Moreover the blow would be powerless to affect the British navy, and it was the navy that was engaging Napoleon's attention, since by it alone could an attack be made on Corfu and Toulon. This being the case, there would be little advantage in fighting for the possession of an island which, seeing that it had already been allotted to Naples by the provisions of the Treaty of Bayonne, could not in any case revert to France. Certainly the mere desire to humour Murat's wishes would have afforded a very inadequate motive for a further sacrifice of French blood which was already flowing abundantly enough in Spain. Such at all events was Napoleon's view. He was perfectly willing to make a demonstration against England, but to go further and to sanction an attack, though in all probability it would have proved successful, formed no part of his intentions, for the simple reason that such a policy would have been opposed to his interests.

Unfortunately Joachim, who never saw very clearly into things, did not doubt for a moment that the expedition would be carried out. He deemed that his reputation depended upon the success of the enterprise, and his anxiety led him into a series of misunderstandings and disputes, first with the French generals and then with the Emperor himself, that only left feelings of bitterness and resentment in their train.

At Paris, Murat, having received formal permission to carry the matter through, submitted his plan of action. He was far from wishing to avail himself of the Toulon fleet, which he feared might rob him of the glory of the undertaking by making a direct attack on Palermo. He therefore laid an alternative scheme before the Emperor, which, as it coincided with a plan he himself had formerly drawn up, readily gained his approval. "The key to the position," Napoleon had once observed to Joseph, "is not Palermo but Faro. All depends on the line of

communication.”¹ The line of communication it would therefore be necessary to seize, but for that troops were needed, and in troops Naples was not rich. French troops, however, would be sent to the front on condition that they were commanded by French generals.² To this the King saw no objection. Whether the attack were made by Frenchmen or Neapolitans mattered little to him, if made it were. No sooner was he back again in Naples than he eagerly began his preparations, finding in the task some solace for the successive rebuffs and humiliations to which his brother-in-law had, he considered, compelled him unjustly to submit. As early as the 30th April he ordered the publication in the press of a statement announcing his coming departure for Calabria. Every one knew what that meant. In Naples the expedition was discussed as though it were certain to be carried out. “They say that King Joachim has made up his mind about it and that he is leaving for Calabria on Saturday next (5th May).”³ Similar rumours had been current in Naples before that, but now, on the 13th May, matters really seemed to be coming to a head. On that day the King himself was reported to have spoken with much frankness and confidence regarding the conquest of Sicily, which he publicly announced as sure to take place. It was added that he had already prepared his plan for landing the troops, and that with twenty thousand men he was confident that Sicily could be won.⁴ The explanation of this attitude of assurance was that, the day before, the French Chargé d’Affaires had handed him a letter from the Emperor which doubtless conveyed the latter’s approval of the proposed plan. To Grosbois he confided with enthusiastic expansiveness the minutest details of his schemes, affirming that once the crossing was effected, Sicily was won. Nevertheless

¹ *Correspondence*, 13,480.

³ *Diario di Nicola*.

² *Idem*, 16,388.

⁴ *Idem*.

there was a fly in the amber. In a communicative moment the King mentioned to the Chargé d'Affaires that certain of the leaders appeared infinitely more impressed by the dangers of the expedition than by its advantages. It would thus appear that, even before he left Naples, Murat had some opposition to contend with. However, nothing could restrain him. He had, he asserted, proved himself successful in undertakings of a far more arduous character than the one now in hand, and on the 16th May, at two o'clock in the afternoon, he commenced his journey, having given orders to the Ministers of the Interior and of Finance, as well as to his Secretary of State, Pignatelli, that they should bear him company.¹ This journey, so at least he thought, would be nothing more nor less than a triumphal progress through Calabria and Sicily, and he publicly announced that within a fortnight he would be master of the whole island. Like the soldiers of the Grand Army his men carried in their knapsacks the gala uniforms in which Joachim proudly imagined he was going to review them at Palermo in the full glory of triumph.²

A dash of extraordinary rapidity, such as Murat alone was capable of performing, brought him to Lagonegro on the 17th May.³ He visited the fort, made a triumphal entry into the town, proceeded to the church and left again half an hour afterwards at the gallop. Thence by tracks that were scarcely visible he went on, via Castro-villari, to Cosenza, where he arrived at four o'clock in the afternoon of the 19th. "The whole countryside had come in crowds to see him. A considerable body of troops had been brought up to line the route, and attended by a numerous suite he rode past in a rich costume not a little resembling a herald's. He was mounted on a

¹ Murat to Pignatelli. Naples. *Archivio di Stato.*

² *Diario di Nicola.* ³ *Moniteur Universel.*

spirited steed which he reined in with grace.”¹ He then awaited the arrival of his ministers, who were coming along steadily by easy stages. With great pomp and much display of gorgeous attire he gave audience to the various military and civil authorities. He held reviews of troops in dazzling uniforms, set the town, which was illuminated in his honour every night,² in a whirl of gaiety, and left again on the 24th for Nicastro. The townsfolk accompanied him a great distance filling the air with shouts of “Long live the King!”³ Equally great was the enthusiasm which greeted him at Nicastro. The keys of the city were presented to him. His progress lay beneath triumphal arches and the whole place was *en fête*. Monteleone was his next stage, and there again an immense concourse had gathered together to give him welcome; indeed it seemed that people had flocked to see him from all the country round. There he halted, well content to flatter his vanity with these popular ovations, and spent a day in consultation with his ministers and the principal officers of the expedition, after which he continued his journey through Calabria, progressing by fairly easy stages and greeted everywhere with the same enthusiasm. Proceeding by way of Tropea, Nicotera, Palmi and Bagnara, he at last reached Scylla, “which he entered amid the ringing of bells and the booming of guns, for the British celebrated his arrival by throwing shells into the town.”⁴

Joachim had good reason to congratulate himself upon his journey. Everywhere popular enthusiasm, in all its varied manifestations, had been awakened at his approach and followed in his train. Passing thus for the first time through his dominions, the thought that he was King, that he and none other was the liege-lord of

¹ Duret de Tavel, *Séjour d'un officier français en Calabre*.

² *Moniteur Universel*.

³ *Idem*.

⁴ Duret de Tavel, *Séjour d'un officier français en Calabre*.

his subjects, surged up more mightily than ever within his heart. Like wine the acclamations of the populace made his hot head reel, and those who were forever at his elbow breathing in his ear alluring suggestions of independence and aggrandisement were quick to remind him that far away in Paris, in the chilly North, there was an iron hand that kept him under control, a hand which he ought to sweep aside.

Murat now felt himself a soldier on campaign once more and free to give full play to his activity. He fixed his head-quarters near Reggio on the heights of Piali, where he occupied an attractive wooden pavilion exactly opposite a beautiful house midway between Faro and Messina in which General Stuart had taken up his abode. All day long aides-de-camp and orderlies would be coming and going. Physical exercises and drills of every kind were continually indulged in. He frequently held reviews under fire from the guns of the British squadron which did but little damage. Meanwhile the army was being organised and prepared for the conflict. It was split up into three divisions: the first, under General Partouneaux, occupied a position to the right of Scylla; while the second, commanded by General Lamarque, was on the left. The central division, consisting of the Guards, the reserve and the Neapolitan contingent, was in charge of Generals Déry and Cavaignac (the former commanding the Guards), and was stationed in Scylla itself.¹ All three divisions were under the supreme control of General Grenier, who had received his appointment from the Emperor. Before beginning the attack it was decided to await the arrival of convoys dispatched from Naples. Few of them came to port, the majority being pounced upon by the English, who captured or destroyed them. In the meantime, Murat, hungry for popular applause, paid a visit to Reggio, where he was

¹ *Journal français de Naples*, July 9, 1810.

greeted with the same warmth that he had encountered on his journey. On his return to the army he learned that a transport laden with food and ammunition had reached Bagnara in safety,¹ and, next, that another, the most important of all, had been destroyed by the English off Amantea on the 26th July.²

On the 15th August the Emperor's birthday was celebrated with great magnificence. The King held a review of the army on the sea-shore fronting Messina, defying the English fleet which looked on at the ceremony. In the evening he entertained the senior officers of the land and sea forces to dinner. The other officers dined with the colonels of the Guard, while detachments from all the corps were entertained by the Guards themselves. The greatest enthusiasm reigned at all these military banquets, the scene of which was lit up by some thirty shells which the enemy discharged into the very midst of the camp. No one was wounded, and it was by their lurid gleams that the army drank to the health of the Emperor and his august consort.³ At nine o'clock there was a magnificent display of fireworks, followed by a brilliant ball, at which several ladies from Reggio and other neighbouring places were present. But such opportunities of distraction were few and far between. Nothing was done. On one pretext or another the troops were kept where they were. It was certainly not because Murat was afraid of a reverse that he postponed the attack. He considered that he could effect the passage with the certainty of success and undertook to prove it. On the 8th September he made an experimental descent on the island. In two boats he dispatched some thirty grenadiers of the Guard. Landing in an outlying part of Messina to the south of the city, they captured a guard-house, fired off a few rounds and returned unmolested.

¹ *Moniteur Universel*.

² *Diario di Nicola*.

³ Murat to Napoleon, August 16, 1810. *Archives Nationales*.

This success the King considered should suffice to convince Grenier of the certainty of victory and to silence his remonstrances.¹ Still the delay went on, and the cause of this delay was—the Emperor! Napoleon, as prudent as his brother-in-law was rash, was determined to run no risks. So far from furthering his plans, the capture of Sicily would have been a positive drawback. By his recent marriage he had contracted ties with the reigning dynasty in the island, and whatever his real sentiments may have been, appearances compelled him, at all events for a time, to deal gently with those whose niece he had just espoused. Thus, far removed as he was from the scene, he made his authority felt. In the first place he sent word from Lille to Clarke saying that it would be necessary to prepare the kingdom of Naples against a possible *coup-de-main*. Gaëta was to be furnished with provisions and munitions of war; its artillery was to be put in order and the whole place generally made ready to resist a siege of several months. He also caused Perignon to write to the King on the matter, and at the same time decided to send an observant officer to Naples in order to obtain accurate information regarding the country's resources, and to urge the King not to attempt the expedition unless he were confident of the issue. The true significance of this message was apparent, and Murat, if he had not wilfully determined to ignore its meaning, could only have interpreted the Imperial behest as an injunction to withhold the attack until he received definite orders to strike the blow. Clarke, on receipt of the Emperor's letter, selected Colonel Leclerc to proceed to Naples, and dispatched him on the 26th May armed with His Majesty's instructions.² Leclerc lost no time in getting to Naples, where he took up his abode. Fortunately for Joachim's peace of mind,

¹ Filangieri, *Autobiography*.

² Clarke to Napoleon. *Archives Nationales*.

Leclerc, though he made no secret of his visit, carefully refrained from disclosing the object of it, for we have it on the word of the French Chargé d'Affaires that "the purpose of his mission was unknown."¹

By a somewhat singular coincidence Leclerc's arrival had been preceded by a cipher dispatch which Campochiaro, the newly appointed Neapolitan Ambassador in Paris, a man of cautious tactics but acute discernment, with a thorough knowledge of all that went on behind the scenes, had addressed to the Duc de Gallo to inform him of certain events of grave import. "According to information that I have received from one of the Emperor's ministers," he wrote, "it is not improbable that His Majesty may at any moment put his veto on the Sicilian expedition. Ciphers do not always preserve their secrets, and I therefore refrain from mentioning the name of the minister in question. The object of his communication was to give me to understand that the negotiations with England might result in the abandonment of Sicily. Still, notwithstanding the value I attach to his information as a rule, I cannot bring myself to give credence to such an idea. The Emperor is negotiating through Maret without acquainting Champagny with the real state of affairs. The opinion of the well-informed, or at least of those who wish to appear so, is that the general principle adopted will be that of *uti possidetis*."² Here was matter to disturb Murat's equanimity. Leclerc's arrival at such a juncture was bound to confirm Joachim in the opinion that the Emperor was about to renounce his claim to Sicily, and that he was merely keeping him there for purposes of his own without genuinely intending to authorise an attack on the island.

¹ Grosbois to Champagny. *Affaires Étrangères*.

² Campochiaro to Gallo, in a cipher message dated Paris, May 22, 1810. It would appear that the minister in question was Fouché, to whom Campochiaro had been specially recommended by Murat.

A further indication of Napoleon's real purpose is contained in a letter which, fearing the effect which delay or discouragement might have upon Murat, he bade Clarke write him to exhort him to patience. "The King will be bound to find an opportunity of invading Sicily some time during the month. Give him to understand that I wish him to remain where he is, with his gunboats ready to cross the Strait, because by holding the enemy in check he will prevent him from transferring his forces elsewhere."

Further doubt could not be entertained by Murat as to the part he was being made to play; it was evident that his mission was merely to hold the enemy in check. As for the conquest of the island—a consummation on which his hopes had been centred for two years past, hopes which he had not hesitated to share with his friends, his Court, his army and his whole kingdom—it seemed as though he would have forever to abandon the idea of bringing it to pass with Napoleon's sanction. Thus then we have Joachim, with his valorous headstrong nature, called upon to acquiesce in an order to ground arms when he was actually face to face with the foe. Behold him, with his ambitions fostered by the cunning flatteries of a whole party in the state, with his head turned by the triumphant reception that had been accorded him in the Calabrias, forbidden to grasp the easy prey so temptingly offered by Sicily lying there before his very eyes. Imagine the feelings of the man who, when he was leaving Naples, boasted to all and sundry that he would be crowned at Palermo and be home again within a fortnight, and who was now to be compelled to submit to the humiliation of returning home with diminished head after the manner of one who had suffered defeat. The King's whole being revolted at the prospect. Napoleon might command, Grenier and the French officers might refuse to obey orders, Murat was

determined to cross the Strait. Why should he not succeed? He could dispose of a brave and splendid body of troops, he knew how to lead men on to victory, the experiment of the 8th September had convinced him that the English fleet was powerless to hinder his passage.¹ Let him but have the command, let him get across with his men at the back of him and victory would be his. His mind was made up; all that remained was to await a favourable opportunity for putting his resolve into execution. That opportunity soon came. On the 17th September a gale blew up from the south and compelled the British squadron to take shelter in Messina. Then suddenly, towards evening, with one of those rapid changes which are so characteristic of the weather in the Mediterranean, it became calm again. The pilots hastened to inform Murat that the conditions were favourable for effecting the passage. The necessary orders were given. At four o'clock in the afternoon all the troops were commanded to hold themselves in readiness. The French divisions under Partouneaux and Lamarque, as well as the Neapolitan Royal Guard under Déry were stationed on the Punta del Pezzo and occupied the hills between Torrecavallo and the village of Catona. The Neapolitan division, with Cavaignac at its head, consisting of foreign troops and the Corsican regiment, was drawn up between Reggio and the battery at Pentimele. Its mission was to draw off the enemy by proceeding to a point south of Messina while the main body was to carry out the attack on General Stuart. At eight o'clock in the evening, the weather still appearing favourable, the order was given to embark. In consequence of Cavaignac's distance from the main body, these instructions did not

¹ It seems certain that the success which attended the attempt of the 8th September had a decisive effect on the King's mind, and that from that moment he thought that as the crossing of the Strait was an easy matter, he had only to order the attack and the island would be won.

reach him till half-past nine. The troops, however, were all got on board during the night and were ready for the passage. According to the official version the French divisions, becoming becalmed, were unable to make any progress. His Majesty remained on board his ship, consumed with the liveliest impatience and vainly longing for a breeze to come and fill his sails ; the most absolute calm prevailed until morning.

Meanwhile Cavaignac's division, which had put off in boats under the command of Caracciolo, the captain of a frigate, was heading for Scaletta. Not having received any counter-instructions or observed any signal of recall ¹ it held on its way. Driven slightly out of its course by a breeze from the south-west, which increased in force as the coast of Sicily was approached, it finally touched land at San Stefano, a spot some three miles to the north of that for which they had intended to make. No sooner had he effected a landing than Cavaignac began to march on Messina. Information of the landing having been conveyed to Stuart, the latter immediately sent forward his cavalry under Campbell's command to meet the invaders. The Sicilian villagers, who had spread the alarm far and wide, seized whatever weapons they could lay their hands upon and assisted the English general to repel the foe. At the same time a portion of the English squadron put out from Messina and endeavoured to attack Cavaignac's flotilla. The weather, however, had suddenly grown calm again and they were obliged to content themselves with an ineffective cannonade.² Cavaignac now perceived that he was unsupported, and, observing with amazement that the French army had

¹ Orloff alleges that orders had been given to Cavaignac's division to return if they noticed any rockets sent up from the tower at Pialo. It is said that the officer whose duty it was to make these signals dropped off to sleep and did not wake up until daybreak.

² Grenier's report.

not quitted the shores of Calabria, gave orders to fall back. Owing to some inexplicable misunderstanding thirteen of his boats had already started for home, with the result that part of his forces were necessarily left behind and fell, with their colonel, Ambrosio, into the hands of the English. The remainder managed to get on board and, the wind being in their favour, succeeded in regaining the Italian coast. The English and Sicilians celebrated their victory with much ringing of bells, and hung up as a trophy in the Cathedral of Messina the colours of the Royal Corsican regiment which they had captured.¹

Such was the official story ; but none of those who took part in the expedition, whether French or English, ever attached the slightest credit to it. Every one in the camp knew of the strained relations existing between Grenier and Murat. Some hinted, and a few openly asserted, that the expedition would never come to pass because the Emperor did not mean that it should. It was even stated as a fact that Grenier had orders in black and white to prevent it. He was merely there to support the King in making a demonstration, but not to carry out his orders if he really intended to effect a landing. "It is certain," says an Italian officer, "that not only Grenier, but also the other three French generals Lamarque, Partouneaux, and Pactod, displayed mighty little eagerness with regard to the expedition." Grenier's report, therefore, which appeared in the *Moniteur* was merely the official dishing-up of the event. What really took place? No document concerning the matter has come to light, nor did Grenier send the Emperor any message giving the true reasons for the Sicilian reverse. Nevertheless it may be possible to reconstruct the course of events by taking stock of the various rumours that were persistently circulated about the matter in the

¹ Guardione, *Gioacchino Murat in Italia*.

Army. It was said, and the hypothesis seems more than plausible, that the moment Murat gave orders to the French divisions to embark he was confronted with formal objections on the part of Grenier. In the magnificent Royal Barge in which Joachim had seated himself with his general staff around him, a violent altercation was said to have taken place, in the course of which the general declared that he had explicit commands from the Emperor forbidding that the expedition should take place.¹ Furious that the venture should have been brought to nothing, and that he had lost Sicily, indignant that the Emperor should thus hold him in leading strings as though he were a child, Murat forgot all about Cavaignac's division which was laboriously making its way towards the island. When at length he did remember it, it was too late to act. It may have been, indeed, that he was animated by a desire to demonstrate to Grenier and the Emperor how practicable, how easy an enterprise it was, and that he therefore suffered Cavaignac to hold on his way. At all events his delight

¹ The version of the story which Pignatelli Strongoli gives in his *Memoirs* (*Mémoire*, pp. 63-64) will not bear examination. "The King," he says, "spent the whole night on board a boat from Reggio, having sent on shipboard half the expeditionary forces. But not being able to make up his mind with a promptitude similar to that displayed by Cæsar when he invaded Britain, and noticing a certain hesitation and lack of cohesion in his generals, he let the hours slip by until day began to dawn, when seeing the English ships, great and small, putting out from Messina, he caused the signal for a retreat to be given to the detachment that had landed in Sicily."

How could Murat have been unable to make up his mind when, at four o'clock in the afternoon, every one was certain that the attack was to take place? How could Cavaignac's division have been ordered to start, seeing that it was the most distant of all, without similar orders being given to the other divisions? How could Murat have continued in a state of indecision from ten at night till four in the morning? Lastly, how was it that he only made up his mind what to do when half the troops had started, as Pignatelli himself says? Was it not rather that when he had seen some of the troops go on board, Grenier refused point blank to go any farther in the matter, and that it was this that occasioned the famous scene in the Royal Barge which ended in Murat's giving way?

was so great that he had been able to prove the possibility of effecting the conquest, that when Cavaignac returned to the camp he embraced him and made him a grand commander of the Westphalian Order.

The problem of concealing the truth of the matter from the Neapolitans at home was one of no little difficulty. Still, though the matter was bound to leak out through one channel or another, it was thought that it might be possible to gloss the affair over in such a manner that it might yet redound to Joachim's honour. If only Grenier could be prevailed upon to maintain silence, no one need know that this abortive attempt of the 18th September had been anything more than a preliminary experiment designed to exemplify the ease with which the enterprise could be accomplished. Grenier evidently promised to say nothing, since in none of his letters to the Emperor is any reference made to the dispute between himself and the King. The latter also carefully abstained from addressing complaints to Napoleon, since they might have compelled Grenier to defend himself by putting forward awkward explanations in the course of which the real purpose of the attack would have become apparent. Both sides therefore had grounds for reticence, and in the end Joachim's vanity emerged unscathed from a very difficult situation, since the notion to which currency was given was that some difference of opinion having arisen between the King and the French officers as to the practicability of the undertaking, the King had succeeded in demonstrating that his view of the situation was the correct one. Such was the version which the Queen gave of the matter to the French Chargé d'Affaires in an interview she had with him on the 29th September. she then asserted that the expedition would have been brought to a successful issue had not the King encountered insuperable difficulties in his own camp. "The French generals," she added, "were persistently opposed

to the enterprise; from the very outset they regarded it as too hazardous, and did everything in their power to discourage and discountenance it. In these circumstances," the Queen went on, "the King had no choice but to abandon the project; nevertheless, before breaking up his camp and withdrawing his forces, he was anxious to demonstrate the possibility of carrying out the attack. This was the meaning of the debarkation of a Neapolitan division at Scaletta." Whether the Queen genuinely believed this version of the case, or whether Murat had sent her a confidential letter explaining the fall his pride had sustained, it is impossible to determine. Certain it is that the story as she gave it involves contradictions and inconsistencies.

On the 26th September the King himself circulated general orders among his forces in which he stated that the expedition had been postponed, but that the Emperor's object had been attained. "You have," he said, "solved an important problem. You have proved that the enemy's fleet cannot prevent the passage of the strait and that Sicily will be conquered whenever we decide to make a serious attack."

A few days later, deeming, it is said, that this proclamation was insufficient, he conceived the idea of printing a circular in which it was to be explained that the Sicilian expedition had enabled His Majesty to raise the blockade of Corfu, to give some practice to his naval forces and to form an estimate of their capabilities and that the King was highly pleased with the superior courage which they had displayed in the face of the English fleet.¹

The failure of the expedition rendered it impossible for him to remain in Calabria, and it became necessary to decide what was to become of the troops since they were not to be allowed to fight. Joachim was little

¹ *Diario di Nicola.*

inclined to pay heed to Napoleon's orders. If the Emperor's object was to hold the English in check, well and good ; but let him not jeopardise Murat's prestige in attaining it. The King now decided that if he and his troops were to be denied the opportunity of displaying their valour he would go home to Naples, and seek in the homage and adulation of his people some solace for the gibes and jeers which he had been compelled to endure from the French. The 22nd September found him at Reggio. He remained there three days, and left on the 25th for Scylla, and then on the 28th took ship at Pizzo.¹ The determination to perform the journey from Calabria to Naples by sea was remarkable considering the risks he ran from the English fleet. Nor did any one suspect him of such an intention, since, for days past, relays of horses had been held in readiness at different stations along the road through the provinces. But it would have been too much for his royal vanity to bear to reappear in the guise of one who had suffered defeat in regions through which, a short time before, his progress had been one long triumphal march. Rather than confront the coldness or hostility of the crowd Joachim preferred to face the dangers that threatened him at sea and the possibility of being pursued by the English. On the 3rd October he landed in the neighbourhood of Salerno and proceeded on horseback to Portici.²

If the King of Naples was displeased with his brother-in-law, his brother-in-law was not a whit less displeased with him. Napoleon no sooner learned of the tenour of Joachim's general orders than, recognising that they meant the ruin of his plans against England, he gave orders to Clarke to write about the matter. "Give the King to understand," he said, "that I strongly disapprove of his general orders announcing the postponement of the Sicilian expedition. He says that my object

¹ *Moniteur Universel*.

² *Diario di Nicola*.

has been fulfilled, but he makes a mistake in talking about my plans without authority from me. My purpose was to carry out the invasion of Sicily, and as Sicily is still unconquered it follows that my purpose is not fulfilled. Tell him that I regard his inaccurate statements concerning me as most extraordinary, and that I am surprised that he should have broken up his camp at Reggio without my orders, when I intended to keep the troops there through the winter; whereas now the English will take themselves to Corfu, to Spain, and add to their forces at Cadiz, while the army which I now have in the Kingdom of Naples will serve no further purpose.”¹

A few days later he himself wrote to Joachim in the following terms: “All the troops that the English were intending to dispatch to Sicily were diverted to Portugal as soon as the terms of your general orders became known. Though you desired to return to Naples, there was nothing to compel you to give out that you were abandoning the expedition. I had made it clear to you that I intended my troops to remain in a position to threaten Sicily until the 1st January, but you act without any kind of prudence.” Vainly did Murat endeavour to exculpate himself. “Your Majesty will perhaps regret having inflicted unnecessary pain upon me by writing that the reinforcements which the English were sending to Sicily had proceeded to Portugal in consequence of my general orders. The order announcing the postponement of the expedition was dated the 23rd September, and the *Moniteur* of the 19th of that month contained the news that reinforcements to the number of seven thousand had left England for Portugal and had already reached their destination. Evidently, therefore, my general orders are not responsible for the fact that these reinforcements, which from the first were intended for

¹. *Correspondance*, 17,042.

Portugal, did not go to Sicily.”¹ On the 22nd December Napoleon further brings him to book concerning the failure of the expedition, and expresses astonishment that Murat, having landed one body of troops on the island, did not push matters to a conclusion.

We do not possess the King's answer to that letter. What could he say? Was he to confess that he stayed behind in Calabria, after having sent Cavaignac across to Sicily, because of his quarrel with Grenier and the latter's refusal to obey orders? Or was he to put forward the current fable about demonstrating the facility of effecting the passage? Probably, in order to avoid the uncomfortable necessity of offering an explanation, he did the best thing possible in the circumstances and kept silence.

What then of that Sicily on which he had been so often led to set his heart, Sicily which had been promised him by the Treaty of Bayonne? What had become of the expedition for which he had waited two years? Where were his fine dreams of conquest? All had dwindled away into a petty inglorious affair, into a few paltry skirmishes which did not even offer him the wherewithal to feed his vanity. The feeling that, so long as Napoleon had the upper hand of him, he would never be King of the Two Sicilies, bred in his heart such bitterness as would be the natural consequence of defeated ambition and humbled arrogance; but it was wounded vanity even more than disappointed hopes that was fated to play such havoc with the King's destiny.

It happened that the moment which Napoleon had chosen to give his brother-in-law a fall coincided with the marriage which united him in ties of kinship with the dispossessed sovereigns of Naples, whose altered prospects, now that their niece had wedded the Emperor of the French, were being secretly discussed on every hand. Since, then, Napoleon appeared to have withdrawn

¹ Murat to Napoleon, November 5, 1810. *Archives Nationales*.

his support and to have transferred his influence to his adversaries, since it seemed to be the Imperial intention that Naples and Naples alone should be his portion, Joachim began to look round him with the view of entering into such *ententes* as might eventually ripen into effective alliances. Ever on the lookout for an opportunity of finding some ground of complaint in the Emperor's dealings with Naples, ever urged on by the crafty suggestions of his Italian counsellors, Joachim came to the conclusion that an understanding had been arrived at between Napoleon and Maria Carolina. His loyalty began to waver. He deemed that the rebuffs he had received from his brother-in-law had been too numerous to permit him any longer to remain on his side. Driven forward on the one hand by those who, for the furtherance of their own aims, played upon what they called his chivalrous feelings, held back on the other by the Queen, Mosbourg and the French party, with whom he dared not risk an open rupture, his attitude towards the Emperor became at first vaguely disloyal, and finally so flagrantly rebellious that Napoleon was forced at length to adopt measures of stern repression. While the enthusiasm which had greeted his progress through Calabria seemed to encourage the possibility of playing the King with a freer hand, the Sicilian fiasco showed him that he counted for nothing in Napoleon's estimation. He had disobeyed and disobeyed to no purpose, and he was mortified at the reprimands his disobedience had brought upon him. At the same time he was wroth with the Emperor for having baulked him of his aims, for having hindered the extension of his dominions. The ambition to add to his kingdom had ever been his, but it was no proud consciousness that he was born to sway the destinies of nations that animated him. Rather the motive force was the vanity that prompted all his acts, the desire that *Murat* should

become a name in the world and that the crowd should acclaim him wherever he went. He himself was of the people, and his aims and ambitions were of the order naturally to be looked for in one who, by a sudden turn of fortune, finds himself a ruler over those with whom he had formerly associated as his equals. His counsellors knew his weakness, and never failed to contrast the power which he actually possessed with the power he might one day attain. They cunningly dwelt upon the enthusiasm of the Calabrians, so that, on Murat's return from Sicily, Napoleon numbered an enemy the more.

Thus it came about that, when in 1811 the Emperor proposed another expedition,¹ Murat would hear nothing of it. It was in vain that Napoleon represented the favourable nature of the opportunity and affirmed that a more propitious moment would never occur; his inducements fell upon deaf ears. Once the mere mention of Sicily would have sufficed to send him hastening away to war; but now his aims had taken a different direction. Others might conquer Sicily if they would. As for him, since his path to the south had been barred by the English and forbidden him by the Emperor, he paused but a moment to consider and then turned his attention to the north.

¹ Napoleon to Murat, May 21, 1811.

CHAPTER V

THE RISE OF THE NATIONALISTS

Renewed dissensions—The Broadbent affair—The Neapolitan debt—Increase of the Neapolitan Army—Murat and his Navy—The matter of the Ambassadors—The rival factions—Birth of the King of Rome—Murat in Paris—Will the King return to Naples?

WHEN, in April 1810, Murat returned from Paris, he was still a prey to discontent. The prospect of invading Sicily had not availed to dispel his dissatisfaction, and he lost no opportunity of embroiling himself with the Emperor on every conceivable ground. He continued the policy he had followed in 1809, but his opposition was henceforth more overt, his acts of disobedience took on a graver character. Two rival factions now came into being which, grouping themselves respectively about the King and Queen, were popularly referred to as the King's Party and the Queen's Party. As a matter of fact, the conflict that was to be waged between them was nothing more nor less than the struggle for supremacy between the Italian and the French elements in the State. It is scarcely probable that, at this period, Joachim had any definite intention of cutting himself adrift from the Emperor and siding with his foes. He was entirely unprepared for such a course of action, and nowhere could he look for such assistance as would enable him to enter upon a struggle with so formidable a power. But his ministers were probably more alive to the situation, more far-sighted than he, and they may have recog-

nised the wisdom of cultivating friendly relations with foreign powers. The future is ever doubtful, and, though none could have deduced from the position of affairs in 1810 the final catastrophe that was in store for the Empire, it was evident that the Emperor, for all his power, was but a man; a man, moreover, who ran more risks than his fellow-mortals, because, being ever engaged in warfare his life was ever in jeopardy. After his death what would become of the Empire and its dependencies? Since no one could supply an answer to this question, prudence clearly dictated the advisability of building up defences and of establishing friendships on which to rely when the crisis came.

It is perhaps some such considerations as these that explain the pertinacity with which Murat negotiated his first commercial treaty. No sooner was he back from Paris than he entered into an agreement (strictly commercial, of course!) with one Broadbent. As soon as the negotiations were concluded, Murat, knowing that the Emperor was bound to get wind of the matter, wrote him on the 11th May as follows: "In virtue of the licences which Your Majesty has already granted me, and of the further ones which you promised me at Compiègne, I have just authorised my Minister of Finance to conclude an agreement with an American named Brodevent, the United States Consul in Sicily, in connection with the exportation of oils from this country." ¹

This "Brodevent," being the American Consul in Sicily, was bound to be in pretty close touch with England, and it was no doubt considered that if occasion offered he might be made to answer the purpose of a serviceable intermediary, just as, later on in the story, we shall see what good use was made of the notorious Jones of Ponza, though he was far from being so favourably situated as Broadbent. Even supposing that this

¹ Murat to Napoleon. *Archives Nationales.*

Broadbent affair should never develop beyond the purely commercial stage, the country could not fail to benefit, for it would attract money to Naples, and money was then a rarity in the national coffers. If, moreover, the Emperor was to be set at defiance the need of money would be all the greater. That the King's aims in regard to the Broadbent agreement went farther than he was disposed to avow, is proved by the following significant sentence with which Murat concluded his letter to the Emperor. "I hasten," he says, "to inform Your Majesty of the matter, in order to forestall any rumours that may awaken prejudice in your mind." What rumours could he have had in view if his intentions had been perfectly straightforward? The Emperor was not deceived. Immediately on receipt of his brother-in-law's letter, he sent orders to Champagny to convey to the Neapolitan Minister his high displeasure that such an agreement should have been concluded, and to impress upon him that no treaty was to be entered into without the Imperial sanction.¹ After that Murat could scarcely pursue the matter further.

For the time being the Sicilian expedition monopolised Joachim's attention and afforded an outlet for his exuberant energy. But no sooner was he home again from Sicily than he began once more to importune the Emperor for licences. Since he was at peace with Africa, the Porte, the Kingdom of Italy, the Illyrian Provinces and the Empire, he cried, wherefore send him useless licences for those countries? What he really desired was the key to the door to contraband, the gateway of treason. Let them give him that and he would be content. He needed "licences such as the Emperor granted for English ports, which were necessary for the export of his oils."² Not content with forty-two further licences

¹ *Correspondance*, 16,496, May 23, 1810.

² Murat to Napoleon, November 16, 1810.

that were granted him, he made an additional demand on the 21st December, requesting permission to enter into commercial relations with divers hostile ports.¹ To have thus failed to realise the extravagance of his demands Joachim must have grossly deceived himself or have been grossly deceived by others. The Empire itself offered abundant facilities for his trade, and it was quite unnecessary to seek additional outlets in Sicily or America. Whatever reasons, therefore, may have impelled Murat to put forward his demands, Napoleon acted with undoubted wisdom in meeting them with an unqualified refusal. Other difficulties follow. Joachim petitions for the readjustment of his frontiers on the Italian side. The petition is dismissed.² There is trouble between Naples and Paris over the cotton duties and over the duties imposed on colonial produce, which, in the Emperor's view, was all contraband. Murat attempts to involve Pérignon and Grenier in the dispute, but they refuse to be drawn. The outcome of the matter is that Champagny instructs the French Chargé d'Affaires to demand that the orders concerning the importation of colonial produce should be carried out at Naples with the same stringency as elsewhere,³ and Murat is compelled to submit.

These successive disputes all contributed to excite the Emperor's suspicions, and from this time forth he betrayed little inclination to repose confidence in his brother-in-law. When it became necessary to revictual Corfu, a task which had always properly fallen to the lot of Naples, Napoleon, professing mistrust of Joachim's willingness, had recourse to Eugène, whom he instructed to send an agent to Ancona and Otranto to make the necessary contracts with the suppliers.

¹ Murat to Napoleon, the same letter.

² Napoleon to Eugène, August 10, 1810.

³ Champagny to Grosbois, November 29, 1810. *Affaires Étrangères*.



EUGENE BEAUHARNAIS

These, however, were incidents of secondary importance. In all essential matters the struggle became fierce and acrimonious, and Murat abated none of his pretensions save when he was absolutely driven into submission. He grew conveniently oblivious of the Treaty of Bayonne. That was an affair of long ago, and there was nothing in those days to which he would not have put his signature in order to procure himself a throne. True it was that hitherto his defections had been of minor importance, but the day was to come when he would repudiate the most vital of his obligations—the ties which united him to France.

On the 18th June Champagny completed a draft agreement relating to the Neapolitan Debt, which Napoleon had instructed him to draw up on the 15th January. The Emperor, having discussed the matter with his Minister and satisfied himself that the proposed terms offered sufficient protection to the French Treasury, sanctioned the opening of negotiations, and on the 23rd June 1810 Champagny and Campochiaro at last put their hands to an agreement in which the amount of the Neapolitan indebtedness to France was formally assessed at five million francs. To meet this liability, the Neapolitan Government undertook to issue five hundred Treasury Bills of ten thousand francs each, repayable in five years, and bearing interest, as from the 1st January 1810, at the rate of 5 per cent. per annum. Thus a satisfactory settlement appeared to have been arrived at. But Murat was by no means to be relied upon. If he had accepted the Emperor's ruling and signed the agreement, he had done so with reluctance and because no other course was open to him. But to sign an agreement was one thing; to fulfil it quite another. To avoid the latter unwelcome necessity he recommenced the recital of his woes. "It is," said he, "with unmingled reluctance that I have to bring the

position of my country's finances before Your Majesty's notice. Your Majesty will doubtless feel surprise at the enormous deficiency which the figures reveal, and apprehension at the progressive increase that deficiency must inevitably show unless a prompt remedy be applied in the direction of diminishing the expenditure on the one hand, and of increasing the sources of revenue on the other."¹ This jeremiad was followed by a refusal to meet the demands of the French agents. No money was to be had at Naples. It was now four and a half months since the agreement had been signed, and not a single payment of any description had been made. Wearying at length of a state of things that bade fair to endure for ever, Napoleon instructed Champagny to communicate with his Chargé d'Affaires. He wrote as follows: "The French paymaster in Naples was instructed to press for the fulfilment of these several promises, but up to the date of the last advice received by His Excellency the Public Treasurer, he had not succeeded in obtaining either an instalment of the arrears due to the French troops, or a refund of the money advanced by the French Treasury to pay the Neapolitan troops, or even the delivery of the bonds in respect of the five million francs."² Grosbois therefore must needs lodge a Note.

The Note was delivered, but it brought forth no response. On the 12th December the Bills were still hanging fire, and the French Treasurer signified his refusal to sanction any further advances to Naples save under express commands from the Emperor. That very day the Marquis di Gallo handed in a belated reply to Grosbois' note. His Majesty, it affirmed, had not overlooked the matter of his liabilities to France. The Treasury Bills were already made out, but the King was

¹ Murat to Napoleon. *Archives Nationales*.

² Champagny to Grosbois. *Affaires Étrangères*.

now desirous of wiping off the debt by means of supplies furnished to Corfu. Truly there was no undue inclination to hurry matters at Naples.

The cause of all these more or less overt refusals was pretty readily apparent. Murat did not pay because he was anxious to keep his money for himself. With him funds were only too scarce. However, the money which, in spite of his promises, he was so reluctant to hand over to the Emperor, he was about to squander recklessly on the establishment of his army. That was the object to which all the country's resources were to be devoted. On the 31st October, aghast at the magnitude of his expenditure, he was foolish enough to forward Napoleon a list of the troops composing the Neapolitan army. The comparison of his forces as at the 1st August 1808, when they numbered no more than 17,405 men, with their extent on the 1st October 1810, when they had reached a total of 40,154, sufficiently indicates how greatly he must have exerted himself in order to bring about so vast and rapid an increase in his army. The Emperor was quick to send a reply. "I have just made," said he, "a careful examination of your Finance Minister's report, and I perceive that your difficulties arise from the fact that you are foolish enough to maintain an army of 40,000 Neapolitans who cannot be of any use to you. If instead of 40,000 you had no more than 15,000 or 20,000, you would find your resources abundantly sufficient." ¹ He accordingly counselled Murat to reduce his army. Next day he received a further communication from Murat, and replied with similar advice. These, however, were precepts that the King was little inclined to follow. On the contrary, he continued to avail himself of every possible opportunity to increase the number of troops about him. When Napoleon called on him to furnish a force for service in Spain, he contributed such

¹ Napoleon to Murat, November 12, 1810. *Correspondance*, 17, 128.

a collection of undisciplined ne'er-do-wells that the Emperor gave orders for them to be turned back on the first opportunity, as he did not wish to encumber Catalonia with undesirables who would only serve to swell the number of brigands. Napoleon required no more soldiers from Naples. This, however, was not enough for Joachim, who wished to bring home those that were already there. He took advantage of the complaints that were made regarding the desertion of some to demand the return of the rest. "I must once more put before Your Majesty my request for the recall of such of my troops as are at present in Spain. So long as they are there it is impossible to prevent them deserting. Here there are no desertions at all." Five days later he was back again on the same theme. "The only means of dealing with these desertions is to send the men back again from Spain to this country. Here I have not a single deserter."¹ No means came amiss to him for adding to the number of his troops. In his impatience he even proposed to the Emperor that he should enlist in the service of Naples the foreign regiments of La Tour d'Auvergne, of Isembourg as well as the First Swiss regiment. He first broached the matter towards the middle of the year 1810. The attempt fell through. But Murat would not accept defeat. He reopened the question in a letter which he instructed his War Minister to write in November of the same year. Once again the Emperor refused to hand over to Naples regiments that were receiving their pay from France. Napoleon, in fact, had now just begun seriously to occupy himself with the increase that had been taking place in the Neapolitan army. The figures had aroused his attention, and he made a request for a detailed statement of the forces at Joachim's command. On the 5th December he wrote to the King of Naples, through his War Minister, order-

¹ Murat to Napoleon, October 31, 1810. *Archives Nationales*.

ing him to submit a monthly report of his Household Troops and of Neapolitan forces generally. The Minister was instructed to point out that Murat was the only one of the allied princes regarding whose forces the Emperor did not possess detailed information. The Emperor also adopted another and a surer means of arriving at the truth about the matter, for he caused inquiries to be made by an agent of his own who, on the 1st January 1811, reported that the total number of Neapolitan troops, exclusive of the Guard, was 30,380, that the Guard consisted roughly of 3000 men, and that the five regiments on active service accounted for a further 6092. Murat therefore had told the truth.

Now that he possessed an army of his own, wherefore, he asked himself, should he endure a foreign force within his kingdom? It was in order to be free, to be his own absolute master, that he had imposed on himself so many weighty sacrifices, and now he deemed it high time that the French army should quit. The Sicilian expedition had shown him that he exercised no real control over it, that he was but its nominal chief. Its real master was not in Naples. What then, he inquired, were these soldiers doing there, encumbering his kingdom, resisting his orders, hindering his plans, thwarting his cherished aims? So far from being useful auxiliaries, they served but to remind him of the bondage in which he was held and from which he was making desperate efforts to shake himself free. He looked upon them as a prisoner upon his warders. "Joachim," wrote a contemporary, "exasperated at the non-success of his Sicilian expedition, kept complaining of the obstinacy he had met with on the part of the French generals, and seemed to behold in the French army, to which he owed the integrity of his frontiers, nothing but an instrument employed by Napoleon in order to keep him in thrall."¹

¹ Gallois, *Histoire de Joachim Murat*.

It was not long before Murat essayed to free himself from the bonds of his oppressors. He had returned from Sicily on the 30th October, and the very next day he dispatched a letter to Napoleon requesting that either the French forces should be maintained at the cost of the Imperial exchequer or that their numbers should be reduced. To this demand, which Murat supported by an appeal to Clause II.¹ of the Treaty of Bayonne, Napoleon, his mind pretty well made up as to the value of the Neapolitan troops whom he referred to as brigands, made answer that if he withdrew the French army, the English would immediately seize the opportunity of attacking Naples, and that then he would be put to the trouble and expense of sending them back by forced marches to repel the invaders. In this view of the matter it was quite impossible for Murat to acquiesce. "Your Majesty," he replied, "does the Neapolitans an injustice in imagining that twelve thousand Englishmen would suffice to drive me from my kingdom. I am unable to share your opinion, and I have been, and now am, every day in a position to estimate their worth. Suppose, however, that your twelve thousand English were more resourceful and more brave than the eighteen thousand who were occupying my islands fifteen months ago, when I only had twelve thousand to pit against them; and suppose they succeeded in satisfying every one that they were more than a match for all my Neapolitans, they would assuredly never convince Your Majesty that they could defeat twelve thousand Frenchmen. Now there are at present twenty-five thousand French troops here. If then you will relieve me of all but ten thousand, I will guarantee that there shall be no neces-

¹ The clause in question provides that "the number of French troops in the kingdom of the two Sicilies shall be reduced, at the King's request, as the organisation of the Neapolitan Army approaches completion and the tranquillity of the country appears assured."

sity for you to hasten by forced marches to my rescue." It was useless. Napoleon's mind was made up. The French army should remain in Naples. How little he could look for support to Murat's army is demonstrated by the fact that on the 6th October he had asked for a single battalion of seven hundred men for Corfu, and that on the 12th November not a man of them had left Naples. It happened that on that very day Napoleon received Joachim's report concerning his forty thousand fighting men and his request for the withdrawal of the French army. There must have been a touch of irony in the letter which the Emperor wrote to Clarke that day, to judge by the latter's reply. "Your Majesty enjoins me, in your orders of the 12th inst., to inform the King of Naples that you are at a loss to understand how it is that in the whole of his army he cannot discover seven hundred men to take up garrison duty in Corfu."

In withholding money to maintain and increase his army, Murat had been guilty of a grave infringement of the Treaty of Bayonne. It was therein stipulated that from 1809 onwards the King should launch two battleships and two frigates every year. On the 22nd May 1810, Champagny wrote to Grosbois to remind the Neapolitan Government of their treaty obligations; but to this admonition no heed was paid. Since Joachim's accession, indeed, there had been much ado to find the time and money to complete a single vessel of seventy-four guns, to wit the *Capri*. The King being away in Sicily at the time, the launching ceremony devolved upon the Queen, who adroitly arranged that it should take place on the 15th August in honour of the Emperor's birthday. Owing, however, to the untimely appearance of some British warships in the bay this plan had to be abandoned, and it was thus not until the 21st August that, with much pomp, in the presence of the Queen, the Princes and Princesses, Maréchal

Pérignon and many other distinguished spectators, the first Neapolitan vessel of the line successfully took the water. This effort was followed by an interval for repose. Highly satisfied with the *Capri*, the Emperor requested Murat to lay down some vessels of superior fighting capacity. He himself was in the throes of reconstructing his navy, and was anxious for Joachim to second him. He broached his idea in the first instance to Decrès, whom he asked for information as to the possibility of building a couple of three-deckers, one to carry seventy-four guns and the other eighty, at Naples or Castellamare. "I should then," he said, "be able to count on three vessels by next year." A few days later he wrote in similar terms to Murat asking him to inform him whether such a programme could be carried out.

It was apparently considered in Naples that the *Capri* ought to satisfy the Emperor for a long time to come. "It seems," wrote the French Chargé d'Affaires to Champagny, "that there is no intention of building the ships of the line and the frigates which, in terms of the treaty, should be ready to put to sea on the 1st October 1811. I have occasionally mentioned the matter to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, but I have only been met with vague replies, from which, however, I was intended to gather that, owing to lack of funds, they were in great difficulties as to how they were to fulfil the requirements of His Majesty the Emperor. That was all the satisfaction I could obtain." It is not surprising, therefore, that Murat replied in the negative to Napoleon's last request. On receiving his answer, Napoleon immediately expressed his astonishment that as they had built a frigate they should be unable to turn out a battleship. However, he modified his proposal and requested that Naples should build one vessel for France and one for herself. By the end of 1811 she would thus have in her harbours a Neapolitan and a

French ship ready for service. These, with the vessels that had already been previously completed, would make three ships of the line and a frigate—the nucleus of a fleet. Murat was careful not to meet this proposal with an unqualified refusal. A downright negative would have revealed his policy too plainly. He replied that the shipbuilding potentialities of the Neapolitan yards did not apparently permit of their laying down anything larger than a frigate, adding, however, that if it were found in any way possible to undertake the construction of a battleship, Napoleon's wishes should be complied with. The rest was silence. After some lapse of time Napoleon reiterated his demand, this time through the medium of Decrès, but without obtaining any tangible result. Murat was determined not to yield. Nevertheless he could not, in this instance, advance the lack of funds as his excuse, for the Emperor was willing to pay—and in advance. Naples would have been the gainer by the arrangement, but Joachim was in no mind to show himself obliging to his brother-in-law. Napoleon could quote the Bayonne Treaty to his heart's content, Joachim cared not a jot. All his energies were centred upon his army, the instrument of his freedom; compared with that all other considerations were as nothing.

These refusals, masked or overt, to do the Emperor's bidding had their reason: Murat was trembling for his throne. He saw himself thrust forth from Naples, and sent, at the Emperor's will and pleasure, to rule another kingdom, or even compelled to sink into the inglorious position of a mere pensioner. The fate that had lately befallen the King of Holland had not failed to make a deep impression on his mind. In every act of the Emperor he imagined he saw a threat if not indeed the preliminaries of its execution. The withdrawal of the French Ambassador, Monsieur d'Aubuisson, occasioned him great distress, and was regarded by him as the

unmistakable precursor of a coming rupture. "It is my intention," wrote Napoleon to Champagny, "merely to retain a *Chargé d'Affaires* at Naples. On several occasions the treatment accorded to my Ambassador has been wanting in correctness, and I mean to suppress the Embassy altogether. The Secretary to the Legation, who is at present acting as *Chargé d'Affaires*, will be officially appointed as such." It was in these circumstances that Hue de Grosbois was accredited to Naples.

At the same time as he reduced the status of his representative at Murat's Court, Napoleon refused to authorise the King to send the Prince de Torella to Russia in the capacity of Ambassador. Joachim, yielding with reluctance, commanded Torella to remain in Paris in the character of an ordinary visitor. Nevertheless, he regarded the circumstance as affording a further proof of Napoleon's displeasure. These two matters, the reinstatement of a French Ambassador at Naples and the coveted permission to send Ambassadors of his own to foreign Courts, were destined to form the burden of reiterated importunities. When he was in Calabria it was given out that the Emperor had refused to receive the Duchesse de Campochiaro with the marks of distinction due to the wife of an Ambassador. Busily engaged as he was with arranging the details of his projected attack on Sicily, Murat yet found time to write to the Emperor on the subject. The letter was dated from Scylla and ran as follows: "Sire, Monsieur d'Aubuisson was never received by me in a manner unbecoming his rank, and if he was never invited to dinner or admitted to any special privileges, this was entirely due to the fact that, in a letter which Your Majesty sent me from Vienna, I was expressly enjoined not to hold receptions of the Diplomatic Corps more often than once a month. If, Sire, Your Majesty will

send an Ambassador to Naples, he shall be treated with every consideration. Send a worthy man and I pledge my word that Your Majesty will never receive any complaints." Precisely what he meant by "a worthy man" is not very easy to determine, but he would probably have been well content with a counterpart of the complaisant Pérignon, the Governor of Naples. However, the application met with no success, for the Emperor had no intention of sending an Ambassador to Naples. Moreover, he instructed Champagny to send a curt refusal to Gallo, who had sought permission to dispatch diplomatic missions to St. Petersburg and Vienna. "Tell Monsieur di Gallo," he wrote, "that the King of Naples would be putting himself to useless expense in maintaining embassies at Vienna and St. Petersburg. No good purpose would be served by it."¹

After the departure of the Russian Minister, who left on the 15th July 1810, the Court of Naples was so denuded of foreign representatives that Grosbois drew the following melancholy picture of it. "Our corps diplomatique now consists of three: Count Benkendorff, who is acting as Russian Chargé d'Affaires pending the arrival of Monsieur d'Alopeus, and the Chargés d'Affaires of Italy and France. This reduction is, if I may venture to say so, by no means popular at the Court here, and what gives rise to equal discontent is the modesty of the titles borne by these political representatives." Moreover, two of them, the French and Italian, were, so to speak, members of the family, so that the Russian was in reality the only genuine foreigner amongst them. Soon, it is true, he was to be replaced by a full-fledged Ambassador, Monsieur d'Alopeus. When, however, the Emperor refused to allow the Prince de Torella to be sent as Neapolitan Ambassador to St. Petersburg, the Russian Government retorted by withdrawing Monsieur

¹ Napoleon to Champagny, *Correspondence*, 16,754.

d'Alopeus. Murat considered this as clear proof of Napoleon's desire to bring about his downfall. "Sire," he wrote, "extricate me from this dilemma by some means or other. It is impossible for me to continue in this manner. The rumours that are current here (these were rumours that he was about to leave Naples) are disheartening everybody, since no one gives them the lie. The fact that the two Ministers whom I had appointed as my Ambassadors to Russia and Austria are still lingering in Paris, added to the Russian Minister's recall, lend colour to these reports and lead people to regard the outbreak of war with Russia as a certainty. I beg you, Sire, to take my position into consideration; I have done nothing to forfeit your favour." He next began to find fault with the French Chargé d'Affaires, who, he averred, was not a dignified representative of his country and lived with a light o' love. He concluded with another appeal for an Ambassador. Five days afterwards he returned to the charge. "Sire," he wrote, "I implore you to appoint an Ambassador or Minister Plenipotentiary for my Court. Such an appointment is a matter of absolute necessity, for so unwearying and so unprincipled is the campaign that is being waged against my Government that in the end you may be brought to entertain doubts of my loyalty." He was prepared to go further, for on the 9th we find him writing yet again: "If, to my great regret, Your Majesty decides not to appoint an Ambassador to Naples, I shall request you to permit Monsieur de Campochiaro to return home, so that I may derive some benefit from his knowledge of affairs and devotion to my interests."¹

Happily, Murat did not find it necessary to engage in the conflict, for all at once the Emperor, who had hitherto refused to accede to the wishes of his brother-in-law, wrote him as follows: "I have told you again

¹ Murat to Napoleon, November 5, 1810. *Archives Nationales*.

and again that there was no need for you to maintain Ambassadors in Russia and Austria, that you spend money senselessly. As for myself, I am now going to send you a representative." He had, in fact, just the day before given orders from Fontainebleau that Baron Durant, Minister Plenipotentiary at Stuttgart, should be transferred to act in a similar capacity at Naples.¹

Thus Murat had his way on one point. It was not, however, without good reason that the Emperor, who had up to then been so strongly opposed to sending an Ambassador to Naples, finally determined to reverse his decision. The menace of war with Russia, which from this time forth began to gather shape, was not without its influence on his attitude towards Naples. It would certainly be most undesirable that those who were scanning the course of events should observe that such a coolness had sprung up between the two countries that their diplomatic relations were strained almost to breaking-point. Would it not afford an opportunity for comment, perhaps for something more than comment, to those active and watchful foes who were forever seeking, by every means in their power, to bring about the Emperor's isolation? But looking at the matter simply from his own point of view, Murat was a force that Napoleon could scarcely afford to do without. And could he, if it came to the point, leave his Empire exposed to one whose policy, if not avowedly hostile, was at all events sufficiently dubious to render it necessary for the garrison of French Italy to keep a lookout towards the South instead of turning their attention to the North. The Emperor put no confidence in his brother-in-law, and the reasons which impelled him to seek a rapprochement in that quarter must have been serious indeed. The war with Russia, long since regarded as inevitable in Paris, was to enable the King to bring pressure to bear indirectly

¹ *Archives des Affaires Étrangères.*

upon Napoleon, and it was solely because the latter had need of Joachim and his Neapolitan contingent that the Emperor approached him with a moderately good grace and acceded to some of his demands.

That did not satisfy Murat. So apprehensive was he of losing his throne that, notwithstanding the guarantee implied by the promise of having a French Minister at Naples, he dared not believe in the possibility of retaining his throne so long as his ambassadors-designate to Austria and Russia had not assumed their functions. "The Court of Vienna," he wrote his brother-in-law, "has just officially notified us of the appointment of Monsieur le Comte de Miura (Mier) as Minister Plenipotentiary at the Court of Naples. The Prince de San Angelo has doubtless asked Your Majesty to sanction his departure for Vienna. I beg Your Majesty to grant his request ; for since, up to now, no objection has been made save on the score of expense, I may point out that it will cost me no more to maintain him in Vienna than in Paris. The same applies to the Minister whom I have accredited to St. Petersburg. Your Majesty has permitted the King of Westphalia to send his Minister here (Baron Hoeffling was the Westphalian Minister at Naples), and your continued refusal to allow my Ambassadors to proceed to their posts gives me proof that you have no longer the same confidence in me and that my existence as King of Naples is but precarious. The thought that I have forfeited your confidence causes me great distress, and I am prepared for whatever may take place." ¹

Thus in Murat's judgment everything pointed to his downfall. He looked upon himself as irrevocably banished from the Emperor's favour, and, like Louis, cast down from his throne. Until the date of the King of Rome's christening he was fated to remain a prey to constant anxiety, to be haunted by the hideous nightmare of

¹ Murat to Napoleon, January 2, 1811. *Archives Nationales*.

being exiled from the country to which he had come in triumph with his family and his friends. In his struggle with his brother-in-law he seemed to foresee his own defeat and to feel the ruthless clutch already at his throat. For two years he had kept up the fight, but his efforts had all been in vain. With all his puny force he had striven without avail to cast off Napoleon's suzerainty. He was too eager for power to content himself with being, in Berthier's phrase, a "viceroy," too ambitious to be satisfied with the position of a subordinate. He must needs figure among the foremost, and as second to none. Threats and admonitions had alike proved unavailing. Now, however, he believed he had a presentiment that his hour had come. Louis' fall appeared to him of evil omen. His own turn, he deemed, would come next. Louis was Napoleon's own brother, but between himself and the Emperor—whom, moreover, he had always thwarted—there existed no such ties of blood. Napoleon's exactions he looked upon as affording proof that he at last meant to drive him forth from Naples. As for submitting and ruling in accordance with the Emperor's dictation, this was more than he could bring himself to do. He meant to be free, to bend the knee to no one. In August 1810, being able to endure the strain no longer, he wrote to Caroline to confide in her all his trials and all his longings. It would be impossible to improve upon the picture which Murat has given of himself in that letter. "I will make an attempt, my gentle Caroline, to reply to your letter of the 3rd. You are perfectly right in all you say, and I assure you that you have thought of nothing which has not formed the subject of long and earnest consideration on my part. The line of conduct that I have pursued, as well as the feelings which inspired it, have shown that I have always seen eye to eye with you. . . . We can but be brave and act according to our lights and then await the issue

with calmness, preparing ourselves to support with resignation whatsoever it is not in our power to prevent. At present the Emperor is overwhelming me with burdensome conditions, compelling me to put my signature to an unjust treaty and to acknowledge a debt that is unjust still. He curtails my revenue, crushes my trade, paralyses my industries, commands me to undertake a ruinous expedition, orders me to build a fleet, hampers my trade and commercial relations with foreign countries, and, in a word, renders it impossible for me to bear the enormous burden which he lays upon my shoulders. He issues decrees with a high hand, gives his orders at Naples just as he does in Paris, and when the time is ripe and when, in obedience to the dictates of caprice or policy, he decides to oust me from the throne, the Duc de Cadore will prepare just such another pompous report upon the King of Naples as he drew up concerning the King of Holland. That, my dear one, is what I shall make every effort to avoid, both for your sake and for that of my dear children.

“ I know that the Emperor has a perfect right to insist that his system shall be carried out, and that it is our duty to consult him on every important step, political or non-political, that we may have to take ; but he should be our Mentor, not our Master. Kingship does not consist in obeying orders (*on n'est pas Roi pour obéir*). Again, how could he have announced to those peoples whose destiny he has confided to princes of his own family, that it was the duty of these same princes to set the welfare of France above the welfare of those over whom they rule ? What the aim of such a maxim could be I truly cannot conceive. Alas, ma chère Caroline, I could keep on fault-finding forever, but no useful purpose would be served by it. Let us rather have patience, and see to it that no real fault can ever be imputed to us, and await with resignation whatever issue it may

please Providence to ordain for us. I have determined to fulfil whatever the Emperor may desire, now or hereafter, and when the load becomes more than I can bear I shall beg him to take it upon his own shoulders.”¹

He would perhaps have been inclined to relinquish a throne which involved so many trials and vexations had it not been for the support which he found among certain members of his entourage. His glory was magnified, his ambitions were fomented by men who urged him forward as though to storm a redoubt, men who never let slip an opportunity of putting a false construction on the Emperor's actions, of making them the subject of subtle comments craftily designed to impress Murat with the belief that Napoleon was really his foe, and to convince him that they were fighting for his good when in reality they were striving solely for their own. These men were the Nationalists.

Long before Murat came to Naples, the ideas and watchwords imported into Italy by the French armies of the Revolution had inspired a movement in that country whose aims were summed up in the words “Freedom” and “A United Italy.” Averse from employing any but peaceful methods for the furtherance of their objects, they hoped to bring about the triumph of their cause by establishing a general union, a common understanding, amongst all whose hearts were fired by patriotic ideals. It was this movement that brought the secret societies into being. The Freemasons and the Carbonari united within their fold all who were zealous for the common cause, and thus it was that high and low, powerful and weak, found a place within their ranks. An English resident in Catania, writing in the year 1806, says, “There exists in Upper Italy a society whose members are animated by the lofty aim of bringing about the

¹ *Lettres et documents pour servir à l'histoire de Joachim Murat.* Vol. I., Introduction.

independence of Italy. This society, which has already been in existence for several years, and of whose members many have assumed the republican garb and the republican mode of speech, secretly hold that Italy should be governed by a single ruler, and that the constitution should partake, as far as circumstances will allow, of the characteristics of a limited monarchy.”¹

The union of French Italy was well calculated to secure the approbation of the patriotic party, since by welding together in one homogeneous whole all the petty states of the North, it had accomplished the most delicate of the tasks involved in the realisation of their ideal. It only remained now to bring together the two great divisions of the peninsula, that is to say, the French provinces in the North and the kingdom of Naples in the South. This done the whole of Italy would acknowledge one supreme ruler. It was a matter of small moment to the patriots whether that ruler were an Italian or a foreigner, provided only he were his own master. Thus Cassetti, an emissary in the employ of the Freemasons, was introduced by Queen Maria Carolina to Stewart, the English General, who provided funds for distribution among such of Murat's Ministers as were deemed to be able to use it to good advantage and to be in a position to promote the cause of Italian Freedom, as they termed it. English gold was apparently regarded by them as a valuable recruiting agency, and it seems probable that many who played a part in the propagandist work of 1813 and 1814 freely availed themselves of the means thus offered of winning adherents to their cause. Even in 1809, when an English fleet was threatening Ischia and Procida, certain members of the Masonic societies put themselves into communication with Stewart.² The negotiators on this occasion may have

¹ Johnston, *The Napoleonic Empire in Southern Italy*.

² Johnston, *The Napoleonic Empire in Southern Italy*.

been none other than the Cassetti, to whom reference has been made above, and his friend Bianchemani. Whether it was they who entered into a plot with the English General to bring about a popular riot on the Feast of SS. Peter and Paul, under cover of which an attempt was to be made to effect an entry into Naples, cannot be stated for certain, though there is nothing to discredit the theory.

It was to Murat that the patriots now turned their attention. As a satellite of Napoleon he had at first been regarded by them with natural suspicion. Maturer acquaintance, however, revealed that he was by no means the rigid and redoubtable overseer that their imagination had conjured up, and they discovered that he had a convenient way of putting upon the Imperial commands an interpretation consonant with his own interests. The defects of his character, the readiness with which he suffered himself to be influenced by others, swiftly became apparent, and those who were brought into close contact with him soon learned to take his true measure. Realising at once how weak was his will and how insatiate his ambition, they decided that, since their policy demanded a figure-head, Murat would well suit their purpose. He possessed the handsome exterior which stirs the enthusiasm of the common people, he boasted a military reputation that was second to none, and he had proved himself pre-eminently endowed with physical courage. But his vanity knew no bounds, and upon his vanity they determined to play till they persuaded him that his vulgar ambitions were the promptings of an exalted mind and he himself the heaven-sent champion of a noble cause. It was to prove all too easy a task to exploit his dissensions with his brother-in-law and to implant in him the belief that he was the victim of untold injustices, till at last all that was low-bred and contemptible in his nature—all the *aubergiste* in a word

—became apparent in the attitude of sullen hostility which he displayed to the sovereign whom he hated but dared not disobey. Admirably adapted as he was to become the tool of the Italian Cabal, the completeness of the ascendancy which they succeeded in establishing over him remains matter for astonishment. They it was who constantly succeeded in creating discord betwixt the King and Queen, who inspired the unfortunate terms in which Joachim replied to his brother-in-law's commands and remonstrances, and, finally, it was owing to their machinations, exercised at first in questions of minor import, but later in matters of the deepest moment, that a harmless disagreement grew into an open and relentless war. The leaven of hatred that these men contrived to instil into Murat's mind was the ultimate cause of the betrayal of 1814.

Who the men were who exercised such a far-reaching influence on the destinies of their country history does not disclose. They are never mentioned by name. In spite of this reticence on the part of the historians, we can conjecture with tolerable certainty the identity of some of the prime movers. The work which was finally accomplished was not conceived and carried out in a moment, and if we project our gaze forward to the year 1814 we may throw a light upon matters that would still remain shrouded in obscurity if we limited our investigations to what had only become manifest in 1810. Thus we may legitimately infer that such men as Colletta, Pepe, Carascosa, Zuccari, Paerio, Lecchi, and many others besides, whose names became prominent when events reached their climax, had been among those to whose labours that climax was due. By the light of the work which they wrought we are able to identify the men who strove long and faithfully in the cause of union, but whose brief hopes of victory were doomed to be quenched in the cold disillusionment of death. To their sons they

bequeathed the fire that had inspired them, and to their sons they handed on the task of rearing once more, upon a durable foundation, the edifice to which they themselves had vainly set their hand. That such men should find pliant instruments in Murat's Ministers is not to be marvelled at. Zurlo, for example, who was totally indifferent as to whether Joachim or Ferdinand was King of Naples so long as he held the power for which he hungered, was scarcely the kind of man to offer any strenuous opposition to their plans. Nor was Maghella, who sold his services to the English—and to the patriots too, perhaps—likely to prove a serious stumbling-block. Of all those who wielded any influence over Murat, the French alone were to be feared. They held the power, they had invaded the sacred soil, they had imposed their hated tyranny on the rightful possessors. In the struggle that was to be waged against them no quarter was to be given, no armistice allowed, till the intruders had been thrust successively from the palace, the kingdom, and from the peninsula itself. To this end all and each of them devoted their energies to the most multifarious activities. Never did the King evince displeasure or reluctance in obeying the mandates of his Imperial Master but they hastened to turn the incident to account. No sooner did they begin to gain an influence over the mind of Joachim than they resolutely set to work to bring about a cleavage between Naples and the Empire. The Neapolitans are an impressionable race, and it was by means of externals that they first sought to influence them. It happened that the means for so doing were supplied to them by Napoleon himself. He raised an objection to the French military titles being used in Naples. "We are," he observed, "forcibly impressed with a sense of incongruity when we are told, for example, that Monsieur La Vauguyon, who a year or two back was nothing more than a captain

in the French army, is now dubbed a colonel-général." That difficulty was easily adjusted. Murat changed the titles immediately. On the 20th September, two days after the Sicilian reverse, the title of Capitaine des Gardes was substituted for that of Colonel-Général. "I further propose," he added, "that, in future, generals of division, brigadier generals, and adjutant commandants shall be known as lieutenants-general, maréchaux de camp and adjutants-general." Joachim or his advisers were not slow in turning this incident to further account. "Sire," he said, "the same uniforms are worn at the Court of Naples as at the Court of Your Majesty, the same flag floats about our vessels, we wear the same tricolour cockade. I am aware that this ought not to be, and, in order to anticipate your wishes in the matter, I have already introduced some modifications in the matter of the uniforms, but I cannot adopt a new flag or a different cockade without your sanction. I therefore beg, Sire, that you will decide as to what national colours it would be proper for me to assume." Whether or not the necessary permission was granted, Joachim signed a decree on the 14th March proclaiming the new national colours, which were henceforth to be white, blue, and purple. As regards the flag the ground was to be sky-blue, the royal arms were to occupy the centre, while the extremities were to be decorated with a double border consisting of equal squares of alternate blue and white so arranged that the squares were separated from one another by the pale blue ground. These colours had been selected for the following reasons: Amaranth or purple was a favourite colour of the King's; white denoted union with France; sky-blue was the original national colour. The innovation gave rise to considerable comment. "It is imagined," says Nicola, "that this flag is a symbol of national independence." A week later,^f just after the promulgation of the decree, he adds,

"All sorts of fanciful ideas are current in connection with this change of flag, some people stating that it is a preliminary to casting off the French yoke." By slow degrees the work of separation continued. As we have seen from the letter he wrote to Caroline, Murat seemed to have made up his mind in advance to the loss of his throne, and the Sicilian reverse brought about a change in the nature of his conflict with the Emperor. Hitherto he had either performed the orders which came to him from Paris with obvious reluctance, or he had devised excuses for shirking them altogether. But from this time forth he began to take the offensive. He prescribed laws the tendency of which was undisguisedly "separatist"; he issued orders that were demonstrably hostile to French interests; and although these measures at first related to matters of small importance, they were destined to go on increasing in gravity till they culminated in High Treason. Murat was no longer a French prince seated on the throne of Naples; but "*Il Gioacchino*," as fervent a Neapolitan as any of his subjects. This metamorphosis he owed to the influence of the party who had gained his ear and to the spirit of rebellion with which they had inspired him; to the injustices—or what he deemed to be such—inflicted upon him by the Emperor, to his ambition, his vanity, and all the evil passions of his heart which grew and flourished under the fostering influence of the Italian Cabal. Such a change could not go unremarked, and the course of events at Naples attracted considerable notice. The King had his partisans; they were many, but obscure. He also had his detractors; they were few, but distinguished. The Neapolitan element was, of course, wholly attached to Murat. An endeavour was made to represent him as the champion of the nation against French aggression. The French party, on the other hand, tended to become alienated from the King and regarded him as too prone

to take sides against his country. Gradually there emerged two opposing factions. There was the Neapolitan or Nationalist group, with the King as its leader, on the one side; on the other was the French party, who wished to be led by the Queen, for at Naples it was Caroline who was the representative of France and the Imperial line.

Remote as he was from the scene of these events, Napoleon was aware of everything that passed. He knew what went on in the Palace; the dissensions of the King and Queen were no secret for him; nor was he ignorant of Joachim's grandiose ambitions, his revolutionary discourses, or the scornful tone which he adopted regarding every one and everything that was French. His emissaries supplied him with abundant evidence, and there were some matters upon which even his official agent, the French Chargé d'Affaires at Naples, deemed it his duty to report. Despite his "correspondance satirique" (the term is Caroline's), Grosbois was far too keen a psychologist not to have detected what it was vainly attempted to conceal from him. He quickly realised in what direction the Queen's wishes lay when, putting aside her mask one day, she asked him to let her know immediately the Emperor instructed him to make any representations to the Neapolitan Government, and to take no official steps until he had done so.¹ Furthermore, he was cognisant of the views that the King was in the habit of expressing in conversation, for the subject-matter of his remarks was repeated to him, and he was thus afforded convincing proof of Joachim's efforts to sever his connection with the French party. Equally clearly he saw through the endeavours that were being made by the members of Murat's entourage to bring about the rupture.

The Emperor, who, as we have said, was not unaware

¹ Grosbois to Champagny, Naples, September 24, 1810. *Affaires Étrangères*.

of the tenour of Murat's speeches, nevertheless refrained from writing to him. He must, however, have voiced his complaints to his intimates, since a variety of reports reached Joachim's ears. He heard tales of the Emperor's choler, rumours that his kingdom was to be annexed to the Empire, that the Kingdom of Poland was to be re-established and that he was to be its ruler—if he proved himself able to subdue it. On the 2nd April 1811, an event occurred to set the spark to Napoleon's wrath. "I have just received," he writes to Champagny, "the King's decree of the 29th February prohibiting the export of cotton. Send for his Ambassador and tell him that the King must rescind his order immediately . . . that he is deceived if he thinks he is going to reign at Naples otherwise than in accordance with my will and the interests of the Empire as a whole. Tell him plainly that, unless he changes his methods, I shall take possession of his kingdom and put it under a Viceroy, like Italy. Tell the Minister of France that the King is not acting as he should, and that whenever the Continental system has been departed from, I have not spared even my own brothers, and that I should be still less inclined to spare him. . . ."

As far as Murat was concerned it was no surprise for him to learn that Napoleon was dissatisfied with his conduct. All his paid agents sent him daily accounts of the Emperor's moods and utterances. He felt that a storm was gathering, and knew that if it burst there would be an end to the Kinglet of Naples. As early as October 1810, letters reached him from Paris which gave him positive information that the Emperor had thoughts of uniting Naples to the Grand Empire.¹ The blow had to be parried; the question was, how. Only two alternatives were open to him. He could bend the knee to the Emperor and put the best colour he could upon his action, or he could boldly lift up his head and front the

¹ Grosbois to Champagny. *Affaires Étrangères*.

storm. The first course was easy, for he could count on the services of one of the Emperor's nominees," to wit, Pérignon, the Governor of Naples, for Pérignon, though he may have been the Emperor's man, was Murat's man at least as much. It was not that he was by any means aware of all the plans of the King of Naples—the King of Naples scarcely knew what they were himself—but that he was prepared to acquiesce with tranquil indifference in all that was brought to his notice concerning them. The aims of the Italian Cabal—be what they might—never ruffled his equanimity. So far as he was concerned, governing Naples meant pocketing his large emoluments, a process which he carried on with no qualms of conscience. Such was the apologist whom Murat decided to select to convince the Emperor of the loyalty of his acts. "The forthcoming departure of Maréchal Pérignon has caused a sensation here," wrote Grosbois. "There are endless conjectures as to the object of his journey, and the secret mission with which he has been entrusted. It is generally considered that Maréchal Pérignon has been instructed to acquaint His Imperial Majesty with the uneasiness felt by His Sicilian Majesty touching the rumours which are going the round to the effect that the Kingdom of Naples is to be merged in the French Empire."

But Murat himself has revealed to us the object of this secret mission. "Sire," ran the letter he addressed to the Emperor on the 5th January 1811, "M. le Maréchal is proceeding to Paris. I have entrusted him with no specific mission to Your Majesty ; I have merely charged him to make perfectly unequivocal replies to any questions Your Majesty may see fit to put to him, and if, Sire, you will condescend to question him, your feelings towards me will once more be such as you were wont to entertain." ¹

¹ Murat to Napoleon. *Archives Nationales.*

Pérignon's apologetics did not apparently have the mitigating effect expected from them, for the sternness of Napoleon's attitude to his brother-in-law remained unaltered. Rumours of annexation continued to arrive from all quarters, and Murat recognised the necessity for playing a cautious game. It was at this juncture, when the way seemed to lie more clearly before him, when his ambitions appeared to be gathering shape, that he felt the need of his new allies, the Italian patriots, to conciliate his opponents and confirm the waverers. Whether he could count on the support of all the "Italians" is doubtful, but so his advisers gave him to understand. He now began to look upon himself as the soul of the Nationalist party. Though he forbore as yet to treat with the Emperor as an independent sovereign, he nevertheless considered himself strong enough to dare a struggle if the necessity arose. If Napoleon meant to give effect to his words and to deprive him of his throne, he was convinced that he would only have to give the word in order that the Emperor should discover that he had at his back the entire Neapolitan nation, united as one man for the defence of their King and the liberties of their country. Some such ideas as these were animating Murat in the discussion which he had with Durant, the French Ambassador, when they met for the first time in Rome.

"His Majesty, after expatiating warmly and at length on the manifold ties which united him to His Imperial and Royal Majesty, proceeded to speak to me of the loyalty of his subjects, *a loyalty which had been strengthened by the rumours of annexation, the only apparent effect of which had been to rally more firmly than ever round the Throne a people tenacious of their independence, &c., &c. . . .*"¹

¹ Durant to Champagny, March 27, 1811. *Affaires Étrangères*. The words in italics are underlined in the letter.

It was therefore no longer with a French Prince and an Admiral of France that Napoleon had to deal, but with the King of Naples, who was as much a Neapolitan as his own *lazzaroni*. His kingdom might still be a vassal state, but the King considered that "the affection of his subjects" rendered him supreme in his own realm and enabled him to cast off all personal allegiance to the Emperor. But he could not divest himself of uneasiness concerning the fate which his formidable brother-in-law was holding in store for him; and in order to relieve himself from further anxiety, he wrote to him on the 15th March as follows: "I am no longer able to resist the desire to see Your Majesty. Am I alone of your loyal friends to be denied the pleasure of being among the first to behold your illustrious offspring? No, Sire, the thought is unbearable to me, and I venture to ask your permission to spend a fortnight in Paris, as I can permit myself this brief absence without the slightest risk. I shall await your commands with impatience."

Such a visit would afford him the opportunity of discussing by word of mouth matters to which he did not dare refer on paper; he could attempt to explain his change of attitude, his Neapolitanism, so to speak, and his recent reforms (the change of flag had taken place just before this letter was written). On the morning of the 26th March an express messenger brought him the great news: the King of Rome was born! That evening Murat attended a performance at the San Carlo theatre, where he caused the event to be announced. He appeared to be delighted, and commanded the Duc de San Teodoro to set out that very night to offer his congratulations to the Emperor and Empress. But whether it was due to the Queen's advice, to that of his Italian counsellors, or to his own impatience, he countermanded the order, and at midnight resolved that

he would go himself. Next morning at seven o'clock he was en route for Paris, accompanied by General Déry. Twenty-four hours later he was at Rome. There he saw Durant, to whom he delivered himself of much exuberant eloquence, laying great stress on the prestige he had acquired in his kingdom, and revealing the apprehensions under which he laboured regarding the Emperor's supposed scheme for annexing Naples. At midday on the 2nd April he reached Lyons. Resuming his journey at six in the evening, he at last found himself in Paris at eight o'clock in the evening of the 3rd. "His Majesty," we are told, "proceeded direct to the Palais des Tuileries, and dined with the Emperor, to whom his arrival afforded the greatest pleasure. Thereafter His Majesty went to pay his respects to Madame Mère and the Princesse Pauline, and finally betook himself to the Palace in the Rue Saint Honoré which had been set apart for him during his visit."¹

If any importance was to be attached to public report, Murat's fears were not without foundation. When on his way to take up his diplomatic duties, Durant heard the same disquieting tales repeated throughout Italy, but nowhere so persistently as in Naples. In Paris, Campochiaro, the Neapolitan Ambassador, was seized with alarm. "The rumours of war," he wrote to Gallo, "and of the incorporation of Naples in the Empire, the talk about our King filling the new throne of Poland, at first vague enough, had by the end of March, and particularly after the birth of the King of Rome, obtained an alarming degree of credit." He alleged indeed that Champagny had already addressed him in terms that were lacking in correctness. The attitude of Napoleon himself seemed to afford grounds for uneasiness. In a conversation which he had on the 10th April with the Russian Colonel Tchernycheff, Alexander's aide-de-camp,

¹ Campochiaro to Gallo. Naples. *Archivio di Stato*.

who had arrived with a letter from his sovereign, the Emperor inquired whether Alexander Roumiantzoff and Tchernycheff himself credited him with the intention of re-establishing the Kingdom of Poland. The Russian confessed to thinking that the Emperor was harbouring some such idea in the back of his mind against the day when he should have no other war on hand. Whereupon His Majesty declared that the notion was inconceivable, and referred to it as a great "gaucherie," since by constantly telling him the same thing they might at length bring him to entertain the idea of making the attempt.¹

Such was the state of affairs when Murat reached Paris. Caroline, who knew her brother better than he, and discerned the ramifications of his policy with greater perspicacity, was not a whit less anxious. In reply to the Emperor's invitation to come to Paris, which the Comte de la Brieffe handed her on the 5th April, she sent a letter in which, while expressing her thanks to Napoleon for his kindness, she pleaded her recent miscarriage as the reason which compelled her to decline. Notwithstanding this, the united testimony of all who were about her at the time was to the effect that her health was excellent. The real reason of her refusal was that she dared not leave Naples, not knowing when, if ever, she would return. "I learned, from a source which left no room for doubt," writes Durant, "that the Queen was violently disquieted at the manner in which all these annexation rumours were gathering form and substance." The King's letters did nothing to diminish her anxiety; they had indeed the contrary effect. On the 6th May she resolved to unburden herself to the French Ambassador. "She questioned whether her departure at a time when the King's absence had already added force to the rumours which were disturbing the country would not have regrettable consequences. For a long time the Queen

¹ Jatischeff. *Alexandre et Napoléon* i^{er}.



MADAME MÈRE
From the collection of A. M. Bradley, Esq.

had dismissed the rumours of annexation which had reached her ears, but now they began to proceed from so many sources and were so uniform in tenour that the King's silence did not reassure her. The thought of leaving Naples, never perhaps to return, of being separated from her children, of leaving them behind in a country where she feared that trouble might break out any day, occasioned her so much pain and bitterness, that either she could not conceal from me what was in her mind or forbore to make the attempt. But she was above all anxious that I should share her views regarding the kingdom, those views being that if it be the Emperor's intention to incorporate it with the Empire, the process should be carried out with care and circumspection, since otherwise the tranquillity of the country might be imperilled and the ever active designs of the Sicilians and the English be assisted."¹

About her, every one is ill at ease. All eyes are turned towards Paris. The King was supposed to have departed for a few days only, and behold his absence already exceeds all anticipations. Rumours of the strangest and most varied description are going the round. Some say that Poland is to be made into a kingdom for Joachim; others that he is to have the command of the Spanish troops; while all unite in affirming that Naples is to be incorporated with the Empire. Officers of State are scared; ministers are seized with panic, and send Murat letter upon letter, what time the worthy lazzaroni, careless of what is passing, receive all these reports with the same equanimity, recking little by what name their ruler may be called, whether it be Gioacchino or "Nasone."

According to the Queen, Murat thought to be absent but a few days. He finds himself caught in his own trap. Once in Paris, to leave again is impossible. The

¹ Durant to Champagny. *Affaires Étrangères*.

Emperor has him and intends to keep him, and his first letters hold out little promise of an early return. Vainly he reiterates day after day his wish to go back to Naples. It cannot be. Even his Ambassador Campochiaro acknowledges that the thing is out of the question. "Although," says he, "the King is sensible how necessary his presence is to reassure his subjects, who view his absence with distress, he is obliged to defer to the will of the Emperor, and to abstain from making arrangements for his return until His Imperial Majesty judges that the time is ripe."¹ Vain too were the expressions of alarm which a number of Neapolitans forwarded from the kingdom to their friends and relatives in Paris, and which added fuel to the King's uneasiness. The Emperor was inexorable. Equally nugatory were the tidings sent by courier or *estafette* between Naples and Paris. Aymé arrives with a sheaf of dispatches; Cariati is sent off with papers for His Majesty. It is all of no avail. At last comes a ray of hope. The King writes to Naples early in May that he will quit Paris immediately after the baptismal ceremony, and that he will be in Naples before the end of June. It was therefore the Emperor who had ordained how long he should stay and when he should depart. What a bitter draught for the unhappy Murat! But there was no cure for it; he simply had to smother his rage, wait for orders and obey them.

Monotonous and interminable the days dragged on. Continued rumours of annexation were bewildering his brain. They reached him from every quarter: from the Court, from Paris, from Naples, and from other sources as well, for all the foreign ambassadors were keenly watching developments, apprehensive of fresh crises in the world of politics. Suddenly a change came over the situation. On the 11th May Campochiaro sent a dispatch to Gallo in which he sounded the fanfare of triumph,

¹ Campochiaro to Gallo, April 24, 1811. Naples. *Archivio di Stato*.

and announced that the King would henceforth be visited by no misgivings regarding the stability of his position. Murat, overjoyed at being able to retain both his kingdom and his liberty, hastened without losing a day to send the good news to his Queen. His letters set her mind completely at rest. He also forwarded a dispatch to his Minister, from the length and exuberance of which we can gauge the state of mental torment from which he had emerged. It also was a paean of victory.

"I am aware," he wrote, "of the base attempts that have been made to provoke unrest in my capital and among the good folk of my provinces. I know that, in order to spread abroad a feeling of insecurity, ridiculous rumours have been promulgated in which the incorporation of this country with the Empire and the re-establishment of the Kingdom of Poland have been declared to be imminent. It would argue considerable obtuseness not to see that such reports are merely a clumsy plot on the part of the English. A man must be blind or totally ignorant of the political situation if he fails to perceive that England's only means of extricating herself from the impossible position into which the Emperor's policy has forced her, lies in the chance of rekindling hostilities on the Continent. But whatever hopes she may have entertained in this direction have been frustrated by the alliance between France and Austria. She has therefore been compelled to bring her nefarious policy to bear upon Russia. She hoped, and the hope has to some extent been justified by the event, that success would crown her efforts if she laid stress on the annexation of Naples and the re-establishment of the Kingdom of Poland, for the annexation of Naples would inevitably involve the necessity of finding another kingdom for its ruler, and by putting forward Poland in this connection the British Cabinet felt confident of setting Russia in arms, since Poland could only be meddled

with at the price of a war with the Czar. Such is the origin of all these ridiculous rumours. That they have not completely failed to produce the results anticipated by England is proved by the fact that Russia has put herself in a posture of defence, and that France has been compelled to take precautions against a sudden attack. It now seems plain, however, that the aims of England have been recognised in their true light, and that the two Great Powers are on the eve of an *entente*. How, moreover, could it be imagined that a man of the Emperor's genius would fail to see that before overturning monarchies which he himself had established, or founding fresh ones, it was his duty to consolidate the work he had already achieved. How could it fail to strike any one that the geographical position of Naples and the peculiar temper of its inhabitants would render its incorporation anything but an advantage to the Empire? Who could entertain any doubt that on the peace of Naples depends the peace of the rest of Italy, or imagine that such obvious facts had escaped the keen eye of the Emperor? Was not the last war a case in point? With the Viceroy forced back on the Adige and the Emperor on the right bank of the Danube, the whole of Italy would have been ablaze—the case of Spain would have been re-enacted—had not the King of Naples remained at his post. Then again, what a juncture to select for the Emperor to effect such a change! His armies have just evacuated the whole of Portugal and a part of Spain. The English, puffed up with these early successes, are about to concentrate all their efforts on the Peninsula, and Masséna's retreat has just given fresh hope to the Spaniards. Is it likely that the Emperor would transfer the seat of war to the Vistula with a formidable army within six days' march of his frontiers? The situation is at all events such as to necessitate the Emperor's remaining at the centre of his own dominions,

and who, such being the case, would undertake the command of his forces? What General would take it upon himself to direct the operations of an army destined to take the field against Russia? Not one; for we are all convinced that neither his troops nor success can be commanded by any save the Emperor. All the Emperor's energies, therefore, should be devoted to the maintenance of peace and the conservation of his possessions. Above all he must avoid a continental war, for by such a policy alone can England be brought to her knees. Twelve months' fighting in Europe would retard for ten years the dealing of that crushing blow at England from which the Emperor's policy has left her no escape. Such, Monsieur le Ministre, is the true state of affairs. Make it plain in word and deed.

"In conclusion, I give my word that no annexation shall take place so long as my subjects maintain the attitude I have caused them to take up. Only let my Government *follow* (the italics are Murat's) my lead with courage, and the Nation's freedom and happiness are assured."¹

What had happened to account for such a song of triumph? Could it be that the "scene" to which everything pointed as inevitable when Murat went to Paris had actually taken place, and that Murat had emerged from the struggle with his colours flying? Such is the construction which Campochiaro puts upon the matter. "The untoward events in Spain have been occupying the Emperor's attention, and the example thus afforded of the efforts which a nation will put forth to retain its freedom, have naturally produced a certain reluctance to wound the susceptibilities of a people so violently attached to their rulers as the Neapolitans. The possibility of a rupture with Russia, and the unlikelihood of any support being forthcoming from the Court of Austria, were con-

¹ Murat to Pignatelli, May 12, 1811. *Archivio di Stato.*

me with delight. The existence of such a bond between my sister and my son will be a source of great pleasure to me, and it will afford the King of Rome an additional claim to your affection. Accept the assurance of the tender regard and profound esteem with which I remain Your Majesty's affectionate brother.¹

That is scarcely the sort of language that would be indulged in by one who harboured the dark design of depriving Murat of his kingdom. Except as regards the permission to depart, all the evidence tends to show that while in public Murat, with his sentries at his gate and his escort round his carriage, was certainly treated as a King, he was in private equally regarded as a friend. "Everything went off in the most peaceable manner possible," says Campochiaro. "The Emperor never had a single day of ill-humour, and apart from the anxieties that were weighing on his mind, the King, during the whole course of his stay in Paris, had every reason to congratulate himself on his visit."

Let us now revert to the period of Joachim's arrival. On the 3rd April, at eight in the evening, Murat was at the Tuileries. It was a time of trouble. The Emperor was grappling with the Russian crisis, and next day sent the following order to the Duc de Feltre. "The nine regiments of cuirassiers which I have in France are to hold themselves in readiness for active service, as well as the two divisions of carabineers, it being my intention to create four divisions of heavy cavalry. . . . In Germany I have six regiments of light cavalry. These, with ten thousand cuirassiers, four thousand dragoons and four thousand Guards, make up a cavalry force of thirty-four thousand men." Was it in his mind to give the command to Murat? With him nothing was impossible. The same day he sent a letter to Clarke telling

¹ *Correspondance*, 17,638.

him to order all the generals and colonels of the army of Germany to proceed to their posts.¹ He also wrote to Davout in Hamburg as follows: "I sent you word that if occasion required you would have to throw yourself with the utmost rapidity upon Dantzic. But we have not yet reached that stage, I imagine." Two days later he wrote a letter to the Emperor Alexander demanding an explanation of his military preparations. With the possibility of war breaking out at any moment, it is not a matter for astonishment that he should have entertained the idea of keeping Murat at his side, for it was to him *par excellence* to whom choice, possibly even necessity, would point as the man to strike the first blow with his cavalry. At an hour when Napoleon was ordering every man to his post, it would certainly have been ill-advised to send his brother-in-law uselessly careering on the road to Naples, when every minute might bring the tidings that the long-expected war had been declared at last. He therefore detained him, not indeed as a prisoner whose sentence was still under consideration, but as a soldier of whose skill he might avail himself in the execution of his immediate plans. This would account for the length of Murat's stay and for the Emperor's attentions to him and his Queen. About the 26th or the 27th of April, however, counsels of peace appear to have prevailed in the Emperor's mind, and on receipt of reassuring intelligence, he brought the army of Germany to a standstill.² On the 7th of May, his uncertainties had practically disappeared. "The messages from Russia," he wrote Davout, "are full of assurances from the Emperor Alexander of his desire for the continuation of peace and the maintenance of the alliance. There appears therefore to be no ground for crediting Russia with any desire to commence hos-

¹ *Correspondance.*

² Letter to Clarke. *Correspondance*, 17,604.

tilities." Since the contingency of a war with Russia seemed thus finally removed, there was nothing to prevent him from suffering Joachim to take his departure. It was at this moment that he had his decisive interview with the King, but far from receiving advice from the latter or listening to his upbraidings, it was in all probability he that assumed the lead in the conversation, and gave Joachim the guarantees for which he asked, and which a leader of men like Napoleon could not have withheld from so brilliant and indispensable a coadjutor. It was his incomparable genius as a cavalry leader that won for Murat the Emperor's permission to go back to Naples, though that permission was subject to the formal undertaking that he would return at the first summons.

Murat's confidence was restored as soon as he was assured that his sojourn in Paris was to be merely temporary. He therefore accepted with pleasure the Emperor's invitation of the 15th May asking him to Rambouillet, whither he set out that very same day.¹ It is possible indeed that he would have still further prolonged his stay, had he not received on the 18th dispatches from Agar, Zurlo and Maghella, couched in such panic-stricken language that he decided to make request to the Emperor for permission to depart immediately.

"My departure," he said, "cannot interfere with your plans, while it may restore confidence among my people."² Napoleon, who had no longer any reason for refusing his permission, gave a most favourable reception to Joachim's request. Not only did he grant him leave to depart, but even told Bassano to censure Durant, his newly appointed Minister at Naples, though the latter's sole fault throughout the whole business had

¹ Campochiaro to Gallo, May 16, 1811. Naples, *Archivio di Stato*.

² Murat to Napoleon, May 19, 1811. *Affaires Étrangères*.



THE DUKE OF REICHSTADT (NAPOLEON II)
*From a painting, probably by Daffinger. In the possession of
Dr. August Heymann of Vienna*

been to read the situation too clearly. The 20th May, the day preceding the Emperor and Empress's departure for Cherbourg and Rochefort, he spent with them at Rambouillet. After bidding farewell to Napoleon he returned to Paris at night, and on the 22nd May, as soon as it was light, commenced his journey to Naples.

CHAPTER VI

THE TWO DECREES

The King arrives in Naples—His state of mind—The Decree of the 14th June—Its effect in Naples—The Emperor's rejoinder—Durant's procedure—The King retracts—Neapolitan opinion—The "affaire Daure"—The Emperor's attitude—Will Murat keep his throne?—Dismissal of La Vauguyon—The Queen's departure—Position of the King—His humiliations—He obeys the Emperor—Gaëta, the naval contingent, finances—Relations with England—The Queen's mission in Paris.

"**T**HOUGH no explanation of the circumstance is forthcoming," wrote the Ambassador of France, "it is nevertheless a fact that the King has returned from Paris in a state of irritation, which the anti-French party lose no opportunity of fomenting. This irritation is at present only reflected in matters of trifling importance, but one cannot help fearing that it will extend to affairs of deeper moment."¹ The King's ill-humour is not difficult to explain when it is remembered that he had been much more a prisoner than a visitor in Paris, and that for several days every one there had looked upon his departure in the light of a phenomenon. "An event has taken place here that has caused the greatest sensation; the King of Naples has departed without waiting for the christening of the King of Rome. The circumstance has given rise to much speculation, and some people go so far as to imagine either that there was a quarrel between the Emperor and the King, or that he was compelled to leave because the English had effected a landing and were marching on his

¹ Durant to Bassano, Naples, June 18, 1811. *Affaires Étrangères*.

capital.”¹ What a contrast was afforded between his departure, which had all the appearance of a flight, and his entry into Naples! “The King arrived this morning at nine o’clock,” wrote Gallo to Campochiaro on the 30th May. “The guns proclaiming His Majesty’s return have aroused the enthusiasm of the entire population, and to-night there is to be a spontaneous illumination of the city.” The “spontaneous illumination” thus announced in advance is a quaint touch, but its quaintness did not worry Gallo, and it was his master’s pleasure that all should know of the enthusiasm displayed by the inhabitants of the capital on the occasion of the happy and unlooked-for return of the King, and the transports of joy and delight with which the news had been received in the provinces.”²

Though the enthusiasm may have been indebted for its keenness to the imaginative flourishes of the ministerial pen, it must be confessed that the warmth with which his Court welcomed his return, and the flattery that was lavished upon him, formed a marked contrast to the chilling aloofness displayed towards him by the satellites of Napoleon. The champions of national independence, whose ideals, if they did not embrace a united Italy, at all events aimed at freeing their country from the foreign yoke, lost no opportunity of making him feel the irksomeness of the bonds by which his brother-in-law held him in thrall. The moment was a favourable one for their purpose, and “the King’s mind was unceasingly fed with false ideas of independence, which he eagerly absorbed.”³ The attempt was made to convince him—and the endeavour met with prompt success—that the French were his enemies. Though to carry their point the Nationalists had to wound their sovereign’s most

¹ Campochiaro to Gallo. Naples, *Archivio di Stato*.

² Gallo to Campochiaro, Naples. *Archivio di Stato*.

³ Durant to Bassano. *Archives des Affaires Étrangères*.

intimate susceptibilities, this did not give them pause ; and while they dared not strike at the Queen herself, they did not hesitate to aim high, and to impute every species of delinquency to those who enjoyed her patronage or possessed her affection. Even while the King was in Paris, Maghella, his Prefect of Police, who was at once the tool of the English and the Italian Nationalists, sent him an insidious message. "We have now come to be told that the Regency will be provisionally entrusted to the Queen, who, it is further stated, may be summoned to Rome to act as Governor-General. Your Majesty will at once recognise the source of this information."¹ This source was, of course, none other than Daure, the lover and the agent of the Queen, and the man who monopolised the control of the Police, the War Office and the Navy. It was therefore decided to make every sort of complaint against him as soon as the King reached home. There would be no difficulty in instigating the fiery Murat to take measures which, though ostensibly aiming at Daure alone, should be subsequently employed as a weapon against the French in general. Only a day or two after his arrival, Murat's animus against the Emperor had grown so strong that on the 7th June he decided to do away with the office of Governor-General of Naples. It was not that he had any personal grudge against Pérignon ; that is clear, for he sent him, through Campochiaro, a letter and a packet, the latter containing His Majesty's portrait, the former his thanks for services rendered in his capital. Unwittingly making himself the tool of the Italian Cabal, he thus asserted, in the presence of those whom he imagined to be his devoted supporters, that independence which he held so dear. Meanwhile, his advisers had completed the drafting of the decree

¹ This document, which is to be found in the *Archives Nationales*, is unsigned, but the writing is so similar to that of Maghella, that there can be no doubt regarding its authorship.

which, according to Murat, was to rid him of "the Frenchmen who aided and abetted the Queen in her intrigues (Daure, the Longchamps, Montrond and the rest)," ¹ but which according to its framers would be a first decisive blow at French influence. At length the decree was ready, and the following were its terms: "All foreigners holding civil appointments in our Realm must, in terms of Clauses 2 and 3 of Article 11 of the Constitution, lodge an application for naturalisation between the date hereof and the first day of August next. Such persons as shall have failed to comply with this regulation shall be regarded as having voluntarily resigned their appointments."

Murat was so impressed with the idea that he was being made to say more than he intended, that for several days he kept the decree in his pocket, though it was quite ready for publication. But when the representations of the Nationalists became urgent, his scruples dwindled and his hesitation vanished. Vainly did the Queen endeavour to prevent the publication of the decree. On the 14th June its terms were already known to a few, and on the 15th the King, only too well aware of the effect such a measure was likely to have on the Emperor, and being anxious to forestall an outburst, sent off a copy to Paris. Bassano, with whom Campo-chiaro was in close touch, was to be the mediator in this delicate business, and the decree was to pass through his hands before it reached Napoleon.

"By command of His Majesty," wrote Gallo to the Neapolitan Ambassador in Paris, "I hasten to send you a copy of his decree in order that you may immediately and in confidence make it known to the Minister for Foreign Affairs before there is time for any wrong colour or insidious interpretation to be put upon a measure which is, in reality, so thoroughly in accordance with the

¹ *Mémoires d'une inconnue.*

intentions of His Majesty the Emperor.”¹ On the following day, the 16th, the process of promulgation began at Naples. “I send you my decree regarding the foreigners in its final form,” wrote the King to Pignatelli. “Send it on to my Ministers and inform the Minister of Police that it is my intention to have it printed and published in all the newspapers.” The same day it was forwarded to the heads of the Executive, and finally, on the 18th June, it was inserted in the *Monitore* of the Two Sicilies. What arguments were adduced to justify it? If Murat was to be believed, the French who were in Naples were scarcely of a sort to enhance the credit of the kingdom. “Your Majesty will doubtless receive numerous and conflicting accounts regarding this measure, but you will appreciate them at their true worth when I tell you that two-thirds of the Frenchmen in this country are either bankrupt or hopelessly in debt, and that having been obliged to flee from France, they are for the most part living here under assumed names, and that, apart from eight or ten persons whom I brought with me, all came in the train of the army, and only remain in this country because they are able to find means of existence here which they would not easily discover elsewhere.”² Thus, with the exception of the eight or ten privileged persons, the French, according to Murat, were so many *canaille* and quite beneath the Emperor’s attention. “I see no likelihood of difficulty,” added Murat, “save in the case of those who hold ministerial appointments or important positions at Court. They do not and cannot show any reason whatever for claiming exemption from the necessity of becoming naturalised. How could I, in fact, repose any confidence in men under whose protection I lie down to sleep, if those very men hesitated to adopt the new country which I have been called upon to adopt

¹ Gallo to Campochario, June 15, 1811. Naples, *Archivio di Stato*.

² Murat to Napoleon, Castellamare, June 18, 1811. *Affaires Étrangères*.

myself? Should they refuse, these men of distinction who find it impossible to cease to remain your subjects will be given back to you. I trust that Your Majesty will approve of a measure which is in absolute harmony with the Constitution of which you are the guarantor, and which you have officially called upon me to administer."

This then is clear. If Murat left his subordinates to decide the fate of the small fry, he himself intended to compel the members of his court and his ministers to become naturalised, though he well knew that none of them would consent. Thus for him once more the matter was purely a personal one. With the general body of Frenchmen he scarcely concerned himself at all.

It might have been thought, however, that a measure directed solely against civilians would fail of its effect in respect of the very persons whom the King was most anxious to assail, since Daure the War Minister, and Lanusse the Grand Marshal of the Palace, were both soldiers.

But Murat had no intention of concealing his purpose. On the 16th June, "when dinner was over, the King, addressing himself to General Exelmans, and asking him what sort of opinions were being expressed regarding the decree, added that every one attached to his Court, particularly those who held the principal offices of the Crown, ought to make their choice immediately, and that he should not regard them with favour if they hesitated." ¹ Not only therefore were they called upon to submit to the decree, but they were required to do so with alacrity. Such was not their view of the matter, and the most highly placed among them never wavered for an instant. No sooner was the decree published than the Minister of Finance (Agar), the Minister of War (Daure), and the Chief Equerry (Exelmans) all declared

¹ Durant to Bassano, Naples, June 18, 1811. *Affaires Étrangères*.

that it was asking more than their lives. The most defiant, the first to proclaim his opposition to the decree and to set the example to the rest, was General Exelmans, who did not hesitate to tell the King as he pointed to the words *Honneur et Patrie* on the Cross of the Legion of Honour which adorned his breast, that if he renounced the one he would lose the other. Accordingly, on the 22nd June, he had decided to say farewell, as also had Lanusse, the Grand Marshal. There was not a Frenchman among them who did not avow his desire to leave Joachim's service, and General Grenier, in conversation with the King, did not conceal the regrettable effect which his decree had produced, and the unanimity with which the French would follow the example of the Chief Equerry and the Grand Marshal. Whether Murat, having escaped for a space from his anti-French advisers, realised in a rare moment of lucidity the extent and gravity of his proceedings we cannot say, but it is at all events the fact that after confiding in Grenier the pain which the Frenchmen's decision had caused him, he decided to adopt milder measures. Exelmans and Lanusse were not destined to go. "It is confidently stated that many others will be similarly exempted, and that as a result the sole effect of the decree will be to remove those whose conduct has given just cause for complaint."¹ Everything therefore appeared to be settling down. Murat would be free to satisfy his anger or his jealousy, and expel at his own good pleasure Caroline's counsellors and friends. For the French in general then there was no occasion for uneasiness; the decree, enforced against a few, would not affect the majority. Even at this date there had been explanations with General Déry, who was to remain because he was a soldier, and urgent appeals to Baudus, who was staying on because he had been all but begged to do so. Clearly

¹ Durant to Bassano, June 24, 1811. *Affaires Étrangères*.

then there was nothing sternly immutable about the new regulation. It would be twisted to suit every requirement. The French could breathe freely; the mountain had brought forth a mouse.

At Naples "the stir was considerable. Many Neapolitans, not perhaps the best-intentioned, are making much of their victory,"¹ and although the King's measures may not in his mind have exceeded the importance of a Court intrigue, the men who inspired them and possibly drew them up, took care that the public should labour under no uncertainty regarding their scope. The Neapolitans who had not the *entrée* to the palace looked upon the whole business as an anti-French demonstration and a grave affront to the Emperor. Opinions on the subject were all the stronger on account of the eagerness of the anti-French faction to drive home their advantage. On the 19th June, the day after the publication of the decree, "Zurlo summoned to the Secrétairerie all who belonged to Sicilian families. He told them that the King had taken their case into consideration, and had decided as a preliminary token of clemency to grant them a subsidy; that he was their King, their ruler and their father, and that he looked upon them as his subjects, and that, as such, they ought to be acquainted with his intentions regarding their island."² One can imagine the applause, the shouts of "Viva il Re" which greeted this pronouncement, and particularly the mark of royal generosity with which it was accompanied. There had been no difficulty in convincing Joachim that a little generosity (which would cost him little since the expenses would be paid out of the money due to France) would win him the affection of a large section of his subjects and their friends, and prove another point to the good for the anti-French movement.

¹ Durant to Bassano, June 22, 1811. *Affaires Étrangères*.

² *Diario di Nicola*.

All were anxious to take advantage of the crisis for the furtherance of their own aims. While some were animated by the heroic but premature longing for a free and united Italy, there were others who merely looked upon Murat as an instrument for bringing about the downfall of France, an object to which they ignobly lent their aid in return for the money or the promises of her enemies. But all united to set him up against the Emperor, though taking care to protect themselves against any untoward consequences that might ensue. "The King deceives himself indeed regarding the state of the country," writes Durant, "if he imagines that he is strong enough there to dispense altogether with the co-operation of France. This absolute confidence in the Neapolitans, this excessive tendency to place exclusive reliance on their zeal and ability, ought to have been the result of time, of a long period of preparation. By his precipitation the King has incurred the risk of furthering interests that are quite inimical to his own. For if we look at the matter carefully, what grounds for security are offered by the men on whom he leans, or by the country itself? Can he doubt that the English and the Court of Palermo have agents here who are incessantly at work, and who are in collusion with all sorts and conditions of people from the most influential (an allusion to Zurlo and Maghella) to the very lowest? It is but a few days ago that two sloops belonging to the royal fleet, cruising off the Sicilian coast, were taken by their crews into one of the ports of the island. There is no doubt about this occurrence, and it is a proof not only of the activity but also of the success with which the Neapolitans may be seduced from their allegiance." ¹

Durant was right, but he could not alter the course of events. Though Murat, when discussing matters with Grenier on the 23rd June, recognised that his decree had

¹ Durant to Bassano, Naples, July 9, 1811. *Affaires Étrangères*.

overshot the mark, he did not modify his conduct. His "camarilla" had him in their grip, and the pusillanimity which he had manifested in the early application of the original decree determined them to resume their subterranean tactics. "An attempt is being made in some quarters to stir up trouble between the King and Queen with the special object of exciting the King's jealousy of his Consort's influence, a jealousy which sometimes causes him to treat her in a manner that is scarcely just or kind."¹ Joachim's attitude now underwent a complete and instantaneous transformation. The French, who had been congratulating themselves on being out of harm's way, were now exposed to the full fury of the storm. "Despite all assurances to the contrary, despite the undertakings of the King himself, no mitigation was proposed or discussed at the Ministerial Council, and the decree holds good in all its rigour."²

The whole Court was now in a ferment, and the issue of the struggle between France and her foes was awaited with keen anxiety. Though none could foretell with certainty, all felt instinctively how the day would go. The King's ardour blinded his caution, and he was too stupid to appreciate the realities of the situation. What though he was hastening to his own doom, the path was strewn with so many seductive lures, that he scarce allowed himself breathing space ere he began to rush more blindly than ever towards the fascinating but fatal mirage of Independence.

A decree of the Emperor brings him suddenly to the halt. "Whereas our Decree of the 30th March 1806 provided that the Kingdom of Naples should be considered as part of the Grand Empire, and whereas the Prince its Governor is a Frenchman and a high dignitary of the Empire, owing his accession to and maintenance

¹ Durant to Bassano, July 4, 1811. *Affaires Étrangères*.

² *Idem*, July 9, 1811.

upon the throne solely to the efforts of our people, we decree as follows :—

“ All French citizens are citizens of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, and the decree of the 14th June last shall not be applicable to them.”

Though the thunders of the Imperial wrath were soon to break on Murat's head, the relations between Paris and Naples were so far amicable enough, and had been since Joachim's return. Campochiaro's reports were perfectly satisfactory. At the very last audience he had had, their Majesties had referred to his Sovereigns, and remarked how pleased they were that the King had arrived home in safety. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, too, was still well disposed, still “ confidential ” towards Campochiaro. As a matter of fact the Emperor was far too busily engaged to seek a quarrel with Murat. Russia, who was contemplating an alliance with England, was engrossing his attention. He scented war, and was anxious to be well armed for the struggle.

First of all he requested Murat to concentrate certain forces (consisting in all of twelve battalions) in one or at most two camps under the command of a French General. This move was in reality only a preliminary stage in a far-reaching scheme which he had devised. Three “ corps d'observation ” were to be reorganised, and the “ Corps de l'Océan ” was to be distributed among three camps, one each at Boulogne and Utrecht, and the third in the neighbourhood of Emden. These camps were to be formed between the 15th August and the 1st September. The next orders concerned Naples. “ You will receive a decree,” he wrote to Clarke on the 24th (the decree went forward the same day) “ disbanding the army of Naples and forming a ‘ corps d'observation ’ for Southern Italy. This corps will be under the command of General Grenier, and will consist of a division and three brigades. Its headquarters must be fixed in as healthy a spot as possible

between Naples, Capua, and Gaeta. It is to be under the sole command of General Grenier, who will correspond with you direct and take his orders from you. It shall not take any part in policing the country, nor shall it be under the control of any officer in the service of Naples. You will notify the King of my decree, and explain to him that, being under the necessity of concentrating all my troops, I have disbanded the army of Naples and formed a 'corps d'observation' under General Grenier, and that I shall allow this force to remain in the kingdom of Naples until such time as I am assured that its presence can be safely dispensed with. As long as it remains within the kingdom of Naples the corps shall be fed, paid, maintained, and clothed at the expense of the Neapolitan Treasury. You will write to General Grenier informing him that this corps, which must be stationed somewhere between Naples and Gaeta, must be ready between the 1st and 15th August to proceed whithersoever its services may be required." ¹

While thus occupied with the reorganisation of the army, the Emperor had also been turning his attention to the navy. He stated that the camp at Boulogne would have to be reinforced, and that it was possible that he would make a descent upon England. With

¹ *Correspondance*, 17,849. It has been alleged that the order of the 24th June had its origin in the irritation felt by the Emperor against Murat. But the King's decree could not have come to Napoleon's notice until the 27th June, or at all events there is nothing to prove that Napoleon knew of it on the 24th. Now all the measures supposed to have been taken by the Emperor on the 6th July, as so many safeguards against the King of Naples, had already found a place in the letter of the 24th June. On the other hand, the purport and terms of the letter of the 24th are perfectly easy to understand if we revert to the general reorganisation scheme as outlined above, which at this moment was absorbing the attention of Napoleon. It therefore manifestly follows that these decisions of his did not in the least imply any resentment against Murat. Not until he learnt of the decree of the 14th June did the Emperor adopt stern measures against his brother-in-law by giving orders (which he did not do in the letter of the 24th June) for the occupation of Neapolitan strategic positions.

these ideas in view he sent a message to Naples on the 26th June (the mildness of the letter was in singular contrast to the orders which he usually gave) requesting that the King should endeavour to furnish his naval contingent. Such was Napoleon's indulgent and peaceable frame of mind when Joachim's decree was placed in his hands. One can readily picture the amazement and fury of the Emperor. At what precise moment it entered his mind to issue his decree of the 6th it is not possible to determine. There is no document in existence to-day which throws any light on the matter. A vague trace of what was coming is discernible in a report from Bassano to Napoleon concerning the latter's right to the throne of Naples and the right of French citizens to be publicly employed there without the obligation of taking out papers of naturalisation. This was on the 1st July, and for five days there was not another word. But on the sixth the Emperor made up his mind. "Send General Grenier," he wrote to Clarke, "a duplicate of the command I have given for the disbanding of the army of Naples and the formation of a 'corps d'observation' under his orders, and inform him that whatever opposition may be offered by the King of Naples, all the French are to receive their orders from him (Grenier). Say that the King of Naples appears to be yielding himself up to the suggestions of the enemies of France, and that I have already pointed out to him the madness of his acts. Tell General Grenier to see to it that a garrison is put into Gaeta and the possession of the place secured, without however allowing his object to become apparent. He must impress upon the French and all who form part of the Guard that they are still French and regarded by me as such, and that by Imperial decree French citizens are also citizens of Naples. He must lend his aid to my Minister, and second him in extricating the King from his present false position. The King must be told

that if his conduct continues to be so far removed from that which duty and gratitude alike impose upon him, he will be sternly called to order. General Grenier must speak firmly, and support my Minister as being in command of an army corps, and not as a subordinate.”¹

Simultaneously Bassano sent Durant the decree of the 6th July, and caused the necessary protests to be formulated at Naples. “It is the will of His Majesty that you should express his dissatisfaction to the Marquis di Gallo and the other ministers in touch with the King. You will also give the Minister of Police to understand that he is suspected of being implicated in the intrigues of Queen Caroline (of Sicily) and of advising the King in such a manner as to bring about his overthrow.

“His Majesty is in general displeased with the direction given to affairs. Orders are being sent to General Grenier to bring the troops together, whatever the King’s views on the subject may be, and to take steps to have them well in hand. In all probability His Majesty’s commands will be quietly submitted to at Naples, but in the event of there being any grumbling or murmurs of resistance, you could spread the report that twenty thousand men were marching on Naples from Italy.”²

These dispatches, which were handed to a trustworthy messenger, reached Naples on the 16th. Durant received his about three in the afternoon, and immediately hurried off to see Gallo. In the course of a prolonged interview “he explained the various just causes of complaint that the King’s behaviour had afforded the Emperor, and set forth the reasons which should induce the King to return

¹ *Correspondance*, 17,894. *Vide* letter from Clarke to Grenier (July 7, 1811). *Archives Nationales*.

² Bassano to Durant, July 7, 1811. *Affaires Étrangères*. The minute of the *Archives* is erroneously dated the 8th. This despatch of Bassano’s certainly reproduces, to some extent literally, orders that had been issued by the Emperor, whose letter to the Minister for Foreign Affairs is unluckily no longer extant.

to a line of conduct more in harmony with his obligations, his interests, the welfare of France, and the invincible determination of His Imperial Majesty.”¹

Gallo undertook to see Joachim next day, but when the next day came Joachim was “in a high fever” and refused to listen to a word on any subject whatever. The Minister would come in the morning and return to the charge in the evening, but his efforts were vain. For three days the door was shut against everybody. No one was supposed to see the King, neither Durant nor Gallo, nor Daure the Minister of War; one person only retained access to him, and that was Zurlo. Was he his counsellor?

Murat, though he had refused admittance to Gallo when he came with the French note, knew very well what that note contained. If he was not acquainted with the precise wording, he was at all events aware of its general tenour. The reports which he received from his emissaries Aymé and La Vauguyon no doubt informed him how he was regarded by the Emperor. Nevertheless, he was utterly disconcerted at Napoleon’s measure of the 24th June providing for the creation of a “corps d’observation” for Southern Italy, notwithstanding that the measure had been inspired by no hostile intentions against himself. His state of mind suggests the guilty unrest of the evildoer forever on thorns lest his crime be discovered. This new departure “gave rise to conjectures which seemed to fill the Court with the liveliest apprehensions—apprehensions which were apparently increased by the terms employed in the order appointing General Grenier to the command of the French division stationed within the kingdom.”² It was in vain that

¹ Durant to Bassano, July 16, 1811. *Affaires Étrangères*.

² Benkendorff to Roumantzoff, July 11, 1811. *Archives Nationales*. The new arrangements made were dispatched to Murat by Clarke on the 27th June. The orders therefore reached Naples about the 6th or 7th July.

Campochiaro, after an interview with Bassano (who was grossly deceiving or grossly deceived), sent word that the latter had assured him of the Emperor's complete approval of the decree.¹ His letter addressed to Gallo reached Naples on the 22nd July, too late to afford Murat even a momentary gleam of hope. In terrified expectation of the blow that was hanging over him, and anxious to conceal his agony of mind from the Court, he fell back on his sovereign stratagem and shut himself up with "an attack of fever."

Everything comes to an end, even such a comedy as this, which it would have been too ridiculous to prolong, and Murat on the 20th July at last made up his mind to reply to the note and the complaints which Durant had delivered. The interval had afforded him ample time to look about for excuses, but whether it was that his efforts in this direction were in vain, or whether it was that the hearts of those to whose advice he had in the beginning lent a willing ear now failed them and that they no longer dared to persist with insinuations which they felt might bring both the King and themselves to ruin, his letter, for all its wealth of phrase and deprecatory eloquence, was utterly destitute of any reference to fact.

"How Sire!" thus the letter ran, "shall men always contrive to make you doubt the loyalty of my sentiments? Must I be forever condemned to act in fear and trembling, when all my thoughts and all my deeds have but one aim, which is never to do aught to hamper your vast plans, but, on the contrary, to second them with all the energy at my command? And what crime can Your Majesty find to lay at my door? Examine my record for twelve years past, scrutinise my conduct from the day I came to Naples: I defy my enemies

¹ Campochiaro to Gallo, Paris, July 12, 1811. Naples, *Archivio di Stato*.

one and all to cite a single action inconsistent with your policy. Yet calumny speaks, and Your Majesty heaps disgrace upon your brother-in-law, deprives your lieutenant of the command of your troops, holds him up to the French as an enemy to France, while by your decree of the 6th you give to the French an advantage for which some of them did not ask and which others are unworthy to receive. Ah Sire, if Your Majesty but desires to be rid of me, seek not for pretexts to work your will. More than once I have told you in writing, oftener still I have declared it to your face, that if Your Majesty needs me not, you have but to say the word, and the King of Naples will cease to be a hindrance in your path. Sire, I was stricken with the fever immediately after I had replied to the Prince de Neuchâtel, and I seize the first moment of respite to tell you of my grief, to tell you that you have killed me, that you have lost your best friend, and that my conduct was never such as to compel me to look for treatment so cruel as this. No sooner had the decree arrived here than copies were distributed far and wide. They will doubtless fall into the hands of the Diplomatic Corps. I know not whether Your Majesty will rejoice, but to-day the King of Naples is a byeword among the French employees and ex-contractors, and will soon be a byeword to the country. So there is an end to my part in the play ; nevertheless I shall continue till my last breath to be as I have ever been—your most faithful friend. I can write no more, my heart is too heavy.”¹

Such was all the fight he made—he who had boasted of his iron will, and had declared when he last left Paris that if Napoleon intended to take any steps to thwart him he would find out with whom he had to deal. So thoroughly certain did he feel that his *entourage* would desert him if he fell, so keenly sensible was he of being

¹ Murat to Napoleon, July 20, 1811. *Archives Nationales*.

in the Emperor's grip, that he forgot all his fine speeches. "His people's love, his soldiers' bravery, the loyal attachment of his friends"—all these resounding phrases and pompous sentiments which he had been accustomed to parade so proudly, were whittled down into inglorious excuses.

Who but Murat—*la Bête*, as Napoleon called him—could have regarded the decree as inoffensive? How could one imagine for a moment that Napoleon would suffer naturalisation to be made obligatory in a vassal kingdom; Napoleon with his notorious sensitiveness regarding all that appertained to the French name abroad! And what Frenchman would want honours and titles on such terms! Murat's painful awakening was the penalty of his stupidity. To imagine that everything became him, to constitute himself the arbiter of the destinies of the realm, might perhaps be expected of his headstrong swaggering nature; but if he lays a hand on the structure, even unconsciously, then let him beware, for he who reared it brooks that none but he shall take a single stone from its place!

Thus Murat was compelled to abate his ambitions of independence, and once again found that he was *roi pour obéir*. Following his usual craven tactics, he threw overboard his allies of yesterday, and sought a *rapprochement* with the French party. He had "one or two conferences" with the Minister of Finance, in which the Queen took part, for he was depending on her to smooth over the difficulties with his brother-in-law. The result of these conferences was a note for Durant and a decree for the French. The note, which contained a copy of the decree, spoke of the "proofs of the unwavering devotion" which the King was desirous of maintaining towards the Emperor. It explained "how seriously His Imperial Majesty had been misled by the statement that the French were subject to unfair treatment in the king-

dom of Naples and that it was desired to rid the country of them." It pointed out that "the decree of the 14th June did no more than carry out to the letter Article 11 of the Constitution of the Realm." "So far," it concluded, "are the French from being the victims of injustice, that the majority of appointments are held by them. Of the six government departments three are controlled by Frenchmen, while the greater number of the executive offices and of the principal posts at Court are in their hands."¹ The following is the decree :—

"Whereas in accordance with Clause 3 of Article 11 of the Constitution our Decree of the 14th June last provided that no foreign subject should hold an appointment within the Realm unless he became naturalised, and whereas in accordance with the views expressed by His Majesty the Emperor, our august brother and brother-in-law, and with the statements made in his name, it is our wish not to regard French subjects as foreigners, and whereas we eagerly avail ourselves of this opportunity of presenting to His Imperial and Royal Majesty the tokens of our deference and of our desire to perform whatsoever may be pleasing to him and of affording a further proof of the sentiments which we have ever entertained towards France and its people, we enact as follows :

"The provisions of our decree of the 14th June last are not applicable in the case of French subjects."²

At the same time as he commanded Durant to plead his cause with the Emperor, Murat also charged Campo-chiaro to add his say in the matter. To the latter Gallo was ordered to point out that Joachim was extremely surprised at the unfavourable manner in which his decree of the 14th June had been received by Napoleon. Only people who were endeavouring to work him ill could

¹ Gallo to Durant, Naples, July 20, 1811. *Archives Nationales.*

² *Archives Nationales.*

have thus blackened his character to His Majesty. The King immediately decided on a further decree, of which he forwarded a copy. "It is the King's wish," said Gallo, "that you should proceed at once to the Duc de Bassano's and hand him the decree and the note of to-day's date (the note to Durant), at the same time assuring him in the most emphatic manner possible of the King's desire to do all in his power to regain the Emperor's regard."¹

But all these conferences and, more particularly, all these surrenders had exhausted Murat. He was at the end of his tether when he signed this new decree, which afforded public and glaring proof of the utter hollowness of his authority. On the night of the 21st July, the King, "who was suffering from an attack of fever," proceeded in a closed carriage to Capo di Monte.²

The strained relations betwixt Naples and France had left no one indifferent. At Court the two hostile parties confronted each other; in the city the partisans of either party grew every day more desperate. In the army the Royal grenadiers came to blows with the French soldiers.³ The ambassadors were eagerly watching the progress of the struggle.

The note presented by Durant, the orders given to Grenier, followed by Murat's attitude of dejection, revived all the old rumours concerning the annexation of Naples. In the Chancelleries the report was current that the days of Murat's sovereignty were numbered, and that the Emperor himself was coming to drive him from the kingdom. "There are some people who pretend to know," wrote Menz to Metternich, "that Napoleon will shortly go to Milan. If it were so, we should have to look for some great measure in Italy destined perhaps to unite the various races of the peninsula under one

¹ Gallo to Campochiaro, July 20, 1811, Naples. *Archivio di Stato*.

² *Diario di Nicola*.

³ *Idem*.

Government. It is thought that the King of Naples would be appointed Viceroy of an Italy thus united. Such an event would necessarily involve changes in Germany with regard to Prince Eugène." ¹

The Neapolitan rumours were not devoid of foundation. To judge by certain passages in his letter of the 20th July to the Emperor, Joachim himself deemed that the game was lost. But when the first moment of dejection was passed, and he felt that the blow was not going to fall immediately, he took heart once more and began to hope for the best. This reaction, however, was accompanied by immense indignation against those whom he considered responsible for the terrible days through which he had passed. The terror and the panic he had suffered were the measure of his fury against them. Daure and his friends, at whom he had intended to strike, had escaped him, and in so doing had all but succeeded in driving him from his throne. With what rabid hatred therefore did he make up his mind to pursue them. Still he could bring no actual proofs against them, and the Emperor's decree left him unarmed: one method alone remained, and that was to turn his back upon them. "The King," writes Durant on the 4th August, "will not give up the idea, or at all events wishes to appear convinced, that the first move of the French party and their determination to resist his decree were due to suggestions on the part of the Minister of War, M. Daure, of the Grand Marshal, of the Chief Equerry, and of M. de Longchamps. The Minister of War is therefore in utter disgrace. He has not seen the King three times in the last fortnight." ² To keep them thus in disgrace, to forbid them the palace and to force on them the resignation he so longed to bring about, was undoubtedly a step in the right direction. But he was willing to pay

¹ Menz to Metternich, Naples, July 26, 1811.

² Durant to Bassano. *Archives des Affaires Étrangères*.

any price to the man who had the audacity and skill to bring forward accusations supported by proofs, irrefutable documentary evidence, such as would enable him to confound his enemies and cast them forth with ignominy. As luck would have it, he had at hand the very man for his purpose. This was none other than Maghella, who had been a subordinate of Daure's at the War Office. Whether Maghella was the tool of the English or of the Italian Cabal, or whether his proceedings were merely dictated by commonplace motives of self-interest, cannot be determined. But whatever the object he had in view, he succeeded, as a result of adroit and cautious investigation, in bringing to light certain letters that had passed between the Queen and Daure. A chivalrous man would have scorned to make use of such documents. They were of a very intimate description, and left no room for doubt concerning the sort of relationship that existed between the writers. But to Maghella it mattered not at all that by divulging their contents he would be bringing dishonour on the Queen, for the letters, in addition to affording proof of Caroline's guilt, also contained convincing evidence of "the efforts that had been made to induce Napoleon to transfer the crown to his sister."¹ He therefore placed the incriminating correspondence in the hands of the King. Disorder now reached its climax. Scenes of the most violent description were enacted almost before the public gaze. Murat, already far from well, was seized with a fever of so acute a nature that fears began to be entertained for his reason. M. Baudus and one or two others were obliged to interfere. The Queen wept copiously, explained matters as best she could, and denied, or ascribed to the machinations of her enemies, whatever did not admit of explanation. Report even had it that "Murat snatched up a couple of pistols and went to seek out the Queen, saying

¹ *Mémoires d'une inconnue.*

that he had made up his mind to kill himself since he did not wish to live on in his dishonour. So ungovernable was his frenzy that one of the generals present told him that he would have to be put in irons like a madman.”¹

So great was the scandal, so terrible the King's fury, that this time he fell genuinely ill. When the 15th August came he was still so ill that, despite his anxious desire to celebrate the Emperor's birthday with as much brilliance as possible, “his extreme weakness did not allow him to hold the reception he had intended. It was as much as he could do to don a uniform and take his stand on the balcony to watch the soldiers of the Guard as they passed by on their way to parade.”² At length the longed-for day of vengeance came. “The King has just commanded that M. Daure be called upon to resign the portfolios of War, the Marine, and the Police.”³ The previous day he had had a stormy interview with Lanusse, the Grand Marshal, who was no doubt implicated in the letters discovered by Maghella, and accepted his resignation. “Despite the fact that his wife was pregnant, Lanusse was compelled to quit the palace within twenty-four hours,”⁴ though he remained a few days longer in Naples. It is probable that had he wished he might have been restored to Joachim's good graces, since the King, through Mosbourg, offered him the command of the Household Troops. But Lanusse, mistrusting the constancy of the King's favour, elected to depart.

As for Daure, his offices had been torn from him with every circumstance of harshness. Murat had ordered the Chief Judge to demand the return of all the

¹ *Diario di Nicola.*

² Gallo to Campochiaro, August 16, 1811, Naples. *Archivio di Stato.*

³ Durant to Bassano, Naples, August 17, 1811. *Affaires Étrangères.*

⁴ *Diario di Nicola.*



NAPOLEON I

*From a miniature—artist unknown. In the possession
of the Emperor Francis Joseph I*

letters which Her Majesty had written to him, and the demand was at once complied with. Daure, though the terms of the Emperor's decree made it impossible for him to be expelled the country, quickly determined on his course of action. On the 18th he set out by night for France without a passport.

He possessed full knowledge of the secret influences that were at work in Naples. Though not in the councils of the Nationalist caucus, his official duties as Police Minister and his relations with the Masonic Lodges had acquainted him with the undercurrents of the Italian policy. He was fully cognisant of the part which the Nationalists desired the King to play, as well as of the latter's eagerness to listen to their suggestions. It was therefore urgent that Joachim should neutralise the effect of Daure's statements by being the first to gain the Emperor's ear, and, since he was unable to write himself, he lost no time in dictating and dispatching the following letter :

" I have just accepted the resignation of General Lanusse, the Grand Marshal of my palace, and have also relieved M. Daure of his official appointments. I hasten to inform Your Majesty of the matter in order to forestall the misrepresentations which these two men, who owe their fall to delinquencies of the most serious personal nature, will endeavour to substantiate, attempting perhaps to avail themselves of the prestige of the French name to vindicate their conduct. Sire, these men have wrought me a grievous wrong. The intrigues of M. Daure have destroyed the peace of my palace and my capital. He it was who brought me to the brink of death and then pretended that my illness was affected. He aimed at forming a party against me in the State, and would have deprived me of all that I held most dear ; and, though his efforts in that respect were far from attaining the success he had the effrontery to look

for, Your Majesty has possibly in your hands the proof that they have not been entirely ineffective. On the other hand, it is impossible for me to view the departure of General Lanusse without regret, for while I always entertained a great regard for him, heaping benefits upon him without stint, he on his part had long shown himself genuinely attached to me. I would fain believe that he was merely led on by the treacherous allurements adroitly held out by a thoroughly unprincipled man. I still feel an interest in his welfare, and I commend him to your generosity.”¹

He then proceeded to announce the provisional appointment of Tugny as Minister of War and the Marine, of Maghella as Prefect of Police, and of Exelmans as Marshal of the Palace. “I am deeply grieved at my inability to write you myself,” he added in his own hand.

Thus the prime object was accomplished. He had secured the first word with the Emperor. The letter having been sealed and dispatched, Joachim did not let the grass grow under his feet. On the evening of the 17th the French Ambassador received word from Gallo that the King wished to see him next day at Capo di Monte. There, attired in his dressing-gown, Murat explained to Durant “that his reasons for accepting the Grand Marshal’s resignation, and for depriving M. Daure of office, were so special and so peremptory that his action would receive the Emperor’s unqualified approval.”² As a third precaution, Gallo was instructed to write to Campochiaro in order that “if the two ex-ministers and their partisans attempted to conceal their misdeeds and to gain support on the pretence that their resignation was a result of the decree regarding the

¹ Murat to Napoleon, Capo di Monte, August 17, 1811. *Archives Nationales*.

² Durant to Bassano, Naples, August 8, 1811. *Affaires Étrangères*.

naturalisation of foreigners holding official appointments, such misrepresentations might be the more readily dispelled." Gallo enumerated the official reasons for Daure's dismissal. They were "negligence in police management, failure to communicate with the requisite promptitude certain events, the disclosure of which was of paramount importance, conniving at a system of speculation at the War Office, a system which he had allowed to be established and from which he himself had derived profit. Lastly, it was alleged that under-hand dealings and intrigues were constantly employed by M. Daure to win a degree of influence which it did not consort with the King's duty to allow him to obtain, and to which it was unbecoming in a Minister of State to aspire."¹ But with this official statement of the case Gallo was crafty enough to slip in a confidential letter to Campochiaro, in which he laid bare the plain truth and disclosed the real nature of the reasons that had led to Daure's undoing.

Murat, who was anxious at all costs to ward off the Emperor's wrath, or rather the consequences of it, was not content with piling up precautions against Daure's possible disclosures. He felt that he would have to face the music, and on the 24th he had made up his mind how to act. He informed Napoleon that he was recovering from the fever, and that he was giving orders for the horses purchased on the occasion of his last visit to Paris to be kept up at Parma or Bologna. There they were to remain until the Emperor made known his intentions regarding the war. "I am happy to advise Your Majesty that I am able to set out should it still be your desire that I should take the field." So great was his desire to propitiate Napoleon and benefit himself, that, with the idea of parrying every objection in advance, he

¹ Gallo to Campochiaro, Naples, August 19, 1811. *Archivio di Stato*, Naples.

added that he could leave Naples without risk, "for," said he, "the English can effect nothing."¹

How immeasurably delighted he would have been if the Emperor had summoned him to his side! But it was not to be. Daure had just arrived in Paris, and despite all Joachim's precautions he had seen the Emperor and given him a circumstantial account of what had been going on at Naples. The eyes of Napoleon were thus completely opened to the secret aims of the Italian party, and the designs harboured by the Cabal which held Joachim in its leading strings. He now knew beyond all doubt—for he had been given chapter and verse for everything—what kind of aims were in men's minds at Naples, what deeds were afoot and what hopes were entertained there. But after all Daure could add nothing save in the way of detail and confirmation to what Durant had already observed so keenly and described so well. "It appears to me that the King is led away in a manner that is to be ascribed either to inordinate vanity or to connections and counsellors of questionable loyalty. His entire confidence is shared by M. di Zurlo, M. Maghella and the Duc di Campochiaro. M. Agar is vouchsafed a hearing, and, so far as appearances go, M. di Gallo is still in command of his department, but they have no real voice in the conduct of affairs, and are unable to counterbalance the secret influence of those whose names I have mentioned, and who, by frightening the King with the spectre of "a French party" or "a Queen's party," have long since persuaded him that the only means by which he can maintain his independence is by strengthening the bonds between himself and the Neapolitan nation.

"It is the King's constant anxiety to be in a position to treat (with the Emperor) as an independent power,

¹ Murat to Napoleon, Capo di Monte, August 24, 1811. *Archives Nationales*.

and to appear to the eyes of Europe as no longer subject to that compelling force to which nevertheless he would not dare refuse obedience. Seeing that all the advice he receives is given with the object of fostering such aims, the Neapolitans and others who have for a long time past harboured some sort of vision of a *United Italy* have no difficulty in hurrying him into acts of imprudence.”¹

This report of Durant's was confirmed in detail by Daure, who quoted names, fixed dates, and threw light upon the various machinations. Hating Maghella with all his heart, he eagerly made accusations against him by which the Emperor did not fail to profit. Probably Caroline's letter arrived at the same time as Durant's report, corroborating Daure's account and confirming the truth of his charges. Those were black days for Murat (28-30th August). Everything was against him. What could his empty protestations, his unsupported excuses, avail against facts which, conclusive and definite as they were, derived additional weight from the confirmation received at the hands of the Emperor's sister and the Ambassador of France.

No sooner had Napoleon learned of his brother-in-law's conduct than he sent him a letter of which we now possess but a fragment. “You are surrounded by men who hold France in detestation and whose aim it is to work your ruin. I have warned you many times. Everything you write contrasts too glaringly with what you do.”²

¹ Durant to Bassano, Naples, August 18, 1811. *Affaires Étrangères*.

² Napoleon to Murat, Compiègne, August 30, 1811. This letter was read by Lord Castlereagh before the English Parliament on the 2nd May 1814, with falsifications introduced by the Abbé Fleuriel but certified by Blacas as being a true copy of the original.

It would not be inappropriate to quote here the version of these events which Norvins, formerly in charge of the police at Rome and well posted in all that took place at Naples, has included in his “Portefeuille de 1813.”

Napoleon did not limit himself to addressing rebukes to Murat. He began to take measures against the men whom he knew to be hostile to France. Though he did not possess proofs of sufficiently convincing a character to enable him to bring about the downfall of Zurlo, Maghella and Campochiaro, he was at least aware that in the heart of the capital of the Empire Murat possessed an agency for the collection and transmission of secret information. At its head was La Vauguyon, one of Joachim's aides-de-camp. If "by special permission"—as Bassano put it later on to Campochiaro—La Vauguyon had been authorised to make his home in Paris, it was because the Emperor considered that the subject matter of his clandestine communications with Naples merely related to such topics as would form suitable pabulum for Court gossip, and that it was in no way calculated to affect the course of his country's policy. Finding that he had misjudged the matter, Napoleon acted promptly, and on the 27th at four in the morning La Vauguyon quitted Paris "with the utmost secrecy, leaving all his effects behind him." Secrecy is indeed the word, since, when Campochiaro learned of the matter three days later, he was so utterly taken aback that all

The following, according to him, was the wording of Napoleon's letter: "COMPIÈGNE, August 30, 1811.—I have already made known to you what I think of your conduct. You are surrounded by men who hold France in detestation and who are aiming at bringing about your downfall. I gave you useful advice some time ago, and I shall see by the way you act whether you are French at heart. It is no use your writing to me unless you have something important to ask of me. Remember that I only made a King of you *in the interests of my system*. Make no mistake about the matter. If you cease to be a Frenchman you will be nothing to me. Continue to correspond with the Minister for War."

If the wording of this letter is compared with that of the instructions given to Pérignon on the 16th September, viz: "His (Murat's) position on a throne to which the Emperor only promoted him *in the interests of France* and the Empire might be compromised," we shall discover a similarity of language which imparts singular weight to the text quoted by Norvins.

he could do was to write to Naples asking distractedly, "where has he gone? Who told him to go? Why did he leave?"¹ The following day he had a prolonged interview with Maret and Savary, who merely informed him that by the Emperor's orders the Duc de Rovigo had commanded La Vauguyon to leave immediately. "As to the motives for this action," added the ministers, "they ought to be known well enough to General La Vauguyon." On arriving at Capua the latter found Mosbourg awaiting him with orders to proceed no farther.² On Murat's behalf he was offered the command of the Neapolitan forces in Spain, which he refused. While with every sign of displeasure at this refusal the King had his name struck off the list of comptrollers of the army, he secretly caused him to be told to join him on the first favourable opportunity, and left him in continued enjoyment of "his not inconsiderable emoluments."³ Such was the treatment that Murat meted out to his friends or those who served him; and thus La Vauguyon was banished from Naples, not because the Emperor had demanded it but because Murat deemed the measure calculated to win him favour. La Vauguyon was thus the first to pay the penalty of the King's misdeeds. Maghella's turn was to come next, and Zurlo, to whose counsel Murat had inclined his ear, came perilously near to losing his place also.

La Vauguyon's expulsion was but a preliminary measure. Napoleon had now made up his mind that Murat should come to heel, and that no one should entertain any doubt that Naples belonged to France and to France alone. On the 16th September came the following

¹ Campochiaro to Gallo, Paris, August 30, 1811. Naples, *Archivio di Stato*.

² Durant to Bassano, September 11, 1811. *Affaires Étrangères*.

³ Mier to Metternich, Naples, September 20, 1811. *Archives autrichiennes*.

orders : Grenier was commanded to throw a battalion, two if necessary, of the 22nd Light Infantry into Gaeta. He was to quarter his troops there and, "if he deemed it necessary, to set up a French Governor."¹ Pérignon received word that he was to start next day to resume his duties as Governor of Naples, where the interests of His Majesty the Emperor demanded his presence. At the same time he was given secret instructions in which the following passage occurs.

"His Majesty has beheld with deep regret the line of action recently followed by the King, and believes that he recognises therein the direct influence of the anti-French faction who are themselves suspected, on no inconsiderable grounds, of acting in obedience to orders received from the Court of Palermo and the English. You are authorised to assure His Majesty that the Emperor is in no way desirous of incorporating Naples with France, and to point out to him that had he entertained such an intention he would have made no secret of it ; that as a matter of fact he contemplates no such object, since no further process of incorporation is necessary to make Naples part of the Empire. You are to state that it suits the Emperor's purpose that the King should reign at Naples, but that the Emperor cannot overlook the fact that he is Emperor of Naples and its Suzerain, just as he is Overlord of Italy, which is equally a part of the Empire. Finally, you are to add that the only result of these needless alarms would be the multiplication of pitfalls for himself, and that nothing but such conduct as his fear of imaginary dangers might lead him to adopt, could in any way prejudice his tenure of a throne on which, as he himself is aware, the Emperor has placed him solely for the benefit of France and the furtherance of Imperial policy.

"These considerations should underlie your dealings

¹ Clarke to Grenier, Paris, September 16, 1811. *Affaires Étrangères*.

with the Neapolitans and the French who are resident in Naples, and you should neglect no means of convincing them of the very real nature of the risks that any departure from these principles would lead them to incur."

Finally, orders were sent to Durant, who also received a copy of the instructions which had been given to Grenier and Pérignon. "It is not likely that the King will be so imprudent as to display any opposition to the Emperor's will." If, however, any resistance were offered and a formal refusal were to result, Durant was under orders "to announce that he was commanded to leave Naples. If you do return," added the Minister, "the Emperor intends to inform the Senate of the King's conduct, to make known to France that he had excluded all Frenchmen from a city which they themselves had conquered, that he had insulted the colours beneath which he had had the honour of fighting in the days before French blood had won him his throne, and that he was therefore King no longer."¹

The ultimatum was clear and concise. Let the King refuse to throw open Gaeta to Grenier and all is over with him. Considerations of a military nature had hitherto led Napoleon to deal gently with Murat, but he was by no means ready to allow these considerations to involve him in the loss of a kingdom. He had humoured Joachim to the utmost limit which his imperious nature would brook, but that his vassal should push his separatist principles beyond that limit by disseminating notions of liberty and independence he was not going to allow. It was now no longer a question of ordinary disagreements or minor breaches of discipline. The Emperor had full proof that Joachim was aiming at casting off his authority, and he at once resolved to crush him. The King should obey, or refuse at his peril.

¹ Bassano to Durant, Compiègne, September 17, 1811. *Affaires Étrangères*.

Murat did not delay making his submission till Grenier and Durant had received their orders, or till Pérignon had returned to Naples. The Emperor's letter, which reached Naples about the 10th September, struck terror into the heart of Joachim. What could be done, if indeed it were not too late to do anything, to avert the storm once again? There was but one means at hand, the means that great crises always brought into play, and that was the intervention of Caroline. None but she was capable of approaching Napoleon and using such speech to him as would ward off the blow. She alone could find the way to her brother's heart, that brother who would suffer anything from his own flesh and blood. Vainly did Maghella (who knew that the departure of the Queen, on whom he had brought recent and almost public dishonour, would inevitably bring about his own ruin) attempt to induce the King to alter his decision. Nothing could shake his purpose. He felt that this alone could save him from immediate disaster. Little recked he what befel one who had served him, favourite though he were, if his crown were in danger. Caroline herself set far too high a value on that crown not to forget the shame and humiliation she had recently been compelled to suffer. A Queen before everything else, a Queen she meant to remain, and all other considerations went by the board when her position was at stake. Nay, this very journey gave her her revenge. She it was now who held her husband's fate in the palm of her hand. She it was to whom he had to come as a suppliant begging her to convey to the Emperor his excuses and his promises of repentance. She it was to be who would speak in the Great Man's ear such words of accusation or defence as would bring her foes to ruin and secure the rehabilitation of her friends. By her departure she became the arbiter of the King's fate, of the fate of her friends and foes. It was a great part to

play, and Caroline, like every woman to whom power was dearer than anything else in the world, revelled in the joys of her vast though transient authority.

By the 11th September peace had been restored between Joachim and his wife. The compact had been sealed. All was to be forgotten. In return she was to go to Paris with assurances of her husband's submission and to promise his acquiescence in any measure if only he might be left in possession of his Kingdom. That day, therefore, Murat wrote to the Emperor as follows: "Sire, the position in which we are situated is so painful, and it is so difficult to convey to you an idea of the true state of affairs that I have determined to persuade the Queen to proceed on a visit to Your Majesty. She leaves the day after to-morrow. I beg Your Majesty to give credence to all she will tell you of my sufferings, and how impossible it is for me to carry out all the behests that Your Majesty has caused to be transmitted to us. I am still hoping that Your Majesty will restore me to happiness by allowing me to live at your side." ¹

The letter was written but not sent. For what then was Murat waiting? Did he hesitate to stake his all on this single card instead of attempting armed resistance, or were the Italian party, whose overthrow would be assured if the Queen were to go, plying their last desperate arguments to prevent her departure? Four days later the King at last made up his mind. On the 15th he despatched a messenger to the Emperor with a letter "announcing that the Queen had decided to go to Paris to have the pleasure of greeting and embracing him once again." ² Joachim sent word of the matter to the Diplomatic Corps, to Durant, to Benkendorff and Mier, the new Austrian Ambassador. The tidings were thus officially

¹ Murat to Napoleon, September 11, 1811. *Affaires Étrangères*.

² Gallo to Campochiaro, Naples, September, 15, 1811. *Archivio di Stato*, Naples.

confirmed. Mier was too recent an arrival at Naples to understand why a sick woman should thus hurriedly depart on a journey. But Durant, whose information was complete about what went on in the Palace, was in no such uncertainty. "It is because the King desires it," he said. "He did not show the Queen the letter he received a few days ago from the Emperor, but he did not disguise from her that its tone was stern, and it is clearly because of what it contained that he decided to send off the Queen on this mission."¹

Besides the letter to Napoleon, Murat's messenger was the bearer of instructions for Campochiaro. As the latter might, if necessity arose, be called upon to support the Queen, it was right that he should be posted in the objects of her visit, at least, the official objects. Gallo therefore wrote as follows: "Her Majesty is leaving on the 17th, the day after to-morrow, and the King will accompany her as far as Gaeta. She will travel by easy stages without fatiguing herself, and will in due course see about bringing her journey to an end at Compiègne, or wherever His Imperial Majesty may happen to be. Besides her domestic staff, she will only take with her Mesdames de Cassano and Exelmans, Messieurs d'Angri and Arlincourt, as well as Commandeur Janvier and Mademoiselle de la Vernet.

"The King hopes that by personally visiting His Imperial Majesty the Queen may be able to dispel all the shadows which have been engendered in the Emperor's mind to the prejudice of the perfect mutual confidence and unclouded friendship which the King both desires and deserves to inspire. Her Majesty the Queen is thoroughly acquainted with the King's sentiments, as well as with every detail of home and foreign policy. She has a knowledge of all the questions, economical or political, that may have been the subject

¹ Durant to Bassano, Naples, September 16, 1811. *Affaires Étrangères*.

of controversy between the two Courts. She is aware of the demands that are made by France and she knows the Kingdom's resources, and above all, she understands how greatly desirous the King is of giving His Majesty the Emperor proofs of his gratitude, loyalty and affection. Her Majesty the Queen is therefore perfectly competent to explain and justify the conduct and sentiments of the King on all points and to supply the answer to whatever unjust doubt, question or prejudice may have taken shape in the mind of His Imperial Majesty. The King says that he hopes by this means to win back the Emperor's confidence and to recover for himself that peace of mind and body from the absence of which he has for some months past suffered so acutely." ¹

At seven o'clock in the morning of the 19th Caroline left Naples, Murat going with her as far as Capua. She gave out to everybody that she intended being absent about two months, a statement she repeated to Norvins on reaching Rome. She arrived in Paris on the 2nd October at one o'clock in the afternoon. "Her Majesty alighted at the palace of His Eminence Cardinal Fesch, where a suite of apartments had been made ready for her until such time as the Emperor, then absent from Paris, should send orders regarding Her Majesty's place of residence. No sooner had she arrived than she hurried off to St. Cloud to see the King of Rome, coming back immediately to seek repose after her journey." ²

While hoping the best from Caroline's mediation, everybody considered Murat's position highly precarious. Mier, Austria's new Ambassador, had all but abandoned his journey. The official in charge of his baggage train, "misled by false reports," had inquired of Menz, the Austrian Chargé d'Affaires, "whether he ought to con-

¹ Gallo to Campochiaro, September 15, 1811. Naples, *Archivio di Stato*.

² Campochiaro to Gallo, Paris, October 2, 1811.

tinue his route." ¹ The rhodomontades of the King and his ministers were of no avail. Equally vain was the explanation which Gallo gave Mier that "since the army of Naples has become a national army, there is no longer any need for Grenier's troops, which have accordingly been disbanded." ² The Austrian Ambassador was not deceived. From the moment of his arrival the weakness of Murat's position had been glaringly evident to him. "The hope is entertained that the Queen may be able to avert the tempest that threatens to overwhelm the King. If she does not succeed it is all over with the Kingdom of Naples. When one knows Napoleon's character one can scarcely deceive oneself about the matter, and once he has set his heart on the union (of Naples and France) I don't think any one will be able to divert him from his purpose, particularly as I do not see what there is to hinder such a measure. Armed resistance would be the height of folly, since the general opinion is that the King could place no certain reliance on his army, made up as it is in large measure of French and foreign officers." ³

Pérignon arrived on the 4th October, and his appearance put a final stop to Italian bluster. Obedient to instructions, "he declared—and he cared not who heard him—that it was no part of the Emperor's plan to unite the Kingdom of Naples to the Grand Empire . . . that the Emperor had no desire to interfere in the internal administration of the country, but that so far as its foreign policy was concerned, that policy must be and always remain subordinate to his own. He added that the King should not forget that he was a French Prince and a Grand Dignitary of the Empire, that he owed his position as King to the Emperor's generosity and that

¹ Menz to Metternich, Naples, August 30, 1811. *Archives Nationales.*

² Mier to Metternich, Naples, September 20, 1811.

³ *Idem.*

the predominance of France was an essential condition to his maintaining it, and lastly, that as the Emperor had conferred that dignity upon him so also he could take it from him again. Deeply humiliating as these speeches must have been to the King, they do not appear to have inflicted any grievous wounds on the *amour propre* of the Neapolitans.”¹

However harsh the treatment Napoleon proposed to mete out to Murat, “the latter appeared to have made up his mind unreservedly to bow to his will.”² Nevertheless he experienced a final pang when he learned that he would have to allow Grenier to enter Gaeta. He sent for Durant, and after showing him the letters he had written to General Grenier giving his consent to the entry of the French troops into Gaeta, he expatiated on the unhappiness of his position, and expressly asked him to announce his determination to relinquish the Crown unless the Emperor gave him back his esteem and ceased to overwhelm him with humiliations, complaints, and unreasonable demands. But he gave way on all points. Grenier might enter Gaeta or any other place in the kingdom. Bitter pill though it was to swallow, he acquiesced in Pérignon’s return to Naples, and showed himself accommodating in all questions relating to the naval contingent. Vainly since June had Napoleon dispatched note after note to Naples to urge expedition in the dockyards in order that the provisions of the Bayonne Treaty might be carried out. Fear now stimulated Murat into promptitude. “He displays an anxiety to carry out to the full all the obligations imposed upon him by the Treaty.”³ The consequences were the appointment of a commission to inquire into the means of increasing the shipbuilding capacity of the nation; the

¹ Mier to Metternich, October 10, 1811.

² Durant to Bassano, September 28, 1811.

³ Durant to Bassano, September 28, 1811. *Affaires Étrangères*.

certainly of being able to lay down more vessels ; the dispatch of Lafosse, a naval engineer, to Paris ; the fitting out of the battleship *Le Capri* and the frigate *La Caroline*, on which work was carried on day and night ; the drafting of Neapolitan crews to Toulon for service in French warships. Matters went on apace.

Though the blow which overwhelmed Murat in September sufficiently explains the completeness of his submission at the time, its prolongation postulates a further cause, for his recuperative powers were rapid. This further cause was none other than Caroline. For, notwithstanding that Joachim's ambition and vanity may have tempted him to embark once more on his Italian adventure, his wife, who grasped the situation, was able to prevent him from making a false step which at that juncture might have involved him in irreparable disaster. Her arrival in Paris had already modified the position of the King. Campochiaro, the Neapolitan Ambassador, who was among those in the King's confidence and whom Durant in his dispatches or Daure in his explanations had represented to the Emperor as an enemy of France, was sent home to Naples. He quitted Paris on the 9th October,¹ scarcely a week after Caroline's arrival, without being accorded an audience and without presenting his letters of recall.

Although by Campochiaro's disappearance from the scene Murat lost a valuable friend and informant at Paris, it was an immense gain to his cause to be rid of a man whose presence had become unbearable to the Emperor. Caroline now had the field to herself, and was able to bring into play that aptitude for diplomacy with which Nature had so conspicuously endowed her. While therefore in society and before the world she studied to make the most of her feminine attractions,

¹ Caracciolo to Gallo, Paris, October 9, 1811. Naples, *Archivio di Stato*.

she was ever labouring quietly and unostentatiously to fulfil the long and difficult task of restoring peace betwixt her husband and her brother. Numerous were the instructions and reports she sent home to Naples. In them she gave her orders with minuteness, and loftily indicated to the abject Murat the line of conduct he should follow. Slowly and surely by her resolution and tactfulness, her perseverance and charm, she attained the object at which she aimed, and cleared away the clouds that had darkened the brow of her all-powerful brother. Though the full measure of his old affection may not have been won back by her for Murat, she at all events produced in his mind such feelings of favourable condescension as would pave the way for the Soldier King to reconquer by his worth as a fighting man the forfeited favour of his master.

Pending the arrival of the sovereigns, Caroline went again to Saint Cloud to see the King of Rome and sought distraction in the fêtes and balls, some of which were given in her honour. On the 11th November the Emperor and Empress returned from Holland. No sooner had they reinstalled themselves at Saint Cloud than she hurried off to visit them. Eager to pay her court "she went every day to Saint Cloud." In due course she was invited by her august brother to take up her quarters in the Pavillon de Flore at the Tuileries, whither she proceeded on the 23rd with the Duchesse de Cassano and the Prince d'Angri.¹ Her letters, of which at first Joachim had made but scanty mention, became increasingly reassuring. "It appears on the whole that the letters written by Her Majesty the Queen, after she had had the satisfaction of a personal interview with the Emperor, have in no small measure added to the King's confidence and sense of security."² Thus she

¹ Caracciolo to Gallo, Paris, November 25. Naples, *Archivio di Stato*.

² Durant to Bassano, Naples, December 2, 1811. *Affaires Étrangères*.

gradually repaired the rift. To Murat, who desired that questions should be put respecting the sequestration imposed by Napoleon's orders on the Farnesian property in Rome, she replied that she had already taken the initiative in the matter, and that the Duc de Bassano was to deal with the affair.

Whether she would be able to prevail on the Emperor to renew his correspondence with the King was a doubtful question. Murat boldly answered it in the affirmative, but the matter was at least questionable even for those who were most closely in touch with the Emperor. Durant himself considered the "re-establishment of direct communication with His Imperial Majesty as only a remote possibility."¹ Nevertheless, Caroline succeeded in bringing about a general improvement in the situation, and her efforts were so highly appreciated by her husband that he freely sanctioned an extension of her stay in Paris instead of requiring her to return to Naples. Her services were far too valuable to admit of his dispensing with so useful an intermediary, particularly as the rumours of war with Russia were gathering strength every day, and none would be so able as she to lay his offers of service before the Emperor.

¹ Durant to Bassano, Naples, December 13, 1811. *Affaires Étrangères*.

CHAPTER VII

THE KING JOINS THE ARMY

Napoleon and the Neapolitan agitators—Maghella dismissed—The King hesitates—His departure—Dissensions between the King and Queen—The Neapolitan contingent—Grenier evacuates Italy—The King desires to leave the Army—His demands—He returns to Naples.

WHEN, in September, the Emperor came to look closely into the affairs of Naples, he quickly recognised that the King was incapable of carrying on unaided such deep-laid machinations against him. He knew his Murat, and before the matter was definitely reported to him he had divined that some secret but powerful influence was at work urging him to take up a position of hostility to France. His interviews with Daure put the matter beyond doubt, and he resolved to strike at the offenders. As a result La Vauguyon was expelled, Campochiaro sent home to Naples, and Aymé shut up in prison at Vincennes on a charge of stealing diamonds.¹ These were the first to suffer. As for the rest it was not so easy to demonstrate their guilt. The Emperor would have proofs, and patiently set to work to collect evidence. Caroline knew better than any one who the plotters were, and the various degrees of their

¹ Aymé, a confidential agent of Murat's, had a similar post in Paris to La Vauguyon's. He was supposed to keep his master aware of all that went on at Napoleon's Court. He was arrested by Savary's men and thrown into prison at Vincennes on the pretext that he had been concerned in stealing the diamonds of the Crown of Spain and the celebrated Peregrine Pearl.

responsibility. The persons next aimed at were nearer to the King, for it was indeed among his immediate *entourage* that he found those pernicious counsellors who urged him to set himself in opposition to France. But worse remained behind, for actual members of the Government, ministers holding office, and these not the least important, were the most active in filling his poor brain with chimerical ambitions of liberty and independence. The King's two confidants, the men who engaged his largest measure of trust, Zurlo the Minister of the Interior and Maghella Chief of the Police, had sold themselves to the enemy.

"Zurlo has the reputation of being a man of great capacity. He was Finance Minister in Ferdinand's time. Many people look on him with suspicion, and it is even rumoured that when he entered the King's service it was with the secret permission of the ex-Court. However, the King has a high opinion of his character and integrity.

"It is more particularly by artfully exploiting the King's imagination and by pandering to the dreams of the glory and renown which he hopes may be his in the years to come, that Monsieur de Zurlo has succeeded in winning His Majesty's confidence, and I have, unfortunately, every reason to believe that he uses the advantages of his position in a manner no less incompatible with the Emperor's wishes than with the real interests of his King and country.

"Monsieur de Maghella has brought himself into prominence by services of a different order. He has been most industrious in drawing up his reports, and showed an exclusive personal devotion to the King at a time when the Ministry of Police was in the hands of a man whom His Majesty considered particularly attached to the Queen (Daure)."¹

¹ Durant to Bassano, Naples, February 1, 1812. *Affaires Étrangères*.

The Emperor was in no need of Durant's reports to enable him to identify the individual in question, and his official representative only confirmed information which had already reached him through less formal channels. With his usual perspicacity he divined all that lay hidden beneath the veil of ministerial reticence ; the treasonable counsels, the war that might have been openly declared against him had a favourable opportunity presented itself. On both men, therefore, he was ready to out-pour the vials of his wrath. But Caroline, furious with Maghella and indignant at the way he had gone to work, had been especially vehement in her denunciations of his conduct, and for the moment the Emperor deemed it advisable to crush Maghella alone.

He therefore requested Bassano to send him a report concerning the Police Minister at Naples, and on the strength of this document, the conclusion of which had been dictated in advance, the Emperor signified his intention of causing it to be announced to Maghella through M. le Baron de Durant that he would be required to return to France within a fortnight of the date of the notice. These intentions were swiftly put into execution. Next day Napoleon wrote to Maret as follows :—

“ Send word to my Minister at Naples and tell him that I have decided to recall Maghella, who has been acting as Minister of Police at Naples, and that he must demand that this individual shall leave Naples for France within forty-eight hours under pain of arrest. You will tell Baron Durant plainly that the Sieur Maghella is charged with plotting against the safety of the Empire, and that he has been acting in collusion with the English with a view to bringing about a rising on the part of the so-called patriots in Italy. He is to say nothing to the man himself, but he must assume a firm tone and insist on Maghella leaving Naples immediately.” ¹

¹ Lecestre, unpublished letters, No. 926.

Thus it was not a fortnight, but barely forty-eight hours, that Maghella was to be allowed to prepare for his journey. Bassano handed Durant Napoleon's orders concerning the man "whom His Majesty looked upon as the ringleader of the intrigues which were intended to stir up the Italian patriots, as they called themselves."¹ But apparently he did not despatch his missive with the promptitude that had been expected, since Durant only saw Gallo on the 22nd March.² Régnier had already sent Maghella his orders to return to France, and Durant's official message to Gallo did not arrive till after the due time. Murat, when informed by Maghella that he had been recalled, had just had one of his usual feverish attacks, which returned with redoubled severity when he heard about the French Minister's communiqué. Not daring to write to the Emperor on so delicate a subject, he confided his troubles to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, on whose support he knew he could count, and begged his aid and protection for the fallen Maghella. "The Chief Justice of the Empire gave orders that M. Maghella should return to France within a month. His departure had already been arranged when M. le Baron de Durant notified my Foreign Minister that 'this Frenchman' would have to leave in forty-eight hours. I will not conceal from you the pain that such orders, so communicated, have caused me. However, M. Maghella leaves to-night, and I will only tell you that I shall find it difficult if not impossible to fill his place. Monsieur Maghella performed the divers duties that were entrusted to him with zeal, fidelity and integrity, and therefore it is that I commend him to your generosity and beg you to take his part. I shall be under the greatest possible obligation to you for whatever kindnesses you may show him. I greatly trust that the Emperor

¹ Bassano to Durant, March 2, 1812. *Affaires Étrangères*.

² Durant to Bassano, March 23, 1812. *Affaires Étrangères*.

may see his way to reconsider his decision and to allow M. Maghella to re-enter my service." ¹

His fever and his fury notwithstanding, Murat took good care not to disobey. It was on the 22nd that Durant made his announcement, and Maghella, cashiered there and then (for it was not Murat's way to support his friends when he felt that he was in peril himself) had to give place to Campochiaro. By a decree of the 24th the latter was "provisionally entrusted with the portfolio of the Police." ² Thus Maghella quitted Naples, but before he set out he spent his last day with Murat at Portici.³ There the latter probably impressed upon him, as he had upon La Vauguyon, the necessity for waiting with prudence and serenity the dawn of better days.

The Emperor's charges against the ex-Minister of Police were not without foundation, for Campochiaro's first act was to seek out the French Minister at Naples in order to tell him about "a secret correspondence that had been established with Sicily through the medium of the Police Department," and to inquire whether he might allow it to continue.⁴ The wary and far-sighted Campochiaro meant to forearm himself against any other Imperial outbursts that the future might have in store. But the correspondence was far too compromising as far as Maghella was concerned, and "without waiting for a reply to the question which had been referred to Paris, Campochiaro persuaded the King to give orders that the

¹ Murat to Bassano, Naples, March 26, 1812. *Affaires Étrangères*.

² *Moniteur Universel*.

³ Durant to Bassano, March 28, 1812. *Affaires Étrangères*.

⁴ Durant to Bassano, March 28, 1812. *Affaires Étrangères*. In a memorial intended to vindicate his conduct which Maghella sent to Austria after 1815, he himself recognised that in 1812, when he was removed from office, everything was ready for entering into relations with the English in Sicily, and that the Emperor's summons put a stop to all for the time and caused Murat's understanding with England to be deferred till 1813. (Maghella, *Compendio della mia vita*: an unpublished document for a knowledge of which I am indebted to the kindness of Commandant Weil.)

correspondence should cease entirely.”¹ It was destined to be resumed later.

There remained Zurlo, whose fall was universally expected. “It is said,” wrote the Austrian Ambassador, “that Maghella was recalled by the Emperor to France at the Queen’s request, and that Zurlo, the Minister of the Interior, who is universally detested in the country, will also be deprived of office in obedience to orders that have been received at the Palace.”² Mier and his informants had gone too far. It was not so easy to find a pretext for getting rid of Zurlo. He was not a French subject, and in all probability Napoleon had not yet settled in his own mind when his departure should take place. But the time was to come when he too would have to hand in his papers. Zurlo himself recognised so clearly the fate that was in store for him that when the Russian campaign was in progress and Cardinal Firrao wanted the *Te Deum* to be sung after the battle of Smolensk, the Minister interrupted him and said: “Monseigneur, if these victories go on, it is all over with you and me.”³ If, contrary to all expectations, Zurlo maintained his position, his immunity was due to the weakening of the Napoleonic power, for his downfall had been resolved upon before the campaign of 1812.

Such were the circumstances and such were the aims, often divergent and sometimes contradictory, which influenced Murat as he wrestled with the difficult problem of determining the line of conduct he should adopt towards Napoleon. Sometimes, overmastered by the forcefulness of the Emperor, he made up his mind to perform whatever was required of him, occasionally indeed more than was required of him. At other times the influence of the Italian Cabal would regain its ascendancy, and he

¹ Durant to Bassano, April 8, 1812. *Affaires Étrangères*.

² Mier to Metternich, March 27, 1812.

³ *Diario di Nicola*.

would seem almost inclined to shake himself free from a domination whose weight appeared at times more than he could bear. His mind thus continually swung to and fro from January 1812 until his departure to join the French army.

As the rumours of war became louder and more definite, Murat pricked up his ears. The doughty cavalrman could not hear the call of the bugle without a thrill, and when Russia began to threaten he quivered with impatience, longing to lay aside the rôle of King and be a soldier once again. As early as the 10th February, he had been anxious to resume his place among the brave spirits in the French army. But how was he to ask Napoleon for a command in the Grand Army after he had been deprived of the command of the French troops in his own kingdom?

"The King," says Durant, "repeatedly expressed his regret regarding this matter, and eagerly added that His Imperial Majesty had but to say the word, all would be forgotten, and he would depart with joy and delight. Every fresh piece of news about the preparations that are going on makes him tremble with excitement, but it is particularly when His Majesty hears any reference to the immense body of cavalry that has already been gathered together that he burns to set out."¹

Durant, as he himself tells us, conveyed what was in the King's mind to the Emperor. Murat, who either did not dare or did not wish to write himself, applied to Paris through the French Ambassador, whom he regarded as a favourable medium. But since Napoleon vouchsafed no reply to the overtures made through this channel, Joachim decided to write himself.² He received no answer

¹ Durant to Bassano, February 12, 1812. *Affaires Étrangères*.

² This letter of Murat's, which is not extant, must have been dated about the end of February, since the letter which alludes to it was dated the 22nd March, and it took ten days for a messenger to get from Naples to Paris.

from the Emperor. On the other hand, he had letters from the Queen informing him of the doubts expressed by her brother regarding the sincerity of the King's demand. The latter could restrain himself no longer. Despite the pleas of his advisers, who urged that he had won glory enough,¹ he continued his endeavour to regain the favour of his brother-in-law. "I have already written to Your Majesty," he said, "to beg the honour of accompanying you in the coming campaign. Your Majesty has not yet deigned to acquaint me with your decision, and the Queen sends word that you doubt the sincerity of my request and of any desire to accompany you. Sire, it is so great that had it not been for the fear of displeasing you, I should have already put myself *en route*; but Sire, it is only too true that it is my fate to lay myself open to suspicion and to be regarded by you as no longer possessing the same heart and zeal to serve you as in former years. Time was when you would not have thought of doubting my word. How often have you said, 'I have no real friends but Murat and Berthier!' And now, while you have forgotten me, I think only of you. Yes, the one thing that torments me is the memory of your past kindness. Summon me to your side, and then judge of my sentiments; ay, bid me come and you will be convinced that my demand is sincere. Recall your Murat. Can you go forth to face fresh dangers without him? I shall die if you do not bid me come. Never was I so fain to see you, and to convince you how sincere, how idolatrous, is my affection for you. Only remember how I served you in the past and my misery will be at an end."²

This letter Murat took the trouble to write himself, but it was just as unproductive of result as his previous applications had been. Napoleon remained dumb, and

¹ Durant to Bassano. *Affaires Étrangères*.

² Murat to Napoleon, Naples, March 22, 1812. *Archives Nationales*.

the Maghella affair, which was now coming to the forefront, was scarcely calculated to make him unbend.

Joachim was beset with apprehensions regarding his future and devoured by longings to command the cavalry force of which in his own mind he already looked upon himself as the leader. But though he was begging and praying the Emperor to summon him to the Army, he took care to conceal from his *entourage* how humble a suppliant he really was. At Naples he gave out that he would consent to undertake a command in the army, but that he would not go out of his way to apply for one. This he considered would add to his dignity and bring his condescension towards his brother-in-law into conspicuous relief. So clearly was this view of his position impressed upon his *entourage* that misconceptions as to the real nature of the relations between the Emperor and Murat were general throughout the Chancelleries. Well-informed as he usually was, Mier himself was at fault on this occasion. "The King," he says, "is very anxious to have a command in the coming war, but he is unwilling to ask for it."¹ These words were penned by the Austrian Minister on the 27th March. What would he have thought of Murat had he known of the application he had made to the Emperor in February or of his still more recent petition of the 22nd March?

Haughty and high-mettled as he publicly displayed himself, Joachim in private was humble and apologetic. On the 5th April, when sending Napoleon particulars regarding the Neapolitan contingent for which he had not asked, he took occasion to revert once more to his request. "I shall be happy for the rest of my days if you will suffer your old henchman, your most loyal and devoted friend, to rejoin his old commander."² It was trouble thrown away. Vainly did he await the arrival of the

¹ Mier to Metternich. *Archives Nationales*.

² Murat to Napoleon, Naples, April 5, 1812. *Affaires Étrangères*.

post. No answer came. Murat began to grow desperate. At last he unburdened himself to the French Minister, and in one of those visitations of sincerity which in his case sometimes succeeded long periods of moral strain, he put aside his braggart airs and humbly confessed that he had twice written to the Emperor to ask that he might take up his post as a soldier at his side. He further confided in Durant how fearful he was lest his efforts should fail. "His apprehension," says the latter, "is increased by the continued silence of His Imperial Majesty."¹

On the 14th April he received a letter from Caroline. Its terms were such that he thought he might safely go to Paris, and he at once made up his mind to start on the evening of the 16th, in order personally to explain his position regarding the matters under discussion. He was to travel as the Count of Calabria, and intended to bring the Queen back with him, but, despite the fact that every preparation had been made, the King did not leave on the 16th. "On the 15th he worked very late into the night," wrote Durant to Bassano. "Yesterday he was to review four regiments which were to be included in the Neapolitan contingent. He was then to hold a Ministerial Council, which was to be followed in the evening by a reception of the whole Court. But none of these engagements were fulfilled. The King remained in his own cabinet till night, and saw no one. It transpired that he had been indisposed and unable to see his ministers until after eight o'clock."²

This indisposition of the 15th was an evil omen, for Joachim could never receive bad news without having an attack of fever. Zurlo, General Carascosa, Poerio, a *Conseiller d'État*, all three closely connected with the Nationalist party, had united in urging him not to go.

¹ Durant to Bassano, April 12, 1812. *Affaires Étrangères*.

² Durant to Bassano, Naples, April 17, 1812. *Affaires Étrangères*.

But the King was impatient, and their counsels would not have availed to restrain him. However, on the evening of the 15th, letters had come to hand from the Duc de Carignano stating that His Imperial Majesty had animadverted in terms of the utmost severity on the King's conduct. This made Murat pause. Suppose the Emperor were to receive him with anger; suppose he were sent back to Naples! What an affront for one who had pretended that he had never begged to be sent for! The whole imposture would become as plain as daylight to every one. Joachim therefore dared not breathe another word, but, curbing his impatience as best he could, made up his mind to wait till a formal command from the Emperor should make him certain of a favourable reception.

Meanwhile letters from Caroline continued to arrive, each one more urgent than the last. She even thought that her husband was already on the road to Paris. Through other channels the King had got wind of rumours "which credited him with the desire to create for himself a personal ascendancy, a following of his own in Italy,"¹ rumours which were said to have reached Napoleon's ears. He therefore deemed it high time to start. By the 23rd his mind was thoroughly made up, and he wrote to the Emperor as follows: "Sire, on the receipt of a message from the Queen, I immediately despatched my equipages to Paris, and was about to follow myself when a report reached me from the Duc de Carignano informing me of the unfavourable manner in which he had been received by Your Majesty. This report gave me to understand that you were still prejudiced in your mind against me and my government. I at once reversed my plans and sent word to the Queen that I would not leave Naples until I received first-hand information regarding your Majesty's final decision. I was awaiting the Queen's

¹ Durant to Bassano, Naples, April 26, 1812. *Affaires Étrangères*.

reply when I was informed by persons on whom I could place reliance and who are thoroughly devoted to Your Majesty, that you had called my loyalty in question, that you considered me mean-spirited enough to fight shy of taking any place in the army, and only to be waiting for a favourable opportunity to present itself in order to shake off your control and assert my independence. Sire, these suspicions, for which you have to thank your own enemies rather than mine, have in a moment given me back all my energy, all my resolution. I hesitate to go to you no longer. It shall be in your power to dispose of me and my alleged plots as you may see fit."

It may perhaps afford matter for astonishment that it should have taken him so long to convince himself that the Emperor was cognisant of his ideas and his intrigues. Certainly the Imperial letter of the 30th August should have opened his eyes; nevertheless, so limited was his vision that he had readily suffered himself to be deluded by the Italian Cabal into believing that his manœuvres were passing unnoticed at Paris. Now, however, that "persons on whom reliance could be placed" (was this Fouché or Bassano?) had assured him that Napoleon was thoroughly alive to his machinations, he became alarmed, and in order to forestall any orders that might come and keep him in forced inactivity at Naples, he acted on the permission implied in Caroline's letter and hurried away to plead his cause in Paris.

His plan of defence was of the simplest. Knowing that in the coming campaign the Emperor would be in need of troops, he placed his contingent—reinforced as largely as possible—at his brother-in-law's disposal and made him a humble offer of his own personal services. "I am going to Paris," he said. "I shall be there within the week, when I look forward to seeing the Emperor. I shall offer myself to him heart and soul and place myself unreservedly in his hands. I shall declare that if

he takes the field I will abide at his side, that I mean to win back his affection and confidence at all costs, and that I do not intend to return to Naples until I can come back with such power and influence as his affection and confidence alone can give. I am sending off my contingent, including more than half my Household Troops. It will be altogether 11,500 strong. I rely on His Majesty to do everything necessary to ensure the safety of my kingdom. I am leaving Maréchal Pérignon in charge, and I hope that the Emperor will give him the control of the 'corps d'observation' so that it may be employed for the efficient defence and policing of my realm. I shall go into the whole matter with the Emperor. My appeal will be to his sense of justice and to his kindness of heart, and I know he will listen to me and give me his approval. Above all he will not hinder me from going to shed my blood in order to serve him and advance his glory."

Such was to be his plea, and on the 26th April he gave a preliminary rehearsal of it to Durant.¹

That his defence was crowned with complete success is due not to any conspicuous astuteness on his part, but to the fact that circumstances once more arrayed themselves on his side. If Murat managed to extricate himself from the critical position in which he found himself, he owed his good fortune first to the necessities of the Empire, and secondly to the possession of certain qualities which at times rendered his assistance valuable, if not indispensable to the successful accomplishment of the Emperor's designs. Twice in the course of this year 1811—in July and in September—he had been on the brink of the precipice, and on each occasion Russia had proved his salvation, for had the Emperor been free from misgivings regarding the intentions of Alexander, Murat would undoubtedly have paid for his rebelliousness with his crown.

¹ Durant to Bassano, Naples, April 26, 1812. *Affaires Étrangères*.

On the evening of the 26th Durant witnessed the passport which His Majesty had taken out in the name of the Count of Calabria, and the King began his journey. So certain was he of succeeding in his object, that his *aides-de-camp* set out to rejoin him ; first the Frenchmen, Rosetti, de Rochambeau, and others ; then the Neapolitans, among whom was Prince de Cariati, who was captain of a warship with a crew of two hundred men. This same Cariati it was who was destined to act as intermediary betwixt Naples and Austria, and who, when Joachim decided to play the traitor, carried the news of his decision to Metternich.

On quitting Naples, Murat did not manifest the slightest intention of relinquishing the management of affairs. Though his interests as well as his tastes were taking him away to the war, he had thoroughly made up his mind to remain ruler of his kingdom. In order to keep the reins of government in his own hands, he had devised the following scheme : " The Council of Ministers was to meet every Thursday as usual, each of its members acting as President in turn. Business would be transacted exactly as though the King were present. Minutes of the proceedings and the result of each sitting were to be forwarded to His Majesty by the Secretary of State, who was to despatch a messenger with the portfolio. In case of emergency the president for the week was to have the power to convene a special sitting." ¹

Doubtless in making these arrangements Murat thought he was avoiding the necessity of appointing the Queen as Regent. The mistrust of her which Maghella's revelations had engendered in his mind remained as great as ever, and he did not intend that because he was going to join his brother-in-law's army Caroline should be left behind with full power to act as she willed. What was to prevent him, as he cavaliered it along the road to

¹ Durant to Bassano, April 30, 1812. *Affaires Étrangères*.

Moscow, from administering the affairs of a kingdom which he now deemed well under control? Napoleon ruled the Empire thus, and Joachim, whose vanity led him to imagine that he too was capable of playing great parts, thought that whatever his brother-in-law could do, he could do likewise.

After reaching Paris, however, he changed his mind. Napoleon probably gave him instructions which he was unwilling to carry out, particularly with regard to Caroline and the Regency. Nevertheless, however greatly the measure may have conflicted with his wishes, he sent a decree to his Secretary of State before leaving for the army on the 12th May appointing Caroline to the Regency and giving Pérignon the supreme command of all the forces in the kingdom. Murat signed the decree with extreme reluctance, and, instead of having it published in the *Monitore* of the Two Sicilies, kept its terms as secret as possible.¹ The French *Moniteur*, on the other hand, publicly announced the Queen's appointment. In this manner Joachim hoped to throw dust in Napoleon's eyes, and the ruse was successful. The Emperor had already set out; he was busy arranging the countless details involved in the organisation of the Grande Armée and he was confronted with the Titanic task of dealing with a body of troops transcending in vastness any that he had ever before put in the field. When therefore he received the guarantee that his orders had been carried out and that Caroline had been duly appointed to the Regency, he was completely satisfied. But Murat, having allowed the Emperor to depart with the comfortable assurance that the Regency would be established, calmly set about rendering the measure ineffective, and of so arranging matters that the Queen, though nominally Regent, should be incapable of exercising the smallest control in the government of the country. "The command of the land

¹ Durant to Bassano, May 26, 1812.

and sea forces was in her hands ; she was to preside over the deliberations of the Ministerial Council and to undertake the consideration of current business, but as all matters whose nature required that they should be dealt with by royal decree were reserved for decision by the King, she was left without any voice in the appointment or dismissal of officers of State." ¹

Thus Joachim remained in command. But Caroline, who felt herself infinitely more capable of governing than her husband, could not long acquiesce in the continuance of such a régime. She arrived in Naples on the 2nd June,² and after little more than a month had gone by she let fall words in Durant's hearing that plainly hinted at the dissatisfaction she felt at the limited scope of the prerogatives conferred on her. On the other hand the King, not content with the precautions he had taken to restrict her influence, was, it appears, desirous of maintaining his control by carrying on a direct correspondence with each department of the State.³ Evidently the situation showed no tendency to improve, since two months later Durant returned to the subject in almost similar terms. Murat was still endeavouring to insure his ascendancy. He had such a dread of Caroline that he sought to rob her even of those poor crumbs of power which he had reluctantly been compelled to leave her. Of a certainty the Emperor, had he been acquainted with the whole state of the case, would have interfered in his sister's behalf, and have brought his brother-in-law with his preposterous jealousy to reason. But events of grave importance were engrossing his attention, and there was no time now to interfere in matrimonial wrangles and to adjudicate between a tyrannical husband and a complaining wife.

¹ Durant to Bassano, May 26, 1812. *Affaires Étrangères*.

² *Moniteur Universel*.

³ Durant to Bassano. *Affaires Étrangères*.

Napoleon had undertaken a mightier task than he had looked for, and found it necessary to call up all his resources, for the war on which he had entered demanded such a huge array that the Grande Armée was destined to be entirely swallowed up by it. He was thus compelled to withdraw the "corps d'observation," with Grenier at its head, from Italy to join the Grande Armée. He knew thoroughly well that this meant the extinction of his authority at Naples and, while Joachim beheld with delight the departure of his oppressors and London remarked with satisfaction that Grenier had taken with him every soldier on whom he could lay hands, it must not be imagined that the Emperor was not the first to realise the consequences of his action. But there was no time to hesitate or to elaborate schemes. The crisis demanded that he should act, and act immediately. The reserves must be called up; every available battalion must proceed to the front. When the struggle was over, if Fortune were still on his side, it would be easy enough to restore these forces to the places from which he had withdrawn them. But the immediate task was to save the situation. Grenier's departure removed the final barrier to Joachim's ambition. So long as the King had felt himself under the eye of the French army at Naples, he had not dared to make a decisive move, for he felt certain of failure. In 1811, despite the goadings of the Italian Cabal, he had twice lowered his flag, for he was conscious that the Emperor was at Paris ready to crush him, while there, before his very eyes, was the Army of France, a living symbol of the Emperor's might. But now his heart was light; the French had departed, the iron hand was no longer upon him. From that day forth he determined to be King of Naples indeed!

For the moment, however, these considerations do not enter Murat's mind. One thought alone besets him, and that is the thought of Caroline and the Regency. How

can he tell that all his precautions will not prove vain ; who knows but that by some enlargement of her powers such as he would have given anything to prevent she may not be reigning in very truth at Naples ? Haunted by these ideas, which tormented him the more since he could not unburden himself to the Emperor, his mind was forever occupied with Caroline ; in the saddle and when he lay down to sleep her image was eternally before his eyes. He beheld her enthroned at Naples, wielding the sceptre with soft and gracious hand, the centre of a powerful party eager to pay her the homage of their admiration. Once more there rose up before him the unwelcome vision of that " Queen's party " which he imagined he had destroyed once and for all when he banished Daure from the kingdom. And he, Murat, where was he ? The same pitiless power which led the whole of Europe captive held him in thrall, compelled him to endure the hardships of the campaign, to march eternally in the dreary frozen night, to mingle in the fray and face wounds and death—for what ? For a kingdom which perchance a woman would conquer with a smile ! With these thoughts constantly upon him his ardour began to grow dim, his courage to give way. The war to which he had looked forward with the lofty enthusiasm of a valorous cavalier, now seemed a wearisome and interminable affair. Little by little the soldier faded away and the King took his place. And the King would fain go home to Naples. In an army that was French in name and French at heart he could no longer feel at ease. Alien sentiments set up a barrier betwixt him and his old companions in arms. His ears were not attuned to their language of submission and obedience. Duty and discipline were words of which he no longer knew the meaning. He longed for his Court, his favourites, his ministers, and above all for his sycophants. If in conformity with Napoleon's orders the army as a whole

yielded to Joachim the homage due to a royal personage, all those former comrades of his who had fought side by side with him and tossed about with him from one end of Europe to the other, treated him with a familiarity that was by no means pleasing to "His Majesty."

And so it was that Joachim was longing to be home again even before Moscow was reached. In the fulness of victory, ere as yet a single reverse had befallen the Grande Armée, Murat had announced his intention to depart. As far back as the beginning of October, d'Harlincourt,¹ one of his aides-de-camp who had returned to Naples, "was instructed to give out that the King would probably be home before long, either because a treaty of peace would happily bring hostilities to a close or because the army would have to remain for a protracted period in winter quarters."¹ D'Harlincourt was also the bearer of letters for the Queen, among them being in all probability the one which Murat wrote on the 10th September saying that as soon as Moscow was reached he would abandon the army and return to Naples.

Moscow was taken, and on the 14th September, as the Grande Armée filed into the sacred city, Murat beheld the downfall of his hopes. The whole place was in flames, and the Emperor was compelled to alter all his plans. So far from Joachim leaving for Naples, his presence with the army was doubly necessary. Napoleon's refusal to entertain his proposal to winter at Smolensk and to reopen the campaign in April 1813 may have stung him to the point of contemplating disobedience to the Emperor's orders. At all events he seems to have made up his mind to quit the army, even against Napoleon's wishes.

"Mon ami," wrote Caroline, "I have just received your letter of the 20th September, and am greatly troubled by it. I can see that you are sad and discontented. I cannot tell you how distressed I am that it should be thus

¹ Durant to Bassano, October 10, 1812.

with you. Be calm, mon ami, and beware of throwing away in a moment all the fruits of so perilous and so brilliant a campaign. I have been looking forward to seeing you again with the utmost delight, but your letter has awakened my apprehensions. Do not lose heart. Now, when I have been counting on being able to congratulate myself and sharing in your happiness, it seems as though you are going wilfully to reject and demolish your good fortune. If my counsel be not too late, I pray you let your mind be at rest. Come back again to your wife, to your children, but leave the path open to return to the Emperor when you may desire to do so.”¹

From this day forth the King's letters were one continuous complaint. He wished to return to Naples, and he meant to have his way, come what might. The thing became an obsession. Any excuse was good enough, and one of his reasons for desiring to set out was that his exploits were unnoticed in the bulletins. The Emperor showed him every kindness, bore him company on the march, took his meals with him and generally treated him with extraordinary generosity. But it was all to no avail. So terrified was he at the possibility of Caroline extending her power that he could not forbear telling her of his apprehensions. The letter, which was intended to be ironical, only succeeded in being ill-natured.

“My dear Caroline,” he said, “I confess to you that I could not help being astonished at this absolute silence on the part of the ministers; if they were not to be allowed to write to me you should have sent on their reports, for it is impossible for me to continue in such a state of ignorance. It is two months now since I had any official news from Naples. I am indebted for my knowledge of Sicilian events to the Paris gazettes or rather to the Emperor, who had the kindness to hand them on to me. You have discontinued sending me the Messina

¹ Caroline to Murat. Portici, October 16, 1812.

Gazette in order to send it to Maret. If you are not disposed to let others write, well and good, but at any rate you should write yourself or send on their reports.

"Why should I not be pleased? You write that my ministers can look after matters as well as I and that you are putting my troops through their paces. If that is so, come and take my place here. Every one would be delighted. The Russians would be vanquished in advance, and the bulletins would carry the news of your brilliant triumphs to every one in Naples and Paris. They are dumb concerning *my* small achievements." ¹

Such were the thoughts that were animating Murat's mind at a time when it was desperately urgent to combat the enemy. The retreat began. The King allowed his forces to crumble away and suffered himself to be caught napping by Platow. But what cared he! His thoughts were not with his troops, but far away in the South, where he seemed forever to behold—and the vision nearly drove him mad—Caroline riding by in state along the Riviera di Chiaia. As he rode back over the snow along dreary interminable roads with the famished frozen host about him, he could think of nothing but Naples and what was afoot there. But once more chance came to his assistance. At Molodetscheno the Emperor learned of Malet's plot and was anxious to start for Paris then and there. Joachim Napoleon, King of Naples, should be his successor. Alas, had he known of the one consuming desire that filled his mind, how swiftly would he have altered his decision. But Napoleon had no time now to make a study of his brother-in-law. How, moreover, was he to expect that one on whom he had lavished so many indulgences should have had in his heart any sentiment but that of loyalty, any thought save that of doing his duty as a soldier. It was an unlucky hour both for himself and the army when Napoleon gave over the command

¹ Murat to Caroline. Vinkovo, October 13, 1812.

to Murat. The latter, feeling himself indispensable, immediately took advantage of the occasion to present a list of demands, which included the removal of the sequestration on the Farnesian property, the Principality of Ponte Corvo, the recall of the too clear-sighted Durant, and the appointment of the complaisant Pérignon in his stead, and finally trading licences and permission to suspend the fitting out of ships.

On the 5th December at Smorgoni the Emperor announced his decision to confer on Prince Lucien, Joachim's son, the Principality of Ponte Corvo. The news was transmitted by Defermon on the 31st December to Caroline and the young prince. "I have the honour," so the message ran, "to inform Your Royal Highness that His Majesty the Emperor and King has by a decree of the 5th December conferred upon you the Principality of Ponte Corvo to be held by Your Royal Highness on the same conditions as obtained in the case of the late Prince of Ponte Corvo."¹

The decree being executed and the Emperor gone, Murat had matters in his own hands. Retreat without any attempt at order of discipline was the order of the day. He openly avowed that his one aim was to get back to Naples. Every messenger he dispatched bore with him the same message. Thus Carafa, his equerry, was sent off from Kovno on the 12th December with the promise that the King would be home as soon as he had settled the army in its winter quarters. An estafette whom he sent from Koenigsberg on the 19th of the same month made a similar announcement. Then again Boccino left Koenigsberg on the 23rd with letters for the Queen "expressing his hopes of returning";² while finally the King wrote to Pignatelli as follows: "I have received your letter of congratulation on the occasion of New

¹ Defermon to Prince Lucien. Naples. *Archives de la Societa Napolitana di Storia Patria*.

² *Diario di Nicola*.

Year's Day. I appreciate your good wishes for my welfare, but my only happiness is to be with my family and my subjects, into whose midst I hope soon to return." At last his departure was fixed. An estafette set out from Koenigsberg with his letters of the 25th, 26th and 27th; they clinched the matter. Murat, overcome with anxiety concerning events at Naples, his poor brain in a ferment of disorder, made up his mind, no matter what came of it, what people might think or what commands he might receive, that he would go then and there and leave the army to its fate.

Before the Emperor could possibly learn what had happened Murat was riding desperately along the road to Naples. The Empire and the Army, what of them? The latter might perish and the fortunes of France might sink in irretrievable disaster, but Murat cared not if only he could win his heart's desire and find himself home again in Naples at last.¹

¹ On receipt of these letters Caroline at once sent Joachim advice inspired by genuine good sense and an accurate view of the situation. Her husband's disobedience struck her as being exceedingly grave and well calculated to bring down upon him the full measure of Napoleon's wrath. She therefore endeavoured to restrain him by one of those letters which she was continually having to write. "Mon ami, I have just received by estafette your three letters of the 25th, 26th and 27th. I am bound to confess that they have made me dreadfully unhappy. Would you have me believe that you could surrender to another the glorious rôle of aiding the Emperor to crush his enemies, or that you could commit an act so wild as to leave the army before the Emperor had fixed on your successor? Do you mean to say that you would come away now, after six months of toil and when the worst time of the year is over? No, that I feel sure you will never do. Be of good heart, mon ami. You would never forgive yourself if you gave up the victory to another. You assisted with all your might to bring about the initial successes of the Emperor; but that is not enough so long as the final issue remains in doubt. A few more days and the Emperor will be with you again with fresh troops. Then will come victory and peace. Your bravery will have helped to bring it about. Your happiness and mine too will be doubly great. Doubt not that I long for your return if it could be brought about without prejudice to your future happiness, but I know your heart too well, I am too well aware of your affection for the Emperor as well as for your own interests, to imagine

To the Emperor, however, some reason or shadow of a reason for such conduct had to be given. Ten days after Smorgoni, Joachim mentioned to Napoleon that he also was desirous of quitting the army. The next day he pursued the topic. "It would scarcely be right for me to remain with the army," he wrote, "when there are only administrative details to attend to and when the needs of my country and the wishes of my subjects recall me to their midst."¹ On the 4th January he wrote again. "Sire," he said, "it is not befitting that I should remain with the army save when you are in command. The King of Naples could scarcely assume control save with the full measure of freedom and power so indispensable to every commander-in-chief." On the 7th he gave notice that he would hand over the command to the Viceroy whenever illness or other circumstances should compel him to leave the army.

As for giving the real reason, he never for a moment dreamt of that. His motives vary with every letter. Now it is because certain accusations are laid against him; now his enemies are responsible for his "firm determination." Or else he has the fever and fears that the jaundice is coming on (which by the way was not unlikely since with him troubles and fever ever went hand in hand). But what did it matter? On the 15th he definitely announced that he was going, and selected illness as his excuse. "I have the fever and am in the early stages of a severe attack of jaundice." Despite the efforts of Berthier and Eugène, who vainly endeavoured to re-

that your mind could be at peace if he were displeased with you. Therefore take heart again. I know what your sufferings must be. I share your trials and troubles, but I conjure you, by the glory which you prize so highly, I conjure you, I say, to continue to endure them. It will not be for long, I trust. Adieu, mon ami." (Caroline to Murat. Naples, January 15, 1813. *Affaires Étrangères*.)

¹ Murat to Napoleon. Stallupönen, December 17, 1812. *Archives Nationales*.

strain him, he made off without daring to confess his real intentions to his brother officers. "I am betaking myself to the rear of the army," he wrote to Berthier, "and I hope that by following a regular course of treatment and taking a little rest I shall regain my health, which has suffered from the manifold labours I have had to undergo, and that before long I shall once more be able to assume the command of the army." Having delivered himself of this crowning falsehood he departed at headlong speed for Naples.

PART II

CHAPTER VIII

MURAT—BENTINCK—METTERNICH

Napoleon learns that Murat has abandoned the Army—Murat's coldness towards the Queen—The *Moniteur* of the 27th January—Murat gets wind of Metternich's designs—His anxiety—He seeks a rapprochement with the Emperor—He also seeks the protection of Austria—Cariati's mission—Metternich proposes an alliance—Negotiations with Great Britain—Eugène arrives in Milan—Murat is furious with the Emperor—The *Moniteur* of the 19th June—Murat's note—Durant's ultimatum—Murat gives way—His letters to the Emperor, Clarke and Berthier—The dispatch from Dresden—Murat joins the Grand Army—The policy of Metternich—Metternich endeavours to persuade Murat to join the Coalition or to remain neutral.

NAPOLEON started from Smorgoni on the 5th December 1812. On the 18th he wrote to Caroline to inform her of his arrival in Paris. His letter summed up all that had taken place during the last few days, and probably made mention of his decision to confer the Principality of Ponte Corvo on her son. On the 4th January he wrote again. The political situation, he said, made it imperative for him to form a Corps d'Observation of Italy, and he requested the immediate dispatch of a Neapolitan cavalry regiment 1000 strong, to consist of four squadrons of 250 men each. The men were to be carefully picked and well mounted, and were to start within twenty-four hours. They were to be accompanied by a detachment of field artillery. Caroline was to furnish their mounts herself. Napoleon supplying the necessary guns and gun-

carriages. This was not all. The Queen was further requested to send a light infantry regiment in two battalions. These battalions were to number between them 1800 men, none of whom were to be under twenty-two years of age. "Send these troops along the road to Verona," he said; "I must have 40,000 on the Adige. There is not a moment to be lost."¹ To the Emperor's first letter Caroline replied with much effusion. She asked permission to offer him her congratulations on his safe return, stating how she herself shared in the delight he must be feeling in embracing the King of Rome once more after so prolonged an absence. "If, Sire," she went on, "I had to express to you the full extent of my gratitude for all the kindnesses you have lavished upon me, I should weary you with the length of my epistles and even then leave my tale half told. Still, Sire, you will, I hope, allow me to express my gratitude not only for the favours you have just conferred on my son, but also for all that you have done for the King. Your generosity, Sire, has still further strengthened the bonds of respect and affection which unite us to Your Majesty."²

Napoleon's letter found the Queen in a highly amiable mood, and ready to do her utmost to carry out his instructions. Possibly she was anxious to minimise the effect of her husband's misdeeds. No sooner, therefore, did she receive the Imperial commands than she set to work. On the 17th January the Minister of France announced that in accordance with a request which His Majesty the Emperor had forwarded to the Queen direct, Her Majesty was about to dispatch a provisional regiment numbering some 3000 men, and that she was drafting

¹ *Correspondence*, 19,421.

² This letter, which is preserved among the *Archives Nationales*, is undated, but it must have been written about the 10th January, when Caroline had just been officially informed by Defermon that the Principality of Ponte Corvo had been granted to Prince Lucien.

some cavalry from Calabria which she intended to add to the other available mounted troops near Naples in order to make up a body of horse a thousand strong. That very day Caroline inspected some of the troops,¹ and four days later, on the 21st, three battalions of the 4th Light Infantry were due to leave Capua. Greater zeal could not have been displayed.

The Emperor was at Fontainebleau, doubtless congratulating himself on the valuable services rendered by the Kingdom of Naples, when Murat's letter of the 15th January announcing that he had quitted the army was put into his hands. Napoleon immediately sent orders to Eugène to take over the command. "I am vexed," he said, "that I did not put you in charge when I left. I feel sure you would have come back more slowly and that I should not have suffered such enormous losses. However, what is done cannot be undone."²

By next day his indignation against Murat had increased. He had just received a letter from Eugène stating that he had temporarily assumed command. "I consider the King's behaviour most outrageous," said the Emperor, in his reply, "and I have a very good mind to make an example of him by placing him under arrest. He is a first-rate man on the battle-field, but he has no idea of method, no moral courage." To Caroline he wrote: "Your husband abandoned the army on the 16th. He is an excellent man in the field, but weaker than a woman or a monk when he has not got the enemy in front of him. He has no moral courage." The same day he informed Defermon that he did not intend that the investiture of the King of Naples' son as Prince of Ponte Corvo should take place until he had taken the oath in person. Napoleon's wrath appeared to gather force. On the 26th the Major-General was told that the Emperor would confirm none of the appointments made

¹ *Diario di Nicola.*

² *Correspondence*, 19,474.

by the King save those which were intended to fill up vacancies. Finally he wrote to Joachim himself. "I say nothing to you of my displeasure at your conduct after my departure from the army, diametrically opposed as it was to your duty. I will say, however, that all the trouble arises from the weakness of your disposition. You are a good soldier in the field, but anywhere else you have no firmness, no force of character. I suppose you are not one of those people who imagine that the lion is dead. If that is what you are counting on, you are making a mistake. You have done me all the harm you possibly could since I left Vilna. But no more of that. The title of King has completely turned your head. If you wish to retain it, conduct yourself properly."

Stern as this admonition was, the Emperor did not stop there. He caused the following note to be inserted in the *Moniteur*: "Owing to ill-health the King of Naples has given over the command of the army to the Viceroy. The latter has had more experience of administration on a large scale and enjoys the Emperor's confidence."¹ The *Moniteur* circulated from end to end of Europe, and thus the Emperor's displeasure soon became public property. This was the first time that any public reference had been made to the strained relations existing between the two brothers-in-law.

At the same time Napoleon sent word to Naples, through his Minister, urgently demanding that the contingent promised by the Queen should be dispatched. "His Majesty," wrote Bassano to Durant, "cannot bring himself to think that the King could possibly give the troops counter instructions. If, however, such a thing should happen, His Majesty desires that you should insist on their leaving. You would have to present a Note to the Minister and point out how pained the Emperor would be at such a proceeding. If the King

¹ *Moniteur Universel*, January 27, 1813.

persisted in his refusal in spite of your urgent representations, you would at once demand your passports, explaining your reasons for so doing to the Queen and Maréchal Pérignon.”¹ Vigorous as they were, these commands differed widely in tone from those of 1811. But in those days Grenier was at hand to exact obedience, and now, amid the demoralisation of the retreat, when the Empire was beginning to totter, there was nothing or no one to drive home Napoleon’s remonstrances. Diplomatic Notes were, alas, the sole weapons, and they had small weight with Murat.

While the Emperor was digesting Joachim’s letter of the 15th January, Joachim himself was galloping full speed for home. It took him just a week to get from Dresden to Caserta. On the morning of the 29th, Comes, the courier, who was a few hours ahead of him, came to announce to the Queen that the King was at hand.² Caroline immediately sent word to the Secretary of State that the King would probably reach San Leucio that night. “His Majesty’s Ministers,” she added, “have expressed a keen desire to pay their respects to their Sovereign, and I have given my sanction to their assembling at San Leucio about midday to-morrow in order that they may be able to do themselves that honour. Kindly inform your colleagues.”³ She herself hurried off to meet the King. The latter, having rested all the next day, wrote to the Emperor on the 31st as follows :—

“I hasten to inform Your Majesty of my return to Naples. My health has undergone some slight improvement in the course of my journey. Nevertheless, I am still far from well, though I trust that a little of the

¹ Bassano to Durant. Fontainebleau, January 25, 1813. *Affaires Étrangères*.

² *Diario di Nicola*.

³ Caroline to Pignatelli. Naples, January 29, 1813. *Archivio di Stato*.

rest and freedom from strain which I needed so sorely will soon bring back my health, the loss of which occasioned me the more regret in that it compelled me to withdraw from Your Majesty's service. I have found Italy perfectly calm and contented."

When he wrote to the Emperor he was in a decidedly happy frame of mind. His letter is proof of that. He was delighted to have escaped from the army with all its depressing surroundings, and overjoyed at finding himself at home again in his own kingdom where he determined once more to resume his rôle of "grand monarque." Napoleon's letter had not yet arrived; the King's mood was gay. Italy, he said, was calm. But a change was at hand.

On Thursday, the 4th February, having rested from his journey, Joachim made a state entry into Naples, accompanied by the Queen, the princes and the princesses. An immense throng had assembled to give him testimony of their deep affection, and he was cheered to the echo. At the Reclusorio he was received by the Municipal Council and other constituted authorities. From Capodichino right up to the Royal Palace the route was lined by the garrison troops, and it was amid all this pomp and splendour that the King proceeded to the Palace. There the Ministers of State and the High Officers of the Crown were awaiting his arrival. As soon as the customary greetings were over, the King retired to rest.¹ People who had caught a glimpse of him as he passed remarked on the peculiar bronze hue of his complexion, and various stories began to go the round. Some said that he was suffering from jaundice, others that he had an open wound in his side.² His arrival was the signal for great rejoicings which his flatterers artfully ascribed to the affection in which he was held

¹ Gallo to Carignano, February 6, 1813.

² *Diario di Nicola.*

by his people. For three days and three nights the city was *en fête* and brilliantly illuminated.

But within his Palace there was waiting for Joachim something that was calculated to set a curb upon his vanity. The Emperor's letters to the Queen and himself had just arrived. The scene underwent a swift transformation. Caroline's conscience, however, was clear, her withers were unwrung. She therefore took it upon herself to reply to her brother. She was, she said, extremely grieved at the contents of the Emperor's letter, and while not attempting to palliate the King's misdeeds, she besought the Emperor to show him indulgence. As for Murat, we learn from a dispatch sent by Mier to Metternich that he was deeply incensed, and that being unable as usual to set a ward upon his tongue, he found it impossible to dissemble his wrath from the few people who had approached him since his return. In order to remove all doubt as to the cause of his displeasure, he refused admittance to the French Minister Durant. So furious was he with his brother-in-law that he was for proceeding at once to extremities. According to Mier, he had determined to summon the Estates and deputies of the realm and to have himself proclaimed King of the Two Sicilies then and there. It was only by dint of prayers and persuasion that the Queen prevailed upon him to forego his purpose.¹ He voiced his complaints for all to hear, and waxed furious over the disasters which had fallen upon France. As for the Queen, who disapproved of his action in leaving the army as well as of his speeches and policy, she, says Mier, was reprimanded for everything she had done during his absence. The result was that there was great coolness between them.

In his attitude to the Emperor, however, Murat kept himself within bounds. Despite the intoxicating influence

¹ Mier to Metternich. Quoted by M. Weil in *Le Prince Eugène et Murat*.

of popular applause, despite his longing to reign as a free and independent monarch, the Russian disaster had not availed to destroy the Emperor's prestige in the mind of the King of Naples. The Emperor was still a power to be looked upon with awe, too mighty to be openly defied, and Joachim was more reluctant than ever to run the risk of losing his crown. When, therefore, on the 7th February, Durant made a further application to Gallo for the execution of the Emperor's orders regarding the troops, he made a show of compliance.' In point of fact the King had not the least intention of meeting the wishes of his brother-in-law or of parting with troops whose presence he considered might be necessary for the safety of his own person.

The King did not mean his subjects, or at all events his friends, to imagine that he was going to rest under the unflattering imputation cast upon him by the article in the *Moniteur* of the 27th January, or that he intended to take his lesson without a murmur. Even at this date there were all kinds of whispers in Naples concerning the bickering between Murat and the Emperor. "They say that reference is made to the quarrel in the *Moniteur* . . . it is also stated that the Marquis di Gallo is starting for Paris to convey the King's excuses and that possibly the Queen will go as well."¹ The rumour that Caroline was going began to gain ground, so much so at any rate that Mier announced it as a certainty in a subsequent dispatch to Metternich. Though Carignano succeeded in persuading the King that the article in the *Moniteur* had been unfavourably received throughout the French army and that they had thoroughly disapproved of it, Naples entertained a different view. To begin with, Joachim had not uttered a word. So reserved was his attitude that even Durant was deceived by the remarkable moderation with which Joachim received the expression of the

¹ *Diario di Nicola.*

Emperor's displeasure. But the Italian Cabal was busy, and soon Murat evinced a desire to put forward his side of the question. On the 20th February Gallo wrote to Carignano requesting him by command of the King to present a Note to the Duc de Bassano "with every regard to prudence and circumspection." Carignano was first of all to talk the matter over confidentially with the Duc and explain to him that the King considered himself obliged to act as he did out of regard for his own dignity and in order to prevent abuses in the future. After these somewhat cautious prolegomena Gallo dispatched his note. "His Sicilian Majesty notices with surprise that the editor of the French journal *Le Moniteur* permitted himself to refer to him in his issue of the 27th January in terms that displayed an equal lack of prudence and decorum. The King feels confident that such unrestricted freedom of utterance, tending as it does to impair the respect due to the monarchy and to injure sovereigns in the esteem of their subjects, cannot have the approval of His Majesty the Emperor. With this conviction His Majesty has commanded the undersigned to request Monsieur le Duc de Bassano to obtain orders to address a severe reprimand to the journalist in question, and to inform him that the paper will be prohibited in the Kingdom of Naples if any attacks are made by it upon the King's Most Sacred Majesty." ¹

This was an inoffensive mode of reprisal, and the reason which restrained Murat, in spite of contrary counsels, from more vigorous action is to be found in the fact that he was once more impressed by the advantages which in certain circumstances might accrue to him if he remained on terms of friendship with Napoleon.

On every hand the nations were anxiously endeavouring to throw off the yoke. The fatal web that was destined to involve the Emperor within its meshes was

¹ Gallo to Carignano. Naples. *Archivio di Stato*.



PRINCE CLEMENT METTERNICH, CHANCELLOR OF STATE

From a painting by Joseph Axmann

In the possession of the Imperial and Royal Court Library, Vienna

at this time being stretched slowly, silently but surely, from end to end of Europe. The centre of this web was Austria, and Metternich the spider who was spinning the toils. But it was a long and delicate business to introduce harmony among so many jarring interests, and in the course of the many exchanges of views that took place some rumours found their way perforce to Murat's ears. Through Cariatì, who, after quitting the Grande Armée, passed through Vienna on his way to Naples, he became acquainted at an early hour with as much of the matter as Metternich was disposed to impart; namely, that an attempt was to be made at bringing about a general peace. But what form the movement was to take, who was its prime mover and what powers were to be admitted to the alliance, still remained a mystery, at all events for Joachim, for nothing in the world would have induced the Austrian to reveal to him at this stage the plan which he was pursuing with such grim and silent tenacity. But fear fell upon Murat's heart. He was beset by the hideous apprehension that such negotiations might leave him without his crown. The Emperor had so often expressed a desire to annex Naples that his brother-in-law deemed he would not be slow to sacrifice his kingdom if necessity arose. His apprehensions were still further quickened by the recollection of what Berthier had said to him when he left the army to return to Naples; which was that he, Berthier, considered him too true a Frenchman to hesitate to give up his crown if the interests of France demanded it.¹ Murat was far from regarding this observation as a joke, and considered that the Emperor had prompted it in order to let him know what to expect. Napoleon had made no comment on the note that had been presented in connection with the article published by the *Moniteur*. Since the letter of the 26th January the King had heard no more. Two

¹ Mier to Metternich, March 10, 1813. Quoted by M. Weil.

letters had come for the Queen, but she had not dared to disclose their contents to the King. All this boded but little good. Then again there was the mysterious coming and going of the diplomatists, words exchanged with an air of secrecy as though some dark project were afoot, all of which sufficed to awaken Murat's apprehensions without letting him into the secret, and at last drove him to desperate shifts to find out the truth about the matter. This accounts for his desire to send an emissary to sound Metternich as to his intentions. It also throws a light on a note sent by Gallo to Carignano concerning the departure of Count von Wessemberg on a mission to London with the object of obtaining the consent of England to Austria's undertaking the rôle of mediator.

"Please be good enough," wrote Gallo on the 3rd March to the Neapolitan Ambassador in Paris, "to make known whatever reports may reach you regarding the attempt which Austria seems about to make to mediate between the belligerent powers. Tell me also if there is any truth in the rumour that Count Otto will be recalled from the Austrian Embassy to proceed on special service to England, whither it is believed Count von Wessemberg has already been dispatched by Austria to make proposals for a general peace."

So great was the importance attached to this mission at Naples that Gallo returned to the matter a few days later.

"The importance of Count von Wessemberg's mission should make you understand the interest which His Majesty takes in its result. You are therefore requested to make known whatever you may succeed in discovering concerning this matter."

Notwithstanding all his attempts at dissimulation, Murat did not succeed, nor Gallo either, in disguising his sentiments and apprehensions from the sagacious

Durant. "The King," says the latter, "informed me when returning from the chase at Carditello that Prince von Schwarzenberg had withdrawn his forces, and that this retreat on the part of the Austrians might have some connection with their project for taking up a position of strict neutrality in order to act the more effectually as mediators. There was a note of approbation in the King's remarks which made an impression on me, and I noticed it again yesterday in some remarks made by the Duc de Gallo."¹

At a ball which took place a few days later at the French Legation, Murat confessed that he was hampered by the silence which was maintained regarding him. As he came to read more clearly into Murat's mind, the Ambassador expressed himself with greater precision. "The King is tormented by the uncertainty of his position, offended at the indifference which has followed the severity with which he was treated, and mistrustful of arrangements which he supposes are only kept a secret from him because they involve his downfall." He concluded by saying: "If I were to put my own construction on what was in the King's mind, I should say that what he secretly feared was to see himself left in the lurch as the result of a final agreement, and that his mind was running on the question of taking measures for his own safety."

The end of February and the whole of March were passed by Murat in a state of great uneasiness regarding the fate that was to befall his kingdom. If only the Emperor would give him some sort of assurance that he was not forsaking his cause he would be reassured, but this silence terrified him. At last he made up his mind to take the initiative himself. To Talleyrand and Belliard he successively communicated his desire of affording the Emperor fresh proof of an affection of the sincerity of

¹ Durant to Bassano, Naples, March 10, 1813.

which he was in his heart convinced, even when apparently wishing to convey the momentary impression that he doubted it. His greatest satisfaction would consist in seeing his old comrade of arms "on the field of honour" again.¹ He considered that his request would thus reach the Emperor without his being obliged to wound his self-esteem by making a direct appeal. In vain did he wait an answer. The 23rd March he thought would have been the turning-point in the matter, but the 23rd March came and went, and brought with it no reply from Paris. Murat then determined to persuade Durant to write, and on the 30th March Durant came to the Palace. As a preliminary the Queen had been told to acquaint him with the misgivings engendered in the King's mind by the continued silence of the Emperor, who, it was supposed, was about to negotiate for terms of peace. Then, intervening himself, he delivered himself of a sort of confession of faith. "I have thirty thousand men under arms; I shall soon have forty thousand. The safety of Italy depends on my army to-day. . . . Do I forget, think you, that I owe my position to the Emperor or that my destiny is irrevocably bound up with his? There is only one path open to me. If the integrity of Italy is threatened, let the Emperor but give the word and I will take it upon me to defend her frontiers. If the Grande Armée has need of me, let him but give the signal and I will be with it in a flash; only let him not shut his heart against me, let him show me the consideration which I need to serve him truly, so that I may know when I devote my life to his cause that he at least will not deny me justice."

Nevertheless all this fervour did not apparently warrant a direct appeal to the Emperor. To that Murat could not make up his mind. At length, however, on the 12th April, his patience being at an end, he took the

¹ Murat to Belliard, Naples, March 3, 1813. *Mémoires de Belliard*.

opportunity, offered by the conscription order of 1814 and Napoleon's departure for the army, to write as follows :—

“SIRE,—After Your Majesty's letter of the 26th January, after the article which appeared in the *Moniteur* of the 27th of that month regarding my return to Naples, I considered it my duty to maintain absolute silence. This rule I was able to carry out so long as negotiations alone were in question and so long as it was possible to indulge the hope that these negotiations, which were in the hands of Your Majesty alone, would be brought to a favourable issue. But now all hopes of a peaceful settlement between France and her adversaries seem to have vanished. Sweden and Prussia have placed their entire forces at Russia's disposal. Denmark is perhaps preparing to follow suit. The invader has set foot within our Northern Departments. Germany is alive with unrest. Austria's designs are at least equivocal. Sicily is in the grip of England, who is scattering her gold, concerting plots, and fitting out expeditions to destroy the peace of Italy. Lastly, Your Majesty has just announced to the Empire your intention of going forth to front fresh dangers. What choice have I therefore but to betake myself to Your Majesty and inquire how I may most usefully serve you ?

“The *Moniteur* of the 27th January and certain demonstrations on Your Majesty's part have given rise to the wildest rumours and conjectures. People considered that you were treating me as an enemy ; that I myself was capable of pursuing a policy injurious to the interests of France. . . . It is my belief, Sire, that falsehoods of this nature are disseminated to work ill to you quite as much as to myself. They give encouragement to your enemies by leading them to suppose that those who are bound to you by the closest bonds can

nevertheless withdraw their allegiance. It is particularly in Italy that such misrepresentations would be calculated to have an evil effect were they to gain any degree of credit. I therefore beg you to put an end to this regrettable uncertainty. Let there be no more grounds for entertaining doubt of your confidence in me than there are of my affection for yourself and for France. I am aware—indeed I have ever openly proclaimed it—that I owe my existence, politically speaking, entirely to the might of the Empire, but more especially do I know, and most emphatically declare, that I would never consent to be King on any other terms. Be pleased then, Sire, in your turn to make it known that I shall never lack the protection of the Empire. Thus may Your Majesty strengthen and augment the confidence of my subjects in their King, thus may you make it easier for me the more completely to organise my resources in order to fight for you against our foes and to bear a hand, if need befalls, in maintaining the peace of Italy. . . .

“With regard to Italy there are grounds for apprehending both trouble from within and invasion from without. I am unaware what measures Your Majesty purposes to take for coping with this twofold peril. In the kingdom of Naples I can, if necessary, mobilise a force of twenty thousand men, consisting of every branch of the service. . . . I am anxious that Your Majesty should instruct me how to act in case of eventualities, particularly if hostile attacks or insurrectionary movements were to take place in any part of the Empire or in the kingdom of Italy.

“In summing up this long letter I beg that Your Majesty will favour me with a frank declaration of your sentiments concerning me. I further beg that you will indicate how I ought to act in the event of trouble or invasion in any part of Italy. If you make known to

me your views, as I venture to hope will be the case, I will scrupulously carry them out. If, on the other hand, you leave me without instructions, I shall have no alternative but to act according to circumstances, and great will be my grief if, in spite of my earnest desire to fulfil your wishes, my endeavours are not crowned with success." ¹

From this lengthy appeal Murat anticipated a triple result. He hoped that the Emperor in his reply would inform him that he would place Naples under Imperial protection, and if that wish were fulfilled he would have no further cause for anxiety, for whatever negotiations took place with foreign powers Napoleon would be under obligation to safeguard the interests of Naples: the King would no longer stand alone, he would once again belong to the Empire, and the bonds that had for a time grown slack would once more be drawn tight. That was the essential point. But further than that, Napoleon's letter, if it came, would, in the eyes of Joachim and his subjects, obliterate the effect of the article in the *Moniteur*. Naples would take it that the Emperor had made the *amende honorable*, and Murat's *amour propre* would be satisfied. Thirdly, in offering to undertake the defence of Italy, his idea was to cover the country with his troops, though it is possible that at this time he had not conceived the definite plans which he freely propounded to Napoleon a few months later. Murat entertained strong hopes that if France found herself compelled to treat with the Allies and to relinquish a portion of her too unwieldy Empire, he would not be thrown over by the Emperor, who, he judged, would claim compensation for his brother-in-law for services rendered. In order to lend weight to his demands, Murat took a step that had been vainly looked

¹ Murat to Napoleon, Naples, April 12, 1813. *Archives Nationales*.

for since his home-coming. He gave orders to the third and fourth squadrons of Chasseurs to leave Nocera, where they had been brought together, and to proceed to the Grande Armée, there to join the two other squadrons which had been sent forward by Caroline a few days prior to the King's arrival.¹

Murat's application to Napoleon did not lead him to neglect other but less avowable means of discovering the nature of the matters that were forming the subject of negotiations between the Emperor and Europe. Dreading that he would find himself thrown over, he had endeavoured to obtain information regarding the question of Austrian mediation which had begun to be talked of in the Courts of Europe about the end of February. He therefore resolved to send an emissary to Vienna, Cariati, one of his aides-de-camp, being selected for the purpose. As early as the 26th February he had arranged the matter in his own mind. "Murat intends to send a secret agent to Vienna to see whether the political existence of his kingdom cannot be guaranteed in the general arrangements which it is thought are about to be made under the mediation of Austria. The Queen disapproves of this secret mission, which can hardly fail to come to the knowledge of Napoleon. Prince Cariati has been chosen for the task. It is desired to send some one to Berlin as well."² Cariati was to investigate what was going on, and to ask Metternich for his support on behalf of Naples in the event of Napoleon showing a disposition to come to terms. But he bore with him no proposals for an alliance, no powers of any description, and his subsequent demands for them were in vain. He was sent merely "to talk matters over" with Metternich, to draw the long bow about Murat's forces, and to give the impression that he was a real power and something

¹ Durant to Bassano, April 12, 1813. *Affaires Étrangères*.

² Mier to Metternich, Naples, February 26, 1813. Quoted by M. Weil.

to be reckoned with. Both the pride and the plans of the King would thus be favoured.

To Vienna and Berlin then Cariati was to go. But the Emperor had a watchful eye—no passing event escaped him. A pretext must be found, or his wrath would immediately descend upon them. The pretext was invented, and Gallo, through the medium of Carignano, thus conveyed it to Bassano. "Some years ago the Orders of the Kingdom of Prussia were bestowed upon His Majesty. In the last meeting at Berlin His Majesty the King promised the King of Prussia that he would place at the latter's disposal four decorations of the Order of the Two Sicilies. A similar plan had been followed in the case of His Majesty and other monarchs. Now that he is home again the King, desirous of fulfilling his promise has instructed Prince Cariati, one of his aides-de-camp, to proceed to the Court of His Prussian Majesty in order to present the said decorations. At the same time he has instructed him to inquire of the Comte de Saint Marsan whether the friendliness which, when the King of Naples was last in Berlin, marked the relations between France and the King of Prussia was still maintained. If Cariati receives a satisfactory assurance to this effect, he is authorised to discharge his commission. In the contrary event he is to continue his journey on the grounds that he has some duty of a military nature to perform." With the real object of his mission thus concealed from the Emperor, Cariati set out and proceeded direct to Munich. There he was to see Caracciolo, who would disclose the position which Bavaria was taking up and unfold the intrigues that were being carried on by Austria in Prussia, Saxony, and the North generally. In due course Cariati reached his destination and saw his colleague. On his return to Naples, Gallo informed Bassano, still through the medium of the Neapolitan Embassy, "that when Prince Cariati reached

Munich he gained the impression that the King of Prussia's attitude towards France had undergone a change and that his conduct politically was such as to give rise to suspicions concerning his *bona fides*. In conformity, therefore, with His Majesty's instructions he abandoned his mission to this Sovereign, and made an excuse for going on to Vienna, where he now awaits His Majesty's commands."¹

A little patience, and Murat would have done well. Cariati had left Naples on the 7th March; on the 9th, Metternich, who was cognisant even then of Joachim's hesitating attitude, instructed Mier to invite the King to say definitely what was passing in his mind and what his wishes were regarding the future.² On the 9th April, having received no answer from Naples, where it was thought that Cariati's instructions would be sufficient to enable him to give a direct reply, he repeated his request. This was eleven days prior to his interview with Cariati. He instructed Mier to speak to the King as follows:—"In the attitude we are now adopting we may legitimately entertain a desire to acquaint ourselves with the views of the other Courts. We are quite incapable of abusing any confidence that may be placed in us. We are perfectly willing to defend, in our capacity as mediators, the interests of the King of Naples, and should like to know his views." Before he had heard a word from Murat, Metternich was already attempting to deal with Naples in the manner that had proved so successful in other quarters. He well knew the King's ambition and love of power, and artfully sought to convince him of Austria's desire to espouse his cause.

The Austrian Minister must have experienced considerable satisfaction when, only a few days after the dispatch of his message, he beheld the arrival of Cariati.

¹ Gallo to Carignano, Naples, April 6, 1813.

² Weil, *Le Prince Eugène et Murat*.

Joachim's demands were not so exorbitant. All he asked him to do was to safeguard the throne of Naples. Sicily he gave up. If Austria would but recognise him as King of Naples and guarantee him in the possession of his kingdom, he was willing on his side to support the Austrian policy, if need should arise, with all the military forces at his command. Thus said Cariatì, and in saying it he greatly exceeded his instructions. The proof of that is that Metternich, desirous of opening negotiations then and there, inquired of the envoy whether his orders were explicit enough to enable him to treat, and whether he had sufficient authority to conclude an agreement; whereupon Cariatì had to draw back, and avow that such was not the case, merely affirming that the King's mind was made up. That did not form an adequate basis for negotiation, and at Metternich's request Cariatì immediately sent home the officer of the Guard who had accompanied him to Vienna to ask for full powers. The request bore no fruit, however, for Joachim, perceiving the prospect of a general peace receding now that the Emperor was entering on a fresh campaign, obstinately refused to grant the necessary powers despite the repeated requests of Metternich.

Mier received his orders from Vienna on the 27th April. He looked upon Gallo as too friendly to the French party to assist the King in involving himself more deeply with Austria. He therefore decided to await the return of the King, who had gone on a visit to Basilicata and the Calabrias. On the 29th Joachim was back again in Naples,¹ and the Austrian Ambassador had a private interview with him. The King requested him to ask Metternich for some friendly advice as to what he ought to say, do, demand and stipulate for, and undertook to follow such advice in its entirety. He merely claimed

¹ *Moniteur Universel*.

that his fortune should be left intact and that the independence of his kingdom should be observed,¹ but he carefully refrained from entrusting Cariati with the powers that Metternich had pressed for. That, however, as it happened, would have proved a matter of no difficulty. On the ground that the Prince de Colobrano's health would not allow of his continuing his ambassadorial duties at Vienna, it became necessary to appoint a mission to replace him. This mission was appointed on the 21st April. At its head was Cariati, who at that very moment was in Vienna. Such was the message that Carignano was instructed to give to Bassano in order to enable Naples to keep an official spy in Vienna. That, however, is as far as Murat's wishes extended for the time being, and Metternich was guilty of error if he thought he was going to enlist him on the side of Austria. Murat desired no such alliance, and would have had no reason to desire it, for at the moment Austria had no power to give him what he asked. What did he wish for, then, that Austria was unable herself to give him? What, indeed, but that on which ever since the failure of the Sicilian enterprise he had set his heart—to wit, some compensation for the loss of the island. For three years his thoughts had lain in this direction, and during that period his plans had undergone a steady but remarkable development. The Italian Party, beholding in Murat the longed-for champion of independence, were continually stimulating his zeal, and since 1810 he had never suffered a day to go by without pondering how he might bring his schemes to pass. His ideas, then, had been growing vaster and vaster until now nothing short of the kingdom of Italy would satisfy his ambition. Joachim Napoleon, King of Italy! What a title was that to flatter his overweening vanity! But how was he to realise his dreams? So long as the Emperor had

¹ Mier to Metternich, Naples, April 30, 1813. Quoted by M. Weil.

remained all-powerful in Europe, it had been useless to attempt the project. But now the situation had changed. It was scarcely probable that conditions would ever prove more favourable than they were at the moment. The Italian Party were prompt to turn the opportunity to account. When Murat came back from Russia, overwhelmed with obloquy and eager for revenge, the same individuals that had egged him on in his early quarrels with the Emperor immediately came to renew their offers of service. They pointed out that neither France nor Austria had any troops in Italy, that all the fighting forces in Europe were massed along the Elbe, that Bonaparte had been dealt a staggering blow, and that, formidable though he might still remain, he could never again become the master of the world.¹ This, then, if ever, was the moment to attempt the great design which was to make Joachim master of the Italian peninsula, and to give him a foremost place among the ruling powers of Europe.

The question was, whose aid should he invoke in carrying out so difficult a task? Not Austria's, for she was thinking only of herself: to prepare her own forces for the struggle would tax her resources to the utmost. But what of Napoleon's natural and implacable foe—the foe that had unceasingly striven to thwart him, not seldom with success, whose wealth and military resources had ever been at the service of the enemies of France—what, in a word, of England? To make peace with England, to obtain the control of Italy, to make the whole peninsula a single independent State, such were the aims by which the Italian Party were animated. Just recently—on the 26th February—Lord William Bentinck, the British representative at Palermo, had taken possession of Ponza. Pursuing the policy which he had inaugurated almost as soon as he arrived, he

¹ Colletta. *Storia del Reame di Napoli*.

continued to scatter agents far and wide, and they, making liberal use of British gold, lost no opportunity of sowing the seeds of insurrection. Joachim himself had not been spared. In July 1812, during the Russian campaign, the English Minister had endeavoured to bring about a rising among the Neapolitans and to gain possession of the Château of Saint Elmo,¹ and after Ponza had fallen into his hands, he determined to extend the sphere of his activities. He established three different sections of espionage, with headquarters at Malta, Vienna, and Ponza. At Malta was one Concannon, who had already put himself in touch with Naples. At Ponza was Major Oswald, "a very intelligent man, who had been entrusted with the command of the place." With regard to the agents at Vienna, one of them was to make a tour of Italy. "He will," it was explained, "see our friends there, and encourage them to give us their support; he will also inquire as to the most suitable form of government, furnish the names of the leaders of our party in each town and province, and induce them to enter into direct correspondence with Lord William Bentinck at Palermo."² That Bentinck numbered among his emissaries men who had direct access to Murat is beyond all question, and through them, as well as through those who urged that Naples should throw in her lot with England, Joachim received encouragement that by no means left him indifferent. It only remained to seize a suitable opportunity to bring the matter to a head. At Ponza, when the non-combatants were sent back to Naples, Coffin, an English lieutenant-colonel who had charge of the matter, took occasion to discuss the general situation with one Bosset, a Neapolitan war commissioner, and, while expressing his regret at the differences which divided the Governments of

¹ *Diario di Nicola.*

² Bentinck to Castlereagh, March 21, 1813. Quoted by M. Weil.

England and Naples, informed him that Bentinck was willing that he should act as intermediary in any negotiations that might be carried on with Naples with the object of establishing a friendly understanding between the two countries. Bosset conveyed this message to Murat, who did not suffer the opportunity to slip by. On the 22nd April, Cerculi, who had a position in the offices of the Ministry of Police, being in fact a member of the Minister's confidential staff, arrived at Ponza. There he saw Coffin, whom he informed that Bosset had interviewed the Minister of Police, and that the latter, after having had an audience of the King, had instructed him, Cerculi, to find out the nature and the scope of the English proposals. Coffin replied that it was Joachim's place to make the first move. Cerculi having observed that the King was anxious to bring his interests into harmony with those of Great Britain, the Englishman stated that he would apply to Bentinck for instructions. Armed with this response, Cerculi made his way back to Naples under the escort of a British man-of-war.¹

The matter was duly reported to Bentinck, who, on the 1st May, sent Coffin permission to continue the pourparlers, but even at that early stage laid it down as an essential condition that Murat should not be recognised as King of Naples. "While displaying all possible friendliness towards him, we must," said he, "make him thoroughly understand that it is utterly impossible for us to disregard the rights of our allies in Sicily. Endeavour therefore to prevail upon him to accept something in compensation. Tell him that it is in his power to become the Bernadotte of Italy, and that as a guarantee of good faith he should put Gaeta in our hands."² On the 16th May, Bentinck, who had had a conference with

¹ Coffin to Bentinck, Ponza, April 23, 1813.

² Bentinck to Coffin, Palermo, May 10, 1813.

Ferdinand's son, the Crown Prince, instructed Coffin to submit the following formal proposals :—

“ Murat was to declare war on Bonaparte and march immediately with all his forces upon the North of Italy. The Allies would effect a junction with him at a time and place to be determined in due course.

“ Murat was to surrender Naples to the King of Sicily on the following conditions :—

“ 1. Murat was to have an equivalent.

“ 2. Murat was to keep Naples until he had obtained such equivalent.”

These proposals were followed by a declaration on the part of the Crown Prince. “ In my Father's name and in my own,” said he, “ it is impossible for me to renounce my right to the kingdom of Naples or to a proportionate compensation.”¹

Three days later, in order to bring the matter to a head, Bentinck sent a letter to Coffin telling him to inform the King that he purposed coming to Ponza in a week's time (that is to say about the 28th or 29th May), and to request him to send a representative fully empowered to act. To Ponza on the 29th May there came not one representative but two—our old friend Cerculi and a certain Robert Jones, an Englishman by birth, a Neapolitan by training. Jones, a man of homely manner and appearance,² was the bearer of a letter from Murat. Lord William was late for the rendezvous, and while awaiting his arrival the two Neapolitans fell to talking matters over with Coffin. Both sides explained their position. Coffin referred to his Government's pledge to Sicily, dilated on the theme of England and Naples joining forces in Italy, and demanded that Gaeta should be handed over as a guarantee. As for Jones, he fell

¹ Bentinck to Coffin, Messina, May 16, 1813.

² Colletta, *Storia del Reame di Napoli*.

foul of England's refusal to give Naples to Joachim, and, gradually feeling his way, at length laid bare his master's terms. The King, he declared, would only consent to give his support to the Allies on the understanding that Great Britain guaranteed him the possession of Naples and the Papal States. At last the truth was out. From that day forth they knew the price that Joachim put upon his honour.

No sooner had Jones obtained a clear view of the English position than he sent Cerculi back to Naples with a letter giving an account of this first stage in the negotiations. Murat was hardly satisfied, but as these informal preliminaries scarcely afforded him a pretext for cutting matters short (Coffin had no official powers to treat), he sent another envoy to Ponza. This time it was not Cerculi but Nicolas, the Keeper of the Archives, who, armed with a commission handed to him on the 1st June by Campochiaro, proceeded to the island to negotiate with Bentinck concerning an alliance with England. Among his papers was a copy of the *Moniteur* containing official news of the victory of Lützen. He was also to refer to Napoleon's successes at Bautzen. By this means Murat hoped to bring pressure to bear upon Bentinck.

The official conference between the representatives of Naples and England took place on the 3rd June. The Englishman stated that he was determined to uphold the claims of Ferdinand : Jones and Nicolas replied that it was impossible for Joachim to relinquish the throne of Naples ; that his own reputation and consideration for his children alike forbade him to make any concession in this direction. However, the discussion went on : the Neapolitans gave way little by little ; they accepted the co-operation of the English troops, they even consented to hand over Gaeta in exchange for twenty thousand rifles which Bentinck undertook to supply.

Bentinck now submitted his final terms. They provided that—

1. The claims of His Majesty King Ferdinand to the crown of the Two Sicilies should be recognised.

2. King Joachim's sovereign rights should also be recognised, and that he should retain possession of the kingdom of Naples pending the conclusion of an arrangement satisfactory to both parties.¹

Such were the proposals that Nicolas, on board Bentinck's ship the *America*, departed to announce to the King. On reaching the Bay of Naples Nicolas went ashore: Bentinck remained on board his vessel to await, beneath the very eyes of the Neapolitans,² an answer to his latest propositions. On the evening of the 5th Nicolas returned. The decision was in the negative. Murat gave vague excuses to Bentinck, and made some quite irrelevant remarks about waiting for a reply from Austria. Bentinck, who stated that he was on the eve of his departure for Spain, remarked that the occasion was eminently propitious for negotiation, but that he was less optimistic about the future. Nevertheless before leaving he formally entrusted Coffin with powers to sign a convention, which he went to the trouble of drawing up himself, laying down that not a single word in the last three clauses should be altered. The following is the text of the document in question:—


"Provisional agreement entered into by . . . in the name of King Gioacchino and by Lieutenant-Colonel Coffin on behalf of Lord William Bentinck.

"Art. 1. The aim of the present contracting parties is to secure liberty for Italy and to emancipate her from the domination of Bonaparte.

"Art. 2. For the attainment of this object the two contracting parties agree to act together with the least

¹ Bentinck to Castlereagh, June 10, 1813. Quoted by M. Weil.

² *Diario di Nicola*, June 5, 1813.



Sir Thos. Lawrence, P.R.A., pinxt.

H. R. Cook, sculpt.

LIEUT.-GENL. LORD WILLIAM CAVENDISH-BENTINCK

possible delay and with all their forces as shall be laid down in the plan of campaign.

“ Art. 3. Within ten days of the ratification hereof by King Gioacchino, Gaeta shall be handed over to the English troops as a guarantee of good faith, and in the event of the British Government refusing to ratify the present overtures it shall be surrendered in the same state in which it was received.

“ Art. 4. The claims of His Majesty King Ferdinand to the crown of the Two Sicilies shall be recognised.

“ Art. 5. The sovereign rights of King Gioacchino shall be recognised. Possession of the Kingdom of Naples shall not be disputed pending the conclusion of an arrangement satisfactory to both contracting parties.”

While Coffin, on Bentinck's instructions, was continuing to parley with the Neapolitan Government, Bentinck himself sent a warship to England with a dispatch for Castlereagh, and asked for authority to conclude a treaty. He was, he said, convinced that Murat would shortly accept his terms.¹ On the 22nd July Castlereagh sent him the necessary powers.²

Murat's refusal to accept Bentinck's proposals may be easily foreseen. Paradoxical as it may seem, the cause of France had at this epoch no more useful and effective ally than the British representative at Palermo. Never had the Emperor received more untiring or more capable assistance than he was afforded by this Englishman who was animated by all his country's inveterate and fiery hatred of Napoleon and of France. It must not be supposed for a moment that Lord Bentinck prejudiced his country's cause by showing narrow-minded stupidity or useless stubbornness in his conduct of the negotiations. On the contrary, of all the people who were brought into contact with Joachim, of all those

¹ Wellington, *Despatches*.

² Castlereagh to Bentinck. Quoted by M. Weil.

who were in a position to weigh his actions and to form an estimate of his character, none saw through his schemes more completely than Bentinck. From the very outset he read the King's mind as though it had been an open book. He beheld all the meanness, all the deceit, all the craft of the man, his vanity and his egoism, his knavery and his folly. That England, later on, was preserved from entering into dubious compromises, that the British Cabinet was able to speak its mind plainly at the Congress of Vienna and elsewhere, that his country avoided the peace, the inglorious peace of 1814, was in large measure due to his clearness of vision. At this moment, moreover, Bentinck saw in Murat an adversary whom it was the more important to vanquish in that his aims precisely coincided with his own. He thus described Murat's schemes to Castlereagh. "He (Murat) hopes that Italy will be given him, he being unable to conquer it merely with his Neapolitans. It must be recognised that he is highly popular in Italy. . . . He only broke off the negotiations because he was not offered as much as he wanted. . . .¹ I am sure he will resume them for two reasons. Firstly, because the victory of Bautzen was indecisive ; secondly, because, in my opinion, he only broke them off in the hope of obtaining further concessions."

Who ever read a situation more clearly than this ? Bentinck had not been duped. He knew that the excuse about waiting for a reply from Austria was mere prevarication. He knew, moreover, that what the King desired was Italy, and nothing less. And was he to aid and abet in handing over Italy to Murat—he, Bentinck, who for two years had been concentrating all his energies upon freeing her from the toils of an alien domination !

Italy was the apple of his adversary's eye ; so was it also of his own. He conceived that Italy, united and

¹ Bentinck to Castlereagh, June 10, 1813.

independent, would prove an invaluable barrier against the ambitious encroachments of France on the one hand and of Austria on the other. Therefore it was that in order to crush Murat he brought to bear all the stubbornness of his nature, and backed it with the might, material and moral, that belonged to England, the mistress of the seas. As to how he went to work, he allows us scarcely a hint. It is enough that he achieved his object. Once, however, in a fit of anger, he momentarily let fall the veil. When Murat and Neipperg jointly put their hands to the first Austrian treaty, rage took hold of Bentinck; that day he disclosed the direction of his hopes.

“I was always afraid that Neipperg would suffer himself to become the dupe of the Court of Naples. The provisions of this treaty are at once impolitic, inopportune, and useless. Murat cannot be relied upon. Not only does this treaty create for us a rival, but it may make Murat master of Italy. When the Viceroy has been forced back upon the Alps, the Italians will be certain to gravitate to his side, whereas, had they been offered the assistance and protection of England, this potent force would doubtless have thrown in their lot with us. A far-reaching national movement in favour of independence could then have been set on foot, and the great Italian people, instead of being the tool of some military tyrant or the unhappy slave of a few miserable princelings, would have developed into a formidable bulwark not only against France but against Austria as well, and have thus become a further safeguard of the peace and happiness of the world. I am sorely afraid that the hour for that has now gone by.”¹

Such was the policy of Bentinck. Such was the reason which forbade him to recognise Murat as the rightful King of Naples, or to surrender Italy into his

¹ Bentinck to Castlereagh, Palermo, January 1814.

hands. It has been said that Bentinck was guilty of personal spite towards Joachim, that he displayed a petty cavilling spirit in his conduct of the negotiations; but in point of fact his Italian policy was distinguished by wisdom as lofty, his forecast of the future by clear-sightedness as accurate, as those of any man of his time.

So long as the *pourparlers* with Bentinck were in progress, the King maintained an attitude of watchful reserve towards France. On the 17th April and again on the 1st May came demands for troops for the service of the Empire. To these demands Joachim paid no heed. When negotiations for a treaty with England were perhaps on the eve of being brought to a successful conclusion, and when therefore it was necessary for him to increase his forces to the utmost limit, it was hardly to be expected that he would hand over to France troops which he urgently needed for himself. Still, he could not afford to break with the Emperor or even to turn too sullen a countenance upon him. He therefore adopted a policy of procrastination, now employing phrases calculated to make him appear the friend of France, now giving orders which proved that he was just the opposite. Thus while he forbore to comply with the Imperial demand for troops, he wrote a letter to Marie Louise which was eloquent of widely different sentiments:—

“Madame,” says he, “Your Majesty has been so good as to inform me by special messenger, and through the agency of the Prince Borghese, of the Emperor’s departure for the army. I was absent from Naples when the news arrived, and it was sent on to me at Taranto. My delay in thanking Your Majesty is due to this circumstance alone. Although the news of the Emperor’s return to the army was not a surprise to me, I was unable to repress my keen and profound emotion when I heard of it. There is fighting to be done, and I shall not be there

to take a part in it ; the Emperor is going forth to face fresh dangers, and I am not summoned to share them. Such are the feelings which as a soldier, as the devoted friend of my old general, and as the faithful ally of the Ruler of the Empire, I cannot help but entertain." He then proceeded to explain that he was unable to leave his country, and that he had informed Napoleon of the fact. "To go myself or to send my troops would, I am most thoroughly convinced, involve the loss not only of my own Kingdom but of the rest of the Peninsula as well." Anxious as I was to take part in the campaign, I have been compelled to subordinate my wishes to these all-important considerations, and only the conviction that nowhere could I render the Emperor more useful service than where I am, can encourage and console me for my absence from his side.

"Nothing, however, avails to relieve me of the anxiety arising from the manner in which he has treated me since my return to Naples. On several occasions he has delivered himself of sentiments reflecting small credit on myself. He has taken measures which implied that he had lost confidence in me, and which could not but give me pain. He has laid commands upon me which he knew it was not in my power to obey. He has given me none of the explanations which I begged of him. He has granted me none of the facilities of which I was in need in order to obtain in France the arms and horses requisite for his service. He has never discussed his views with me, never furnished me with any instructions regarding the policy I should pursue in Italy. Were I less familiar with the Emperor's genius, or with the scrupulous care which he himself brings to bear on every single question, I might justly assume that the entire direction of affairs at the Tuileries had been in the hands of my enemies, and that they had acted with the express intention of creating trouble for me and

working up grievances with which to confound me on some future occasion.

"To be in such a position as this is no happy experience. Nor must I omit to add that it is impossible for me to hide these matters altogether from my subjects. Such a state of affairs alarms the loyal, emboldens the disaffected, and lends encouragement to our common enemies. I therefore make so bold as to implore you, Madame, to put an end to so deplorable a situation. It would be a deed well worthy of Your Majesty to convince the Emperor that he is being deceived regarding the true state of Italy, and to persuade him to restore to me the confidence to which twenty years of conspicuous service in his cause and a loyalty which even injustice has been powerless to impair, entitle me to lay an indisputable claim.

"If the Emperor will but disclose his intentions, if he will but deign clearly and definitely to make them known to me, I will use my best efforts to fulfil them. But isolated acts which seem to foretell that others of a similar nature are to follow, continually tend to weaken my position, and are calculated to deprive me of the power necessary to withstand our enemies; such acts compromise my honour and jeopardise my kingdom, and can but evoke my just complaints."¹

Had Murat been as eager to learn what was going on in France as he had been to gain information regarding the course of events in Austria, he would not have found a grievance in the Emperor's failure to send him the rifles and horses that were "destined for his service," rifles for which a few days later he made application to Bentinck. At this time in fact it was a matter of extreme difficulty to find horses for the French troops, and Napoleon was doing his utmost to push on the manufacture of rifles.

¹ Murat to the Empress, Portici, May 11, 1813. *Archives Nationales.*

On the 18th May, from Portici, Joachim sent a long overdue reply to the Imperial War Minister. He said, though his words were wrapped round with much circumlocution, that he could not send the Emperor any troops, but that in the event of Italy being invaded he would undertake its defence. "I presume," he added, "that since the Emperor requires me to provide a mobile army he will dispense me from the necessity of furnishing any other kind of contingent." As a counterblast to that, he commanded that every fort in the capital should fire a salute of one hundred guns in honour of the victory of Lützen, the news of which reached Naples on the 13th May.¹

The King was pursuing this policy of blowing hot and cold as occasion and the needs of the moment might dictate, when the whole outlook was darkened by the news, brought him by express messenger, that Eugène had arrived at Milan. This meant that his plans for occupying Italy under pretext of defending it were completely overthrown. His fury knew no bounds. An outrage was committed on the Italian Legation at Naples, but he took no steps to bring the offenders to justice. Dispatches arrived from Vienna. With a great show of courtesy, he begged Mier to discuss their contents with Gallo. To the Austrian Ambassador he was markedly gracious; to the French Minister he was all coldness and reserve. Clarke made another request for troops. Caroline was obliged to smooth matters over. At a ball on the 27th May she told Durant that neither Eugène nor Clarke had succeeded in obtaining a favourable reply from the King regarding the troops demanded by Napoleon. Taking up Joachim's tale of woe, she complained of the manner in which both the King and herself had been ignored by Napoleon, and, while recognising that as far as externals went her husband's conduct was

¹ *Moniteur Universel*.

perhaps a little imprudent, she felt confident of being able to keep him loyal to France if only she had some message of encouragement to give him.¹ On the 5th June it was she again who wrote to her brother to congratulate him on his success at Bautzen. "Will Your Majesty permit me to offer you my congratulations on the fresh triumphs you have won?"² It happened that on that very day Durant had handed Gallo a note from the Imperial Government demanding, in pursuance of orders given by the Emperor on the 14th May, that Cariatì should be recalled. Gallo at first could not summon up sufficient courage to show the note to Murat, but after a lapse of three days he determined to take the plunge. So violent was the outburst of fury with which Murat greeted the announcement that his thunders were audible throughout the palace.³ Cariatì, he cried, had orders to work in concert with the representative of France. In all cases of emergency he had been definitely told to seek the advice of the French Minister and to act as he directed. How, then, could he possibly come under the ban of suspicion?

At this juncture there arrived at Naples from the Grand Army some twenty or twenty-five men belonging to the Neapolitan Guard. The Emperor had been requested to allow them to return, and had given orders that they were to be sent home. Their arrival gave currency to a popular rumour that Naples was no longer making common cause with the French Empire—that King Joachim had himself to think of, and could not take part in the Russian campaign. This was stated to be the reason why the remainder of the troops were being brought home.⁴

¹ Durant to Bassano, Naples, June 1, 1813.

² Caroline to the Emperor, Naples, June 5, 1813.

³ Mier to Metternich, June 13, 1813. Quoted by M. Weil.

⁴ *Diario di Nicola*.

All this would have merely tended to show that Murat was actuated by feelings of latent animosity towards his brother-in-law, had it not been that refusals of a more downright and uncompromising nature clearly showed that he intended to turn a deaf ear to his brother-in-law's appeal for help. On the 1st June the Emperor wrote Eugène telling him to pretend that he expected to be attacked by Austria at the end of the month, and secretly to inform Murat to that effect. The Viceroy did as he was bid, and at the same time announced the conclusion of an armistice. To Napoleon's wishes Joachim expressed bitter and peremptory opposition. "If," he wrote Eugène, "the war which the Emperor regards as inevitable should come to pass, I will march at the head of my troops myself. I will not allow them to be scattered as they are at present among the various brigades of the army, for nothing is less conducive to their discipline and welfare."¹ Never before had he dared to meet the Emperor with so unqualified a refusal as this answer implied. Nor had he acted on the impulse of the moment. He had carefully and deliberately considered his action, and was prepared to abide by the consequences. A letter which a short time afterwards he wrote to Clarke was couched in such terms that, had it been penned in the Empire's palmy days, it would have brought down Grenier upon him and involved him in the loss of his crown.

On receipt of Joachim's first letter to Clarke, the Emperor sent the latter further instructions. "Inform the King of Naples that I believe Austria to be on the point of putting forward claims to which France cannot with honour assent. Thirty thousand men Naples cannot spare, but I desire that endeavours should be made to furnish a good division of ten to twelve thousand infantry, fifteen hundred horse, and twenty-five guns, and that

¹ Murat to Eugène, June 18, 1813. *Archives de la Guerre.*

they should be in readiness to start for Bologna early in July, there to await developments. In the event of war they would march on Laybach: if terms of peace were arranged they would return to Naples. I desire that the King should put his troops under the command of a French general. . . . By the 15th July without fail his division must be in the neighbourhood of Bologna in order to support the Viceroy, who will then be encamped on the heights of Laybach. He must say definitely what he can and what he will do, and he must be given to understand that any troops which have not left the country by the beginning of July will not be in the running. Impress on him especially that cavalry and artillery are particularly needed, and that if he cannot make up twelve thousand foot his division should at all events total twelve thousand men altogether.”¹

On receipt of this letter, Clarke transmitted the Imperial demands to Murat who immediately replied that the Emperor had already sent him a similar request through the Viceroy, that he had replied to the latter, and that, as all this had taken place as long ago as the 18th May, the Emperor should by this time be fully aware of what he, Murat, could and could not do in the event of the alleged inevitable war with Austria. He adhered, he went on, to what he had then said. If his troops were required, he and none other should lead them. He absolutely would not consent to their being split up among the various brigades of the Grand Army and the Army of Spain, where their doings were completely ignored. In conclusion he stated that he was organising an army of thirty thousand men with eighty pieces of artillery, and that he would be in a position to leave Naples on the 15th of the following month if his services were required. The letter terminated with a request to be informed of the Emperor's decision and a protesta-

¹ Napoleon to Clarke, June 11, 1813. *Correspondance*, 20, 108.

tion of his anxiety to give His Imperial and Royal Majesty a further proof of his "inviolable attachment."¹

The manner in which his designs on Italy had been checkmated by Eugène's occupation of Milan had sent the King into an ungovernable rage, but on the 29th June an event occurred which served, if that were possible, still further to increase his fury. On that day he was handed a copy of the *Moniteur* of the 19th of that month containing an article headed "Malta," which asserted that the British flag had been hoisted on the island of Ponza without a blow being struck and without the Regent or his Ministers having the least suspicion that an attack had been intended.² There is every possibility that the article in question, which had already been published in the *Journal de l'Empire*, was intended by Napoleon as a warning. It is quite possible that at that date, the 19th, the Emperor's spies had made him acquainted with what was afoot in Ponza, for, although it is true that the negotiations did not assume definite shape until the end of May, the continual going and coming between Ponza, Naples, and Sicily that had taken place since the 22nd April and during the first fortnight in May, must have kept too many people busy for the matter to have remained a secret. Napoleon may well have known of the affair since, on the 11th June, an English newspaper, *The Morning Chronicle*, printed an article on the subject. "It is," said this journal, "with the utmost surprise that we learn from advices, received from Sicily under date of the 8th April, that there are indications that an amicable understanding is in course of being brought about between Lord William Bentinck and Murat's Minister at Naples. It has apparently been agreed that there should be an entire cessation of hostilities between Sicily and Naples, and a letter from Messina

¹ Murat to Clarke, June 27, 1813. *Archives des Affaires Étrangères*.

² *Moniteur Universel*, June 19, 1813.

dated the 7th April states that relations had been re-established with the islands off Gaeta and Naples, and that there was a good prospect of profitable trade relations being thereby opened up with the Continent. How strange it would be if we were to see another French Marshal, one moreover who has been raised to the dignity of royalty, taking his stand among our friends and allies."

This letter, which is supposed to have left Messina on the 7th April, must have been a long time on the way not to have reached London till about the 10th June. It is highly probable that its date was tampered with, if indeed it ever had any real existence. At all events it is a somewhat curious circumstance that charges against Murat should at this time (June 11-19) have made a practically simultaneous appearance in the journals of England and France. Be the explanation what it may, Murat, as soon as he read the article in the *Moniteur*, deemed that the cat was out of the bag. So unbounded was his rage, says Mier, that he made himself ill. Anxious to prove to the Austrian Ambassador how little disposed he was to truckle to the Emperor, he told him that he had just sent a strongly worded note to Durant, in the course of which, according to him, attention had been drawn to the fact that this was the second time the French Gazettes had gone out of their way to insult him, and that the next time such an article appeared he would return the compliment by sending the French Minister out of the country. Napoleon had asked for twelve thousand men, but he declared to Mier that the Emperor had just made a demand for twenty thousand, and that he had promptly refused.¹

How widely the real facts differed from this presentment of them will be seen from the actual text of the note handed by Gallo to Durant. We look in vain for

¹ Mier to Metternich, Naples, June 29, 1813.

the note of defiance, for the threat to send the Minister of France about his business. "Monsieur le Baron," the document began, "the *Journal de l'Empire* and the *Moniteur Français* of the 19th instant contained an extract from a letter alleged to have been written from Malta on the 28th May, stating in the most positive, and therefore in the most insulting manner, *that the Island of Ponza had been surrendered to the Anglo-Sicilian forces*.¹ This assertion, repeated without comment by the French papers, has naturally inflicted great pain upon His Majesty. The King could not possibly ignore the matter, and he has commanded me to declare to you, Monsieur le Baron, that the national honour requires that the lie should publicly be given to the writer of the letter, inasmuch as it would not be right to allow Europe and the brave Neapolitans who fought with such distinction at Lützen, Holkirk, and Wurtchen for their King and his allies, to labour under the impression that their comrades could have tarnished their renown by committing so base an act of treachery. The garrison of Ponza fought bravely, but were compelled to yield to vastly superior numbers. Testimony is borne to the truth of this statement by the enemy themselves as may be seen from General Keith's report as published in the *Palermo Gazette* of the 8th March.

"His Majesty therefore gave orders that when the letter from Malta was published in the *Moniteur des Deux Siciles*, this declaration should appear side by side with it in order that the writer of the letter should realise that though the Kingdom of Naples may still contain a few adherents of the late dynasty, the nation as a whole knows how much value to attach to the news, and that it has no room in its heart for any one so treacherous as to betray his king and country. In all their thoughts, in all their prayers, the Neapolitans think wholly and

¹ These words are underlined in the letter.

solely of their King, whose loyalty towards his august ally cannot be called in question.

"While instructing me to acquaint you with this measure, the King also commanded me to add that if the French press makes such flagrant attacks on the people and Government of Naples, His Majesty will have no alternative but to direct that articles from these papers shall not be inserted in the journals of Naples, and that if circumstances demand it they may be forbidden in the country altogether. In thus discharging myself of His Majesty's behests, I beg you, Monsieur le Baron, to accept the assurance of my high esteem.—Gallo."

Gallo also wrote off to Carignano, the Neapolitan Ambassador in Paris, to apprise him of this important event. Having related the circumstances and the King's grief that such charges should be made against the national honour and the loyalty of his troops, he goes on to say that the Minister of Police had been commanded by His Majesty to insert the obnoxious extract in the *Moniteur des Deux Siciles*, adding thereto a note of which he attached a copy. "His Majesty," he concludes, "furthermore desired that I should send the enclosed note to the Minister of France. I forward these papers for your information in order that you may know how the matter stands."¹

Thus the terrible warning, the dread announcement that was to strike terror into Durant's breast, merely amounted to a threat to forbid the Neapolitan papers to adorn their columns with extracts from the *Moniteur de France*.

Every day seemed to increase the tension between France and Naples. Napoleon's attitude grew harsher as he became more fully aware of Murat's hostile intentions. Joachim, who deemed himself mortally insulted

¹ Gallo to Carignano, Naples, June 29, 1813.

by the Emperor's determination to give the Italian command to Eugène, grew more resolved than ever to stand his ground.¹ Such was the state of affairs at the beginning of July when Durant intervened. On the 18th June the Duc de Bassano had sent him categorical instructions from Dresden. He was to present Napoleon's final and irreducible demands. The Neapolitan division was to consist of eight infantry battalions, a thousand horse, two batteries of artillery, one, mounted, with six guns, the other, unmounted, with eight. The whole force was to be on the road to Bologna by the 10th July. Failing this, Durant was to hand in his papers and quit the place, leaving only his secretary behind him. By the 2nd July Durant had presented his ultimatum, and Murat changed his front. He realised that the moment was anything but propitious for cutting himself adrift from Napoleon. Austria had made no offers of an acceptable nature; the *pourparlers* with England had come to nought. Bentinck had insisted on the restoration of Naples to Ferdinand as an essential condition of an agreement, and to this Joachim would not consent. It was by no means easy to foresee the result of the struggle between the Emperor and the Coalition. To judge from Napoleon's successes at Lützen and Bautzen, it would seem that the Imperial banners were once more attended by that good fortune which appeared lately to have deserted them. In Italy it was held that Napoleon's present situation was in reality far less critical than in 1809, when he had succeeded in shattering the hopes of Austria by the overwhelming defeat which he inflicted upon her forces at Wagram. With such a man to reckon with, who could foretell with any certainty what the future might have in store? His astounding genius was capable of overcoming the most stupendous obstacles, and it might well be that he would yet crush

¹ Brunetti to Testi, Naples, July 11, 1813. Quoted by M. Weil.

this new Coalition by means of some sudden and decisive stroke that he was then secretly preparing to deliver. Murat stood alone. England had failed him, Austria was vacillating: where, then, could he look for an ally if he decided to defy the Emperor? Finding no answer to this question, Joachim, deeming that his best plan was to humour Napoleon, to watch the course of events and to follow the lead of the stronger party, resolved to give way yet once more. On the 3rd July the Queen gave an audience to Durant. Having delivered herself of some complaints concerning the statement that had appeared in the *Moniteur* and of the Emperor's aloofness, she concluded by giving the Minister to understand that the King was ready to proceed to whatever part of Italy the Emperor might desire.¹ That same day she thought it well to explain the King's conduct in a letter to her brother. Expressing the great regret with which she had learnt that Durant was under orders to leave Naples unless the ten thousand men were forthcoming, she went on to say that the King would march not only with ten thousand men but with twenty or thirty thousand—nay, with all the men he had; that he would willingly sacrifice his life in the Imperial cause on one condition, which was that he himself and no other should command his troops. She next contrasted the coldness and reserve with which Murat had been treated with the boundless confidence reposed by the Emperor in Eugène. Her husband, she said, may have been tempted in a fit of vexation into some imprudent vivacities of speech which had been snapped up and reported to the Emperor, but she urged that although it was always the way of the French to become declamatory, none—as Napoleon needs must know—had hearts more truly loyal than they. “It is,” she went on, “the King's excessive attachment to you that has made him jealous,

¹ Durant to Bassano, Naples, July 3, 1813.

and his jealousy has put him beside himself. You have but to give the word, and he will hasten to place his life at your disposal. He may be fiery, he may be hot-headed, but you, Sire, know how deep is his affection for you. Set me free from the anxieties that beset my mind. A word from Your Majesty, and he would be at the very pinnacle of happiness. Do but restore to him your favour, and he will be but too ready to lay down his life in your cause.”¹

The following day Murat himself wrote to the Emperor at great length. Napoleon had made a further application for troops, but, said the King, “the treaties and the country’s present situation relieve me of all obligation to make any addition to the contingent already furnished. As matters now are, I cannot allow any of my troops to leave the country unless I myself take command of them; but if Italy is threatened or attacked, I am ready to march with twenty-five or thirty thousand men whithersoever Your Majesty may deem that my services would be of use.” This is his “irrevocable decision.” After complaining about the favour shown to Eugène and the manner in which the Neapolitan troops were ignored in the bulletins and journals, he went on: “Wherefore, Sire, do you reject my offer? You told the French War Minister that my kingdom could not spare a force of thirty thousand men, but can Your Majesty suppose that I have lost sight of the necessity of defending my own dominions? I can answer for it that I have not. If I leave with twenty-five thousand men, the troops which remain and the National Guard will abundantly suffice to protect the country’s safety. Besides, I can raise fresh levies at once if Your Majesty supplies the muskets and gives your consent to the recall of the troops which I have in Germany and Spain. So long, moreover, as I am in command of

¹ Caroline to the Emperor. *Archives Nationales.*

an army in the region which Your Majesty appears to regard as the probable seat of war, I could easily hurry away to my country's defence if the enemy attempted to effect a landing on its shores." He next complains that Napoleon had found fault with him unnecessarily. He begs that he will recall his services to the Empire, and read again, with those services in his memory, the letter which he (Napoleon) wrote to him after his return to Naples, as well as his letter to the Queen. More than that, let him remember the absolute silence he maintained after writing those letters, and then judge how sturdy must have been the loyalty that had remained unimpaired in the face of such injustice as that. "Remember, Sire," he said, "that, as I deem it, honour requires that I myself should lead the troops that are to fight for you, and that I may terminate the high career I have followed beneath your auspices by losing both my crown and my life, but not at the sacrifice of my self-respect. Only send me word, Sire, that you accept my proffered services and your enemies will behold me once more upon the battlefield, worthy of you and worthy of myself."¹

That, then, was his final reply. His letter was sufficiently vague, sufficiently contradictory of Caroline's, to justify us in doubting whether he had made up his mind to go campaigning in the North, as his wife said, or whether he intended remaining in the South, as he appeared to say himself. The whole effusion was interlarded with just such a mass of denials, and protestations of sincerity and devotion, as he never failed to employ when he desired to obscure the issue and to evade the necessity of giving the Emperor a straightforward answer. But with all his talk of leading the Neapolitan troops in person, of marching to defend Italy from the foe, he came back by a series of détours to his proposal of the

¹ Murat to Napoleon, Naples, July 4, 1813. *Archives de la Guerre.*

12th April—the proposal that he should be entrusted with the defence of Italy.

The letter was sent to Dresden by special messenger, and Murat began his preparations. Certain in his own mind that Napoleon would be bound to accept his aid, he put considerable energy into the organisation of his forces.¹ To the command of the three Neapolitan divisions he appointed Carascosa, Pignatelli, and Campana. He further gave orders that a fourth division should be formed. This latter was to remain behind in Naples, while the other three were to set out for Italy. Desvernois, Pepe, Carafa, d'Aquino, Filangieri were made brigadier-generals. As though confident of its acceptance, he allowed rumours to spread abroad concerning his offer to the Emperor to march at the head of his troops into Upper Italy. It was publicly reported that the King was about to set out for Verona with twenty-five thousand men. On the 7th July he told the Duc de Feltre that he was looking forward to rendering further services to the Emperor at the head of the troops of His Royal and Imperial Majesty. On the 9th he declared to Berthier that he was perfectly ready to march. "I have just proposed to the Emperor that I should proceed to the Adige with twenty-five or thirty thousand men."

While Murat was endeavouring to secure Napoleon's acceptance of what he was pleased to term his offer to undertake the defence of Italy, time had been slipping by, and the interval granted by the Emperor for the departure of the Neapolitan troops had at last expired. On the 6th July Durant had written to Bassano informing him that unless he received an answer by the 10th he would present Monsieur de Gabriac to Gallo and request an audience of the King. The appointed day came, but brought with it no response. Durant therefore betook

¹ Mier to Metternich.

himself to Gallo, with whom he had a prolonged interview,¹ in the course of which he gave notice of his departure. He then had an audience of the King. The latter asserted that his letter of the 27th June to the Duc de Feltre was not to be regarded as a refusal, whereupon Durant stated that the value of his assistance depended on the promptness with which it was rendered, and added that he should leave Naples unless a division was sent to Bologna immediately. Murat protested that he could do nothing before the 20th or the 25th at the earliest, but that the delay would be immaterial, since the troops would go by way of the Abruzzi, and concluded with renewed protestations of his loyalty to the Imperial cause. Nevertheless the following day Durant demanded his farewell audience. "If my request is granted at once," said he, "the insincerity of Murat's offer will be proved." In the contrary event, he decided to wait for instructions from Bassano. The 15th came, and still he had not had his farewell audience, and, as Mier wrote to Metternich, it appeared as though he had made up his mind to remain at Naples till Murat received an answer from the Emperor.

The King's anxiety was great. It is easy to judge of his impatience when we bear in mind that, notwithstanding all his essays in diplomacy, Napoleon still remained his sole support. His advances to the English had been received with unmingled hostility by Bentinck. There was no satisfaction to be won from Austria's mediation, since it was not in the power of Metternich to give him that "compensation" to the attainment of which the policy of Naples was at this time exclusively directed. Truth to tell, relations with Austria had been of a very humdrum description since Cariatì had been at Vienna. Cariatì had informed Metternich that his letters of credit, which had been sent off by special messenger,

¹ Brunetti to Testi, Naples, July 11, 1813. *Archives Nationales.*

would shortly reach him. The said letters, however, were stopped at Rome and, according to popular report, sent on to the Emperor Napoleon.¹ After this début, relations remained uneventful. It may be a fact that on the 29th June, Joachim, who had just received the fatal copy of the *Moniteur* and was exceedingly wroth thereat, caused Mier to be informed that he and the Queen were impatiently waiting for an answer to Cariati's proposals,² though the said proposals were already ancient history and Metternich had long ago sent his reply. If such was the case, it was merely an ebullition of temper which went no further, for the King steadily refused to grant the full powers demanded of him, without which neither Cariati nor any one else could move a step.

Thus Murat was still in suspense. He was indeed awaiting his fate with feverish anxiety. He endeavoured to find vent for his impatience in reviewing his troops, which, he observed with vexation, had suffered numerous desertions. He found it impossible to dissemble his consuming anxiety, and Durant recorded the symptoms with the accuracy of a skilled psychologist. On the 26th the long-looked-for letter came at last. "His Majesty had a protracted consultation with the Queen." Next day he conferred with his Ministers,³ and ordered the following stale news to be inserted in the *Moniteur des Deux Siciles* :—

"His Majesty has received an express dispatch from His Majesty the Emperor informing him that the armistice has been extended till the 15th August next. The Peace Congress has commenced its deliberations at Prague."

He hoped therefore that if he left Naples he would be able to make it appear that he had been summoned to the Congress.

¹ Brunetti to Testi, July 11, 1813. *Archives Nationales*.

² Mier to Metternich, June 29, 1813. Quoted by M. Weil.

³ Durant to Bassano, July 22, 1813.

It was, however, to Caroline that the Emperor's letter was addressed. Its terms were far from gentle. In it charge after charge was levelled against Murat. It spoke of his disobedience—nay, his treason, and of his relations with England. The Emperor showed that he was fully aware of what had been passing between Naples, Vienna, and Berlin (thus proving that the real object of Cariatì's mission in February and March had not escaped him); he denounced the connections in which the Neapolitan Minister at Vienna had involved himself, and brought against Murat a body of accusations which that monarch found the more distressing in that he knew they were well founded. Nevertheless Joachim could not bring himself to depart.

At last, however, on the 30th July, his mind was made up. "Sire," wrote he to the Emperor, "Your Majesty has not written to me, and your letter to the Queen has greatly troubled me. But I mean to retain my self-command. Thinking only of your past kindnesses, of the affection you were wont to show me, I have resolved to hasten to your side. A little while and I shall once more be in your hands, and if war breaks out again your foes will see how little reason they had to count on me as an ally. The Queen, my family, and my subjects are grieved at my departure. But though they view the future with anxiety, that anxiety is tempered by the feeling of confidence with which your power and generosity inspire them. Never cease to trust me, Sire; my heart is better than my head!"¹

The same day, together with this short epistle of the King's, Caroline sent her statement of the case, for Murat would have been hard put to it to present a respectable *apologia*. "Sire," began the Queen, "the letter with which I was honoured by Your Majesty has greatly affected the King, and it cannot be gainsaid that certain

¹ Murat to Napoleon, July 30, 1813.

passages in it were well calculated to give him very considerable pain. I myself could not help feeling deeply grieved that such statements should have been made about the King, still more that they should have been made by Your Majesty, whose lightest word is law to us. The King is in despair because you did not write to him direct. A line from you, Sire, and he would have started for Dresden with a joyful heart ; but the silence which you have maintained towards him and some of the references in your letter have wounded him so sorely that for a space I saw that he was hesitating whether to go or not. Then the thought that your enemies had dared to sully his name, the irresistible impulse to find himself once more at Your Majesty's side, the desire to afford fresh proofs of his devotion, at length carried the day, and he is about to begin his journey. His presence at Dresden will put a stop to the ridiculous reports that his enemies and Your Majesty's have put into circulation.

“ That portion of your letter which referred to Malta and the English almost put him beside himself. ‘ How,’ he kept on saying, ‘ how could the Emperor dream that I should enter into a compact with England ? How could he ever doubt that his enemies were my irreconcilable foes ? ’

“ No, Sire, neither with Malta, nor with Berlin, nor with Vienna has the King had any treasonable commerce : no act of his has been hostile to your interests. The secret reports to which Your Majesty refers as having been received from London can only relate to some such insignificant statements as are occasionally bandied about between the secret service agents, and I am in a position to assure Your Majesty that if the King's new Minister at Vienna was led by an imperfect acquaintance with the Court there to form some ill-judged connections, his conduct has been strongly condemned. Never believe, Sire, that the King could have fallen a prey to snares so

clumsily devised. The influence which Your Majesty wields over his heart and mind is too potent to admit of hesitation on his part. Sire, he is about to place his destiny once more in your hands; it is my hope that he will thus win back the favour you were wont to show him, never to lose it again. If he does not, it will weigh heavily on both of us. I am bound to confess to Your Majesty that the article in the *Moniteur* which pained us so much is ever present to my mind, and that it would make me tremble for the King's reception at your hands were it not for the knowledge I have that you are thoroughly acquainted with his real sentiments."¹

It remained to give a plausible reason for the King's departure, and to display the event to the public and the foreign powers as a mark of Imperial favour. Thus, on the morrow of Murat's decision, it was currently reported in Naples that the King had been summoned to the Congress at Prague, at which the question of a general peace was being discussed, it being desirable that Naples and Sicily should be represented there since England was anxious to retain Sicily. Compensation was to be given to Ferdinand and to Joachim, hence the summons.² On the 2nd August the following note appeared in the organ of the Neapolitan Government:—

"At a time when Europe as a whole is animated by the most ardent desire for the restoration of peace, it affords us deep satisfaction to be in a position to announce that His Majesty, in response to an invitation received from his august brother-in-law the Emperor and King, is leaving to-night for Dresden. The happy prospect of which this auspicious event is the augury must in some measure compensate the King's subjects for the regret his absence will cause them. The object with which this Congress has assembled at Prague—that of restor-

¹ Caroline to the Emperor, Naples, July 30, 1813. *Archives Nationales*.

² *Diario di Nicola*.

ing peace to the world—will render it memorable in history; and in undertaking his present journey His Majesty is following the inclinations most dear to his heart, in that he will be paying a visit to His Imperial and Royal Majesty, his illustrious brother-in-law and ally, to whom he is united by the sacred bonds of kinship as well as by political relationship.”¹

The next person to have dust thrown in his eyes was Mier, who was informed that the King had received a letter from the Emperor.² Even Carignano, the Neapolitan Minister in Paris, was not allowed to know the truth. “His Majesty,” wrote Gallo, “having received a most cordial and friendly invitation from His Majesty the Emperor Napoleon, has decided to set out for Dresden. He will travel *incognito* as General Domont, who will accompany him as Captain of the Guards. The King will leave to-morrow night, taking with him only the Baron Carafa his chief equerry, Giuliani his aide-de-camp, and Pébord the surgeon.”

After all these cordial and fraternal invitations, Murat had no choice but to start, and he began his journey on the 2nd August at ten o'clock at night. Prior to his departure he entrusted the Regency to Caroline, of whose “*haute sagesse*” he declared himself highly appreciative, and informed the Diplomatic Corps that his absence could not be a prolonged one. Everything was to proceed as if he were present. Hardly had he got clear of the capital when he encountered on the road a messenger from Cariati, who, in addition to the dispatches which the Neapolitan Minister was sending to his King, was the bearer of papers addressed by Metternich to Mier, Metternich having begged Cariati to suffer him to avail himself of the opportunity thus accidentally offered of communicating with his subordinate at Naples. Murat

¹ *Moniteur des Deux Siciles*, August 2, 1813.

² Mier to Metternich, Naples, August 1, 1813. Quoted by M. Weil.

was eager to examine the contents of his papers, but unfortunately they were in cipher. He therefore commanded the courier to go on to Naples, and gave orders that as soon as the documents had been decoded they were to be sent on to him. Meanwhile he would wait for them somewhere on the road. He then continued his journey to Rome, saw Miollis, spoke of his early return, of his army of thirty thousand men which would enable him to undertake the defence of Italy, narrated the attempts made by the British forces at Ponza and recommenced his journey on the 3rd August at ten o'clock at night,¹ at the same time as the courier whom he had encountered on the road was riding into Naples. Each party opened his dispatches. Mier found a letter from Metternich, written at Prague and dated the 16th July, which calls for some explanation. From the 15th June, the date of the second treaty of Reichenbach, which had been supplemented by the treaty of Peterswaldau, the Coalition had settled its policy regarding Italy. England, Russia, and Prussia not only acquiesced in Austria's claims to the Italian Tyrol—the Grand Duchies of Tuscany and Modena—but agreed to give Austria the control of affairs beyond the Alps.

The bonds which existed between England and Austria were now to be drawn closer. By the secret treaty signed at Prague on the 27th July, Great Britain definitely consented to give Austria a free hand in Italy. On the strength of the authority thus formally conceded to his Government, Metternich now endeavoured to exert a predominating influence in Neapolitan affairs. This influence Bentinck was compelled to resist single-handed, for Castlereagh and Aberdeen, their hands tied by the treaty, had no legitimate grounds for interfering with Austria's proposals. The first use which Metternich made of this accession to his authority was to demand

¹ Miollis to the Minister for War, Rome, August 4, 1813.

from Murat an explanation of his policy. He, like Cariatì, had been wondering when Murat was going to send those powers which alone were required to bring about a settlement between the two countries. He was determined to fathom the intentions of Naples and to discover for certain with which party Joachim was going to throw in his lot. Mier was therefore instructed to seek an audience of the King and to put the question to him. Metternich demanded that a reply should be sent him by a Neapolitan emissary before the 10th August, for on the 10th August Austria had finally resolved to denounce the armistice. If, while awaiting developments, the King was willing to observe an effective neutrality, then he was to sign a formal though secret agreement to that effect. If, on the other hand, it was his desire to take an active part in the fighting, it behoved him to appoint a plenipotentiary in order to enter into an alliance with Austria and formally to join the Coalition. He promised the King that in the event of the Prague negotiations resulting in a peaceful settlement, the Court of Vienna would divulge nothing. "We are of opinion," he went on, "that the King's only means of assuring his continued existence as a sovereign is to join forces with Austria. He cannot honestly fail to see that he has gone too far not to have exposed himself to the full measure of the Emperor's reprobation."

Such were the famous proposals by which Metternich hoped to dissuade Murat from departing to throw in his lot with the Emperor. In point of fact, they gave Murat not one of the things he wanted. What did they amount to? Merely an alliance with Austria, with nothing—not so much as an inch of territory—to make up for the loss of Sicily, his claim to which he was to agree to abandon. How could he have been expected to assent to such terms? To have done so would have been sheer madness on his part, and instincts of self-interest, with which he

was more plentifully endowed than with wisdom, told him to refuse. In vain did Mier submit Metternich's dispatch to the Queen Regent ; she tore it up. In vain did he hurry after the King to Terracina : he was already far away. From the hands of the courier, who had been sent back again from Naples on the night of the 4th, Murat received Cariatì's dispatch, which contained a copy of Metternich's. He read them, and then pursued his journey at redoubled speed to make up for lost time. Leaving Bologna on the 7th August, he reached Verona on the 8th, where he halted for half-an-hour. Continuing his journey thence *via* Roveredo, Bozen, and Innsbruck, he arrived at Munich at eleven o'clock on the morning of the 10th. There he alighted at the residence of Caracciolo, his plenipotentiary, with whom he had a long interview. In the afternoon he went to Nymphenburg to call on the King and Queen of Bavaria, with whom he attended an operatic performance in the evening.¹ About midday on the 11th he set out once more, and on the 14th August found himself at Dresden.

¹ *Moniteur Universel*.

CHAPTER IX

MURAT'S DEMANDS

Caroline at Naples—Relations between Murat and Napoleon at Dresden—Schinina's visit to Murat—Pescara's mission—Ollendorf—What Murat demands of Metternich—He abandons the Grand Army—His arrival at Naples—The defence of Italy—The *Monitore*—Interview with Mier—Demands of the King and Gallo—The raising of the Continental blockade—Murat decides on a forward movement—His letter to the Emperor—His interview with Durant—Devices for making a peaceful entry into Italy—Roman opinion—The second division sets out—Metternich's dispatches reach Naples—The part played by Menz—Murat mistrusted by Napoleon—Fouché's mission to Naples—Schinina's failure at Syracuse—The King stays his preparations—Endeavours to renew relations with the Emperor.

CAROLINE, thus left to her own devices in Naples, bore with a light heart the burden of sovereignty. It is true that, as in 1812, the King had carefully curtailed her prerogatives, but if the crisis were grave or she deemed her throne in peril, it was not in her nature to hesitate to assume even the weightiest responsibilities. She set a higher value on the throne than did the King himself. For him the externals of royalty were all in all. Like the vain-glorious adventurous son of Cahors that he was, he prized the gorgeous trappings, the pomp and circumstance which excited the admiration of the multitude; he loved the etiquette which constrained the very flower of the kingdom's most ancient and illustrious nobility to bend themselves in homage before his person. With Caroline it was far different. She had an eye above all for the real, tangible advantages of the royal state, for the power, the wealth, the position which it offered. She

loved the throne because it made her supreme (at least within the limits of her realm), and placed within her reach the means of gratifying her ambition and her love of pleasure. To Murat she was willing to resign the shadowy splendours of sovereignty so she herself might remain in undisturbed possession of the substance.

By her inherited qualities Caroline was much better fitted than her husband to hold the reins of government. She took a clear, definite view of things; and though she was not to be compared with her brother, though she had nothing of his world-wide vision, nothing of his extraordinary depth of character, she played her part with credit on a smaller stage, noting with intelligence the march of events and recognising with keen and accurate discernment the policy which her interests required. So cleverly indeed had she directed that policy that, up to the present, it had never entered Napoleon's head that she might desert his cause if the day should go against him. She neglected nothing that might tend to place her conduct above suspicion. When, a few days after Murat's departure, Naples was attacked by the English, she was seen in the front rank riding along the foreshore with her generals about her.¹ On the 15th August, the Emperor's birthday, she held a reception and ordered Mass to be sung, while, in the city, illuminations, free performances in the theatre, salvoes of artillery at sunrise and at sunset, reminded the people of the great occasion. On the 5th September she ordered the victory at Dresden to be publicly announced, and was herself accorded an enthusiastic reception at the Théâtre du Fondo.² On the 12th a *Te Deum* was sung for the same victory.

All this was for the multitude. In her own heart Caroline was not so tranquil, not so certain that victory would ultimately remain with the Emperor. Such a

¹ *Diario di Nicola.*

² *Moniteur Universel.*



PAULINE BONAPARTE
From a pastel in the possession of Mr. John Lane

host of difficulties now confronted him that she conceived it hardly possible for him to overcome them. Every day saw the hopes of peace grow fainter, every day witnessed the uprising of some new foe, the appearance of some fresh complication. All this was reflected in her conduct, for it was not in her nature to carry her support of anybody to the extent of risking her crown. Thus she repeatedly caused Gallo to intimate that she was anxious for Mier to remain at Naples as long as possible, nor before she was absolutely compelled did she consent that his passports should be delivered to him.¹ By this means she designed to maintain a foothold in either camp, and to be in a position to trim her policy according to events. Then, again, she wrote a letter to Eugène excusing herself from sending troops on the grounds, true or false (Murat may well have given such a command), that she could do nothing without the sanction of her husband. "According to orders given by the King when he went away, I can do nothing," said she, "in the matter of sending troops out of the kingdom, and I cannot take any action until I receive instructions from Dresden. Nevertheless as soon as the necessary permission reaches me I will not lose an instant, for I am always happy and eager to carry out the Emperor's wishes."² However, it was necessary to reckon with desertions on a large scale. In four days a single division had lost seven hundred and fifty men in this manner, a circumstance due to the terrible tales brought back by the men who had returned from the North of what they had suffered from the cold. This was another addition to the list of excuses to be used the next time troops were demanded.

Meanwhile Durant's influence had been on the wane

¹ Mier to Metternich, Report dated December 16, 1813. Quoted by M. Weil.

² Caroline to Eugène, August 19, 1813. *Archives de la Guerre.*

at Caroline's Court. Time was when she had been wont freely to unburden her heart to the Minister of France, and when he had been a sort of confidant, sometimes indeed an ally, in her quarrels with her husband. She had made liberal enough use of his services in 1811. But now times had changed. On the 27th August Durant sent the Queen an official note informing her of the resumption of hostilities, insisting that the Austrian Ambassador should be sent home immediately, and demanding that troops should be dispatched to the front. It was all to no purpose. Gallo replied that he had received no one's instructions to dismiss the Austrian Ambassador. Again and again did Durant point out to her what an unfavourable impression Mier's continued presence at Naples was bound to have on Napoleon.¹ It was of no avail. The Queen rejoined that it was impossible for her to send him away without specific instructions from the King. As to the troops, she said that, in accordance with General Miollis' request, she had given orders for the 1st Light Infantry Regiment to set out for Rome.²

It looked as though Mier was going to stay on indefinitely when on the 9th October a message came from Joachim ordering that the Austrian Minister was to be given his passports—this, of course, "with reluctance, and only because circumstances made it absolutely inevitable." Well, the passports had to be given since there was no help for it; but to such an extent were matters delayed that, though Mier had been officially notified of the cessation of his functions on the 10th October, he was still at Naples when Murat returned, and did not finally set out until the 14th November.

So we see that Caroline, once the life and soul of the French party, had changed her attitude. Not as yet

¹ Mier to Metternich, Report dated December 16, 1813.

² Durant to Bassano. *Archives Étrangères*.

actively or avowedly hostile, she had grown uneasy and was standing on her guard. She, too, meant to await the issue of the grim conflict that was approaching, so that she could come to terms with the victor. As for Murat, we have seen the circumstances which attended his departure from Naples; and what his feelings must have been when he found himself face to face with the Emperor, it is no difficult task to conjecture. Though neither party makes mention of it, the meeting must have been a stormy one. At the end of August, after the battle of Dresden perhaps, Joachim wrote the Queen a letter, "in which he gave free expression to his discontent;"¹ and it is doubtless about that time that Napoleon addressed a reprimand to Berthier for his action in sending the Adjutant Commandant Galbois to Murat. "I disapprove," said the Emperor, "of your informing the King of Naples of what passes between the Austrians and myself."² Relations became still more strained. Durant's reports on the attitude of the Queen and the Government coincided too thoroughly with the hostile position assumed by the King for Napoleon not to have taken the alarm. Vainly did he ask his brother-in-law for proofs of his loyalty to France. At last, losing all patience with the King because of his obstinate refusal to send troops to support the Viceroy, and confirmed by Durant's reports in his suspicion that there was some secret understanding between the two Courts, he broke out into a storm of rage, overwhelmed Murat with the most violent and humiliating reproaches, ordered him to recall Cariatì from Vienna immediately and to command the Queen to send Mier about his business.³

¹ Hiller to the Emperor of Austria, September 2.

² Napoleon to Berthier, Dresden, August 29, 1813; Lecestre, *Lettres inédites*.

³ Mier to Metternich, Report dated December 16, 1813.

If we connect the letter from Bassano to Durant which was dispatched from Dresden on the 1st October 1813, with the letter from Murat to the Queen giving orders for Mier's dismissal which reached Naples on the 9th, we shall see that in all probability the quarrel between Murat and the Emperor at Dresden took place somewhere about the end of September. That outburst, however, was succeeded by a period of silence. Murat was awaiting an opportunity to flee. It soon came.

No sooner did Metternich become aware that the King had reached the Grand Army, than he conceived the project of sending after him the proposals for an alliance which, originally formulated in his letter of the 16th July, had been renewed in that of the 3rd August,¹ which latter was received at Naples some considerable time after Joachim's departure. He dispatched them through the agency of the Chevalier Schinina, the secretary to the Neapolitan Legation at Vienna. Schinina, thus sent by Metternich in pursuit of the King, came up with him on the 7th October,² and informed him of the advantageous terms which Austria, with the sanction of the Allies (so at least Metternich alleged), was disposed to offer him at that time; the terms in question being an offer to recognise Murat as lawful King of Naples on condition that he should join the Coalition. On the 7th October, therefore, Austria's terms did not amount to more than a mere willingness to "recognise" him. Did Metternich suppose that Murat would abandon the Emperor's cause, which had just emerged triumphant from the field of Dresden, to transfer his allegiance to the Coalition on the strength of such a niggardly concession as that? Eager as he may have been to throw over Napoleon, he was not disposed to hold himself at quite so cheap a rate. When, therefore, Joachim had

¹ Metternich to Mier, August 3, 1813. Quoted by M. Weil.

² Bentinck to Castlereagh, Palermo, December 20. Record Office.

seen Schinina, he sent him back to Naples to talk over the Austrian proposals with the Queen. Schinina lost no time on the road. Staying his course no longer than the necessity of changing horses demanded, he was in Rome on the night of the 16th October,¹ and reached Naples the following evening. Without losing an instant he acquainted the Queen with the preliminary proposals which he had been instructed by Metternich to lay before the King. He also informed her of the position of the French armies, of the defection of Bavaria, and spoke so strongly of the trend of events that Caroline decided to seek a *rapprochement* with Austria. Next day she saw Mier, and began by speaking to him of the friendly overtures of the Emperor Francis. After that honied exordium, she gave him the Act of Regency to read, declaring that she was authorised on all occasions of unusual importance to take whatever measures she might deem expedient for the peace and safety of the kingdom.² She had therefore made up her mind, she said, to enter into negotiations with Austria to assure herself of that government's protection, and to use every effort to bring about the fulfilment of their policy. With this object in view, she requested Mier to draw up a memorandum fully setting forth his ideas on the subject.

This meant the extinction of French influence at Naples. The Queen, though her plan was not completed in detail till the 28th October, had made up her mind to play the traitress. As for Murat, despite the expostulations, the violent reproaches which the Emperor hurled in his face, he had not summoned up courage to abandon the cause of France. Still, he reflected, Napoleon was but his brother-in-law, and he had long since ceased to regard him as a benefactor. Yet Caroline, though it was

¹ Zuccari to Gallo, Rome, October 18, 1813.

² Mier to Metternich, Report of the 16th December.

but little more than two months since she had sent the Emperor that passionate appeal in which she affirmed that her husband was on his side, and that she herself looked upon Napoleon as their only protector, was visited by no such hesitations. The transfer of her allegiance to the enemy was the affair of one brief night. The memory of past benefits, the love due from a sister to a brother, were alike unavailing to restrain her. Schinina and his message had sufficed to banish all such considerations from her mind. If we find it difficult to discover a fitting attribute to apply to the falling away of Murat, with what epithet shall we brand the treachery of Caroline ?

On the 28th October the news of Bavaria's defection was confirmed by Brunetti, and the Queen resolved to cross the Rubicon. Sending for Mier, she definitely informed him that she wished to open negotiations with Austria. It being, she said, impossible for her at the moment to refer the matter to the King, she would acquaint him with the steps she had taken at a later opportunity. She requested him to lay her proposals before his Court, and placed her future policy unreservedly in the hands of the Emperor Francis. She instructed Gallo to write to Metternich making proposals similar in effect to those which the latter had sent to Mier, from which it appears that the only condition laid down by Caroline as the price of her co-operation was that her husband should be recognised by the Allies as King of Naples ; and in order that there might be no mistake about the matter she gave her word that she would not send another soldier out of the kingdom, and that her whole army was at Austria's disposal if Austria needed its services.¹ Such was the point she had reached on the 28th October. In eleven days she had done more to advance the cause of Austria in Naples than her

¹ Mier to Metternich, Report of the 16th December.

husband had compassed in eight long months. Metternich had good reason to be satisfied with her. As yet, however, he was in ignorance of the progress his policy had made at Naples, and was still endeavouring with all his might to detach Joachim from the Emperor. Lord Aberdeen, who had been sent on a special mission to the Emperor of Austria, had learned from a conversation which he had had with Metternich that he was striving to draw Murat into the Coalition. Aberdeen was therefore authorised to offer the royal family of Sicily compensation for Naples in case Austria, to secure Murat's co-operation, insisted on recognising him as its lawful sovereign.¹

¹ Castlereagh to Bentinck, London, August 7, 1813. Quoted by M. Weil. M. Masson (*Napoléon et sa Famille*, ix. 77) writes:—"Lord Aberdeen went further. He made it understood that the Prince Regent left the Neapolitan question entirely in the hands of Austria, and that he himself was in possession of the King of Sicily's formal renunciation of his claims on the kingdom of Naples, and that he was empowered to sign jointly with Austria a treaty with the King of Naples, supposing that the latter was agreeable to such an arrangement." M. Masson has taken this declaration from a dispatch which Metternich sent to Mier from Ohrdruff on the 28th October 1813. Now Metternich was lying in this dispatch, for Aberdeen never told him that he had received the renunciation of the King of Sicily. The proof of this is to be found in a conversation which Graham had with Neipperg and Menz on the 5th January 1814. Graham's dispatch is as follows:—

" . . . After the papers enclosed as to the negotiations direct between Buonaparte and headquarters, he (Neipperg) put into my hands three others, the most extraordinary that were ever presented. 1st—The dispatch of the 28th October from Count Metternich . . . In the dispatch of the 28th October, immediately preceding the words which are quoted by M. Menz in his letter to your Lordship (*v.* pages 291–292) it is stated that the reason why Great Britain is prepared to treat with Murat is that she has obtained (underlined) from the King of Sicily a renunciation in hope of an indemnity for the crown of Naples. I asked M. Menz directly on the spot why he had not inserted this clause of the sentence: he said he himself had entertained some doubts as to the fact, and he was unwilling to raise an obstacle to an early accommodation between Murat and Great Britain (underlined). The undistinguished reason of this garbled extract is that M. Menz was aware of the intention of signing a separate treaty. He knew the disinclination of Murat to contract any engagements to which the British were no parties and, conscious of the falsehood of this pretended renunciation, he studiously

Metternich, who intended to neglect no means to win Joachim to his side, sent word to Cariati to come to Prague. In a secret interview which took place between them at the end of September,¹ they weighed the possibilities of getting through dispatches to the King. It was decided that Cariati should send a messenger to Caracciolo, Murat's Minister at Munich; Caracciolo in his turn was to dispatch another messenger bearing Metternich's proposals to the King. The matter was important, and Caracciolo entrusted Pescara, his own secretary, with the mission.

The precise date of Pescara's departure from Munich has not hitherto been ascertained, but he eventually succeeded in finding his way to Murat. According to the latter, who cautiously qualified his statement with the words "I think,"² the date of this meeting was the 16th. Therein Murat lied (he was talking to Mier). He knew the date perfectly well: he had good reason to remember it, for it was the day after Leipzig, and Leipzig was not an event that could be readily forgotten.

Several of the best informed historians of the period, such as Fain, Caulaincourt, Colletta, and Montveran, have already made mention of the meeting which took place at suppressed it." (Graham to Bentinck, Naples, January 5, 1814. Record Office. Foreign Office, Sicily, vol. lxiii.)

Metternich himself puts the matter as follows in a note which he sent to Aberdeen from Frankfort on the 12th December 1813:—"The undersigned has had the honour on several previous occasions of explaining how fair the Emperor considers is the clause providing for an indemnity for the King of Sicily in case the latter should renounce his claims to Naples." (Metternich to Aberdeen. Frankfort, December 12, 1813. Record Office. Foreign Office, Sicily.) It is clear therefore that Aberdeen never alleged that he had obtained Ferdinand's renunciation, and that the latter, moreover, despite all the pressure that had been brought to bear upon him, steadily refused to sign such a document. This is one of the examples of Metternich's mendacious policy.

¹ Metternich to Mier, Ohrdruff, October 28, 1813. Quoted by M. Weil.

² Conversation between Murat and Mier; Mier's Report.

Ollendorf between Murat and the bearer of the Austrian proposals, and those who have hitherto denied the authenticity of the interview have all done so on the ground that Austria's spokesman was Mier, and that Mier being at Naples—as Durant's dispatches and his own papers abundantly testify—he could not at the same time have been in Germany. All, however, that is necessary is to read Pescara for Mier, and the whole matter becomes as plain as daylight. The conference at Ollendorf did in fact take place: it took place on the 23rd October, and the writings of the historians whose names I have mentioned above throw a singularly vivid light on this dark chapter of diplomatic history.

Pescara it was, as Murat himself affirms, who took part in the interview, and it was at Ollendorf that the conversation took place, but on the 23rd October, and not, we repeat, on the 16th, as the King would have us believe. When Schinina in the course of an interview he had with Bentinck at Syracuse on the 12th December, explained to Lord William that Austria had offered to recognise Joachim as King of Naples if he would join the Coalition, Bentinck observed that the offer had clearly been refused, since at Leipzig Murat had fought against the Allies. Whereon Schinina made reply that Murat did not know of the offer before Leipzig, but that he had since signified his acceptance of it. It therefore follows that the King had seen nothing of Pescara on the 16th, but that they had met subsequently, when Murat, as we shall presently show, had agreed to accept the terms offered to him.

Here is evidence more convincing still. On the 16th October, the day which Joachim alleges as that which witnessed his interview with Pescara, Merfeldt, the feldzeugmeister, was taken prisoner by the French. Napoleon took advantage of the occasion to send Merfeldt back with proposals for the Allies. On the 17th he spent some hours in conversation with his prisoner, and on the following

morning sent him on parole to the headquarters of the Allies. On the way thither he saw and spoke to Murat. But though Murat knew perfectly well that Merfeldt was proceeding under safe-conduct to an interview with Metternich, he limited his observations to an expression of the satisfaction with which he had learned that the missions of their respective countries were still at Naples and Vienna, and merely added that he hoped they would both remain at their posts.¹ But of Pescara and his proposals he said never a word. If, therefore, Murat failed to avail himself of this supremely favourable opportunity of communicating with Austria regarding the proposals of which Pescara was the bearer, we can only conclude that at the date in question Pescara had not yet arrived, and that therefore Murat had nothing to say. In point of fact it was not until after Leipzig, when the retreat had begun, that Pescara came on the scene, and then he was received with open arms. He carried with him an ordinary note without superscription of any sort. "The Austrian Cabinet," it ran, "is taking further steps to obtain from the King of Naples as early a reply as possible to the overtures which the Chevalier Schinina was authorised to impart. Austria is in a position to communicate to the King news of the utmost importance from England and the Regent of Sicily as a result of the direct relations established between the Neapolitan Government and Lord William Bentinck, and it is desirable that the King should, as soon as possible, send a representative for the purpose of taking cognisance of the proposals and of removing the uncertainty which still exists regarding the intentions of his Neapolitan Majesty.

"The course of events is so unfavourable to France that the King must recognise that in no long time it will be impossible for us to ward off from Naples the animadversion of the Powers or to prevail on them to accept any

¹ Metternich to Mier, Ohrdruff, October 28, 1813.

proposals which His Majesty may send us at the eleventh hour."

There is no doubt about that being a document intended to run the gauntlet of the enemy's lines. Undated, unsigned, and enigmatic in tone, there were evidently some negotiations in progress of which a knowledge was necessary for its full comprehension. The terms which Pescara was instructed to offer verbally were these :—

" Joachim was to quit the French Army ¹ and to send no more troops to the assistance of the Viceroy, while England, who was willing to undertake to obtain Ferdinand's renunciation of the kingdom of Naples, associated herself with Austria in guaranteeing that Murat should remain in independent possession of his kingdom. Nay, they were willing to put him in the way of obtaining additional advantages."

Joachim, who had paid no heed to Schinina, lent a willing ear to Pescara, for the good reason that Leipzig had intervened to modify his attitude. Napoleon's defeat had put his hesitations to flight. No sooner had he heard what Pescara had to say than,² deeming there was no time like the present, he saw the Emperor and asked for permission to return to Naples. All his old arguments were made to do duty once again. The Allies had drawn nearer, Italy was in greater danger than ever, and ought to be defended and so forth. Murat laid great stress on the importance of his Neapolitan forces, though Napoleon knew perfectly well that he would not send a single man to Eugène's assistance. In the end the Emperor gave his consent, so at least it would appear

¹ The Duc di Vicenza says "immediately abandon," and this fits in very well with Murat's statement that he *at once* asked the Emperor's permission to return to Naples.

² This explains Murat's phrase "I made up my mind at once." In his conversation with Mier the egregious Murat failed to see that there was a whole week between the alleged date of his interview with Pescara (October 16) and that of his departure.


from his letter to Cambacérès and from the latter's conversation with Clarke. "The King of Naples," wrote Napoleon, "started for Naples last evening, his presence there having seemed to me to be necessary."¹ "Monsieur l'Archichancelier told me the day before yesterday," wrote the Duc de Feltre, "that the King of Naples had merely returned home in order to make arrangements for sending the greater part of his forces in the direction of Upper Italy."² However, the interview was rather a painful one. "Our farewells," said Joachim at a later date, "were not particularly cordial. He (Napoleon) displayed a good deal of ill-humour, and reproached me for leaving him at a time of so much difficulty."³

But before finally leaving the French army, it was Murat's duty and intention to reply to the Austrian proposals. For the first time he set out his remarkable claims in writing. Cariati was instructed "to approach Metternich and to inform him that as soon as the King had become aware of the suggestions broached to him (Cariati) at Prague, he had told the Emperor that the interests of his country demanded his prompt return to Naples, and that having made this declaration to the Emperor he had left the Army and started for Naples without waiting for a reply. His first task on reaching Naples would be to bring his army up to eighty thousand men, and he desired nothing so much as to make common cause with the Allied Powers. Nevertheless he would point out that he was not only King of Naples but King of the Two Sicilies as well, and that Naples apart from Sicily did not sufficiently guarantee his future as a sovereign. While, therefore, he appreciated to the full the offer of the Allies to guarantee him in the possession of Naples, he was bound to insist that their guarantee

¹ Napoleon to Cambacérès, Gotha, October 25, 1813.

² Minister of War to the Emperor, Paris, November 5.

³ Conversation between Murat and Mier.



CAMBACÉRÈS

From a painting by Bailly after a bust taken from life by Roland

should be extended to Sicily or to some equivalent to that island, which equivalent in his view would suitably be found in the Papal States. As soon as this matter had been cleared up and put in order, the Allied Powers would find him ready to give them his most active assistance, but it was an indispensable preliminary that he should make sure of the Papal States.”¹ There we have a clear statement of the price of his co-operation. The claim was formally submitted to Austria and the Allies immediately after the 24th October 1813. Having put his dispatch into cipher, Joachim gave it to Pescara, whose instructions were to seek out Cariati at the headquarters of the Allied armies, and to hand it over to him in order that the Neapolitan Ambassador might personally place it in the hands of Metternich. As there was some risk of the document falling into the enemy's hands, it was given to Pescara unsigned and undated like the message he had brought with him.

Pescara departed with the precious paper, but amid the confusion that followed on the battle of Leipzig Cariati was nowhere to be found. Pescara therefore made his way back to Munich, and handed the dispatch to his chief, Caracciolo. On the 31st October the latter wrote off to Cariati at Vienna enclosing the royal document, which reached the Austrian capital on the 3rd November. Unable to see Metternich, who was at the moment at headquarters, he at once interviewed his deputy, Hudelist, who undertook to hand the King's proposals to his chief.

It was thus the 24th October that marked Murat's decisive entrance into the Coalition. To use his own words, his “mind was made up” from that day onwards. It may be asked why he should have deliberately gone out of his way to deceive Mier by telling him, as he did

¹ Hudelist's report to Metternich, Vienna, November 3, 1813. Quoted by M. Weil.

on the 8th November, that he had seen Pescara on the 16th October. The explanation is simple. On the 16th Napoleon was still undefeated and formidable; on the 23rd, after the bloody and decisive field of Leipzig, he was beaten and a fugitive. Joachim was anxious to conceal from the Austrian diplomatist, and indeed from every one, that he had deferred his decision until after the overthrow of his brother-in-law. Such, however, was the fact. It was Leipzig, and Leipzig only, that decided Murat to turn traitor. After all, whatever strictures we may pass upon his conduct, it needed a battle to bring him to make up his mind, and he knew better than any one how fiercely the conflict had raged. With Caroline, Napoleon's own sister, it was different. The mere possibility of what might come had sufficed to send her over to the enemy.

The fact that, after this, relations continued to exist between Naples and France, as well as the tone of the letters which Murat wrote to the Emperor, will of course be adduced as evidence by those who seek to show that Joachim's treason was not consummated. Consummated as yet it was not; for that we must wait until the 8th January. But it was determined upon, and that irrevocably. If Joachim wrote to Napoleon, it was because he had need of him, of his sanction, or at all events of his silence, to accomplish his designs on the Papal States. But from this time forth his real connection with the Imperial system was a thing of the past, and if he adhered to it in any way it was only because his personal interests rendered such adherence expedient. Henceforth, whether the Empire stood or fell, Joachim Napoleon, King of the Two Sicilies, intended to be free and independent. This was what he looked for when his alliance and friendship with England and Austria had been brought to pass. In the circumstances his hopes were not extravagant, for Austria was apparently

empowered to pledge her own word and that of England also. As for Napoleon, the appeals that he made for help through Eugène, Clarke, Durant, Fouché, Joseph, and others met with no response. Not until he had had experience of Austria's perfidy and England's indifference did the scales fall from Murat's eyes. Then, indeed, he turned once more to the Emperor, but turned too late.

On the evening of the 24th Murat left the French headquarters at Erfurt, and, proceeding by way of Mayence, Strassburg, Switzerland, and the Simplon,¹ where he left his carriage embedded in the snow, he arrived at Milan on the 31st October. During the journey he was very uneasy, fearful of arrest or pursuit, and apparently resolved to defend himself if need arose. At Milan, where he felt himself at home again, or nearly so, he suddenly began to put his plans into execution. Though simple in conception, these plans were by no means easy to carry out. His object was to obtain, in compensation for Sicily, the whole or part of the Roman States. He had already communicated his decision to Metternich; he was now going to set it down in black and white in a letter to Napoleon. This was to be the first step. Then if circumstances were favourable, if things went as he hoped they would, he proposed to get the whole of Italy within his grasp. But that was not so simple. For such an enterprise as that he required time and certain elements of success which at the moment were lacking.

To enable him to realise his plans the King of Naples was in need of many auxiliaries. Seeing that he was fighting neither for France nor for Austria, but wholly and solely for himself, he required the assistance of French, Austrians, and English alike.

The French he needed because if he showed his hand

¹ Mier's report to Metternich of the 16th December, 1813.

to his brother-in-law his forces would be unable to cross the frontiers without immediately finding themselves opposed by the troops of Eugène and Miollis. And wherefore should he lay siege to the strongholds of Italy, all of which were in the hands of the French, when all that was necessary to bring them to fling wide their gates was to appear before them as the Emperor's friend, or better still as his lieutenant? Why should he sacrifice his men, and thereby diminish his resources, when he had such means as these at his command? He had only to cajole Napoleon, to mislead him as to his real aims, until the Neapolitan troops had succeeded in occupying as much territory as the King desired to lay hands upon, until he had gained possession of the French fortresses under pretext of holding them against the common foe; and when this was accomplished the mask could be thrown aside.

Austria he needed because he could not advance upon the Roman States and Upper Italy without quickly coming in contact with the Austrian troops, who would soon be descending into French Italy with the object of driving out Eugène. With the armies face to face, Joachim would have to declare whether he came as friend or foe.

Lastly, he was bound to propitiate the English, for he could not draw away his troops from Naples to hold the places he had won unless he was assured of the safety of his capital. A pretty business it would be if, while he himself was marching upon Upper Italy, the enterprising Bentinck were to throw an Anglo-Sicilian army into Naples. With England, therefore, he must needs be friends.

It was to carry out this threefold deception that Murat applied his energies. It was high time to act, or the Austrians would be beforehand with him in Italy. He therefore decided to write to the Emperor offering

to send forward his troops on condition that he was given control of the Roman States. But for that purpose it was necessary that he should belittle in Napoleon's eyes the man who seemed to have a natural right and title to the position. He must cut the ground away from Eugène.

"Sire," he wrote, "I hasten to inform you of my arrival at Milan. The news of what had taken place at Leipzig had already reached Switzerland, and they know all about it here. As, however, the affair had been greatly exaggerated, I am sanguine that my journey will have had a reassuring effect, and that the public will have gained a just impression of what had actually taken place. The greatest alarm prevails here; the Viceroy's headquarters were at Sacile, and every one is convinced that he will cross the Adige. I gave out that I was going to march at the head of 40,000 men, and I am certain that this news will have a salutary effect.

"For the rest, the Viceroy is falling back very quietly. His retreat is unharassed, and it is averred that he never fires a shot. Bavaria's action has created a deep impression, the more so as it is given out that the King is doing his best to procure a principality for the Viceroy in Italy. Similar reports reach me from Munich. I leave it to Your Majesty to give them their proper value. The spontaneous and undisturbed retreat of your army is not regarded in a favourable light here.

"I am about to make all the necessary arrangements for putting thirty thousand men in motion, but I must know for certain what you intend to do. I must have the command of the Papal States if I am to march, and in the event of my effecting a junction with the Viceroy, I must know who is to have the chief command."¹

There, then, the question was definitely stated. To Napoleon as to Austria, Murat makes the Papal States

¹ Murat to Napoleon. *Archives de la Guerre.*

the condition of his co-operation. If the Emperor accepts, Joachim's mind will be at rest so far as France is concerned.

Congratulating himself that Eugène's absence relieved him from the necessity of entering upon awkward and uncomfortable topics, Joachim also dispensed with the obligation of paying his respects to the Viceroy's wife at Monza. He saw Méjean, Eugène's secretary, however, and gave him certain undertakings, repeating his everlasting promise to come to the defence of Italy at the head of forty thousand men. To some he had even had the effrontery to speak of eighty thousand.¹

From Milan, where he remained for a few hours, the King set out for Florence, which he reached about ten o'clock in the morning of the 2nd. "He proceeded to the Pitti Palace, where he was received by their Royal Highnesses the Grand Duchess and Prince Felix, and left again for Naples at two o'clock."² At Florence he followed the same tactics as at Milan. "From remarks which His Majesty let fall, there can be no doubt," said the *Gazette de Florence*, "that the sole object of his journey was to offer effective assistance and to safeguard Italy from any possibility of invasion or attack." To Elisa, who had been positively amazed at the lightning rapidity with which the King had travelled, Murat spoke of coming with forty thousand men and establishing his headquarters at Bologna. Then, what time the Grand Duchess sends off a messenger to Caroline to inform her of the King's arrival, the latter hastens to Rome in a borrowed carriage. There he spent a night, saw Miollis, confirmed some orders given by the Queen,³ and continued his journey. On the 4th November Caroline went to await his arrival as far as the Maison Aversa, but returned with-

¹ Melzi to the Viceroy, November 5, 1813. Quoted by M. Weil.

² *Gazette de Florence*.

³ Miollis to the Minister of War. *Archives de la Guerre*.

out seeing him.¹ At ten o'clock, however, he put in an appearance. "He was in a gay mood and very pleased at being back in his own kingdom again."² On the 5th November, at daybreak, the guns of the forts proclaimed the King's arrival, and straightway the *Moniteur des Deux Siciles* published the following article:—

"This morning the guns announced to the inhabitants of the capital the joyful intelligence that our august and beloved Sovereign was in our midst once more. The Grand Army which is at present in Germany under the command of the Emperor and King having made preparations to go into winter quarters, the King our sovereign has availed himself of the opportunity thus offered to fulfil the desire which lay nearest to his heart—the desire, that is, to find himself in the bosom of his august family and among his faithful subjects once again.

"His Majesty the Emperor and King was pleased to give his sanction to this plan, and was anxious that the King should not delay the execution of so auspicious a project. His Majesty reached the capital at ten o'clock last night in perfect health, his arrival being impatiently awaited by all who had been apprised of his much-looked-for return.

"His Majesty the Emperor and King gave permission to all our troops with the Grand Army to return home, and they immediately set out."

This was Joachim's explanation of his departure, though in public people were already referring to it as a flight.³ To his troops he issued the following general orders. The language is unequivocal, and the purpose obvious:—

"From to-day the King is resuming the command of his army. His Majesty desires it to be made known that

¹ *Diario di Nicola.*

² Mier's report to Metternich, December 16, 1813.

³ *Diario di Nicola.*

the Neapolitan troops who have fought with such glory in the North are on their way home. Never on any future occasion will the Neapolitan Army find itself obliged to serve in those rigorous climes to which it is unsuited. It will be called upon for service in Italy alone, there to fight for the safety and independence of the country.”¹

This was the first time he had hazarded the word “independence” in a public document, and, for such as were in the secret, the “independence of the country” meant the “independence of Italy.” Every day saw some increase in his pretensions. Yesterday he might still have been content with the Papal States; to-morrow we shall find him writing to the Emperor urgently impressing upon him the necessity of consolidating the whole of Italy under one head.

Mier had not left Naples, and it was necessary to discuss matters with Austria before taking any steps. Metternich had laid it down as an indispensable condition of the alliance that no troops should be sent to help the Viceroy. On the other hand, it would manifestly be impossible for Murat to carry out his invasion scheme if none of his troops were to be allowed to leave the country. In the first place, then, it was necessary that Mier should be thoroughly aware that if the troops left Naples with the ostensible purpose of rendering assistance to the forces of Eugène and Miollis, this would be in reality merely a blind. As a matter of fact the King’s aim would be to effect a junction with the Austrians. Such was the plan he decided to unfold to the Austrian Minister. Thus Metternich would find in the King’s departure and his apparent co-operation with the French, no grounds for cutting off negotiations, since Mier would have informed him of the King’s real intentions.

Murat had thought of waiting for Pescara, who was expected back with Metternich’s reply, before dispatching

¹ Durant to Bassano. *Archives des Affaires Étrangères*.

Mier with his proposals ¹ but time passed by and Pescara did not arrive, and as Joachim could not put a single soldier in motion until he had explained his intentions to Mier, he decided to talk matters over with him. On the 8th November the Austrian Ambassador was informed by the Grand Marshal of the Palace that His Majesty had decided to receive him in private audience in his (the Grand Marshal's) house, and begged him to be on the spot at eleven o'clock that evening. There, with a great display of politeness and effusive eloquence on both sides, the interview took place, and Murat laid bare his projects. "I have," said he, "left the French army in deference to the wishes of Austria and England, and I have determined not to comply with the demand for troops. My mind is made up; I mean to throw in my lot with the Allies, to uphold their cause, to play my part in expelling the French from Italy, and I look to have my share in the benefits that will accrue therefrom. I promise frankly to sever my relations with France; I desire to enter into an alliance with Austria, and to act according to her views, provided that she supports me whenever necessary, and procures for me in return some concessions indispensable to my welfare." ² He went on to speak of the Pope, who, he considered, might be removed to some other city either in Italy or Germany. If it was insisted upon that he should occupy his old See, was it, he asked, necessary that he should be left in possession of the same extent of territory? The City of Rome, with a nice piece of land round it, a good and sure income combined with plenty of homage, ought to be sufficient for the Holy Father. "I desire," he continued, "that Austria and the other Powers should guarantee my political existence and my independence and grant me such concessions as would put me in a position to render them useful assistance. Austria does

¹ Mier to Metternich, Report of the 16th December.

² *Idem*.

not intend to retain the whole of Italy for herself. Let her, then, grant me some additional territory adjoining my frontiers, let her increase the extent of my realm by arranging that its confines should be rivers and mountains ; the possession of Corfu would also give me great satisfaction." Finally, he explained to Mier how he would be able to effect a junction with the Austrian army. " I have given orders for the mobilisation of thirty thousand men, and they can be on French territory before the month is out. While their ostensible object in proceeding thither will be to guarantee the frontiers of my kingdom, their real aim will be to enable them the more easily to act in concert with the Austrian army when we have come to some agreement regarding conditions." " I asked him," said Mier, " whether he intended entering French territory as a friend or an enemy." " As a friend," he answered, " and I shall keep up the pretence of being a friend as long as practicable."

Having dealt at great length with the situation as a whole, Murat dismissed Mier with the request that he should see the Queen before he left Naples. " Speak to her frankly," he said. " Explain to her thoroughly how matters stand. She has confidence in you, and anything you say will tend to confirm her in her present favourable attitude." The Ambassador must have smiled when he heard this advice, for on the 5th November she had impressed upon him how necessary it would be to avoid wounding the King's susceptibilities, and begged him to say nothing to His Majesty about the arrangements she had made for the exchange of communications between the two Courts after his departure. It was her desire that all such ideas should be made to seem as though they came from him. For the rest, she undertook that the King should act precisely as Austria might require.

Mier, who considered Murat's demands exorbitant, communicated his views to the Queen and to certain

other persons who enjoyed the King's confidence. The Duc de Gallo used to see the Ambassador every day, and on the 13th November, the day before the latter's departure, he informed him that he had made mention to the King of his (Mier's) apprehensions regarding the fate of the negotiations, and that he had been authorised to state that the King's observations concerning an increase of territory were suggestions and nothing more, that they were not his last words on the subject, that the matter must be further discussed, and that he was sure 'a satisfactory understanding could be arrived at with Austria. Gallo repeated to Mier what Cariatì had already said to Hudelist; they could strike a bargain.

On the 14th Mier, who left his secretary M. de Menz behind him, set out for Barletta, where he was to embark for Austria, carrying with him to Metternich the latest edition of the King's proposals.

England had not been overlooked in Murat's efforts to secure the success of his plans. No sooner did he reach home than he summoned his Council and enlarged on the European outlook, the misfortunes of the French army, the certain and imminent break up of the Continental tariff . . . the necessity for reviving national trade, and for establishing the country's domestic welfare on a sure foundation. He requested the Council to put forward its views on this matter. All this was widely discussed by the public, who discerned the true import of the official phraseology: "The King is said to have declared that the door must be opened to the English." By the 8th the decree had already been signed. On the 11th the *Monitore* of the Two Sicilies rendered it official. The King sanctioned the importation of foreign goods under a hostile or neutral flag, and gave his permission for the exportation of home products under similar conditions.

Now that the Emperor believed Joachim to be the

friend of France, and Mier was equally convinced that he was the ally of Austria, now too that England had been appeased by the raising of the Continental blockade, the King of Naples deemed that he might safely put his forces in motion. Neither the Emperor, who would assume that he was marching to the defence of Italy, nor Mier, who would take it for granted that he was going to join the Austrians, would have any grounds for opposing his movements. On the 11th, Tugny, the Neapolitan War Minister, informed Miollis, the Governor-General of Rome, and Elisa, the Governor-General of Tuscany, that, in view of the urgency of the position, His Majesty had resolved to dispatch a force of forty thousand men, six thousand of whom were cavalry, to Upper Italy.¹ On the same day Gallo wrote to the Neapolitan Chargé d'Affaires at Milan, so that the latter might give the necessary information to the Italian Government. Lastly, Carignano received word that a division of ten thousand men had just had orders to proceed from the Abruzzi in the direction of Rimini, while the remaining divisions would march on Bologna, where the King intended to fix his headquarters.

These tidings reached Miollis on the 13th November, Elisa on the 16th, and Fontenelli on the 19th. All three made the necessary preparations for the arrival of the Neapolitans. On the 12th Joachim wrote to the Emperor. On returning from Italy, he said, he found the country in a state of great uneasiness in consequence of the Viceroy's retreat and the advance of the Austrians. He had stated that he was going to march with forty thousand men to defend Upper Italy. For a time he had hesitated to put these troops in motion, fearful, he said, lest he should be considered to be violating Imperial territory (this was his way of accounting for the delay caused by his discussion with the Austrian Ambassador),

¹ Gallo to Carignano. Naples, *Archivio di Stato*.

but at length a sense of their common danger had decided him to begin the march. Ten thousand men had been ordered to Rimini, the remainder were preparing to proceed to Bologna, where he intended to establish his headquarters. If, however, the Austrians were to take Milan and cross the Po, if they aimed at bringing back the Pope and making a fresh partition of Italy, Murat was not disposed to regard these measures as adequate. There was, in his opinion, only one means of ensuring success, and that was to proclaim the union and independence of all Italy. This, he considered, would have the effect of firing the enthusiasm of the whole nation, and would bring them as one man to enlist for service beneath the banner of whomsoever the Emperor should appoint as their ruler. By no other means, he deemed, could Italy be saved. Indeed, in the face of the various movements which endeavours were being made to set on foot in Naples itself, he saw no other possibility of preserving his own crown. People had tried to convince him on his return that no course was open to him but to obtain peace from the belligerent powers on a promise of neutrality, but this, he added, was repugnant to his wishes, since it was his desire to serve the Emperor to the last.¹

The day after he wrote this letter to the Emperor he saw Durant at Carditello. This was the first time he had met him since his return. To him he laid great stress on the evidences of uneasiness which he had encountered when passing through Italy. On every hand he had been assured that he alone could save Italy. He went on to speak of his letter to the Emperor, adding that it was not his intention to wait for a reply before setting out. Within three days, he said, the troops would begin to move towards the frontiers, and at the first

¹ Rapport du Duc de Vienne à l'Empereur. Paris, November 27, 1813. *Affaires Étrangères*.

word from General Miollis he would march on the Po with all speed, because he feared that if the Austrians invaded Imperial territory and reached the heart of Italy, the blame would be laid at his own door. What would become of the Tuscans, what would happen to the Roman States, what indeed would be his own fate, if communication with France were cut off? By keeping the enemy on the other side of the Po, he would enable the Emperor to throw into Italy as many reinforcements as he might deem necessary. By this statement he doubtless hoped to make a favourable impression on the Emperor. He miscalculated the effect of his words on Durant.

It had been better for him had he devoted less time to speechifying and more to action. He had doubtless done his utmost to put as many men as possible under arms; he had even put into execution a plan conceived as long ago as 1807, and appointed the Chevalier Mariano Simonetti as his *Chargé d'Affaires* to the Swiss Confederation, with the object of bargaining for the transfer of certain Swiss regiments to his service, an arrangement which would have brought about a rapid addition to his fighting force. Nevertheless there was no time to be lost if he wished to be beforehand with the Austrians, for Nugent had just taken Ferrara and was threatening Bologna. On the morning of the 19th he reviewed his Guard and the remainder of his troops, consisting of four cavalry squadrons, nine battalions of infantry, sappers, and naval gunners.¹ On the same day Aymé sent word to Miollis informing him of the departure of these troops, adding that their commander, Carascosa, had received special instructions to carry out no orders that did not come direct from His Majesty.² This measure was intended to prevent the French authorities from making use

¹ *Diario di Nicola.*

² Aymé to Miollis, Naples, November 19, 1813. *Archives de la Guerre.*

of Neapolitan troops, and so involving the King in difficulties with Austria. On the 21st the troops at last set out for Rome. One can readily understand that they made no secret of their discontent despite the "enthusiasm" noted in the *Gazettes*. Indeed it became necessary for the King to repeat the proclamation which declared desertion to be punishable by death within forty-eight hours.¹ At length, however, they were got on the road, and that was the main part of the business for Murat.

According to Joachim's supporters, their arrival at Rome was awaited with impatience. As long ago as the 12th November, Zuccari, the Neapolitan Consul, a man with a natural taste for intrigue, considering that his position demanded that his part in the affair should be a prominent one, requested Gallo to send a message of encouragement to the Romans, as they were apprehensive that the Neapolitan army would fail to march.² Gallo replied on the 15th, stating that His Majesty had resolved to send his army to Upper Italy.³ For a long time past Zuccari had been working hard to increase the popularity of the King of Naples, and ever since October he had been forwarding bulletins to Gallo stating that Murat was regarded with such affection in Rome that even the Papal party would rejoice to have him for their ruler. In his eyes, therefore, the coming of the troops meant the triumph of the cause of Naples. Norvins, whose character and office alike disposed him to superior steadiness of judgment, reported on Roman opinion in terms of greater moderation. "It is generally held here," he said, "that the Pope should play a part in Italian affairs, whence it comes about that the friendliness of the Neapolitans is regarded with greater misgiving than the hostility of the Austrians."

¹ *Diarioldi Nicola.*

² Zuccari to Gallo. Naples, *Archivio di Stato.*

³ Gallo to Zuccari.

From this it would appear that Murat and his schemes, which were now no longer a secret, excited no great measure of enthusiasm among the Romans. This, however, did not prevent the Neapolitan agitators pursuing their work with alacrity, sometimes indeed with a zeal that did more harm than good to their cause. Ever since the visit paid by the King on his way back to Naples, there had been scattered broadcast a host of incendiary leaflets which, in the name of some alleged Italian league, called upon the Italians to arise as one man, slay the French, and secure their country's freedom.¹ The authorship of these inflammatory documents was attributed by the police to a priest of Viturchino in the district of Viterbo, named Felix Battaglia. Orders were given to arrest him at Viterbo, where he happened at the moment to be. The priest resisted, killed the officer in command of the troops who had come to seize him, and took to flight with some forty of his followers.² After this exploit he proceeded to establish himself in a small village, where he turned out the Mayor, seized the public funds and continued to perpetrate all kinds of misdeeds till he was eventually seized and taken off to Rome. This incident would have been without importance had Battaglia merely been acting on his own account. It happened, however, that he was nothing less than the agent of Zuccari, the official representative of Naples at Rome, who had made most flattering references to him in his dispatches. He had made no secret to Gallo of his relations with the priest and the aims which they were jointly striving to fulfil. "In the month of April last," said he, "this Battaglia imparted to me with much secrecy that he had conceived a plan for creating a party in Italy whose members were to unite and place themselves under the command of the

¹ Report sent by Norvins, November 22, 1813. *Archives Nationales*.

² Zuccari to Gallo, Rome, November 22, 1813. Naples, *Archivio di Stato*.

King in the event of French affairs taking an unfavourable turn. Seeing how attached he is to our Sovereign's cause, Battaglia may render invaluable assistance in adding to the King's following in the districts of Viterbo, Luti, and Civita Vecchia." ¹ So Zuccari suffered him to assume the title of "Chef de la Ligue italique," ² and doubtless gave him considerable assistance, since Battaglia, on his arrest, confessed that he had acted solely on the instigation of Zuccari, the Neapolitan Consul, who had bidden him stir up a general insurrection against the French.

On the 22nd November an estafette arrived with details of the route which the Neapolitan troops were following, and their coming was the sole topic of conversation in the city. Even Zuccari, however, admitted that the inhabitants might have some reason to modify their transports, since by a recent decision of Miollis the Neapolitan troops were to be furnished with all their necessities, not excepting horses, by requisition, an arrangement which caused the liveliest discontent among the Romans. This last-quoted letter brought forth a comment from Gallo, who informed the Neapolitan Chargé d'Affaires that the King was annoyed at the idea of private citizens being put out in order to provide for his troops. "The King is anxious," he said, "that no hardship should fall on the civil population. On the contrary, it is his wish that they should be most carefully studied." ³

Joachim was naturally averse from imposing hardships on any one in the Papal States at this juncture,

¹ Zuccari to Gallo, Rome, November 22, 1813. Naples, *Archivio di Stato*.

² Zuccari to Gallo, Rome, November 21, 1813. *Idem*.

³ Gallo to Zuccari, Naples, November 25, 1813. Naples, *Archivio di Stato*. The postscript of the letter runs as follows: "Give encouragement to all those who are desirous of taking part with the King in the defence of Italy." In the original draft the sentence ran: "Give encouragement to all who are desirous of taking part with the King in defending the freedom and independence of Italy."

for he was now about to make his great effort to win control of Italy. Whether it was the feeling that the psychological moment had arrived, or whether he was afraid of being outstripped in the race by Austria, it is not easy to determine. It might well have been the latter consideration. The young and redoubtable Nugent—who represented the anti-Neapolitan school among the Austrians much as Bentinck did among the English—was advancing with such baffling rapidity that the King began to feel alarmed. The second division was therefore ordered to proceed to Ancona and occupy the Eastern half of the Papal States just as the first division had been assigned the task of making sure of Rome and the Western half. But before committing himself to this decisive step the King considered it important to put himself right with the world at large. On the 23rd November, therefore, he wrote again to the Emperor. Despite the risk to which he exposed his country by thus denuding it of troops, he had, he said, put his army in motion. Rome, Florence, and Milan had already had instructions regarding the maintenance of his forces. If, he reflected, Napoleon's mind were set at rest he would have time to act. His next step was to invite Durant to the chase, and to take advantage of the occasion to talk matters over with him. Conversations with the Minister of France were of somewhat rare occurrence nowadays. He ran over the various arrangements he had made, told him he had received a letter from the Emperor, that some of his troops had left Naples and that others were to follow, and that he himself was going to take command. He hinted in a sort of offhand manner that he hoped to receive an answer in such terms as would enable him to prosecute his operations with the energy necessary to bring them to a successful issue. Continuing to give free vent to his eloquence, he came at length to his main point. He laid great stress on the

caution he had been obliged to observe in getting his troops out of the kingdom. Once, however, he was at their head and had got them well in hand, he would set them to work. The state of public opinion had also compelled him to allow his intentions to remain more or less undefined. He therefore begged the Ambassador not to say too much about the agreement between the Emperor and himself.¹ That was the point which he had been leading up to. What he wanted to make sure of was that Durant would maintain silence about his relations with the Empire, for at a word from the Minister of France the Austrian Ambassador would be down on him, Bentinck's agents would apprise their chief, and the whole of his edifice of deception would come toppling about his ears, leaving him with no other defence than his own much-vaunted army.

Now that word had gone to the Emperor and that Durant was satisfied, the signal was given. Ambrosio, who had command of the second division, consisting of nine battalions of a thousand men each, was told to put his troops in motion and to concentrate them at Ancona between the 2nd and 4th December. Of this order Aymé sent word to Miollis, and caused the necessary arrangements to be made for housing and victualling the troops. It was now that Joachim's envoys began to be active in Italy. First General Colletta was sent across the country ostensibly to carry out a reconnaissance of the right bank of the river Po. "You must keep up a regular correspondence with me," said the King in one of his letters, "and let me know the enemy's every movement in the region of the Lower Po, as well as the attitude of the public, and any other news you may consider useful. You must pay a visit to the Duke of Otranto if he is still at Bologna. Endeavour also to cultivate cordial relations with the Italian authorities.

¹ Durant to Bassano, Naples, November 24, 1813. *Affaires Étrangères*.

Try to get on good terms with General Pino and any other generals you may find at Bologna. Be very cautious in what you say, and limit yourself to stating that the Italians may thoroughly rely on the assistance of our troops.”¹ Next came Carascosa, who was entrusted by Murat with a letter to General Pino regarding the method to be followed to secure Italian unity. He was also to interview the Adjutant-General Paolucci, and endeavour to procure his co-operation in the liberationist movement. In the case of Pino, matters were arranged in twenty-four hours. Joachim had only to proclaim the union and independence of Italy, and Pino was his man. Paolucci gave a similar undertaking, and made no doubt of his ability to carry with him the volunteer battalions he had been commanded to raise. According to them the other Italian generals, Zucchi, Palombini, would follow their example, and the Italian army would desert the French colours in a body.² Exaggerated as these statements may have been (Zucchi showed later on that he had no treasonable intentions, and he at any rate did not prove a deserter), it cannot be denied that Murat’s cause was winning adherents in many quarters. Tremendous efforts were now put forth. The *Monitore* could talk of nothing else but independence. Independence was made the theme of songs that were sung in every Roman café and placarded about at every turn. The word was upon everybody’s lips, and none made a secret of it. The troops that were *en route* contributed their share to the movement without any attempt at concealment. The officers everywhere gave out that they were marching to strike a blow for Italian freedom, and not to fight for France.³ All eyes were now turned

¹ Murat to Colletta, Naples, November 22, 1813. Colletta, *Opere inedite o rare*.

² Gabriel Pepe, *Galimatias*; published by A. Lombroso.

³ Letter from Testi to Tassoni, Milan, December 15, 1813. Quoted by M. Weil.

towards the Liberator, whose departure for the army was to be the signal for that general uprising which France and Austria would alike be powerless to resist. Of a truth it was a glorious moment for Murat. Never before had his vanity known so magnificent a triumph. To be the Saviour of Italy: what a dream was that, and he it was who was about to bring it to pass! The *Monitore* grew positively dithyrambic. It was announced from Rome that no sooner was the coming of the first division made known than popular enthusiasm was raised to white heat. To such an extent was the writer carried away that he even spoke of the "*amoureuse hospitalité*" with which people intended to welcome the soldiers. In the edict of the Mayor of Rome we read the following:—

"The troops of His Majesty the King of Naples will begin to arrive in Rome to-morrow, the 25th November. The first division, consisting of nine thousand five hundred and eighty-four men will assemble in this city, and will then go forth to fight for Italy, to bring Peace to these regions and to banish from our land the evils of War. Nothing has been left undone that would be calculated to minister to the needs and conduce to the comfort of the brave and disciplined soldiers of the gallant Prince who made a lasting impression on the heart of every Roman by the affability which he deigned to display in the course of his sojourn in our midst. These sentiments, which mark the confidence inspired in the hearts of us Romans by the virtues and military talents of the King, are shared by all the Italian races, who turn towards him with one accord, whose hearts have gone out to him, and who invoke him as a champion and deliverer of Italy. Heralded by the glory which their prodigious valour and stern discipline have enabled them to win, our brothers who fight beneath the victorious banner of the King will find in Italy's preservation the most glorious recompense for the hardships they endured and

the laurels they won on the battlefields of Spain and Germany.

"No epoch in the whole history of Naples has been more honourable to the nation. What achievement could outshine the glory she will attain from the splendid stand she is making for future freedom by an act which will fire the enthusiasm and excite the emulation of the whole of Italy?"

At Rome it was supposed that the King would arrive early in December, about the 7th or 8th. Everything had been got ready for his reception at the Palazzo Farnese. The arrival of his military household and of a portion of his domestic staff, together with that of the Secretary of State and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, was publicly announced. Even the ceremonial that was to be observed at his entry into the city had been arranged, and the Neapolitan Artillery had received orders to meet him at the Porto San Giovanni, where they were to fire a salute of one hundred and fifty guns, and precede him as he made his State entry into Rome.

All was ready. The hero of the hour alone was waited for. On the 2nd December he took his final step: he sent Prince Pignatelli-Strongoli on a mission to Upper Italy. He was to proceed to Rome and Florence to see Pino and the other Italian generals, make certain about everything, inquire into all that had been done, find out the attitude of the people, and report to Murat.

The King himself was about to begin his journey when, on the 2nd December, the very day of Pignatelli's departure, the Chevalier Menz, whom Mier had left behind him to carry on the affairs of the Austrian Embassy, presented himself to Gallo with a letter of the gravest importance. Under the impression that he was still at Naples, Metternich had sent the letter to Mier informing him that he was transmitting it by a special messenger provided with a passport taken out in an

assumed name so that his arrival should not evoke comment in Naples.

"We have now reached," so the missive ran, "a momentous epoch, and the Neapolitan question must be settled one way or the other. The enclosed batch of State papers and military bulletins will sufficiently reveal to you the counsels that have guided our deliberations and the successes achieved by our arms.

"As a result of our recently assumed relations with England, we have obtained cognisance of the transactions which have been effected through Lord William Bentinck direct with the British Cabinet, concurrently with the negotiations carried on with ourselves. Lord Aberdeen, the English Ambassador at our Court, received official instructions to intimate that the Prince Regent was willing to leave Neapolitan matters entirely in our hands. He has in his possession a document in which the King of Sicily formally renounces his claim to the Kingdom of Naples, and he is empowered to sign a treaty jointly with ourselves in the event of His Majesty proclaiming himself in favour of such an arrangement.

"The King's unlooked-for departure for the French Army and the active part played by him in that army's operations led England to withdraw the foregoing offers. We, however, took effective measures to keep the matter open pending the receipt of the King's reply to the friendly proposals of England and Sicily, which we had undertaken to transmit to him.

"In the month of September last I had a secret interview with Prince Cariati at Prague, in which we discussed the best means of getting dispatches through to the King. I am at the moment unaware whether, in view of the complete discomfiture of the French army, our communications ever reached his hands."

This dispatch brought Murat to a standstill. It afforded food for reflection. Gallo in his first interview

with Menz took refuge in generalities. "The King has quite made up his mind to abandon the alliance with France and to make common cause with the Allied Powers if mutually satisfactory arrangements can be arrived at."

All this failed to satisfy Menz, but it was a means of gaining time. Next day Menz had another meeting with Gallo, who in the meantime had had an opportunity of discussing the situation with the King. He now declared that Joachim would send an army of thirty or forty thousand men, and that they would begin operations as soon as terms were arranged with Austria. He also made the formal announcement that Ambrosio's division, which was proceeding by way of the Abruzzi, had nearly reached Ancona, and that another division was in Rome. Menz artfully availed himself of the occasion to request Gallo to see that instructions were sent to General Ambrosio to assure Feldzeugmeister Hiller in the King's name that the Neapolitan troops did not intend to hinder his operations. By this means Murat would be giving at one and the same time his first pledge of friendship to Austria and the first indisputable proof of his own treason.

Gallo saw the danger, and asked for twenty-four hours in order to lay the matter before the King. The latter, seeing the lengths he had gone with Austria, was compelled to acquiesce. On the 4th, therefore, Gallo had a further interview with Menz, and requested him to inform Hiller that the dispatch of the Neapolitan forces to the Po implied no hostile intentions towards Austria, and that they would not cross the river until definite arrangements had been arrived at with Vienna. The negotiations in progress with Austria and England, he continued, could leave no doubt as to the King's sincerity, and there was no need therefore for the Commander-in-Chief to hamper his operations. General Ambrosio would be instructed to keep in constant touch with General

Hiller, and orders would be sent to him to forward this information to the Austrian headquarters without delay.

On the evening of the 6th, a dispatch in the aforesaid terms was sent off to Ambrosio. The plot betwixt Naples and Austria began to thicken. Murat, satisfied that Metternich's overtures meant peace, the integrity of his kingdom, and compensation, possibly in the shape of the whole of Italy, became increasingly disdainful to France. So assured was he of success, that he could not restrain himself from making open reference to the negotiations which had hitherto been kept a profound secret. On the 9th December it was rumoured in Naples that His Majesty had declared for the Allies against France.

On the 24th there was a conversation with Durant, who had been invited to lunch at Capo di Monte. There was no particular object in the invitation, but on the other hand it was not entirely without its aim, and that aim was to inform Durant that the King had received encouraging overtures from Rome, Florence, and other Italian cities. It was thought that by this means the news would get to the Emperor's ears. Durant's attitude was one of surprise. He would rather have had some solid news concerning the troops than all this thumping on the big drum. He sought out Gallo shortly afterwards to tell him how urgently necessary it was to hurry on the Neapolitan troops. Gallo, however, taking a leaf from his royal master's book, merely began to dilate on the subject of Italian independence and the advances that had been made to Murat—the whole at such length that the shrewd Durant at last remarked that he assumed the King had told the Emperor which of his subjects had taken it upon themselves to employ such language.¹

¹ Durant to the Duc de Vicenza, December 12, 1813.

That may have sufficed to put the closure on Gallo ; it had no restraining effect on the King. He had just been exalted to the seventh heaven by the following letter which Menz had forwarded to Bentinck on the 14th December—"My Lord," it ran, "in the absence of Monsieur le Comte de Mier, envoy extraordinary and plenipotentiary at the Court of Naples, who has left for the headquarters of the Allies, I have been informed by the Duc di Gallo, Minister for Foreign Affairs, that the Neapolitan Government has sent a representative to Sicily to sign an armistice with your Excellency. The Duc di Gallo has further expressed a desire that I should acquaint your lordship with the latest communications addressed by Austria to Naples. These communications, which relate to the attitude of the Court of London towards the Neapolitan Government, reached Naples on the 2nd December last, and state that Lord Aberdeen, the English Ambassador at the Court of Vienna, is authorised, in conjunction with Austria, to sign a treaty with the King of Naples on the understanding that His Majesty declares for the cause of Europe, and that Austria proclaims her willingness to participate in such an arrangement.

"I have deemed it my duty to comply as promptly as possible with this demand, inasmuch as the aforesaid Minister informed me that he was dispatching a messenger to Prince Cariati with full powers to sign the treaty in question."¹

Murat was now fully convinced that the Austrian Minister would warmly support the cause of Naples, and that Bentinck, on receipt of Menz's letter with Austria's official proposals, would have no alternative but to sign an armistice. Considering himself beyond the reach of any adverse stroke of fortune, his attitude towards the Empire became more arrogant than ever.

¹ Menz to Bentinck, Naples, December 14, 1813.

On the 15th December he wrote to the Grand Duchess and to Miollis in language that defies comment. "The time has come," said he to the former, "to make the fullest use of the resources of Tuscany, and you must put a stop to the Tuscan tax-collectors sending funds beyond the Apennines for purposes other than those on which my troops are employed, namely the defence of Tuscany. I have just informed General Miollis that I am taking over the command in all districts occupied by my troops, and I have given him instructions to receive no more orders from the Viceroy. Your Highness will readily perceive that I cannot possibly undertake the country's defence unless I am to have all the civil and military authorities under my control. To Your Imperial Highness I shall never go beyond making requests, but I claim the right to dictate commands to the Governor of the Tuscan States. I beg that you will inform me whether Your Imperial Highness will consider yourself in a position to carry out such directions as I may be under the necessity of giving for the defence of Tuscany and to refrain from obeying the instructions of the Viceroy. Were any obstacles thrown in my way I should bring my army to an immediate halt and concern myself solely with the defence of my own territory."¹

The same day he wrote to Miollis as follows: "Take no more orders from the Viceroy, for I am in command of all places occupied by my troops. You must henceforth refer to me in all matters concerning the defence of the Papal States."²

This was riding the high horse with a vengeance. On the 17th December he issued the following proclamation:—

"We, Joachim, commanding the army in Italy, order

¹ Murat to Elisa, Naples, December 15, 1813. *Affaires Étrangères*.

² Miollis to Clarke, Rome, December 17, 1813. *Archives de la Guerre*.

all authorities, civil and military, Italian and Neapolitan; all prefects and sub-prefects, and especially the Prefect of Rimini, to do their utmost to enable our secretary, Monsieur de Couchy, who is entrusted with a mission of importance, to proceed with all speed to the outposts."

So much for the civilians. But further than this, he had the effrontery to send orders direct to Eugène's generals. "Monsieur le General," wrote he to Pignatelli-Strongoli, "I have duly received your reports up to the 13th. Write to General Pino and say that I desire him to hold Ferrara to the very last, but that if he is compelled to evacuate the place he must fall back on Bologna and effect a junction with my army. Polucci must also remain at Bologna. Tell him I am counting on him and the good folk there, and that I shall be with them soon. I will write you from Rome. Send along my horses to Florence."¹

It was not so much that Murat sought to impose his will on Miollis, Eugène, and Elisa, that he aimed at making himself supreme in Italy, which calls for condemnation, but rather the manner in which he went to work, pretending to possess an authority that had never been granted to him, and seeking, on the pretext of defending the country against the Emperor's foes, to filch it for himself. Indeed the most odious part of Murat's treachery is that he never openly avowed it. He had taken his Machiavellian tactics from the country of his adoption, and, though he had vaunted himself as stainless as a knight of chivalry, he did not hesitate, for the

¹ An unpublished letter from Murat to Pignatelli, dated Strongoli, December 19, 1813, in the Museo di San Martino, Naples. Pignatelli had instructed Pepe to deliver the reports concerning his mission into the King's own hands. Pepe left Bologna on the night of the 13th-14th December and reached Rome on the 17th. There he handed over his papers to Zuccari, who gave them to the King, and it was on their receipt that Murat wrote the letter quoted above.

furtherance of his own ends, to stab his benefactor in the back.

In spite of Murat's traitorous attempts to gain possession of Italy, Napoleon had, up to the present, given him none but fair words, but he soon saw the snare. Nevertheless for a brief space, at Mainz, he seems to have had faith in Murat's promises. "My brother," he wrote to Eugène on the 3rd November, "the King of Naples, tells me that he will shortly be at Bologna with thirty thousand men. Work with him as well as you possibly can. Send him an Italian commissary to see to the victualling of his troops, and show him every consideration, so that we may turn his assistance to the best account. It is a great relief to me that, thanks to his army, I shall have nothing more to fear as regards Italy."¹ To avoid all jealousy between Murat and Eugène, Napoleon decided "that the Neapolitan army should form a corps apart under the command of the King." On the 13th November Bassano advised Durant to this effect. By the 20th, however, the Emperor had come to see through Joachim's procedure, and altered his views. "The King of Naples," he wrote to Melzi, "has given me his word that he will march on the Po with thirty thousand men. If he keeps his promise, I trust that no further disaster will occur." These words are practically repeated in a letter which he sent Eugène the same day to acquaint him with Fouché's mission. "I have dispatched the Duc d'Otranto to Naples," the latter runs, "to keep an eye on the King, and to urge him to set out for the Po. Unless the King fails in his duty to France and to myself, his progress thither should have a great effect."² In a note of great length,

¹ The Emperor to the Viceroy. Mainz, November 3, 1813. *Correspondence*, 20,861.

² Napoleon to Eugène. Saint Cloud, November 18, 1813. Lecestre, No. 1105.

intended to explain to General Anthouard the line of conduct to be pursued in Italy, he adds, "In all that I have said I have not taken the King of Naples into account, for if he is loyal to France and to the dictates of honour, he should be on the banks of the Po with twenty-five thousand men." After that it can scarcely be affirmed that the Emperor reposed unshaken confidence in Joachim. Evidence of Murat's defection now begins to reach him from all parts. Eugène, Miollis, Elisa, Durant, Norvins, all unite in a chorus of accusation, and such unanimity could scarcely have been without its effect on a far less sagacious man than Napoleon.

Nevertheless, the Emperor insisted on making every effort to retain Joachim's allegiance, and scattered orders far and wide that every consideration should be shown to the Neapolitans. "If the King passes through the Papal States on his march through Etruria to the river Po, he must be accorded a good reception, and his troops must have the best possible treatment." These instructions were straightway sent by Clarke to Miollis and Elisa, and as a result it was from Rome and the French Departments that the King was enabled to obtain necessities for his men and horses; provisions from this place, boots from that, and various supplies from another. Nay, on the 3rd December, he received authority to take four thousand muskets from Corfu, an opportunity of which, it is hardly necessary to add, Gallo took prompt advantage. "Do not appear to harbour the slightest doubt regarding the King's loyalty, and display more confidence than you may in reality entertain."¹ Such was the order of the day, and it was universally obeyed. Even the *Moniteur*, the restrained and official *Moniteur*, indulged in eulogistic references to the Neapolitan troops, notwithstanding the fact that in Italy they were looked upon as thieves and

¹ Caulaincourt to Durant. Paris, December 4, 1813. *Affaires Étrangères*.

plunderers, craven-hearted bullies that maltreated the women and the weaklings.

For all the Emperor's efforts to deceive himself regarding Murat's real intentions, he was at last compelled to abandon hope. Word having been sent by Miollis that the King desired to occupy the Imperial strongholds, Napoleon gave the following stern command: "Instruct General Miollis definitely that he is not to supply the King of Naples with any muskets, nor to permit any Neapolitan troops to enter Civita Vecchia or the Castle of S. Angelo. Reprimand him for having sent the five hundred muskets, and tell him that there will be none forthcoming for the conscripts. Write in similar terms to the Grand Duchess and the Viceroy." ¹

Napoleon was in this hostile mood when he received Murat's letter of the 15th December to Elisa. He at once replied as follows: "No muskets must be given to the Neapolitans. The King's ideas seem to me to be extravagant. On no account allow him to assume control of the civil government. If he comes with that intention, he had better recall his troops and remain in his own country. Do not give your consent to any tampering with the funds. If the King declares war upon us, it is not yet all over with France, and if any one could meditate so base an act of treason as that it would assuredly recoil on its author's head. I rely on your firmness of character in this crisis. Let the King imprison you, let him slay you, but suffer no disloyalty to the nation." ²

On the Emperor's part that was tantamount to a declaration of war, and that Eugène's troops were not immediately commanded to throw down the gauntlet to Murat and his Neapolitans was solely due to the fact that the Austrians were in Italy, and that in France he

¹ Napoleon to Clarke. December 11, 1813. *Correspondence*, 20,998.

² Napoleon to Elisa. December 25, 1813.

himself had more than he could cope with in stemming the ceaseless advance of the Allies. All that he could do had now been done. He had given orders that no more muskets, no more boots, no more clothes should be furnished to the troops of Naples; food alone was to be given to them, and that merely because the Treaty of Bayonne required it; he had also forbidden that any Neapolitans should be admitted into the Imperial fortresses. Alas, he could do no more. The day had long gone by when Grenier and his men had been a power in the land; yet if by some miracle that day had dawned again, Murat, false now as he had been false then, would assuredly have changed his tone and have protested himself the Emperor's devoted servant in phrases as interminable as insincere.

Not content with placing the resources of French Italy at Joachim's disposal, the Emperor employed yet further means to win his brother-in-law to his side. On the outbreak of hostilities Fouché had quitted the Illyrian provinces and was now roaming about in Northern Italy scenting the breeze and resolved to follow whithersoever chance might direct, yet eager for an opportunity to return to Paris. He had, however, been obliged to send word to Napoleon of his sojourn in Bologna, and on receipt of the letter Napoleon decided to dispatch him to Naples. He would thus not only get Fouché off his hands, but turn his services to useful account. If indeed any man was likely to exert an influence over Murat, that man was Fouché. Fouché had been his friend and confidant in 1809; he had secretly protected his interests at the Imperial Court; he had been the unseen counsellor of his Ambassador in difficult or urgent situations. Ignorant though the Emperor may have been of all the details of their manœuvres, he probably knew enough to convince him that their relations one with the other were somewhat closer than the ordinary. When there-

fore he sent the Duc d'Otranto to Joachim he was aware that he was not dispatching a mere outsider. He wrote to Fouché requesting him to proceed with all haste to Naples in order to impress on the King the importance of marching with his twenty-five thousand men on the river Po. He was to lay the matter before the Queen as well, and to do his utmost to prevent the Government of Naples from being misled by Austria's illusory promises or the honeyed talk of Metternich. "In France troops are everywhere arming and getting on the road. The crisis is one of the extremest gravity. You will return with the Neapolitan army if the King is loyal to the dictates of patriotism and honour. You will then proceed with all speed to Turin, where fresh orders will await you. Go by way of Florence and Rome, and give every one there such advice as the circumstances may indicate."¹

Fouché, who had quitted Bologna, having made up his mind to return to France by way of Parma and Milan, found this letter waiting for him at Parma, on the 21st. Thereupon he wrote to Murat as follows: "... Our fortunes, Sire, however widely we may be sundered in point of rank, have but one foundation. We both owe them to the Emperor. On him and on the continuance of his prosperity they alone depend. We should be the last to be induced to dissociate our aims from his. Could we waver an instant, even though the sentiments of honour and patriotism had been extinguished in our hearts? On the one side stands the Emperor with his genius and strength of will wielding the vast resources which France entrusts to his hands; on the other are ranged a group of feeble, mean-spirited princes nourishing hopes which they are incapable of realising, holding out doubtful or deceptive promises. The powers that are leagued against us have but one desire at heart: they aim at the destruction of the Imperial line and the reinstatement of fallen

¹ Napoleon to the Duc d'Otranto. St. Cloud, November 15, 1813.

dynasties upon thrones which, despite the most solemn treaties, they persist in regarding as being occupied by usurpers." ¹

This was the official statement of the case. But Murat knew that it would be in the course of conversation rather than in the written word that Fouché's real sentiments would come to light. Having written his letter, Fouché set out for Naples. On the 22nd he was at Bologna, and the day after at Florence. On the 24th he posted to Rome, where he arrived on the 25th. In obedience to his instructions, he discussed matters with Miollis, and left Rome on the evening of the 26th. Delayed by the floods of the Garigliano, he did not get to Naples until eleven o'clock on the night of the 30th. Next morning, the 1st December, he saw Murat and paid his respects to the Queen. "Monsieur le Duc," she said to him, "you come too late. The King's heart is with the Emperor, but his imagination has been led astray." ² As for Joachim, he, as usual, was possessed with enthusiasm and zeal for the Emperor's cause, at least in word. "There is no need to urge me to serve the Emperor," said he to the Duc d'Otranto, "my heart is with him. But in my present situation I cannot act openly without imperilling my country's safety. The twenty-five thousand men whom I promised to the Emperor are *en route*; the incessant rains and flooded rivers have alone delayed my progress. I am allowing the English to suppose that I am acting on my own account; by so doing my coasts will escape attack and my kingdom be left in peace. The Emperor must rely on me." ³ Thus far for all to hear. Then came conversations in a lower tone, whispered confidences. They were just the sort of men, these two, to arrive at an understanding with one

¹ Fouché to Murat. Parma, November 21, 1813. *Affaires Étrangères*.

² Fouché to Napoleon. December 20, 1813. *Affaires Étrangères*.

³ Fouché to Napoleon. December 2, 1813. *Affaires Étrangères*.

another, and Murat had too often experienced the value of Fouché's assistance to dispense with his aid now that chance and the Emperor's waning fortunes had sent him to his door. So protracted were the interviews between them that Durant began to open his eyes. As to Fouché's counsels, no document is extant to enable us to state precisely what they were. Confidential exchanges of this sort are not recorded in black and white. Nevertheless, if we piece together the King's half-avowals, the laboured explanations of Fouché, and the fragmentary excuses with which he sought to justify his conduct to Caulaincourt and the Emperor, we may perhaps reconstruct his part in the affair as follows :—

Murat doubtless explained to the Duc d'Otranto how favourable circumstances were for him to declare his independence. The Emperor had no force with which to oppose him, since the only troops he had in Italy were busy under Eugène fighting the Austrians. There was no one who could be sent against him. Miollis, with his slender resources, had just the wherewithal and no more to retain possession of the fortresses of the Papal States. The hour had therefore come for him to proclaim his independence. But he could go still further ; he could add to his dominions. Austria had not hesitated to make overtures to him when he was yet with the French general staff, overtures to which he had replied from Ollendorf demanding that the whole or at least a part of the Papal States should be given to him in compensation for the loss of Sicily, and now Metternich was repeating these very proposals through Menz, the Austrian Chargé d'Affaires. This meant that Austria desired him for her ally, and there was every indication that she would agree to his terms, particularly as she herself could be harbouring no designs on the territory which he claimed. Nor was this all. Over and beyond these indications of the coming independence and extension of the kingdom of Naples

came the whole of the Italian race crying aloud for emancipation, and pointing to him, Murat, as their deliverer. Let Fouché but glance at all or any of the Italian journals, let him read the letters that had been received at his Court, the reports sent in by his emissaries ; let him note the attitude of the Neapolitan officers, who everywhere proclaimed that they were come to deliver Italy from bondage, let him but hearken, as Murat himself hearkened, to that mighty host crying with one voice, " Italy is one, Italy is free ! " Then let him say whether the moment had come for Joachim to cut himself adrift from France and to put himself at the head of that nation of freemen which destiny called on him to form, and to become their King.

This or something like it would have been Murat's line, and to it Fouché probably answered that the moment was doubtless propitious for proclaiming the independence of Naples. But was it necessary to contract an alliance with Austria ? What did they offer him ? Independence. What did he demand of them ? The cession of all or part of the Papal States. Now did not Murat himself state that all Italy was calling upon him to lead them ? Well, then, let him leave the Austrians out of the question, let him seize this unique opportunity and play the glorious rôle which circumstances put it in his power to fulfil. Let him draw together all Italy under his banners and proclaim the union of the Italian people beneath his single sceptre : he would then be King of Italy, he would have at his command an army with which he could hold France and Austria alike at defiance ; for Murat should know that " his sole bulwark was in a well-trained army." ¹

By making this his line of conduct Joachim would be rejecting any compromise with the Allies, and from the fact that he would have broken off the negotiations

¹ Fouché to Murat. Florence, January 20, 1814. Quoted by Lumbroso.

for the proposed alliance with Austria, he could still declare that his loyalty to France and the Emperor was unimpaired. Nay, more, he could urge that he was serving their cause. At the head of a large and powerful army, wielding sway over wide and rich dominions, he would take his place among the sovereigns of the Great Powers, he would be admitted to their councils and have a voice in their deliberations. The question of peace was now being discussed, and "if he could add his influence to bring about a general pacification, if his voice acquired sufficient authority in the affairs of Europe to restore the dignity of the reigning houses and to guarantee the independence of its peoples,"¹ he would be serving France as well as serving himself. He would be able to bring his influence to bear in the negotiations, and to compel the Allies to deal gently with his brother-in-law. He would show that he was strong enough to give back to the Emperor and to France that which he had received from them, for just as Napoleon had seated him on the throne of Naples, he in turn would be the means of restoring Napoleon to the throne of France.

Such apparently was Fouché's line of argument, and as such it throws a light on the words he subsequently used to Caulaincourt. "If," said he, "the King of Naples had listened to me, he would be laying down the law to the Coalition instead of being compelled to take his orders from them. Moreover, he would have achieved a lofty ambition and fulfilled his duty to his Emperor and the land of his birth."² It is also a commentary on his letter of the 27th December to the Emperor, in which, on Murat's behalf, he pleads so warmly for Italian independence. It is the key to his other letter of the

¹ Fouché to Murat. Florence, January 20, 1814. Quoted by Lumbroso.

² Fouché to the Duc de Vicenza. Florence, January 12, 1814. *Affaires Étrangères*.

3rd January and to the words—"The idea that he could not count on the support of France, the thought of facing the Coalition unaided and alone, daunted his imagination." Finally, it explains, at least to some extent, Joachim's two letters of the 21st and 25th December, in both of which, but more particularly in the former (the nearer in date to Fouché's departure), he occupied himself with the question of a general peace. Taking this thesis for his text, Murat, even in his most overt acts against France, would never allow that he had done aught to injure the Emperor or his country. One can readily understand why Durant was so rigidly excluded from these colloquies. The question of Joachim's severing the bonds which made him dependent upon France was scarcely one to be discussed in the presence of the Emperor's Minister.

Having "seen Their Majesties every day during his stay,"¹ Fouché left Naples on the 17th December. He bore with him a sum of one hundred and seventy thousand francs as a token of gratitude from Murat for suggesting how the Emperor might be decently betrayed. His mission may have done little to advance the French cause at the Court of Naples, but it at least gave Joachim some ideas for dissembling his treachery and cloaking his ingratitude.

The Duc d'Otranto's arrival in Naples had been well timed. The city was as busy as an ant-heap: dispatch on dispatch, mission after mission was being hurried away. The King, anxious to be away from Naples, was treating simultaneously with the Austrians and the English. For Joachim the English were still more to be feared than the Austrians, and he was careful not to leave them out of his calculations; they might well give him an unpleasant reminder of their existence. Murat therefore sent for Lieutenant-General

¹ Durant to Caulaincourt. *Affaires Étrangères*.

Manhès, and requested him to act as his intermediary with the English. Decorated with the Grand Cordon of the Royal Order, the price of his commission, Manhès returned to Calabria on the 28th November bearing the proposals which Murat had authorised him to lay before Bentinck. On his arrival he demanded an audience of Lord William, but in his stead saw General Robert Hall. The latter he informed that the King of Naples was desirous of entering into an alliance with England, that he had, after the battle of Leipzig, made terms with the Allied Sovereigns, and further, that he was willing to join the Coalition if he received satisfactory assurances as to England's peaceful intentions towards him.¹ To these preliminaries there was, so far as Manhès was concerned, no sequel, for the Neapolitan Government now resolved to send an agent from Naples with instructions "to furnish the fullest information." The individual on whom the task devolved was a man deep in Murat's confidence, a man who, after the King himself, was more completely versed than any other in the dark and crooked ways of Neapolitan diplomacy, a man who had served his master in good stead in previous negotiations with Metternich and Bentinck, and was *par excellence* the person to whom the conduct of any unusually difficult or delicate piece of business would naturally be entrusted. This man was none other than Schinina. When peace was concluded Joachim conferred upon him the title of Marquis de Saint-Elie as a reward for his services.

Schinina then it was on whom the King relied to bring the negotiations with Bentinck to a satisfactory termination. Manhès was hardly the man for the part, but Schinina would tame the lion if any one could. On the 19th November, therefore, he left Naples for Ponza,

¹ Bentinck to Castlereagh. Palermo, December 26, 1813. Quoted by M. Weil.

whence he was conveyed across to Sicily. Arriving at Palermo on the 27th November, no Bentinck was there, but at Syracuse, on the 11th December, Schinina came up with his man. On the 12th Lord William consented to receive him.¹

Schinina duly revealed the object of his mission. The King of Naples, he said, had received from Austria, who was acting as spokesman for the Allies, a proposal to the effect that he should join the Coalition. Deferring to Austria's request, Murat, whose army consisted of forty thousand men, had already given orders to his first two divisions to march on Rome and Ancona. He refused, however, to put the remainder of his forces in motion until he was acquainted with Bentinck's intentions and had come to a thorough understanding with him. It might be, he went on, that his lordship did not possess the requisite powers to enable him to sign a treaty of peace whereby England should recognise his master as the rightful King of Naples and guarantee his kingdom. If this was so, he, Schinina, was authorised to sign an armistice in which Bentinck was to promise not to commit any act of hostility against Murat and not to take advantage of his absence in Upper Italy to disturb the peace of his kingdom.

Bentinck had heard nothing from the Allies since Castlereagh's dispatch of the 7th August, and he refused point blank to have anything to do with treaty or armistice. Murat, he said, could have accepted, had he wished, the offers made to him in Germany on the 7th October. Since, however, he had elected to fight on Bonaparte's side, let him stop where he was. He, Bentinck, would sign nothing unless he had definite and specific instructions.²

¹ Bentinck to Castlereagh. Palermo, December 26, 1813. Quoted by M. Weil.

² *Idem.* Palermo, December 20, 1813. *Idem.*

The interview was not exactly proving a success. Bentinck's attitude was haughty and uncompromising. Schinina, however, would no doubt have endeavoured to round off the corners a little, but in the very midst of the discussion fresh instructions were handed to him from Naples which obliged him to bring the conference to an abrupt termination. Metternich's dispatch of the 28th October had reached Menz on the 2nd December, and had been communicated the same day to the Neapolitan Government. It made no small impression on the Court. Murat, who was on the point of leaving for the army, at once changed his purpose. The first moment of astonishment over, he fell to reviewing the situation, discussed matters with Gallo, and resolved to modify his plans. On the 4th he had determined on his course of action. He would let Hiller know that the Neapolitans were not his enemies, and deemed it expedient to send full powers to Cariati at Vienna to conclude a treaty with Metternich. The agreement was to be based on the proposals made by Metternich in his dispatch, to which, of course, were to be added those claims for compensation of which the Austrian Cabinet already had cognisance. For this purpose, however, he needed some one on whom he could rely, some one who had the details of the negotiations with Austria at his fingers' end. One man alone could fulfil these requirements, and that was Schinina, who was now in Sicily seeking for Bentinck. On the 7th December a messenger was sent after him. Together with Metternich's dispatch concerning the negotiations with England, they sent him word that, "according to information received from Austria, Lord Aberdeen was in possession of full powers to sign a treaty with Naples."¹ In conclusion, Schinina was commanded to return to

¹ Menz to Metternich. Naples, December 7, 1813. Quoted by M. Weil.

Naples immediately,¹ in order to convey to Cariati the full powers required by him to sign a treaty.

It was this dispatch that was handed to Schinina in the middle of his conversation with Bentinck. Thinking to compel his lordship to abate something of his obdurate hauteur, the Neapolitan handed him his dispatch, together with the extract from Metternich's letter. Judge of his amazement when Lord William, having glanced at the document, declared that if "Lord Aberdeen held the full powers in question, well and good; he himself, at any rate, had no authority to sign an armistice, far less to enter into negotiations for a treaty."² In the face of this formal refusal Schinina pressed the matter no further; indeed he had not the time, since his instructions were to return home immediately. He therefore left Syracuse forthwith, and was back in Naples on the 18th December, when he gave Murat a full account of the failure of his negotiations with Bentinck.

His efforts to arrive at an understanding with England having come utterly to grief, Murat began to speculate as to what success was awaiting him in Austria. On the 20th December Menz advised Metternich of Schinina's departure for Vienna. He carried a dispatch for Metternich and full powers for Cariati, with whom he was to remain as long as the *pourparlers* were in progress, to assist in the negotiations and to bring back dispatches to Naples. As to the contents of the letter to Metternich, they doubtless consisted of those old undertakings which Murat had once more repeated to Menz on the 17th December in the following terms: "The King, having implicit confidence in the sincerity, candour, and goodwill of the Emperor of Austria, will act exactly as he is desired. He will personally direct any operations that may be deemed necessary, and is willing to take command

¹ Gallo to Mier. Naples, December 16, 1813.

² Menz to Metternich. Naples, December 20, 1813. Quoted by M. Weil.

of any troops that may be entrusted to him. He will, in a word, defer entirely to the wishes of the Austrian Court.”¹ With regard to the full powers which Schinina was carrying to Cariati, they authorised the latter “to arrange and sign a treaty of peace with Austria and the Allies.”²

About the 25th December Schinina proceeded to Bologna. To assist his chances of getting through the French lines and reach the Austrian outposts, he was handed over to the care of General Pepe, who was to bear him company on his perilous mission. They took the most elaborate precautions to avoid arrest. Before setting out Schinina disguised himself as a lackey. At every “suspicious sound they made ready to swallow the papers; for whatever happened, it was necessary to prevent them from falling into the hands of the French.”³ Nor can their anxieties be regarded as excessive when it is remembered that if Schinina had been taken and his papers seized, the Emperor would have had written proof of Joachim’s perfidy and of his collusion with the Austrians. “Happily,” says Pepe, “all went well.” Schinina, astute and wary man, carried his caution to the length of deceiving Pepe himself, for when the latter questioned him as to the contents of the dispatches, he told him he was carrying the Queen’s promise to support the policy of Austria, and that the Austrian alliance might be regarded as a *fait accompli*. It was not the Queen’s promise that he had in his pocket, but something even more important—to wit, the King’s authority to conclude the treaty.

The report which Schinina gave of his doings in Sicily was an immense disappointment to Murat. It was utterly impossible to leave his kingdom exposed to

¹ Menz to Metternich. Naples, December 20, 1813. Quoted by M. Weil.

² Graham to Bentinck. January 5, 1814. Record Office. Sicily.

³ Gabriel Pepe, *Galimatias*. Quoted by M. Lumbroso.

the risk of attack from the English, and experience had taught him that Lord William was a man to stick at nothing. Once again, therefore, he put off his departure, though all his preparations had been made. Certainly his luck was out. In the beginning of December, when everything was ready, he had been stopped by the Austrian dispatches, and now, just as he had given the word to start, Bentinck's refusal compelled him to submit to a further postponement. To account for the delay all manner of excuses were invented, some of them not over skilful. On the 22nd Durant reported that Murat was not leaving for the army "because of the discovery of a plot, the details of which were still involved in some mystery."¹ Next it was given out that Joachim was remaining in Naples because the Queen was ill.² Clearly nothing grave was the matter since the remedy prescribed was "camomile tea."

The abortive result of the Sicilian negotiations not only arrested his departure; it prompted an immediate change of tactics. Since the English would have neither treaty nor armistice, they were not to be counted on, at all events for the present; but by a *volte-face*, which to him seemed the most natural thing in the world, Murat turned once more to the man whom he considered still able to advance his cause. Forgetting the arrogant and imperious tone of the communications he had sent on the 15th to the agents of France, profiting by the counsels which Fouché had given him, he addressed himself on the 21st December to the Emperor. "Sire," he began, "a new year is about to commence. May I take advantage of the occasion to offer Your Majesty my very best wishes? Were they fulfilled, nothing could be wanting to complete Your Majesty's happiness or the happiness of your family. May this present year

¹ Durant to Caulaincourt. December 22, 1813. *Affaires Étrangères*.

² *Diario di Nicola*.

see the end of war, with all the distress that follows in its train, and may the year which is about to dawn bring us more peaceful days. Long may you take your ease beneath the shade of the laurels you have won. Your Majesty's glory is now complete, nothing remains to be wrought that could add to its lustre. Now therefore it behoves you to provide for your happiness. Give us now the blessings of peace, and win from Europe admiration of a new order by setting before all men the model of a perfect government. Sire, all my life long I shall love you. The affection which I entertain for Your Majesty can never be changed by political events." ¹

This letter, which was to bring about a renewal of relations that had well-nigh been broken off (for Murat could scarcely have been in doubt as to how the Emperor regarded him after his grave defiance of Imperial authority), he followed up with an exhaustive apologia.

"Sire, I am in receipt of your letter of the 4th in reply to mine of the 23rd November. You take it that I am on the banks of the Po; you assume that at the sight of my army the enemy have taken to flight, and you now express the desire that I should cross the river and raise the blockade of Venice. Sire, I will speak to you frankly; I will tell you precisely what the position of my country will allow me at the present time to do for France. Thirty-five thousand men and an artillery train of fifty guns are on the march for Florence and Fano. This army comprises the total available forces of my Kingdom, and I have not hesitated to send it beyond the Apennines, because from the Roman States I can control my territory as though I were at Naples; because by a counter-march I could within a few days find myself at whatever point danger might threaten my Kingdom; because from Bologna I can hold the whole of Southern Italy;

¹ Murat to the Emperor. - Naples, December 21, 1813. *Affaires Étrangères*.

because I am powerful enough to cope with aggression from without or revolution within, and because I serve your ends in checking the designs of your enemies on Milan and Turin. The first move on the part of my army did in fact bring the enemy to a standstill, and since then the two armies have been under a sort of armistice. I have thus carried out the task which Your Majesty imposed upon me in the beginning. But now Your Majesty requires fresh sacrifices of me. You ask that I should throw my army across the Po and advance on the Piave. You doubtless forget that I have left my Kingdom without defence, and that the Queen and my children have no other protection than the devotion of my subjects. Meanwhile the English can bring war into the heart of my country, destroy the peace of my provinces, and fling their shells into my capital, almost into my very palace. Sire, I must not mislead you; I have done for France and Your Majesty all that it was in my power to do. I have fulfilled my obligations as a Frenchman, as your friend and brother-in-law. I have made up my mind to send forward my army to the Po to arrest the enemy's advance on Milan and Turin, to make a diversion in favour of your armies, to protect my own territory, and thereby to help on the negotiations for peace. But in the event of my action not resulting in the attainment of the object I have principally in view, which is the bringing about of peace, would not Your Majesty yourself allow that, having fulfilled my obligations towards you, it is next incumbent upon me to do my duty by my own subjects and to take steps for my own defence and for my Kingdom's safety? In that case Your Majesty will relinquish any hope you may have formed of my crossing the Po, for by putting that river between my subjects and myself I should be powerless to oppose the enemy in Tuscany, the Papal States, and my own Kingdom. You will say that I might

divide my forces. But in so doing I should render them useless. I pointed out to Your Majesty the only alternative left, but you disdained my advice, or at all events remained silent regarding it, and your silence told me that my suggestion did not fit in with your plans.

"Believe me, Sire, the proclamation of the union of the Italian peoples in one or two powers with the Po as boundary would be the salvation of Italy. If this course is not followed, Italy is lost irretrievably. She will be once more rent asunder, and your lofty ambition of setting Italy free, of making her one nation, will for ever be destroyed. Only let me be free now to deal with the provinces beyond the Po, and I give Your Majesty my word that the Austrians shall not cross the Adige. You will, in the negotiations for a general peace, be the arbiter of the destinies of Italy, and you will have created in me a trusty and powerful ally. With a single word I can bring about that which the English and Austrians at Leghorn, Lucca, and Ravenna have essayed to achieve in vain. Remember, Sire, that the enemy are exhorting the Italians to emancipate themselves, they are offering to make them free, but the hopes which they place in my army have rendered them deaf to these proposals. Would they remain indifferent if the King of Naples failed to realise their hopes—if, on the contrary, he tightened the bonds of alien domination? No; the Italians will throw in their lot with those who strive to make them a free people. That is the fact, the plain, unvarnished truth. Time is hurrying by, the enemy is gathering reinforcements, and the day is not far distant when I shall be obliged to make clear my position to my nation and to the enemy. Were I to remain longer silent as a result of the silence you have maintained towards me, I should chill popular enthusiasm, and in popular enthusiasm resides my only strength. Once my popularity were gone I should be powerless to strike

a blow for you or for myself. Give me then, I beseech you, a definite answer. I could draw to the full on the country's resources ; its inhabitants are ready to make any sacrifice for me, whereas the French would be able to obtain nothing.

" You know my heart is true ; my affection for you would make me shrink from nothing. Answer me then, I implore you. I can receive your reply at Florence or Bologna. To-morrow I leave to take command of my army.

" P.S.—Sire, in the name of all you hold dearest in the world, carry resistance no farther. Make peace, peace at any price. Only gain time and you will have gained all. Your genius and time will do the rest. If you turn a deaf ear to the prayers of your subjects, of your friends, you will bring yourself and all of us to ruin. Believe me, Italy is still loyal because she foresees happier days in store, but she will not remain so for long if her hopes are deceived. The Italians, once they give free play to their passions, are capable of the utmost excesses, even as to-day they are capable of making the greatest sacrifices. There is still time to save Italy ; only declare what your intentions are."

When at the beginning of 1814 the Emperor received this letter his line of conduct lay plain before him. Even supposing he realised that Italy was slipping through his fingers, and that in his own mind he was willing to relinquish it to his brother-in-law, it was in fact no longer in his power to do so. He himself was the first to declare to the Duc de Vicenza " that he had accepted the conditions of the Treaty of Frankfort, and that it was not in his power to make special arrangements with Murat to the prejudice of the peace of Europe." Therefore it was that he sent no reply to the King's proposals.

His letter written, Murat began to make prepara-

tions for his departure. When he told the Emperor that he was leaving the next day he may have meant what he said, for on the 30th December Colonel de Beaufremont came up with Pignatelli-Strongoli and informed him that the King would be at Rimini on the 1st January. Nevertheless Joachim was fated to get no further than making ready, and now the play began in earnest, for on the evening of the 30th December Neipperg arrived at Naples.

CHAPTER X

TREATIES AND ARMISTICES WITH AUSTRIA AND ENGLAND

Progress of the negotiations—The Treaty of the 8th January in draft and in full—Metternich and Castlereagh—The second draft—Murat agrees to the alterations—Why the Second Treaty was dated 11th January—Murat's letter to the Emperor of Austria—Epilogue—Official ratifications—Graham comes to Naples—The object of his mission—He confers with Neipperg—He goes to headquarters—He returns to Naples—The First Armistice signed—Lord Bentinck's arrival—Signature of the Second Armistice—Wherein it differed from the first.

“FRANKFORT-ON-MAIN,
10th December 1813.

“**M**ONSIEUR MON FRÈRE,—I am sending to Your Majesty my Lieutenant-General, the Comte de Neipperg, who will have the honour to deliver this letter into your hands. It being the object of his mission to draw yet closer the bonds of friendship which unite us by employing them at the present important juncture in the common interests of the Powers, I trust that Your Majesty will treat him with cordiality and confidence. Particularly do I beg, Monsieur mon frère, that you will attach entire credence to the assurances he will give you of my regard for Your Majesty and of my sincere desire to avail myself of every opportunity to afford you proofs thereof.”

Such were the terms of the letter brought by Neipperg when he came to Murat's Court with his proposals for a treaty. Metternich too wrote to Gallo as follows :—

“The latest proposals put forward by Prince Cariati

have decided His Majesty the Emperor to reply by dispatching a confidential agent to His Majesty the King of Naples; His Majesty's choice has lighted upon Field-Marshal the Comte de Neipperg. The special information with which the said officer is entrusted, taken in conjunction with the confidential communications transmitted through Monsieur de Mier, will enable him to lay the matter before Your Excellency in the fullest detail."

Together with these official letters of introduction Neipperg was given authorisations and instructions. They were to be acted upon by him jointly with the Comte de Mier, whom Metternich supposed to be still at Naples. "You will observe," wrote Metternich to Mier, "that these powers are delegated jointly to you and Field-Marshal the Comte de Neipperg. Please therefore arrange together to adopt a perfectly consistent plan of procedure. The Comte de Neipperg's initial task will be to acquaint you with the nature of these joint instructions in order that you may arrive at a mutual agreement regarding the best course to follow in order to bring the negotiations to a successful issue."


Neipperg's powers were drawn up at Frankfort-on-Main and dated the 7th December 1813. In the course of his instructions to the two diplomatists Metternich traced the successive changes which Murat's attitude had undergone, showing how he had thrown over Napoleon to join hands with Austria and England only to return again to his former allegiance. He then went on to impress on Mier the necessity of obtaining a clear and definite understanding within "two or three times twenty-four hours," adding that Austria, never having recognised Murat as King, would support the claims of King Ferdinand in the event of war with Naples.

"Austria," he continued, "is determined to find out

once and for all how matters stand. She means to know whether the King of Naples is for the Powers or against them. If he declares himself the friend of the Allies, Austria will espouse his cause, but, in such an event, it behoves her to know what part is to be played by the Neapolitan army. The Comte de Neipperg will inform the King that Naples cannot be suffered to remain neutral. If the King means to adopt an attitude of neutrality Austria will recall her representatives. The Comte de Neipperg will give the King to understand that his fate is in Austria's hands, and that Austria has been empowered by the Allies to act on their behalf, that the arrangement of terms is in her discretion, and that she alone can procure the assent of the Allies to any treaty made between Naples and herself.

"The Comte de Neipperg will communicate direct with Lord William Bentinck and Field-Marshal the Comte de Bellegarde if his mission is brought to a successful issue; in the event of failure he will quit Naples at the earliest possible moment. This also applies to the Comte de Mier."

Carrying with him these instructions and the draft of a treaty, Neipperg set out from headquarters. On the 17th December he was at Vicenza, and the 20th found him at Boara, on the banks of the Adige. In order to avoid the necessity of passing through the French lines he went on board a trading brig. But a storm springing up, the vessel was driven past Ancona, signalling to those on the look-out, and finally put into Manfredonia, where she was detained in quarantine. At Manfredonia Neipperg was met by Coucy, one of Murat's secretaries, and arrived on the 31st December at Naples, where he proceeded to take up his quarters at the Hôtel Mazetti at Santa Lucia. In the afternoon of the same day Neipperg had a long interview with Gallo. In the evening he went to the Palace. Taking



FRANCIS THE FIRST
EMPEROR OF AUSTRIA

him apart, the King dismissed the various notabilities who had come to present their New Year compliments, and remained closeted with the Austrian till a late hour, when he invited him to supper. On the 1st January there was a State performance at the San Carlo, at which Neipperg and the whole Court were present. Negotiations had so far advanced on the 3rd January that Neipperg requested Nugent to suspend operations on the main road from Rimini to Bologna if the presence of the Neapolitan troops had caused the enemy to retire from the neighbourhood. He also begged Nugent to inform the Commander-in-Chief that his negotiations seemed to be taking a favourable turn, and that as soon as the treaty had been thoroughly settled and signed the army of the King of Naples would lend its active co-operation. On the morning of the 4th Neipperg and Gallo met at the latter's residence. When Graham, the British emissary, came on the scene, he was informed that proposals for an alliance had already been interchanged, and that only a few verbal and technical difficulties remained to be settled before the treaty was definitely signed. Gallo kept them both to dinner, and the two diplomats chatted and discussed matters with each other. On the 6th Murat gave a grand banquet on board the *Capri* to Neipperg, Graham, and the officers of the *Furious*, the British frigate on which Graham had arrived. At last, on the night of the 7th–8th January, the treaty of alliance between Austria and Naples was signed. It was ratified by Murat, and needed only the ratification of the Emperor of Austria for its completion.

Of what did this treaty of the 8th January consist?

To the instructions given to Neipperg Metternich had annexed the following draft.

“Article I.—There shall exist from the date on which the present treaty is signed, and during the course of the present war, an alliance both offensive and defensive

between Austria and Naples. In terms thereof their Majesties bind themselves to direct the whole of their forces towards the realisation of the objects set forth in the preamble of this treaty.

“Article II.—His Majesty the Emperor of Austria guarantees to His Majesty the King of Naples the States at present possessed by the latter in Italy. His Imperial and Royal Majesty will use his good offices to procure the assent of his allies to the present guarantee.

“Article III.—So soon as peace is concluded a defensive alliance shall be forthwith entered into between the two courts for the purpose of giving due effect to the said guarantee.

“Article IV.—To make more clear the assistance to be rendered to the common cause by the High Contracting Parties, His Majesty the Emperor of Austria undertakes to maintain an active army of not less than 150,000 men. His Majesty the King of Naples shall on his part put in the field a corps of . . . infantry and . . . cavalry, which shall always be maintained at full strength.

“Article V. (Draft A).—The Neapolitan army, under the personal command of His Majesty the King of Naples, shall be reinforced by an Austrian contingent, which shall in like manner be under the King's command.

“Article V. (Draft B).—The Neapolitan Army shall be under the supreme control of the Commander-in-Chief of the Austrian Army, but shall be in the immediate command of a Neapolitan general. The Neapolitan Army shall work in absolute agreement with the Austrian Grand Army in Italy.

“Article VI.—All booty and trophies shall be deemed the property of the army by which they may have been captured.

“Article VII.—A military agreement shall at once be made between the High Contracting Parties in order

to regulate questions relating to the victualling and co-operation of the armies.

“Article VIII.—The present treaty shall be ratified at the earliest possible moment.”

To the above draft was added a preamble setting forth the object of the alliance, which was described as the re-establishment of peace on the basis of an independent and equitable balance of power. Lastly came a secret clause, separate from the rest of the treaty. It consisted of a promise on Austria's part to employ her influence with the Allies, especially Sicily and England, to obtain the recognition of Murat as King of Naples. At the same time Austria guaranteed to Murat Ferdinand's renunciation of his claims on Naples.

To the instructions and draft quoted above, Metternich added the following memoranda :—

“Article I. is essential, and the draft in this respect must be rigidly adhered to. The King of Naples must use every means in his power to achieve an aim in the successful attainment of which will reside the sole guarantee of his possessions.

“Articles II. and III. are wholly in favour of Naples. We desire no reciprocal guarantee in Article II., as we are not in a position to specify the arrangements that have been made with other Powers regarding the future reconstitution of the Austrian Monarchy. Our plenipotentiaries will put aside any proposals on the part of the Neapolitan Government by stating that the matter would be considered at the time of signing the treaty to be entered into after the conclusion of peace.

“The forces for which provision is made in Article IV. should be on the same scale as in Article I.

“We should prefer the second version of Article V. But if the King accompanies the Army we could hardly ask him to forego the command. The readiness of our plenipotentiaries to fall in with the King's demands

should be in proportion to the advantage accruing from the troops offered by him and to the zeal he may display for the cause.

"The next three articles require no comment. The separate and secret article should demonstrate to the King the *bona fides* of our procedure. Our plenipotentiaries are instructed to give a verbal promise that we should, if necessary, use forcible means to compel the King of Sicily to renounce his claims to the Kingdom of Naples. Seeing the nature of the information previously given by us to His Majesty concerning the King of Sicily's attitude, he should entertain no further doubt as to the readiness with which the necessary understanding will be arrived at.

"If the King of Naples refuses his assent to the treaty on the grounds that he receives nothing tangible to indemnify him for his co-operation, and if on this account there should be any risk of the negotiations falling through, our plenipotentiaries are empowered to sign a further secret article to the following effect :

"His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, King of Bohemia, Hungary, &c., undertakes when peace is restored to use his influence in order to obtain for His Majesty the King of Naples an extension of his frontiers as an indemnity for the efforts made by him in support of the common cause."

Such were Neipperg's instructions and the lines laid down by Metternich. The following is the treaty of the 8th January *in extenso*.¹

¹ The text of the treaty as here given is not official, since all efforts to discover it in the Archives of Austria, England, France, and Naples have hitherto proved unavailing. But taking the treaty dated 11th January and noting one after another the points of difference to which reference is made in collateral and official documents, I have attempted to reconstruct the treaty of the 8th January by making use of all the information at present available on the subject.

“ In the name of The Most Holy and Indivisible Trinity.

“ His Majesty the Emperor of Austria and His Majesty the King of Naples, being desirous of consolidating by the closest union the welfare of their respective States and at the same time of considering the most effective means for establishing a lasting peace in Europe, and more especially among the peoples of Italy, upon the basis of the independence and equilibrium of the powers, have resolved to enter into a treaty of alliance with one another for the purpose of uniting their efforts for the attainment of the object in view.

“ Wherefore the following plenipotentiaries have been appointed.

“ By His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary and Bohemia,

“ The Sieur Adam Albert, Comte de Neipperg, Knight of the Order of Maria Theresa, Grand Cross of the Order of Saint Anne of Russia, Knight of the Military Order of Sweden, His Majesty's Chamberlain and Lieutenant-General.¹

“ By His Majesty the King of Naples,

“ The Sieur Martino Mastrilli, Duc di Gallo, Grand Dignitary of the Order of the Two Sicilies and of the Iron Crown, Knight of the Golden Fleece, His Majesty's Counsellor of State and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

“ The same, after exchange of their full powers, have agreed on the following terms :

“ Article I.—From the date of the signature hereof there shall be maintained friendship, alliance and sincere union between His Majesty the Emperor of Austria and His Majesty the King of Naples, their heirs and successors, their dominions and subjects in perpetuity.

“ The high contracting parties shall use every en-

¹ Mier being absent, nothing could be said about his powers in the first treaty.

deavour to maintain their mutual friendship by avoiding whatsoever might be calculated to impair the union and cordial relationship so happily existing between them.

“Article II.—The alliance between the high contracting parties shall be directed towards the prosecution of the present war as well as towards the re-establishment, through their joint efforts, of a due balance of power and the restoration of peace to Europe, and particularly to Italy, where the two high contracting parties agree to co-operate for the defence of their States and respective interests.

“Article III.—In pursuance of the preceding articles, the high contracting parties have covenanted to aid each other with all such means as Providence has placed at their disposal, and not to lay down arms save by mutual consent.

“Article IV.—His Majesty the Emperor of Austria guarantees His Majesty the King of Naples, his heirs and successors, the free and peaceful enjoyment of the States at present possessed by His Majesty in Italy, as well as the absolute and undivided sovereignty thereof.

“[His Majesty the King of Naples renounces for himself and his successors all claim upon the Kingdom of Sicily, and declares his willingness to guarantee the possession thereof to the present reigning dynasty.]¹

“His Imperial and Royal Majesty will use his best endeavours to procure the assent of his allies to this guarantee.

“Article V.—By way of indicating in greater detail

¹ The words in brackets were omitted or inserted elsewhere in the second treaty. The paragraph in question was, in the second treaty, inserted in the secret articles together with the passage relating to Austria's guarantee of Ferdinand's renunciation of Naples, but in the first treaty it was included in Article IV. It was at Murat's own request that Metternich made the change.

the forces to be furnished by the high contracting parties in the common cause, His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, &c. &c., undertakes to keep constantly in the field 150,000 men, of whom not less than 60,000 shall be for service in Italy.

"His Majesty the King of Naples likewise promises to put a corps of 30,000 men in the field. These troops shall consist of the due proportion of infantry, cavalry, and artillery, and shall be maintained at their full strength during the course of the present war.

"[It is, however, stipulated that the troops of His Majesty the King of Naples shall only be required for service in Italy, and that they shall not be employed beyond the Alps.]¹

"In the event of the forces provided in terms of the preceding clause being insufficient for the defence of the common interests, His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, &c. &c., and His Majesty the King of Naples mutually agree to increase their auxiliary forces in such measure as the necessities of the case may demand, always, however, maintaining the proportion laid down in the preceding clause.

"Article VII.—In the event of the King of Naples leading his army in person, the troops working in imme-

¹ Durant, who knew of this article, makes the following comment there-upon: "The King attached great importance to this restriction: it was an immense weight off his conscience." (Durant to Caulaincourt. Naples, January 5, 1814. *Affaires Étrangères*.) Mention is also made of it in a work entitled, "Sulla condotta politica del Re Gioacchino Murat nel 1814 e nel 1815," published in the *Minerva Napolitana* in 1821. These articles, which are unsigned, were manifestly written by one who followed the negotiations very closely, or who possibly played an active part in them, for it would be impossible for greater accuracy to be displayed, all the statements contained in them being confirmed, without any exception, by collateral documentary evidence. The work in question must not be confused with a somewhat violent pamphlet published in 1814 and 1815 under the almost identical title of "Memorie sulla condotta politica e militare tenuta da Gioacchino Murat."

diate conjunction with the said army shall be under that monarch's direct command.¹

"In the contrary event, the Austrian Grand Army in Italy being commanded by a field-marshal or feldzeugmeister of His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, the Neapolitan corps co-operating with that army shall be under the command of the said field-marshal or feldzeugmeister.

"If His Majesty the King is present the operations shall be so planned and concerted as may be most expedient for the common interests and the success of the armies of the two allies.

"Should His Majesty not accompany the army, the general commanding the Neapolitan troops will take his orders from the Commander-in-Chief of the Austrian Army in respect of such plan as may be agreed upon between the two armies.

"Article VIII.—For this purpose a military agreement shall be arranged immediately after the present treaty is signed in order to determine all questions relating to the operations of the two armies, the lines which they will be called upon to hold, as well as the victualling and maintenance of the respective troops, it being understood that each of the two armies will avail itself of the resources of the district it occupies.

"Article IX.—All prizes, booty, and prisoners shall belong to the troops by whom they are captured.

"Article X.—The high contracting parties covenant together that neither of them will make peace nor consent to a truce without including its ally.

"Article XI.—The ambassadors and ministers of the high contracting parties at foreign courts shall be instructed to render assistance to each other, and in

¹ At the request of Maréchal Bellegarde this passage underwent some modification in the second treaty.

every way and on all occasions to act in such manner as may tend to further the interests of their sovereigns.

“Article XII.—His Majesty the Emperor of Austria undertakes to release all Neapolitan prisoners in his custody, and will use his influence to obtain the release of such as are detained by the allied powers.

“Article XIII.—The present treaty shall be ratified, and the ratifications exchanged at Naples at the earliest possible moment.

“In witness whereof the respective plenipotentiaries have hereunto set their hands and seals.

“Done at Naples the 8th January 1814.

“LE COMTE DE NEIPPERG.

“LE DUC DI GALLO.”

Secret Articles.

“Article I.—His Imperial, Royal, and Apostolic Majesty undertakes to use his good offices to facilitate the conclusion of peace between His Majesty the King of Naples and His Majesty the King of Great Britain and His Majesty the King of Sicily on a base equally just, sure, and honourable to all parties, as well as to bring about the restoration of friendly relations and a cordial understanding between His Majesty the King of Naples and the other powers in alliance with Austria.¹

“Article II.—In order to preclude any possibility of dispute between Their Majesties the King of Naples and the King of Sicily, His Majesty the Emperor of Austria will employ all possible means to obtain for King Joachim Napoleon and his descendants a formal

¹ Reconstructed on data obtained from a dispatch forwarded by Graham to Bentinck. (Dispatch No. 4. Record Office. Sicily.) In the treaty of the 8th January this was the first of the secret articles. After revision by England it was placed second.

act of renunciation from the King of Sicily of all claims on the Kingdom of Naples. This renunciation shall be recognised and guaranteed by His Majesty the Emperor of Austria to His Majesty the King of Naples, and His Imperial and Royal Majesty will take steps to obtain from the allied powers a similar recognition and guarantee.

"Article III.—The two high contracting parties, recognising that it is impossible for His Majesty the King of Naples to send his troops any farther afield than they are at present unless he is relieved from the apprehension of a descent upon his shores, it is specially agreed that His Neapolitan Majesty shall not be obliged to permit his army to take an active part in such operations as shall be determined upon until he shall have been completely assured that Great Britain will cease all hostile action against him.

"Article IV.—The two high contracting parties reserve the right to enter, on the conclusion of a general peace, into a treaty of alliance with the object of mutually safeguarding their dominions in Italy and of aiding one another in such fashion as may be calculated to advance the interests of their respective crowns and peoples.

"Article V.—His Majesty the Emperor of Austria binds himself to use effective means, on the conclusion of a general peace, to secure as an indemnity for the King of Naples in respect of the efforts and sacrifices made by His Majesty for the furtherance of the common cause, a satisfactory military frontier in conformity with the political interests of the two powers and with the friendly relations established between them by the treaty of this date.

"Naples, the 8th January 1814.

"LE COMTE DE NEIPPERG.

"LE DUC DI GALLO."

In the course of the negotiations Neipperg found himself compelled to make use of the additional inducement indicated by Metternich regarding the King of Sicily's renunciation of his claims to the throne of Naples, which renunciation Austria undertook to obtain by every means in her power. Murat demanded that this undertaking should be inserted in a clause in the treaty, but to this Neipperg obstinately refused to consent.¹ Gallo was thereupon commanded to place the declaration on record, and this he did in the following terms :—

Special Article.

“I, the undersigned Minister for Foreign Affairs of His Majesty the King of Naples, do hereby state that Monsieur le Lieutenant-General Comte de Neipperg, Minister Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, declared to me in the course of the discussions which took place between us in connexion with the treaty of friendship and alliance signed at Naples this 8th day of January 1814, that he was authorised by the instructions of His Imperial and Royal Majesty to assure the King, my Master, that in the event of his becoming a party to the political system of the allied powers in the present war, His Majesty the Emperor of Austria would use every means, and if necessary would resort to force, in order to prevail upon the King of Sicily formally to renounce the Kingdom of Naples for himself and his successors in perpetuity and to guarantee the peaceable and undivided possession of the same to His Majesty King Joachim and his descendants for ever.

“In witness whereof I, the undersigned, have, with the consent of Monsieur le Comte de Neipperg, recorded the said verbal statement in these presents, which I have

¹ *Minerva Napolitana.*

communicated to him and whereunto I have set my hand and seal.

“Done at Naples, the 8th January 1814.

“LE DUC DI GALLO.”

The treaty being signed, or just about to be signed, Murat dispatched Lieutenant-General Pignatelli-Strongoli with the following reply to the Emperor of Austria.

“NAPLES, 7th January 1814.

“MONSIEUR MON FRÈRE,—The Comte de Neipperg duly handed me the letter which Your Imperial and Royal Majesty was so good as to send me from Frankfurt under date of the 10th December last. The mission with which the officer in question was entrusted constituted a further proof of the interest and friendliness with which Your Majesty has ever regarded me. I beg you to accept my sincere thanks for the same and to rest assured of my ardent desire to lose no opportunity of affording you convincing demonstration of my sincere friendship and gratitude. I am sending to Your Majesty's headquarters Lieutenant-General the Prince de Pignatelli-Strongoli, one of my aides-de-camp, who will deliver the present letter and reiterate by word of mouth the sentiments which I entertain towards you. I thoroughly and most genuinely share in the desire expressed by Your Majesty and your Allies for the re-establishment of peace on the basis of the due balance and independence of the powers. Your Majesty may rely on my doing all that in me lies to assist in the attainment of this most desirable object.

“It will always afford me satisfaction to draw yet closer the bonds which unite us, convinced as I am from my knowledge of Your Majesty's character that the fresh ties which are about to be formed between us

and our thrones will conduce to the interests we have in common as well as to the welfare of our peoples.

“ Believe me to remain, Monsieur mon frère, Your Imperial and Royal Majesty’s affectionate brother.

“ J. NAPOLEON.”¹

On the 8th January envoys set out for the headquarters of the Allies with the signed treaty. Menz, who was accompanied by Coucy, had charge of the copy intended for Metternich.² Simultaneously Captain the Baron d’Aspre was dispatched by Neipperg with the following letter to Lord William Bentinck :—

“ Acting on the commands and instructions of His Majesty the Emperor, my Master, and in conformity with the arrangements made by His said Majesty with the High Allied Powers, and especially with the British Government, I had come here not to seek an alliance with the King of Naples, but to discover the attitude which he intends to take up at the present juncture with regard to the other powers. I have strictly adhered to my instructions, which were definite and required that I should satisfy myself as to his intentions within a strictly limited interval of time.

“ It was Austria’s duty to come to an understanding. It was necessary for her to know as soon as possible whether the King was hostile to the cause of Europe : it was above all important from the military point of view that she should clearly understand whether she had to regard the Neapolitans as the allies of her army in Italy or whether she would be under the necessity of detaching a portion of her forces in order to keep a watch on the movements of a hostile Neapolitan army.

¹ Murat to the Emperor of Austria. Quoted by Lumbroso. *Revue de Paris*.

² Neipperg to Metternich. Naples, January 8, 1814. Quoted by M. Weil.

“Taking into account the position of the armies in Italy and Switzerland, I have been led, on mature consideration, to negotiate and sign the accompanying treaty. In now entrusting it to you I rely on your noted good faith and uprightness to make no use of it, whether in connection with your own Government or in any other manner whatsoever, until the news of the transaction has been made public through the official channels.”

After a few notes regarding the forces of the Allies and the necessity of calling on the Neapolitan troops for assistance, he proceeded—

“Having unfolded to you, my Lord, the advantages that would accrue from the co-operation of the Neapolitan troops and made clear the danger of pursuing a contrary policy, I must in addition to these purely military considerations call your attention to the fact that my expedition was undertaken with the full cognisance of Lord Aberdeen. You may therefore rest thoroughly assured that you will be acting in full accordance with the views of your Government in signing an armistice with King Joachim, such armistice being an essential condition of the active employment of the Neapolitan troops mentioned in the treaty. I therefore urge you, my Lord, in the common interest, not to put off the conclusion of an armistice with the Neapolitan Government, seeing that it will bring about an immediate cessation of hostilities between Sicily and Naples, render effective the provisions of the treaty which I have just signed, and procure the prompt and active co-operation of the Neapolitan army in Italy.

“Any further delay in arranging this armistice might result in incalculable injury to the cause of the Allies. I am under the necessity of officially declaring in the name of my August Sovereign and His Allies that both you and I will be held responsible by them if we are the cause of delay in securing the co-operation of the fifty

or sixty thousand men who may seal the fate of Italy, and consequently of Europe also. To you, my Lord, blame will attach for delaying the conclusion of the armistice which I have the honour to submit to you, and to me for failing to convince you by the cogency of my arguments of the sincerity by which I am actuated.”¹

The above letter and the treaty were conveyed to Palermo by Captain d'Aspre, who embarked on the *Furious* with Colonel Berthemy. The frigate made ready to sail on the 9th January, but owing to the stormy weather, she did not put to sea until the 10th.

As for Menz, he reached the headquarters at Bâle somewhere between the 20th and 22nd January with the treaty signed by Neipperg. This he duly handed to Metternich, who in turn submitted it to Lord Castlereagh on the 22nd January. Instead, however, of immediately laying it before the Emperor of Austria for ratification, it was decided, in view of representations made by Castlereagh, to introduce certain alterations.

A second treaty was accordingly drawn up, and on the 23rd January Menz was instructed to convey it with certain orders to Mier. The revised version differed in two essential respects from the original. In the first place, Murat was now to undertake to procure a suitable indemnity for the King of Sicily; in the second the indemnity promised to the King of Naples was to be strictly defined.

The second article of the secret treaty, which by reason of the changes that were made became one of the principal clauses in the agreement, was now put in the first place, and read as follows:—

“Article I.—In order to remove all grounds for dispute between Their Majesties the Kings of Naples and Sicily, His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, &c., under-

¹ Neipperg to Bentinck. Naples, 8th January 1814. Quoted by M. Weil.

takes to use every endeavour to obtain in favour of His Majesty King Joachim Napoleon and his descendants, the King of Sicily's formal renunciation of his claims on the Crown of Naples, which shall be binding on him and his descendants in perpetuity. The said renunciation shall be recognised and guaranteed by His Majesty the Emperor of Austria to His Majesty the King of Naples, and His Imperial Majesty will approach the Allied Powers with the object of obtaining from them a like recognition and guarantee.

"On the other hand, His Majesty the King of Naples renounces, on his own behalf and that of his successors, all claims on the Kingdom of Sicily, and declares his willingness to guarantee the possession thereof to the present reigning house.

"Inasmuch, however, as the Allied Powers are not in a position to acquiesce in the guarantee of the Kingdom of Naples to King Joachim unless the latter becomes a party to the agreement mutually arranged between the said powers to procure a fitting indemnity for the King of Sicily, His Majesty the King of Naples now and henceforth binds himself to admit the principle of such indemnity, and the efforts of His Neapolitan Majesty being directed towards the attainment of all the objects of the Great European Alliance, he specially undertakes to embrace in his aims the procuring of an indemnity for the King of Sicily."

At the same time was added the article defining the concessions made in Murat's favour.

Additional and Secret Article.

"His Majesty the King of Naples and His Majesty the Emperor of Austria being desirous of concluding forthwith a lasting agreement in pursuance of the stipulations of Article IV. of the secret treaty signed

at Naples on the 11th January, have covenanted as follows :—

“His Imperial and Royal Majesty guarantees His Neapolitan Majesty an acquisition calculated on a scale of 400,000 souls to be taken from the Roman State as may be agreed upon between the two States. His Apostolic Majesty will lend his good offices to obtain the consent and sanction of the Holy Father and the Allies to this concession.

“On the other hand His Majesty the King of Naples formally agrees to look upon (the fulfilment of) this undertaking as fully satisfying all his claims to be accorded an increase of territory.

“The present article shall be ratified separately, and the ratifications thereof shall be exchanged at the same time as those of the overt and secret treaties of this date.”

Menz, bearing Metternich's instructions and the new treaty, reached Naples on the 3rd February. Next morning Mier read over the treaty to the King, as well as his instructions regarding the same. The King gave his unqualified assent to the new treaty, and wrote as follows to the Emperor of Austria :—

“BOLOGNA, 5th February 1814.

“MONSIEUR MON FRÈRE,—Monsieur le Comte de Mier has acquainted me with the modifications which Your Imperial and Royal Majesty has deemed it necessary to make in the Treaty of Alliance which had been signed at Naples by our respective plenipotentiaries, and I take the earliest opportunity of informing Your Majesty that, relying on the constant friendship of which you have never failed to give me proof, I have unreservedly assented to the new version and to the additional articles ; this letter may be looked upon in the meantime as a preliminary ratification.

“I trust that this loyal and frank determination on my part will bear witness to my conscientiousness and to my wish to second with the utmost promptitude the efforts you are making for the success of the common cause. I am now at the head of my army, and I am only awaiting information regarding Monsieur le Comte de Bellegarde’s plan of action to support him by every means in my power.

“I pray Your Imperial and Royal Majesty to be assured of my sincerity and to accept my best wishes for your own happiness and for that of your illustrious Family.”

This letter was conveyed to the headquarters of the Allies by Colonel de Beaufremont, Murat’s aide-de-camp, and delivered by him on the 14th February into the hands of the Emperor of Austria at Langres.

Meanwhile—on the evening of the 12th February—Neipperg, Mier, and Gallo had put their hands to the new treaty of alliance, and it was immediately handed to the Comte de Schonfeldt to be conveyed by him to Metternich. It is this second treaty which was eventually dated the 11th January.

The Emperor of Austria, who received Murat’s letter on the 14th February, sent him the following reply from Troyes on the 21st :—

“MONSIEUR MON FRÈRE,—Your Majesty’s aide-de-camp, the bearer hereof, handed me the letter ratifying the treaty which I had proposed to you with certain modifications. I accept your preliminary ratification, and I beg you to regard the present letter as an undertaking on my part to dispatch with the least possible delay the said treaty in its proper form.

“The resolution adopted by Your Majesty necessarily insures you my entire support, and I have instructed my Minister to lend a hand to Prince Caricati

in connection with such steps as remain to be taken in order to procure the assent of the Sovereigns my Allies to the provisions of the said treaty. This will doubtless afford Your Majesty a further proof of the regard I have ever entertained for you. The happy relations existing between us cannot but contribute to the final triumph of the general cause and particularly to the future welfare and tranquillity of Italy.

"Believe me to remain, Monsieur mon frère, Your Majesty's affectionate brother,

"FRANCIS."

Subsequently, after the treaty of Paris, Murat was anxious to have the agreement officially ratified. On the 13th July, therefore, the "Cavaliere" de Angelis, head of the principal department of the Neapolitan Foreign Office, arrived at Vienna with a formal ratification bearing Joachim's signature, for which Metternich readily exchanged a ratification signed by the Emperor Francis.

In the course of these proceedings Campochiaro observed that the Austrian ratifications were dated from Dijon. On his manifesting surprise thereat, Metternich informed him that the document in question was one which had been dispatched from Vienna to the headquarters at Dijon, and had been supposed to have gone astray, but that, having been subsequently discovered, it had not been considered worth while to alter the date, seeing that the exchange was officially recorded as having been effected at Vienna.

As soon as the due formalities were concluded, the Duc de Roccaromana returned with the official documents to Naples, and on the 22nd October delivered into the hands of the King the copy of the treaty which was supposed to have been concluded on the 11th January.

One last question arises in connection with these two treaties and their dates. Why did Metternich cause the

treaty which was signed on the 12th February to be ante-dated? Merely because he now perceived that the necessity for the treaty for which he had striven so hard was growing less and less urgent, and because he wished to avoid the adverse criticisms of the Allies, whose agent he was for all matters connected with Italy. He therefore put the date of the treaty as far back as possible, so that it might be generally supposed that vital necessity had at the time impelled him to get it signed.

Far less crooked, far less underhand, the negotiations with England were equally decisive. On the 1st January 1814, on receipt of a letter from Menz dated the 14th December, Bentinck sent Graham, his private secretary, to Naples with full powers to conclude an armistice. Graham, however, was formally instructed "not to sign, whatever the nature of the offers that might be made to him, until he had put himself into communication with the Allies." He left on board the *Furious*, which reached Naples on the morning of the 4th. On proceeding to Gallo's quarters he was "somewhat astonished to find an Austrian General there." The Austrian General was Neipperg.

Faithful to his orders, Graham, after several discussions with Neipperg, who wanted him to sign the armistice with Naples then and there, requested Gallo to give him passports for the headquarters of the Allies. These he received on the morning of the 7th, and, setting out on the 8th with Menz, he reached the Austrian outposts at Forli on the 13th, finally arriving at Bellegarde's headquarters on the 17th. "It was his intention to proceed on his journey to the Imperial headquarters, but His Excellency Marshal Bellegarde urged him so strongly to go back to Lord William Bentinck, and laid such stress on the importance of the armistice demanded by Marshal Murat as a *sine qua non* of his co-operation, that he made up his mind to fall in with His Excellency's views." Thus Graham left

again on the very day of his arrival. Before his departure, however, he had a long conversation with Sir Robert Wilson, the English attaché at Bellegarde's headquarters. Wilson, misled by the representations of the Austrians, gave him to understand that the British Government was desirous of making peace with Murat. On the 25th January Graham found himself back again in Naples. Without a moment's delay he sought out Gallo and signed the armistice with him at four o'clock on the morning of the 26th. The following is the text of the agreement :—

“ The undersigned, being furnished with the requisite full powers, have concluded an agreement for an armistice in the following terms :

“ Article I.—There shall be from this date an absolute cessation of hostilities between the land and sea forces of Naples and Great Britain, and such forces as may be under British command in the Mediterranean.

“ Article II.—This armistice shall remain in force until the treaty of peace which is to be concluded between the respective countries for the purpose of securing united action in the common cause has been definitely signed.

“ Plenipotentiaries shall be appointed by either party for the purpose of arranging the said treaty, and they shall meet together at the earliest possible opportunity.

“ Done at Naples, 26th January 1814.

“ E. A. BERTHEMY,

JAMES GRAHAM,

“ Maréchal de Camp,
His Majesty's Aide-de-Camp.

Aide-de-Camp to His
Excellency Lord William Bentinck.”

Meantime, Bentinck had made up his mind to come to Naples. Sailing from Palermo on the 30th January on board the *America*, he reached Naples at eleven o'clock on the following night and proceeded to take up his quarters at the “ Locanda de la Grande Bretagne.” On the 1st February, after seeing Graham, who acquainted

him with the terms of the armistice which he had signed on the 26th January, Bentinck had an interview with Gallo and Neipperg, and drew up a modified version. The following are the reasons he gave to Castlereagh for not accepting Graham's settlement :—

“ MY DEAR LORD,—On arriving here the night before last in order to conclude an armistice with Murat, I found that an armistice had already been made by Mr. Graham. Lord Aberdeen will have sent you a copy of the agreement as arranged between the Duc de Gallo and Mr. Graham, as well as the memorandum in which the latter mentions the considerations which guided him in the matter. The Comte de Neipperg and Sir Robert Wilson appear convinced that Lord Aberdeen had given me full powers to sign a treaty of peace with Murat, or that such powers had been sent me direct by the British Government. As far as Mr. Graham was concerned, he was absolutely positive that the letter which I recently received from Lord Aberdeen contained the necessary powers. You will have seen from the letter which I sent to Lord Aberdeen by my aide-de-camp, Captain Foljambe, that in giving effect to the instructions of the British Government I thought it incumbent upon me to express the doubt I entertained as to the interpretation put upon Lord Aberdeen's letter of the 12th December, which reached me on the 18th January—the only one I received from him.

“ The Neapolitan Government is very anxious to make peace with Great Britain, and the army and the people generally are being told a great deal about the prospect of the treaty being signed at an early date. Constant pressure has been brought to bear on Mr. Graham, and it was in order to hasten on negotiations for the treaty that they were so anxious to introduce Article 2 into the armistice stipulating for the immediate appointment of plenipotentiaries. Fully persuaded after

his conversation with Sir Robert Wilson that the intentions of the British Government lay in this direction, Graham did not consider himself justified in opposing the desires of the Duc de Gallo. For my part, I could not see my way to accept the article, and this I made clear both to the Duc de Gallo and to the Comte de Neipperg. I told them that I was prepared to conclude an armistice, to enter into a military agreement or a scheme of co-operation, but that my powers did not go beyond that. They then put forward a number of other suggestions, and pressed for the introduction of an article which would have been tantamount to giving them all they wanted. But I absolutely refused to insert anything that was extraneous to the strict object of the matter I had been instructed to negotiate, as that, in my opinion, exceeded the powers which I considered had been granted to me. I am particularly anxious not to involve the Government in any way, nor should I like the King and Crown Prince of Sicily to have grounds for thinking that I am taking Murat's part against them."

While Bentinck was thus explaining to Castlereagh the reasons which had led him to suppress the second article of Graham's armistice, Caroline was also expressing her dissatisfaction to Gallo. "I have since yesterday given a great deal of thought to the armistice proposals which you submitted to me, and what I am afraid of is that the English are endeavouring to obtain all the advantages of a peace, of an alliance even, by a mere offer to suspend hostilities without giving us any guarantee in return.

"What in fact do their promises amount to? Simply to an offer to suspend hostilities which, according to the terms you have just put before me, they would be able to resume whenever they chose. On the other hand,

what do they want for themselves? First of all, that their trading vessels, or vessels proceeding from islands in their possession, should have unrestricted access to our ports, and that, secondly, a military agreement should be drawn up in order to arrange the nature and scope of the joint operations of the Neapolitan, English, and Austrian forces.

“These two clauses might conceivably find a place in a treaty of alliance, but they are not admissible in a mere armistice. Unrestricted trade relations presuppose and constitute conditions of absolute peace. The union and co-operation of the forces of the two powers for a common end constitute and presuppose a state of alliance. But it is without precedent and contrary to all accepted principles that an alliance should exist between two powers one of which has not formally recognised the other. If the English can obtain the twofold advantage at which they are apparently aiming, what object would they have in concluding a regular treaty of peace and in formally recognising our dynasty? Evidently none at all. On the contrary, it would be much better policy for them to avoid stipulations which would only add to their obligations without giving them anything they do not already possess.

“I am, therefore, of opinion that if Lord William Bentinck could sign a treaty of peace there would be no objection to acceding to his proposals. But as he is not possessed of the requisite authority, I think we should adhere to the armistice as already concluded, which, as I gather, merely amounts to a mutual undertaking to cease hostilities.

“This is what you should give Lord William Bentinck to understand, taking pains to state your views in such terms as could not give offence, and carefully avoiding the discussion of any other proposals. You can allege that the first agreement having been confirmed by the

King and made public, I could scarcely assent to different terms without his sanction. In the event of their refusing to give way, you might suggest to these gentlemen that they should go and see the King and treat with His Majesty direct."

Vainly did Caroline attempt to wring better terms from Bentinck. The latter was obdurate. At last he presented his ultimatum. Either his terms should be accepted or he would return to Palermo. Gallo, however, did succeed in obtaining a small concession: either side wishing to terminate the armistice could only do so by giving three months' notice to that effect. On the 3rd February, after two days of negotiation, Graham's arrangement was superseded by an armistice in the following terms:—

"Article I.—From this day forth there shall be an entire cessation of hostilities, by land and sea, between the British and Neapolitan forces as well as between the Kingdom of Naples and the islands in the Mediterranean and Adriatic where British troops or troops under the command of the British may happen to be stationed.

"Article II.—During the armistice commerce in all unprohibited articles shall be freely carried on between the Kingdom of Naples, Great Britain, and the islands aforementioned, subject, however, to such regulations as have been laid down or may be hereafter laid down by the respective Governments.

"Article III.—If circumstances should render it necessary to terminate the armistice, hostilities shall not be resumed till after the expiration of a period of three months from the date on which either of the parties shall have denounced the same.

"Article IV.—A military agreement shall be entered into between the generals and superior officers of the Austrian, Neapolitan, and English armies for the purpose of arranging a plan whereby the operations of the re-

spective forces, united for the fulfilment of a common end, shall be determined."

The armistice signed, Bentinck immediately gave orders to Graham to set out to acquaint Castlereagh with the result of the negotiations. On the 20th February Graham delivered his dispatches to the latter and informed him of what had taken place. Next day from Châtillon-sur-Seine Castlereagh confirmed all that Bentinck had done. "The armistice as now settled by Your Lordship is wholly satisfactory."¹

¹ Castlereagh to Bentinck. Châtillon-sur-Seine, February 21, 1814.

CHAPTER XI

MURAT AS KING OF ITALY

Negotiations with Austria—Neipperg's offers—Metternich's proposals—Murat's demands—The part played by Graham: his interview with Cam-pochiaro—Murat's letter to the Emperor—The signature of the treaty—Caroline's attitude—How Murat attempted to deceive Elisa and Miollis in order to gain possession of the forts at Leghorn and Rome—Gallo's false statements to Durant—Pérignon's departure—Murat's letter to the Emperor (15th January)—His false assertions—Murat confers with Mier—Endeavours to obtain the surrender of Rome and Ancona—Maghella and La Vauguyon—Murat's relations with Eugène and Fouché—Negotiations with Bentinck—The latter promises to come to Naples—Murat sets out for Rome—The decrees—Waiting for England's reply—Murat leaves to join the army at Bologna—He throws aside the mask—Proclamations—Italy under Murat's control.

THE Papal States were overrun with Murat's troops. Carascosa, with the first division and the Royal Guard, had secured possession of Rome, Foligno, Florence, Imola, and Bologna, and thus held the whole western portion of the territory which the King proposed to take for his own. On the east, d'Ambrosio, with the second division, was advancing northwards, making sure of the road that runs through Ancona, Rimini, and Ravenna, echeloning his forces at Sinigaglia, Fano, and Pesaro. Moreover, Joachim was still the ally of France, and on the 14th January 1814 was well able to hold his head high in discussing with Neipperg the proposals which Austria laid before him.

So thoroughly was this recognised at the headquarters of the Allies that the Austrian plenipotentiary came laden

with good things. Joachim was to be recognised and his kingdom guaranteed by Austria; Ferdinand was to renounce his claim to Naples, and the said renunciation should, if necessary, be obtained by force; lastly his services should be rewarded with another slice of territory. It is true that the offers were presented in terms that were abrupt and haughty. Austria, resolved to see plainly how matters stood, called upon Murat to declare the attitude he intended to take up. Neutrality was admissible no longer, and Neipperg was to play the rough and domineering dragoon and bring the whole business off in a few rounds of the clock. But in reality Metternich, who was ready to purchase Murat's friendship at any price, soon laid aside this assumption of arrogance to resume his customary attitude of prudence and politeness. Mier's arrival at Fribourg in Breisgau, the recollection of the events of the last few months of 1813, and a few hours' conversation with his chief sufficed to make the latter abandon the attitude which Neipperg had been ordered to assume and to push his concessions to a point that drew upon him the censure of the English. In accordance with his instructions of the 10th December, Neipperg was supposed to terminate the negotiations in "two or three times twenty-four hours." Nevertheless ten days later, on the 20th, Metternich sent him orders "not to cut off the communications," instructing him, if the King had not come to an arrangement with him, to await Mier's return before saying the final word. Fresh instructions were given to Mier; he was to begin by offering a population of half a million souls, to be taken from the departments of Tronto, Musone, and Metauro. Should this not prove acceptable, he was to offer the departments in question with a population of 717,647. Thirdly and lastly, if the King was not satisfied with this offer, Mier was authorised to go as far as Naviglio along a line excluding Faenza and thence to the



COUNT VON NEIPPERG

Tuscan frontier. Even this, however, was not Metternich's final word, for he gave Mier instructions that in the event of the King's not assenting to any of these proposals, he was to hold the matter open by stating that he would be obliged to ask for further orders. Had Murat proved recalcitrant, Austria would have been quite capable of giving him the whole of Tuscany.

Happily for Austria's *amour propre* and her future position at the Congress of Vienna, Neipperg, who combined military decision with diplomatic subtlety, extricated Metternich from his difficult situation with promptitude and skill. Wasting little time over the brilliant court fêtes and the elaborate receptions with which the King and his ministers sought to welcome him, he went straight to the point at issue. In the course of the negotiations, which he himself describes as "stormy and painful," but above all "very active," he allowed neither Murat nor Gallo any breathing space.

As usual Murat met the Austrian proposals with an account of the terms which he alleged had been offered him by France. According to him, Napoleon was ready to give him more than half of Italy. He would have command of Prince Eugène's army, which was to be increased to one hundred thousand men. His frontiers were to be immediately extended to the Po, and it had been settled that half of the future conquests in Italy should be retained by him. Taking his stand upon these pretended concessions, he had no compunction about asking Neipperg for that upon which he had set his heart, namely, the Papal States. Unhappily for the King, the Austrian's credulity was limited, and he categorically refused to entertain the request, and proceeded to lay before him all that he had authority to offer.

It was not long before the affair was settled, for Joachim did not insist, and for good reasons, upon his exorbitant claims. On the 3rd January Neipperg sent

word to Nugent of his initial success. On that day all essential matters had been arranged : there was to be an alliance, both offensive and defensive ; Naples was to be guaranteed to Murat ; Ferdinand was to be compelled to renounce his claim to Naples, and Joachim was to have an indemnity. All that remained to be settled were questions of form and detail—a mere matter of time. On the 4th Neipperg was at work with Gallo in the latter's room when the door opened and admitted Bentinck's envoy, to wit, his secretary Graham.

A curiously interesting figure is that of James Graham. A young man of twenty-one, he was making, in these negotiations, his first official entry into the diplomatic profession, and though he had to contend with the skill and experience of the veteran Gallo and with the soldier-like bluntness of Neipperg, he displayed a coolness of demeanour which formed a striking contrast with the fiery impetuosity of Bentinck, his chief. He proved himself a consummate dialectician, evinced a rare faculty for accurate expression and clear thinking, and succeeded in leading his adversary to make admissions without ever revealing his own hand. With that stubborn imperturbability so characteristic of his race, he kept constantly harping on the limited scope of his instructions, and managed to lead the discussion on to whatever ground seemed most favourable to his side of the question. No contradictions escaped him, no dissimulations passed undetected, not a single subterfuge or deceit did he fail to scent out and drag forth into the light of day. Bentinck's ideas concerning Italy and his consequent hostility to Murat may have preserved England from a peace which Castlereagh, had he been in Bentinck's place, would probably have had no scruples about signing, but Graham it was who, in the negotiations with Austria, succeeded—where Bentinck himself would perhaps have failed—in insuring the triumph of

his master's policy. It was he who enabled Lord William to take stock of the position at his leisure and brought out into strong relief the manner in which the Austrian aims conflicted with the policy imposed upon England by necessity and by duty; he it was who detected without a moment's hesitation the special reasons which made Austria so anxious to come to terms with Murat. Throughout the whole affair he avoided every pitfall, kept his hands free, and left the future open. In the diplomatic trial of strength that began on the 4th and ended on the 7th January the victory was undoubtedly with Graham.

Neipperg's countenance must have fallen somewhat when the British envoy appeared on the scene. What sort of comments was Bentinck's secretary going to make about the promises given to Murat concerning Ferdinand's renunciation? Nevertheless Graham was received with a great show of cordiality, and was told that his arrival was highly opportune, since a treaty for an offensive and defensive alliance was at that moment under discussion. And then the business began. Asked to sign the armistice for which it was presumed he had been sent, Graham refused, and in his turn demanded a private interview with Neipperg and Menz.¹ The interview was given, and

¹ Graham had certainly not been sent by Bentinck to sign an armistice with Naples. The letter which Menz had written him on the 14th December had quite taken him by surprise, and as he had received no English news from the headquarters of the Allies save a solitary letter from Lord Aberdeen dated the 12th December, he decided to send his secretary, James Graham, in whom he placed implicit confidence, to find out how matters stood.

Graham therefore was to go to Naples, see Menz, talk things over with him, and then continue his journey to the headquarters of the Allies, where it was expected he would get definite news from England and probably instructions as well. In the event of the aspect of affairs tallying with the statements contained in Menz's despatch, Graham was given authority to sign an armistice. The said authority, however, was wholly conditional, and was only to be acted upon after Graham had duly acquainted himself with the position of affairs, it being the essential object of his journey to obtain positive information regarding the state of European politics.

the Austrian General apprised him of the various events that had taken place since Leipzig. Thus was Graham informed of Metternich's proposals of the 28th October, of the movements of Hiller's army in Italy, and of the negotiations that had taken place between Napoleon and the Allies' headquarters. These general topics disposed of, they proceeded to examine the details of the proposed treaty with Naples. Neipperg informed Bentinck's envoy of Metternich's dispatch of the 28th October, which had been sent to Mier and was received in his absence by Menz on the 2nd December; he also acquainted him with the provisions of Metternich's draft treaty as well as with the Neapolitan counter-proposals. Graham, knowing the character of the Austrian Minister (Metternich), at once expressed surprise at not seeing Lord Aberdeen's signature on the deeds, and detected contradictory passages in the documents presented to him. He was astonished that, although on the one hand Austria was declared to have obtained the King of Sicily's renunciation, together with some hopes of an indemnity, this clause, of first-rate importance from the British point of view, had not been inserted in the treaty. He called upon Menz for an explanation. Menz stammered out that he was not certain about the matter himself, and that he wished to throw no difficulties in the way of an early arrangement between Murat and Great Britain. Graham then manifested surprise that Great Britain had left the Murat affair to be dealt with by Austria, notwithstanding the fact that Bentinck had been placed in possession of full powers by Lord Aberdeen. In the end, when he had read the instructions given to Neipperg "to communicate with Lord Bentinck when his treaty was signed, and not before," he was no longer in doubt as to the opinion he ought to entertain of Austria's good faith. After that he was appealed to in vain to sign the armistice. He was convinced that Lord Aberdeen knew absolutely nothing about the con-

tents of the papers, and made up his mind that Austria's falsehoods would have to be nailed to the counter. First Gallo, then Neipperg, employed every means of pressure and persuasion to bring him over. Graham was obdurate. The aspect of things had been completely changed by the presence of an Austrian emissary at Naples, and he professed himself quite unable to sign without fresh instructions. He therefore decided to dispatch his frigate to Palermo, though, in order to avoid putting any obstacle in the way of beginning military operations at once, he undertook as a favour to repair to the headquarters of the Allies in order to arrange a plan of campaign.

Gallo conveyed to the King the news of Graham's refusal as well as his request to leave. Instead of sending his reply by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Murat, anxious not to let slip so favourable an opportunity of making further overtures to Bentinck, sent Jones with a letter addressed to Lord William which he asked Graham to deliver. Jones discharged this duty, and, after a few observations, withdrew. Next, Campochiaro, who had been specially entrusted by Murat with the conduct of negotiations with Bentinck, came upon the scene.

"Campochiaro came," says Graham, "with instructions from the King to furnish any explanations that I might wish to have. He began with the breaking off of the Ponza negotiations, and took me right up to the battle of Leipzig, repeating the various details which your lordship has heard so often, and which I am inclined to think are, on the whole, true. After the defeat of Leipzig, Murat, according to the Minister's account, presented himself in person to Bonaparte and begged him to make peace. The Emperor would not hear of it, and Murat then announced his intention of withdrawing from the army and making peace with the Allies on such terms as he was able to obtain. The truth, I think, is that under cover of the confusion that followed the defeat Murat

secretly made his escape from the army and sent word of his intentions to the Emperor by letter when he got to Naples.

“Fouchet (*sic*) was here about a fortnight ago and made him the most tempting offers: he was to have command of Beauharnais' army, which was to be increased to 100,000 men, the frontiers of his kingdom were to be immediately extended to the Po, and it was even settled that future conquests in Italy were to be equally divided. These proposals were rejected by Murat, and when the Italian levy (Catinelli's expedition) seized Lucca, and his sister-in-law demanded his assistance, he sent orders to his generals on the frontier not to stir. In reply to the demands of the Duchess (Elisa), he merely referred her to the declarations he had made to Bonaparte. On the other hand, he had thrown down the gauntlet; his troops had entered Florence, Bologna, Ancona, despite the remonstrances of the French: at present, continued Cam-pochiaro, he was about to make an offensive and defensive alliance with Austria against France herself.

“To make his co-operation effective, he only needed an armistice with Great Britain; he was ready to cast himself into our arms. England was his country's natural ally. With her he could defy the world, without her he was bound to confess that his continental alliances were useless; for the help of the British navy he would willingly abandon them. If only he were received by us as a friend he would ask nothing further. Murat, he went on, did not conceal the fact that he had military ambitions. The ideal that was nearest his heart was to be at the head of an *Italian Nation*, and this did not conflict, but rather coincided, with England's interests. The formation of a great and united Empire controlled in Italy itself by a soldier of genius would serve at once as a barrier against France and as a curb on the greed of Austria. He was too good a judge of what his own country's true policy

should be to aspire to naval supremacy. If we were willing to fight for him by sea he would fight for us on land. It was Bonaparte who had forced him to maintain the fleet he now possessed, but if the armistice were signed he would give it up to-morrow, and be only too well pleased to expunge this item, which did not conduce to his proper aims, from his expenditure. Colonial produce, articles of foreign manufacture, naval defence—for all these things he would look to England. Neither France nor Austria would be able to work him ill if we were on his side. He asked no favours, but merely for some military supplies and the recognition of his title. He would then follow us without reluctance in the path we pointed out to him.

“I admitted the cogency of the argument, and added that the political importance of a union between England and Naples was really too obvious to require discussion. But, said I, we are bound by our undertaking with another King, a sovereign who has made sacrifices on our behalf, and whose rights we have promised to defend. At the present time, I went on, Murat’s sphere of action was necessarily circumscribed. His line of conduct might be represented in the form of a dilemma. Either he would have to side with France or he would have to make peace with England. At war with us and hampered by our army, it would be impossible for him to support our adversaries with a force large enough to make success possible. His only course, therefore, was to make peace with Great Britain on such terms as he could obtain.

“The Duke’s reply is worthy of attention, because the same argument evoked a similar answer from the Queen when she was pressed by the Comte de Neipperg, and it shows that Her Majesty the Queen really directs the policy of this Court, which thus seems fated to be controlled by a woman.

“The Duke declared that there was a third alter-

native, and that His Majesty had made up his mind to adopt it if Great Britain refused to recognise him. He might be overborne, but he had learned to scorn danger when fighting for others, and he was not going to grow timid when it came to fighting for his own cause. By the sword he had won his crown, and if the worst came to the worst, by the sword he would defend it. He would either fall as King of Naples and Great Britain's foe or he would reign as a sovereign recognised by her and as her firm and faithful ally.

"I replied that he (Murat) had spoken about giving the King of Sicily an indemnity for the loss of Naples. But why would not Murat accept an equivalent for Naples, since no particular ties bound him to that kingdom? The Duke replied that I could tell Your Lordship that Murat's most ardent desire was to ally himself with England, but that if his crown and his life depended on the renunciation of his claims to Naples, then he would lay down life and crown together.

"Such sentiments, I remarked, are more chivalrous than politic. That matters not, was the reply; when Murat's honour is at stake his interests count for nothing.

"The Duc de Campochiaro next pointed out that there was a singular identity between your views regarding Italy and Murat's. He said that His Majesty had become an Italian, that it was in the interests of France and Austria to partition Italy, but that his aim was to unite it and to be independent. His greatest ambition, continued Campochiaro, was to be at the head of a nation so united, and with England at his back he could defy the world. I inquired whether, supposing such a union were possible, a Frenchman would ever be suffered to accomplish it. He answered that he was absolutely convinced that Murat had abandoned the land of his birth. He wished to live and die an Italian, and the sentiments which he had expressed in favour of Italian

independence had won him popularity. I replied that in my opinion his rule was one of terror rather than of affection. An absolute monarch who imposed the laws of France on his subjects and swelled the ranks of his army by conscription to an extent far beyond what the nation could bear could not be very greatly beloved. The reply was that the system in question had been forced upon him by Bonaparte, that hitherto Murat had not had a free hand in his own kingdom, that though his ministers were unpopular he was held in esteem, and finally that if absolute rule was the sole remaining obstacle, that obstacle was not insurmountable. Kings, I rejoined, are as a rule very loth to exchange absolute power for a limited authority. He appeared, however, to think that this did not apply to Murat, who aimed not so much at power as at glory. . . .”

Such, openly stated for the nonce, were Murat's demands. Here were no sounding phrases, no protestations of “unalterable devotion” and “everlasting attachment.” In plain, bald terms, Murat wanted an alliance with England, and England would do well to make friends with Naples. Therefore, let an armistice be signed, let peace be concluded so that beneath the ægis of England Joachim might bring to pass the unification of Italy and become its ruler. Such were Murat's proposals. To delude Graham, as he had deluded Neipperg, as he had endeavoured to delude Durant, Miollis, and the French generally, as he was fain to delude the Emperor himself, he always had recourse to one and the same device—he lied. He lied when he told Graham that he had informed Napoleon at Erfurt of his intention to make peace with the Allies, but Graham knew he was lying. He lied when he affirmed that Napoleon had offered him the command of Eugène's army, for Napoleon had definitely stated that the army of the King of Naples was to form a separate corps ; he lied again when

he said that it had been proposed to extend his frontiers to the Po, that future conquests were to be divided, that he had written Elisa simply referring her to his declarations to the Emperor (and therefore, according to him, of his resolve to make peace with the enemy). What he really did tell her was that General Filangieri was to receive orders immediately to undertake the defence of Florence.

Henceforth there were dupes no more. Though he had endeavoured to play off Graham against Neipperg and Napoleon against the English and the Austrians, he could not now deceive those who had heard what he himself had said and possessed letters which he himself had written. It is useless to plead that Campochiaro in his interview with the British envoy was merely giving expression to his own private opinions, for Graham was careful to settle that matter at the very outset. The Neapolitan Minister was sent by the King to supply official explanations, and those explanations give clear and irrefragable evidence of Joachim's betrayal of the Emperor. Thereafter his interminable letters, excuses, and protestations of good faith availed him little: they were all so much play-acting. The real drama was being enacted behind the scenes with Austria and England. To them Murat appeared without the tinsel properties he assumed for the benefit of the French and, showing himself in his true colours, avowed his desire to become King of a free and united Italy.

No sooner had Graham arrived in Naples than, trembling with delight and fully believing that matters were on the point of being satisfactorily arranged with England, Murat took up his pen in order to give his brother-in-law a harrowing account of the unhappy circumstances which compelled him to take sides against France. The following letter, which he wrote on the

4th, should be read in conjunction with Campochiaro's declarations to Graham :—

"Sire," he began, "I have now reached the unhappiest day of my life. I am a prey to more painful thoughts than any that ever yet came to torment my peace of mind. The hour is at hand when I must choose. On the one side I behold the inevitable loss of my country, and, may be, of my fame as well; on the other I am invited to enter into undertakings which conflict with my undying affection for Your Majesty and my unalterable affection for France.

"For four days an Austrian plenipotentiary has been here in order to submit to me in his Sovereign's name proposals for a treaty of alliance. Bringing with him the kindest of letters from the Emperor of Austria, he has offered me terms most highly advantageous to my kingdom, and this morning, while my Foreign Minister and he were conferring together, a British frigate, flying a flag of truce, brought an officer with authority from Lord Bentinck to arrange an armistice pending the conclusion of a formal treaty of peace.

"Nevertheless, Sire, I have delayed, I am delaying still. I wished to await, and I am still awaiting, Your Majesty's reply to the urgent demands I sent you to put me in a position to undertake the defence of Italy and of my own kingdom with some chance of success. I pray you read again my letters of the 23rd November and the 25th December. In them I spoke to you with all the loyalty of my nature, with all the frankness that the circumstances so imperiously demanded, yet all that Your Majesty has written me up to now has only served, and could only have served, to increase my doubts and difficulties to the most lamentable degree.

"You bade me march my army to the Po, and I ordered the advance, but you gave me no authority in the places through which I had to pass and where of neces-

sity I was obliged to establish my military bases. The result was that I was met on every side with sullenness and opposition. Everywhere the royal authority was flouted, the movements of my army hampered. You expressed a desire that I should advance upon the Piave, despite the fact that Your Majesty knew perfectly well, for I had told you, that I could not cross the Po without exposing my family and my kingdom, threatened as they were by attacks from the sea, to the most imminent peril. Nor did you decide who was to have the supreme command when my army had effected a junction with the Viceroy's. The absence of any such instructions rendered it manifestly out of the question to attempt to carry out operations the success of which—if success were possible—could only be obtained by the most rigidly harmonious and united action.

“ You informed me, after I had urged you repeatedly, that you had agreed to negotiate for peace and that a congress was about to meet, but you did not condescend to acquaint me with the lines upon which you intended to treat ; you said not a word about guaranteeing the existence of my States ; you took no notice of the urgent requests which I made myself and transmitted through others, to have a voice in the negotiations by sending a Neapolitan plenipotentiary to the Congress. I was, I am bound to add, informed that Your Majesty had made proposals very prejudicial to my interests as King of Naples. I should, however, have done you wrong had I for an instant imagined that these reports were true.

“ I cannot help being impressed by the manner in which my relations with a sovereign to whose cause I have given my lifelong and faithful service contrast with the terms on which I stand with princes whom I have never ceased to combat ; for, while by the former I am treated with a mistrust which twenty years of loyal and devoted attachment should have eradicated

for ever from his mind, the latter not only afford me unmistakable evidences of their esteem and good-will but overwhelm me with offers of the most flattering description.

“ Nevertheless it would not enter my mind to hesitate had Your Majesty but given me, could you but give me now, the opportunity of serving you, of serving that beloved France, my earliest home, whose glory and prosperity will, so long as life lasts, be ever dear to me.

“ Yes, Sire, had Your Majesty but suffered me to avail myself of the resources offered me in Southern Italy, I should have had eighty thousand men ready to fight for you. Such an army would have placed the issue of the war in Italy beyond all doubt—nay, more, it would, I judge, have set a term to the disasters of France by inclining our enemies to conclude a treaty that would have brought peace with honour to all the powers concerned. And even now, I swear it, if I thought that by sacrificing my own welfare, by consenting to my own undoing, I could save France from the miseries that threaten to engulf her, I would surrender all—prosperity, happiness, kingdom, life itself—for her sake.

“ But what can I do with perils all around me, with no one upon whom I can rely for help? Had I a French army to lead into battle, I would risk all, I would fight wherever there were foes to be found, and if fortune went against me, I would endeavour, difficult as the task might be, to cut my way back by Genoa. But think you that I could act thus with Neapolitan troops? Do you dream that I could hope to lead them beyond the Alps, or that, however deep their attachment to me, they would not forsake a sovereign who forsook their Fatherland?

“ Such circumstances may make it my duty to follow a course at enmity with my dearest and most constant

affections. If it should come to this, may Your Majesty have pity on me. It would mean that for the sake of my subjects, throne, and children, there had been wrung from me the direst sacrifice that it was in my power to make. Whatever the course that Fate may compel me to adopt, believe me, Sire, my heart will always be with France, whose friend I shall never cease to be. Believe me also when I tell you, Sire, that he whose teacher you have been, your kinsman, your most devoted friend, will never show himself unworthy of Your Majesty. The love he bears you is unchangeable, and speaks to his heart in accents that compel the more now that he beholds you again at strife with Fortune—Fortune whom you have so often subdued and moulded to your will. Suffer him still to enjoy your friendship; you know how for twenty years he has wrought to win and to retain it. Doubt not, Sire, but that he will again find means to prove himself worthy that friendship still, and worthy the esteem of France.

“Sire, if cruel necessity compels me, as I have cause to fear it may, to enter into relations which apparently conflict with your interests, such relations may yet prove of service to Your Majesty and to France, by enabling me to make my voice heard in the negotiations for peace. I therefore make so bold as to hope that you will judge my conduct with calmness and impartiality, fully taking into account the necessities of my country’s situation.”

Having written the letter, Murat kept it back until the 7th. It may have been that he was anxious to make quite sure of the success of his negotiations, for he could not have been waiting, as he said he was, for the Emperor to reply to his letter of the 25th December, which he knew perfectly well had hardly reached Paris. Whatever the cause of the delay, a courier was dispatched to Carignano on the 7th January bearing the letter as well as instructions for the Minister.

In addition to writing to his brother-in-law, Joachim also took care to advise the French Ambassador. On the 4th, after the arrival of the British envoy, he ordered Gallo to see Durant, to draw his attention to the lamentable condition of the affairs of France, and to serve up to the Emperor's Minister the various arguments which the Emperor himself was to find in Murat's letter. But another falsehood was added. "The British Agent," said Gallo, "who is empowered to sign an armistice as soon as we have come to an agreement with Austria, is threatening us, if we refuse, with a force of twenty thousand men, who are being held in readiness to embark at Trieste and Fiume to effect a descent on our shores." Truly a pretty assertion this when it was perfectly well known that the object of Graham's mission was merely to see how the land lay, and that he was under strict orders not to commit himself to any undertaking.

On the 6th Pérignon was allowed to obtain an inkling of the state of affairs, though the King dared not tell him openly. "The King had promised Maréchal Pérignon that he would advise him of the date fixed for the signature. The Maréchal had just dined at the Court, and the Queen had told him in somewhat offhand fashion that it was doubtless for the last time. The King was much preoccupied, but he made no statement to the Maréchal."

At length on the 7th, a few hours before the treaty was signed, he charged Millet, the captain of the Guards, to address the French officers of his army in terms curiously reminiscent of his own letters to the Emperor.

"I am not," the address began, "speaking to you on the present occasion as your chief, but as a fellow-countryman to whom you are dear, as a friend who esteems you and knows your worth. I am aware that efforts are now being made to influence the views of the French officers of the Guard at Rome and at Naples. There is possibly a desire to take advantage of the trying situation in which

the King is now placed to make them imagine that His Majesty would be capable of proving false to those sentiments which are, and ever will be, ours as well as his. You then it is whom I bid enlighten the men (if such there be) who may, even for an instant, suffer themselves to be misled upon the matter. You will remind them that the chief and noblest Frenchman of us all is the man who for twenty years has fought for the honour of his native land, who twice, beneath our very eyes, bade farewell to his wife, his children, his subjects, and all that he held most dear, to go and brave innumerable perils in order to advance the glory of the Emperor and of France.

“And now, returning to the bosom of his country after winning unexampled successes, after giving manifold proofs of the most unselfish devotion, he finds himself abandoned to his own resources. Nevertheless, upborne by his unconquerable courage, he even now makes offer to hold all Italy against the enemy. For all reply he is greeted with obstinate silence. Time is fleeting by, the enemy is advancing, the King's position grows daily more critical. The Emperor he has told in detail what his position is, but still he gives no answer, and the King, who occupies a throne on which he has so often shed renown, seems destined to the shame of being required to yield his sovereignty to each and every one who may be called upon to share it. Negotiations are afoot, yet he has been suffered to know nothing of them.

“Ponder for a moment on what must be the thoughts of a prince, whose splendid achievements seem to be forgotten, when he beholds the pains that are taken to rear again the long fallen throne of the Roman Pontiff. Then, on the other hand, see how the Allies, far from abusing their position, display their willingness to recognise the King's independence, make him offers of peace which alone can bring happiness to his people, and this despite His Majesty's refusal to take arms against his country

and without any condition save that of friendship alone. Imagine yourselves for a moment in his place and tell me how you would have acted. When all hope was gone of assisting a cause which you had served so well and so gallantly in days gone by, when the foe in countless numbers was bearing down upon Italy from without or striking at her heart from within, when the enemy had invaded Switzerland, crossed the Rhine, and set foot on the unhappy soil of France herself, would you have imperilled the future of your children, the welfare of your subjects, your own political existence and the fortunes of those brave Frenchmen with whom that political existence is intimately connected? No, you would have yielded even as he has done to the force of circumstances (at the moment irresistible) in order to reserve your strength for happier days when perchance you could render more useful service to that cherished land which one so great and noble as our King could never cease to love or bear in memory.

“ I know full well that an attempt has been made to assail your ears with vain and malicious rumours. Some will tell you that His Majesty will now require the Frenchmen in his service to renounce the land of their birth, and I am authorised by His Majesty to give the lie direct to this assertion. Others, going to the opposite extreme, declare that the King has no further need of your services, but I swear to you by that Honour which is your guide that never have I seen more clearly than I see to-day the affection he harbours in his heart for the children of the Motherland.

“ Fight, then, against those insidious suggestions, thrust from you those base insinuations : whoso speaks to you in different words from mine is the enemy of the King and the enemy of truth.

“ If among the number of your friends and comrades there should be found (and I scarce think it possible)

any of those timid folk whose only sentiments are those of misgiving, whose conscience is but prejudice, and who have no opinions save such as they borrow from others, bid them take heart, and be assured yourselves that His Majesty desires and aims at nothing but your love, and that never will he avail himself unworthily of your services."

Thus, in language that half revealed and half concealed the truth, protesting more effusively than ever his loyalty to France and his devotion to the Emperor, Murat was careful to give some hint of his intentions to all. Napoleon, Durant, Pérignon, his French officers, were all advised of the treason that was hatching, yet all in such a manner that none could believe that Joachim had resolved to come to terms with Austria.

Following on the rapid interchange of views between Neipperg and Gallo, the conclusion of which was postponed at least two days by Graham's appearance on the scene, the Austro-Neapolitan treaty was signed on the night of the 7th-8th January. An agreement had been arrived at regarding Murat's indemnity. In return for the efforts he was about to make in furtherance of the common cause, it was promised that when peace was made he should be granted "a satisfactory military frontier." Herein lurked mutual deceit. Neipperg, as he himself confessed, assented to this vague phraseology because the concessions allowed laid no burden and no obligation upon Austria. Murat, on his side, was pleased with such a hazy stipulation because he considered that it gave him, or at least implied, Austria's sanction to bring to pass his ambitious dream. According to the clause as he read it, Italy was to be his: what could that "military frontier" betoken but the river Po? He had spoken of it too often to the Austrian envoys, to Mier, Menz, to Neipperg himself, for Austria to go astray on that point. With this article to go upon, he

claimed to possess and control the Papal States, Tuscany, Parma, Modena. All the country between Naples and the right bank of the river would henceforth be Neapolitan. Thus Murat in high glee fancied that he had obtained from Austria far more than Mier was authorised to offer him.

All Joachim's future tergiversations, his successive leanings now to this side, now to that, were contained in embryo in the secret article which Neipperg and Gallo had signed and which had just received his royal ratification. Later on, when Metternich revealed the slender portion that was granted him, Murat rejected the beggarly pittance with indignant scorn. Not until Mier presented his ultimatum of the 4th February did the King accept the inevitable and realise how utterly he had been duped. Doubtless Neipperg drew up his article without perceiving all that was to come of it; nevertheless, in exclusively concerning himself with the Austrian side of the question he succeeded in bringing off a master-stroke of which Metternich himself might have well been proud, for it was destined to destroy Murat's hopes of winning Italy, and finally to deprive him of his kingdom.

On the 8th January then it was that, betraying his fealty to France and to his overlord, forsaking his former companions-in-arms, breaking the parole he had given and the treaties he had signed, Murat entered into that odious and fatal covenant which was destined to hurry him to his doom. Nevertheless justice demands that we should not heap all the guilt upon his head alone, that we should apportion the blame among those who deserve to share it.

It was, as we have seen, the Queen who, led to a sudden change of front by Schinina's report of the disasters that had taken place in the north, and urged on by Mier to enter into an alliance with Austria, resolved then and there upon a course of action which Leipzig

and the Empire's misfortunes only served to confirm. Anxious at all costs to preserve her husband's crown, Caroline from the very moment of his return urged her husband, whose own ideas made him a ready listener to her counsels, to cast in his lot with Austria. The testimony of Mier and Durant leaves no room for doubt regarding the part played by the Queen. On Neipperg's arrival she toiled and plotted with redoubled vigour. Even at that date we find Lord Aberdeen, who had been informed of the dispatch of an Austrian plenipotentiary to Naples, writing to Castlereagh telling him that Murat would probably put forward some high and mighty claims, but that the Queen, who managed everything, had written to Metternich saying that in the end he would do all that was required of him. During the negotiations that took place between the 1st and the 8th January, Caroline's attitude could not have been more characteristic. While she extended to Neipperg the most gracious of welcomes and did everything in her power to please him, she was present at all her husband's ministerial councils. Informing Durant that the treaty was on the point of being signed, Gallo said: "The King makes no doubt that France will recover herself and that she will always be a power to reckon with, but he feels that before she is able to re-establish her influence over the destinies of Italy the throne of Naples might be lost to him and to his children. The Queen herself is entirely of the same opinion." Her attitude towards Pérignon was no less significant. On the 6th January, when the Marshal was dining at the Palace, the Queen is reported to have said to him somewhat lightly that no doubt he was dining there for the last time. She was also present on the 14th when Pérignon called upon the King to explain his conduct. The Marshal addressed himself in terms of hot reproach to the King, who scarcely replied at all. Then, turning to the Queen, he cried:

“And you, Madame, you, the Emperor’s sister, if this fatal treaty is to be signed it will doubtless be against your wishes, and you will of course depart with the French army. Surely Napoleon’s own sister will not remain here among his enemies. She will protest by her departure against a treaty which she strove to prevent.” “Monsieur le Maréchal,” she replied, with a smile and a little curtsy in her husband’s direction, “you ought to know that a woman’s duty is to obey her lord.” And by continuing in this jesting tone she gave him to understand that the conversation had endured long enough. Durant remarks in the most positive fashion on the part played by the Queen in bringing the treaty to pass. “The Queen,” he wrote on the 9th January, “is even more decided in the matter of the Austrian alliance than the King himself. She looks on it as her own particular handiwork.” Nor is the testimony of the negotiators, who were eye-witnesses of her activities, any less convincing. Graham considered that it was she *par excellence* who directed the policy of Naples. As for Neipperg, he attached great importance to her intervention. “Her Majesty the Queen, convinced of the justice of our demands, gave them her warm support. The welfare of her kingdom and her subjects was her sole concern.” Lastly, Mier himself judged her as follows: “The Queen is perfect. She has manifested on this occasion a greater strength of character than any one deemed she possessed.”

Thus all who were witnesses of or actors in the treachery of the Court of Naples were of one unanimous opinion. The Frenchmen, Durant and Pérignon; the Austrians, Metternich, Mier, and Neipperg; the English, Graham and Aberdeen; all point with one accord to Caroline as the originator. All the force and subtlety which in former days she had placed at her brother’s service she now brought to bear on the accomplishment

of this alliance. Though Murat signed the treaty, hers were the efforts that impelled him to the act, and it is perhaps no exaggeration to say that if Caroline had stood by the Emperor in the hour of his defeat in 1814 with a loyalty equal to that which she had displayed in 1811, when her husband's throne had been momentarily in peril, Napoleon might still have had Naples for an ally, and although of course no active assistance would have been rendered by Murat to the Imperial cause, he would at all events have been spared the ignominy of his useless act of treachery.

The treaty having been signed, it remained to send word of the fact to the parties concerned. While Berthemy, with Bentinck's copy, was making for Palermo accompanied by d'Aspre, who was bearing Neipperg's letter to the English ambassador, Menz and Coucy set out for the headquarters of the Allies with the copy intended for Austria. At the same time Prince Pignatelli departed with the letter which Murat was sending to the Emperor Francis in answer to the latter's communication of the 10th December.

After the signature, ratification, and dispatch of the treaty of the 8th January, it only remained for Joachim to reap the fruits of his diplomacy—that is to say, to occupy the States on which he had set his heart. There was now to be a trial of speed between himself and Austria, a race to see who would be the first effectively to occupy the lands along the banks of the Po. In his eagerness to get away from Naples and to begin the systematic organisation of the territory which, on the plea of a temporary occupation, he intended to keep permanently for himself, he had made up his mind to set out the moment the Austrian treaty and the armistice which he deemed Graham to be on the point of signing were completed. The day he had fixed upon for his departure was the 8th. Finding, however, that the

British envoy was deaf alike to his Minister's importunities and to Neipperg's arguments, he decided that there was nothing for it but to remain at Naples until he received Bentinck's reply. This was an early and a serious set-back. He determined, however, to send such orders to his troops as would tend as far as possible to make up for the time he was forced to waste vainly champing at the bit in Naples. In the first place, he could not organise the Papal States until he had them completely under his own control. True, he practically occupied the whole of them, but still the fortresses were not yet his. Above the castle of San Angelo, above the fortress of Ancona, the flag of France was floating yet; Tuscany was still French. He therefore decided to attempt to obtain by trickery what he knew it would be difficult, if not impossible, for him to win by force, for he was very uncertain in his own mind as to how his troops would take a command to storm the castle of San Angelo. He therefore went gently to work. On the 9th January General Pignatelli-Cerchiara asked Miollis for permission to quarter the train of the 7th Neapolitan of the Line, which was hourly expected in Rome, in the castle of San Angelo. It very fortunately happened, however, that Durant, having been informed by Gallo on the 4th that the signature of the treaty with Austria was only a question of hours, had written Miollis on the 6th saying that he had strong reason to believe that an offensive and defensive alliance had already been concluded between Naples and Austria as well as an armistice with England. The governor, therefore, merely informed Pignatelli that the castle of San Angelo was entirely occupied by the garrison and supplies. Persisting in his endeavour to persuade the French General, of whose honesty and straightforwardness he was well aware, Murat sent him word on the 10th of an alleged attack by England on Leghorn, and

announced that Pignatelli had orders to defend the town as soon as he was in occupation jointly with the French of the castle of San Angelo. As he was also anxious to prepare the ground at Rome for the establishment of his projected military government, that being the second step in the direction of an effective occupation of the Papal States, he added: "I informed you in my letter of the 15th December that I was taking over the command in all districts occupied by my troops. You sent me no reply, doubtless because you did not regard yourself as possessing the necessary authority, and were desirous of awaiting your Government's instructions. I therefore give you notice that if you persist in your refusal to carry out my orders, particularly now when our communications with France are about to be cut off, I shall be obliged to take matters into my own hands. I prefer to think, however, that, realising the position in which you, the French in Italy, and I myself are placed, you will not only relieve me of the necessity of taking so disagreeable a step, but that you will render me your willing assistance in maintaining the peace of the Roman States and in protecting the interests of the French subjects within them."

Meanwhile, anxious to deceive Miollis as he had deceived every one else, he wrote him saying: "I have had an Austrian plenipotentiary here for the past ten days, but I have been unwilling to make any arrangement with him because I am waiting to hear from the Emperor." That was written on the 9th January, a day after the treaty had been signed.

In reply Miollis met him with a polite but unconditional refusal, and begged him to wait, as he himself was waiting, for the Emperor's messages and instructions. This was another rebuff for Murat.

With regard to Tuscany, the King on the 7th January had sent a special messenger to Elisa to announce that

he would shortly rid her of the brigands who were infesting the country. Then he gave her a brief survey of the position of the negotiations with Austria, stating that he was in a position of doubt and suspense which only the Emperor could resolve. On the 9th, after the treaty had been signed, he wrote her another letter. To give an excuse for marching his troops into Tuscany, he now pretended that the English were meditating an attack on Leghorn. According to his account, Bentinck was about to begin operations in Tuscany with six thousand men. Pignatelli-Cerchiara was therefore coming to defend Leghorn with the 4th Light Infantry regiment, for which he requested a becoming reception. Speaking of the treaty, which had actually been signed the day before, he had the effrontery to write: "The negotiations are still going on without anything definite being arrived at, and I believe that the real object of these delays is to give them time to get the most important harbours, such as Genoa, La Spezia, and Leghorn, into their hands."

But Elisa had also been forewarned and was not to be taken in. While thanking the King for his obliging offer to relieve her of the brigands, of which, however, she declined to avail herself, she added: "When the English did attack Leghorn (alluding to Catinelli's expedition), Your Majesty's troops were by no means eager to march to its defence, yet now, when the place is in no danger, you desire to come without being asked. Do you want to declare war upon France by deploying your troops against a country which they have no business to occupy?"

"The knowledge that Your Majesty has compounded with the enemy forbids me to hand over a country to whose defence I might indeed summon you, but which I have no right to deliver up to you as to an ally or neutral party. I beg Your Majesty to consider the position in

which I am placed. I am too well aware of the quality of Your Majesty's friendship to believe that you will continue to make such demands of me as would destroy my esteem for you, dishonour me in the eyes of the Emperor and of Europe, and deprive me of my own self-respect. I therefore beg Your Majesty to stay the progress of your troops, and to order them not to proceed to Leghorn, where it would be impossible for me to receive them."

Thus in Tuscany also Murat's schemes were doomed to come to naught.

Nor did the King meet with better success in Naples itself. On the morning of the 9th he told Pérignon, as he told every one else, that nothing had been arranged. In the evening Gallo gave a similar assurance to Durant, who, nevertheless, felt convinced that the treaty had been signed. In vain did Murat endeavour to bring his schemes to pass by throwing dust in the eyes of those who represented in Italy the vestiges of the power of France; he succeeded in deluding no one. His last essay in mendacity was to be directed towards the Emperor himself. He was farther away, news took some time to reach him. It remains to be seen how far the attempt was successful.

Since his letter of the 3rd January, the King had written no word to his brother-in-law. What could he have told him in the midst of the negotiations with the enemies of France? How was he to explain these negotiations now that they were completed? Bold as he was, Murat blenched before the task of making the avowal. At length, on the 15th January, he braced himself for the ordeal.

"Sire," wrote he, "I have just concluded an alliance with Austria. I, who fought at your side so long, your kinsman and friend, have signed a treaty which makes it appear as though I had made myself your foe. I need say no more. Your Majesty can now judge how dire

is the necessity to which I yield and how my heart is rent. It were useless to recall the past. Your Majesty has all my letters before you, especially those of the 23rd November and the 25th December. I was then firmly convinced that by acting on the lines I had indicated it would be possible to insure the independence of a large part of Italy, possibly of the whole. In the confident expectation of a definite reply, a reply which I never ceased to hope for, I sent forward my troops and was already beginning to act in conformity with the plan I had laid down. But for two whole months Your Majesty was silent. However, events were hurrying on, the movements of my troops had resulted in bringing me face to face with the armies of Austria. There was no time for deliberation; it was necessary to join battle then and there or to accept peace on the conditions offered. . . . I was therefore compelled to come to terms and to consent, almost against my will, to save myself, my family, and my crown. And yet, in spite of all, I was still undecided how to act when I received the report of the Central Commission and Your Majesty's reply to the Senate's address. I learned therefrom that not only by the whole of France, but by Your Majesty as well, peace was ardently desired, and that to give peace to the world you were willing to renounce all your conquests. Italy then, was no longer of importance in your sight. This announcement, which Your Majesty doubtless gave me by design, was duly understood by me. Thus, though necessity compelled me to make peace with those who are still your foes, amid all these seeming changes my heart is still the same. No, against France and against you I will not fight. The scene of this unhappy war is vast enough to permit the hope that we shall never meet in conflict and that the general treaty of which your own moderation seems to afford the presage may soon come to remove from the peace which

I have now concluded all that may be bitter to your heart."

According to Murat, then, the determining factors in the situation had been, first, the silence of the Emperor, secondly, Napoleon's message to the Senate.¹

As regards the first point we have the comments of Napoleon himself. "About the middle of January the Emperor received two letters from Naples, one of which was, I think, from the Queen, his sister. Besides these, other letters reached him from several parts of Italy in which King Joachim was pictured as being driven, despite himself, to take desperate measures. As his position was represented as being forced upon him by the silence with which his appeals were met, I took the opportunity of asking the Emperor if he would not send him some sort of answer. 'Well,' was the reply, 'what would you have me say to a madman? How can he fail to see that my overwhelming preponderance in Europe alone kept the Pope out of Rome? It is the wish of all Europe that he should return thither, and now I myself desire it too.' I suggested that, without giving in to the King, for his demands were certainly unreasonable, the Emperor might show him some mark of friendship and confidence and relieve him of the idea that he was being

¹ "Senators, I fully appreciate the sentiments to which you have given expression. From the documents with which I have made you acquainted you have learned the efforts I have made to bring about peace. The sacrifices involved in the preliminary conditions proposed by the enemy have had my acceptance, and I shall carry them out without regret. My life has but one aim—the happiness of the French people. Nevertheless, Béarn, Alsace, the Franch Comté, Brabant, are all assailed. The cries of my people there make my heart bleed. I call upon the Frenchmen of Paris, of Brittany, of Normandy and Burgundy and the other departments to rally to the aid of their brothers. Shall we abandon them in their hour of need? Peace and the deliverance of our country should be our battle-cry. When he beholds the whole country thus in arms the foreigner will flee or he will sign a treaty of peace on the conditions proposed. We must no longer think of winning back our conquests."

treated with disdain. 'What would be the good of it?' rejoined the Emperor. 'He is bereft of his senses; he is hurrying to his doom. I shall have to allow him something, but,' he added vehemently, 'in the interests of morality, such black ingratitude ought not to go unpunished, and I will see to it that it does not.' The Emperor Napoleon never doubted that he could keep or recall King Joachim's allegiance by giving him what he asked, but he refused to hold him or to have him back at such a price."¹

It was therefore by design that Napoleon, thunder-struck, no doubt, by the extravagance of Murat's demands, sent him no reply. Joachim's second decisive argument, the plea that he was led to compound with Austria and England by the terms of Napoleon's address to the Senate, may be refuted by a mere examination of the dates. The address in question was given on the 30th December 1813 and published in the *Moniteur* of the following day, and at the very earliest it could not have been at Naples before the 10th January. Now when Graham arrived on the 4th, the treaty was all but completed, only matters of detail remained to be settled, and the Royal signatures and ratifications were obtained on the night of the 7th-8th January, some two or three days before the French paper came to hand. Murat's allegation therefore affords but one more instance of his treachery to the Emperor.

The latter, however, had guessed how matters stood. Fouché's letter of the 3rd January, which he received on the 13th, the letter from Murat himself falsely dated the 3rd which reached him on the 19th, left him no longer in doubt. He read clearly enough between the lines of the latter to write the same day to Caulaincourt as follows: "It seems that the King has almost con-

¹ La Besnardière to Talleyrand. Vienna, December 12, 1814. *Affaires Étrangères*.

cluded his treaty. The Austrian General Neipperg has been the intermediary in the matter, and a British colonel with whom the King has negotiated though he had no powers and did not recognise him as a King. These gentlemen, observing the importance publicly attached to their presence in Naples, imposed very severe conditions on the King, and he is apparently still struggling against them."

Napoleon now decided to take action. To combat Murat he determined to set up a ruler who was an Italian and a sovereign recognised by the Allies. On the 21st January, Savary was informed that the Pope was to leave for Savona that very night. He was commanded to see that his departure took place at all events before five o'clock in the morning. The adjutant of the palace was to attend him on his journey. The carriages were to cross the Rhone at the Pont Saint-Esprit and proceed to Savona by way of Nice, ostensibly to avoid the mountains. The adjutant of the palace was to state that he was conducting him to Rome, his orders being to bring him thither with the suddenness of a bombshell. On arriving at Savona the Pope was to be treated as before.

Then he took a second step. This was the recall of all the French at Naples, whatever the nature of their business there.

"Whereas Napoleon, Emperor of the French, King of Italy, &c., considering that the King of Naples has severed all ties which bound him to our Empire, that he has violated the treaty of alliance of the 15th July 1808, and has taken up an attitude of hostility to France by covenanting with our enemies, even with those who have not recognised him as King ;

"And whereas it is the bounden duty of all our subjects to quit the service of a prince who has declared himself the enemy of our country, such duty being prescribed by the law of the land and still more by the dictates of honour ;

“ And whereas it is in especial measure to the deeds of the brave soldiers of France that the King owes his crown, they having shed their blood for the welfare of France alone, and having only attached themselves to the service of the King as being a prince in alliance with France, we therefore now ordain as follows :

“ Article I.—All French subjects in the civil and military service of the Kingdom of Naples, of whatsoever rank, officers and soldiers, officials of the palace, administrators, agents, and employees of whatever kind or grade, shall cease their functions and return to France. Officers will retain in France the rank enjoyed by them in the Kingdom of Naples.

“ Article II.—Such officers as, in pursuance of the present decree, shall have failed within one month of its promulgation to quit the service of Naples, shall be declared to have acted dishonourably, to have been guilty of treason towards their country, and shall be dealt with in accordance with our decree of the 6th April 1809.

“ Article III.—Such French soldiers as may be compulsorily detained in the Neapolitan army shall, even after the expiration of the period laid down in the preceding article, be permitted to return to France on giving proof that they left the colours at the earliest possible moment and as soon as they came face to face with French troops.

“ Article IV.—Particularly on our subjects of the departments of the Golo and Liamone do we enjoin the necessity of quitting the service of the enemy.

“ Article V.—All Frenchmen holding civil appointments about the palace, all those employed in the Customs and Postal Service are commanded to cease work immediately and to return to France forthwith.”

This draft was probably drawn up at the same time as it was decided to send the Pope to Savona. It was forwarded to Durant, who had orders to publish it if hostili-

ties broke out and if the King had really compounded with His Majesty's enemies. If, however, he had only concluded a treaty of neutrality, base as such a defection would be, he was enjoined to say nothing.

The Emperor was not kept long in suspense. Murat's letter of the 15th January reached him at Brienne on the 31st. All doubts about his brother-in-law's treachery being now removed, he commanded d'Hauterive to send on his decree to Durant. Unluckily it was fated to arrive too late.

While Joachim was doing his best to deceive the Emperor and his agents, Mier appeared on the scene—Mier, his friend and confidant whom he had charged to plead his cause with Metternich. On the 6th January Carascosa, who had proceeded as far as the Austrian outposts to await the Ambassador's arrival, gave him a magnificent reception at Rimini. On the 11th Mier reached Naples, too late to suit Murat's purpose, since the treaty had been signed three days before. However, the King, who felt more at home with him than with Neipperg, was very anxious to explain to him all the concessions he imagined he had wrung from Austria. No sooner, therefore, had the Ambassador arrived than he begged him to come to the palace.¹ The following is an account of what took place :—

¹ According to M. Masson, the treaty was signed on the 11th January, and Mier played a predominant part in securing to Murat the cession of a piece of territory comprising 400,000 souls. "On the 11th," he says, "Mier arrived, and before signing the treaty had a prolonged interview with Murat, who dilated with the most exuberant verbosity on the indemnity due to him on the conclusion of peace. Mier protested that his powers did not in any degree differ from Neipperg's. However, after a discussion which lasted all through the night, he gave a reluctant assent to the cession of a portion of the Papal States comprising a population of 400,000 souls." (*Napoléon et sa Famille*, ix. 194.)

As a matter of fact, the treaty which had been signed on the 8th January had already been dispatched to headquarters when Mier reached Naples. Moreover, it was not by any means on his own responsibility that Mier made

"The roads were almost impassable," wrote Mier to Metternich, "and the caution I was compelled to use in getting through the places still held by French troops prevented my reaching Naples until the 11th instant. I learned with real pleasure on my arrival that an alliance between the two courts had been concluded and signed on the 8th January in accordance with the instructions given by Your Highness to the Comte de Neipperg, who on this occasion has given further proof of his talents, his *savoir-faire*, and his devotion to our august Sovereign.

"One hour after my arrival in Naples His Majesty the King sent me word by M. le Duc di Gallo that he was anxious to see me immediately. I therefore repaired to the Palace, where the King received me with much kindness, making a number of complimentary remarks about my return and referring to the hopes which he entertained of keeping me with him always. Offering him my respectful thanks, I informed him that it had been my Sovereign's intention, in the event of diplomatic relations being resumed between the two countries, to replace me in my former office, and that it accordingly only rested with His Majesty to confirm my master's choice. 'I asked the Comte de Neipperg,' was the King's reply, 'to beg the Emperor as a favour to send you back to Naples. You will therefore understand the pleasure I feel at learning for certain that you are to be accredited to my Court. I have done,' His Majesty went on, 'everything that Austria desired: I have signed without question the treaty submitted to me by the Comte de Neipperg placing no less reliance on the friendship and goodwill

the offer of "400,000 souls." It was Metternich who, after conferring with Castlereagh, 20th-23rd January 1814, sent Mier with the second treaty which contained the aforesaid offer, an offer which the King of Naples at first refused, saying that it was not worth while putting it in a treaty. But in the course of his conversation of the 11th January he conceded nothing. With the object of giving formal proof of this version of the matter I here reproduce *in extenso* the report of the interview which was sent by Mier to Metternich.

which the Emperor Francis is kind enough to display towards me, and on his promise to obtain an indemnity for me when peace is concluded in return for the sacrifices I have undertaken to make, than upon the transactions and stipulations which we were able to agree upon for the time being.

“ ‘ I place myself entirely in the hands of the Emperor Francis, and I am perfectly willing to act beneath the ægis of the Austrian Government. I am confident that I shall never have cause to regret my action, but I must say once more that you ought to increase my power so that I may no longer be a burden to you. You will reap no advantage from the various little states you are desirous of establishing in Italy. Put me in a position to maintain a standing army of 60,000 men, and the peace of Italy and your influence in the country will be assured. Only enable me to withstand the first onslaught of whatever foe may come to attack you there, thus giving you time to come to my support, and Austria and the King of Naples, having one single aim between them, could defy any attack the powers might make upon Italy.’ I replied that Austria deserved to be trusted by the King because of her perseverance in upholding and defending his interests with regard to the other powers; that he should fully realise that he owes the preservation of his crown entirely to her efforts, and that his country’s interests as well as the gratitude which he ought to entertain should prompt him to second the aims of my Court; that if he conscientiously carried out his promises and undertakings and displayed straightforwardness in all his proceedings he could be assured of Austria’s unflinching support, and that on these conditions I was authorised to promise him an increase of territory and other advantages when peace was declared.

“ ‘ I will discharge my obligations,’ said the King, ‘ as becomes a man of honour. From the moment I decide

to throw in my lot with her, Austria will never have occasion to regret the protection she affords me. But could you not give me some assurance beforehand regarding the concessions you promise that I am to have when peace is made? The matter should remain a secret, and I should feel more confident regarding the future.'

"I replied that nothing of the kind had been done in the case of any other power, and that all such considerations had been reserved until the war was over, adding that if the separate interests of each particular power had been studied at the outset, the allied armies would not yet have crossed the Rhine. I went on to remark that the confidence with which the King had placed his interests in the hands of the Emperor Francis would make it the more incumbent on my master to see that he obtained some tangible benefit when peace was concluded.

"The King replied that only the absolute confidence he reposed in the goodwill of our Sovereign had induced him to forego the consideration of many matters which touched him personally and to give his unquestioning consent to our views. 'I will not conceal from you,' he went on, 'that it is painful for me to have to fight against the French. Your Sovereign would have but a sorry opinion of me were it not so. But I know what my country's interests demand. I am acting as King of Naples, and to my kingdom's welfare all other considerations are but secondary. The Neapolitans ought to be grateful to me for giving them such a convincing testimony of my devotion, and my present and future conduct proves and will continue to prove to the sovereigns of Europe that I am worthy to take my place among them. I was first of all anxious to await your return before signing the alliance, as I felt confident that the proposals with which I had entrusted you as well as your perfect acquaintance with our opinions and the feelings which I entertain for your master would be the means of securing

me better terms and some genuine and definite concessions. Upon reflection, however, I came to the conclusion that it was better not to put any obstacle in the way of a prompt settlement. Such questions therefore that have been left open for the time being will be settled later.'

"I made answer to His Majesty that my instructions and powers were precisely similar to those of the Comte de Neipperg, and that my arrival would have had no influence on the course of the negotiations. I am, I added, merely authorised to assure Your Majesty that my Sovereign will readily lend his good offices in obtaining advantageous terms for you on the conclusion of peace, and that such terms will be proportionate to the efforts made by you to assist the cause of the Allies.

"Our conversation was prolonged far into the night, and everything that His Majesty was pleased to say to me afforded me convincing proof that we may rely on him."

Murat got but little satisfaction from Mier. The Ambassador, knowing that Neipperg had signed the treaty, took refuge in generalities, and refused to make any definite promise. Nor did he show himself in any way responsive to the King's overtures regarding the suppression of the lesser Italian States. And so Joachim, not particularly well satisfied, declared positively "that he would take no steps until the treaty had been ratified."

Thus Murat came back to his original plan. He would occupy Italy before the Austrians. With Austria for an ally, in treaty with the English for an armistice whose signature was now only a matter of days, not yet officially at war with France, and therefore not wholly dispossessed in the eyes of the French in Naples of the prestige that had formerly attached to him as a lieutenant of the Emperor, he was in an admirable position to effect the realisation of his desires. To occupy the Papal States, Tuscany, and the departments of Southern Italy,

to proceed northwards towards the Po, and to set up in the countries thus "provisionally" occupied a civil and military organisation—the whole without coming to blows with the French and without awakening the suspicions of Austria—such was the initial part of his plan. Thereafter he would increase his fighting force, gather supporters to his side, and await the issue of the struggle, confident in the possession of a powerful army and in the affection of his subjects. Then, when peace was declared, and relying on Austria for support, he would demand of the Allies that they should confirm him in the permanent possession of those regions his occupation of which he had alleged to be merely provisional. Thus, assured of his conquests, King of Naples, of Tuscany, of the States of the Church, of all Italy as far as the Po, Murat would make them all into a single kingdom: he would bring his dream to pass—he would be King of Italy!

To bring about this provisional occupation, the indispensable preliminary of final success, what remains to be achieved? Scarcely anything at all, now that Austria is on his side, unless it be to dislodge Miollis from Rome, Barbon from Ancona, Elisa from Leghorn, and to throw Eugène off the scent. True, he has already attempted this task without success. Since, however, persuasion seems to have no effect on men who are stupid enough to remain loyal to their country when it is in its death agony, he will show his teeth or make pretence of so doing. On receiving Miollis' letter of the 11th, Murat resolves on a fresh line of action. He determines to find out the state of popular feeling in Rome and to endeavour to stir up a movement in his favour. Zuccari will lure the authorities from their allegiance, popular manifestations of discontent are to be artfully fomented, and the whole will form an excuse for the King to seize the reins of the civil and military government. To carry out this plan Maghella, his trusty confederate in all dark

and crooked tasks, sets out for Rome on the 13th January.

"He was," said Durant, "to have supreme control over the administration of the former Papal States. His first duty was to get together a deputation, no matter how, in order to wait upon His Majesty with the request that he should at least grant them his protection. From this moment attempts were made to share the task of guarding the City of Rome between the soldiers of France and Naples. At the King of Spain's palace, at the residence of the Queen of Etruria, behold Neapolitans mount guard side by side with the soldiers of Miollis. Neapolitans are stationed at the City Gates. All Rome is eagerly discussing the coming of the King. Reaching Rome on the 14th, Maghella immediately set to work, and first and foremost organised the wonderful deputation that was to start for Naples without delay. It arrived on the 16th, and gave Murat an excuse for taking action. Without losing a single day he issued a decree stating that in view of the disorder prevalent in the Roman States and of the request of the principal families in Rome as well as of King Charles IV. who demanded protection; by reason also of the refusal of General Miollis to co-operate with the Neapolitan troops in the defence of the said States, the King had resolved to take possession of the same."

Thus the die was cast. La Vauguyon was to have charge of the military, Maghella of the civil government. The latter demanded an interview with Miollis, and on the morning of the 17th endeavoured to explain why Naples had intervened and sought to justify Murat's conduct towards France. "It might be," said he, "that the King would be under the necessity of occupying certain places in order to preserve them from the evils of an otherwise inevitable invasion." On the 19th, La Vauguyon issued a proclamation which put Murat's intentions beyond all doubt. It ran as follows:—

"We, Paul de la Vauguyon, Lieutenant-General of His Majesty the King of The Two Sicilies, Senior Commandant of the Roman States, unto the inhabitants of the Departments of Rome and Trasimeno ;

"Whereas, &c. &c.¹

"His Majesty having by his decree of the 16th instant been pleased to appoint us to the Chief Command of the Roman States, we regard it as our first duty to announce that the powers hitherto exercised by General, le Comte de Miollis have expired, and we command all the authorities, both civil and military, to consider the said powers as having been transferred to ourselves by order of our August Sovereign Lord His Majesty the King of Naples." ²

Simultaneously the city was filled with Murat's troops. Neapolitans were picketed in all the squares : Miollis could do nothing against such superior numbers. On receipt of La Vauguyon's letter of the 19th he sent word to La Salcette and instructed him to bring into Civita Vecchia all the detachments remaining on the coast in order to defend the place to the last extremity. He ordered General La Fosse to concentrate the gendarmerie in the province of Trasimeno with a view of keeping open the line of retreat in the direction of Tuscany. He commanded General Lecrosnier to do the same for the Department of Rome. Having taken what precautions he could, he replied to La Vauguyon, giving him clearly to understand that on no condition could he recognise any other authority but that which he himself had been granted by His Majesty the Emperor. He then informed Napoleon and the Minister of War how matters stood, and finally betook himself to the

¹ The preamble recited Murat's usual arguments : the popular movements, public disorders, the address of the Roman citizens, the paralysis of public business, the King of Spain's anxiety, the helplessness of the French Government.

² *Moniteur des Deux Siciles.*

Castle of S. Angelo, where he made ready his means of defence.

Miollis then being cornered and helpless in his fort, there only remained the Emperor's representative in Italy, Joachim's execrated rival Eugène. On hearing the news of Murat's treachery the Viceroy had immediately sent a message to him inquiring whether there was any truth in the report, and asked the King for a definite "yes," or "no." "It would not be like you to allow the man who is entrusted with the defence of the Emperor's interests here to learn from any other source but yourself of the course you have been led to adopt. I therefore apply to Your Majesty with full confidence to enlighten me as to what the Emperor's subjects and soldiers are to hope for or to apprehend from the troops which belong to you. If Your Majesty takes sides against the Emperor, I shall indeed be filled with profound regret, but I shall not be led thereby to forget the sentiments which attach me to you personally; and difficult as the position in which Your Majesty will have placed me must prove, I shall be unable to help expressing the hope that you and your family may enjoy every happiness." This letter was entrusted to General Giffenga, who was instructed to present it to Joachim and obtain detailed explanations. He would also see for himself how matters stood and report to Eugène.

Having surmounted innumerable difficulties, Giffenga reached Naples on the morning of the 20th January. Next day he was received in audience by Murat. The conversation lasted three hours, and it is possible that the King confessed that he had entered into an alliance with Austria, but if he did he wrapped up the avowal with such a host of rhetorical qualifications, such endless protestations of loyalty and affection for the Emperor, that Giffenga was unable to bring back any positive report as to what had really happened. He bore with

him a letter from the King in which the latter set forth the proposals he had made to the Emperor, how the presence of his troops had prevented the Austrians crossing the Adige and how he was prevented from crushing them solely by the arrival of an Austrian emissary with powers to negotiate for peace. At present, he went on, he had been led by the attractive nature of the terms offered to enter into negotiations of which, however, he had advised the Emperor. He concluded with a formal undertaking to the effect that if he were compelled to take up a definite position he would carry out no movement calculated to prejudice the Viceroy's army without sending him word beforehand. Hoodwinked by these lies, Eugène made no effort to move until Murat without striking a blow had possessed himself of all the territory he desired.

Everything had been arranged, the troops were on the march, Maghella and La Vauguyon had gone to Rome, yet still Murat lingered on at Naples. On the 15th January was published the decree of the 24th December 1813 raising a levy of 12,000 men. On the 17th the King's equipages left Rome. The same night all those who were going to Rome in connection with the organisation of the provisional government took their departure. There were the "Cavaliere" Macedonio, Poerio the procurator, Winspeare, Onofrio, Fortunato, Tito Manzi, &c. The King actually wrote a letter to the Duc d'Otranto requesting him to put in writing the ideas that had occurred to him in connection with the suggested constitution. Why then was he tarrying? What was preventing him from putting himself at the head of his troops and appearing in triumph in his newly acquired dominion amid the vociferous acclamations of the crowd?

One circumstance alone restrained him. On the magnificent prospect that lay unfolded before him

lingered one dark cloud. That cloud was England. Murat knew well enough how deeply hostile to his aims was Bentinck, and would on no account quit Naples with such a danger in his rear. Some time back when negotiations had been in progress with Graham, the King had been on the point of leaving, feeling sure that the British representative would fall in with Neipperg's proposals. When Graham refused he suddenly faced about and sent him word that he would not leave Naples until the treaty had been ratified. Since then he had been doing his utmost to prevail on Bentinck to sign the armistice and—he was still waiting. On the 10th January the *Furious* set sail for Sicily, having on board Berthemey, Murat's aide-de-camp, and Captain d'Aspre, who had been sent by Neipperg. On the 12th they had an interview with Bentinck, who, adhering to his customary tactics, would sign nothing until he had received his Government's authorisation in documents drawn up at the headquarters of the Allied Sovereigns. Back again, therefore, they sailed for Naples, still on board the British frigate. On the 13th, at ten o'clock at night, they were home again, and Berthemey immediately sent word to the Palace of the result of their mission. Murat was aghast. Happily, however, for him, Neipperg had received through Comte Michel the message which Aberdeen had addressed to Bentinck under date of the 12th December. He decided to send it on at once.¹ Without a moment's loss Gallo wrote off to the British Ambassador as follows :—

“The King trusts that the dispatches of Lord Aberdeen which the Comte de Neipperg, Austria's Minister Plenipotentiary, has been instructed to forward to Your Excellency, will remove all the difficulties that have hitherto impeded the progress of the negotiations, to the

¹ Bentinck to Aberdeen. Palermo, January 22, 1814. Record Office, Sicily.

satisfactory issue of which His Majesty attaches the highest importance. General Berthemy, who will have the honour to hand this letter to Your Excellency, will inform you how ardently His Majesty desires to make your personal acquaintance. General Berthemy, moreover, is empowered to make all arrangements necessary to secure the object of his mission should you, to His Majesty's regret, be prevented from coming to Naples yourself." ¹

On the 15th January Berthemy and d'Aspre embarked again on a British vessel which had arrived from Sicily on the 12th with one of Bentinck's aides-de-camp and some letters. At length, on the 18th January, Berthemy landed at Palermo and delivered into Bentinck's hands Aberdeen's dispatch giving him authority to negotiate with Murat. This put a different complexion on matters, and, now that Bentinck had his Government's formal sanction to proceed, he could advance no further excuse for delaying to sign an armistice.

England's acquiescence in the Austro-Neapolitan policy was therefore merely a matter of days. Still, Joachim was loth to leave his kingdom until the success of the negotiations with Sicily was absolutely beyond doubt. Notwithstanding that everything was ready for him to set out, and that his officers and confidants had already started, he still lingered behind at Naples in constant expectation of Bentinck's reply. On every side pressure was brought to bear on him to put himself *en route*, but all to no purpose; nothing availed to shake his resolution. From the 15th to the 22nd, a whole precious week went by during which he might have taken possession of Tuscany and the country bordering on the Po. Times without number he peered with eager longing across the bay to try to catch a

¹ Gallo to Bentinck. Naples, January 13, 1814. Naples, *Archivio di Stato*.

glimpse of the British man-of-war that seemed as though it would never heave in sight. Though he fumed with ill-suppressed impatience, he would not leave until he had received a satisfactory assurance from Bentinck. At last, however, racked with suspense, harassed and goaded unceasingly by Mier and Caroline, who were fearful lest he should take a step in the wrong direction, he reluctantly resolved to go.¹ But while he suffered his wife and the Austrian to suppose he was hurrying away to take up the command of the army, he made all manner of reservations to himself. He promised himself that he would come to a halt at Rome, where, on pretence of busying himself with matters of organisation, he would wait for Bentinck's reply. If that reply were to betoken a declaration of war he could be back again at Naples in a day.

On the 22nd January his departure was officially announced. His Majesty was to leave that evening. A note regarding the provisions of the Austrian and English alliances was put into circulation in Naples, which, though it emanated from the Palace, was purely a product of the imagination.

"The King of Naples," it ran, "is upheld and confirmed in the possession of his kingdom in terms of a Treaty which he has concluded with the Allies. Great Britain and Austria constitute themselves guarantors of the indemnity to be granted to him. His dominions will, when a general peace is declared, be increased by a large extension of territory. As a provisional measure he takes possession in the name of the Allies of the Papal States and legations, as well as of Tuscany. The English will occupy no fort in the Kingdom. The Neapolitan navy will be armed and will act in conjunction with them, and they in turn bind themselves to render the King every possible assistance.

¹ Mier to Metternich. Naples, January 22, 1814.

"King Ferdinand has renounced for himself, his heirs and successors, all claim on the Kingdom of Naples, and the King of Naples will act likewise in regard to Sicily. The coronation of the King of Naples will shortly take place."¹

On the morning of the same day the announcement was made in the *Monitore* of The Two Sicilies that such authorities as offered no objection to the Neapolitan occupation would be treated as friends. By this subtle process Murat possibly hoped to obtain the support or at least the neutrality of the French officials, for so great was his audacity (or his effrontery) that he tried to make people believe that he was still on terms of friendship with the Emperor even when he was advancing with his troops into countries beneath the French flag. He even had the hardihood to put pressure on Durant, the Minister of France, to accompany him to Rome in order to make his seizure of French territory appear to be the outcome of an arrangement with Napoleon's representative. At the King's command Gallo wrote to the French Ambassador informing him that His Majesty was leaving for Rome, and desired that he (Durant) would have the goodness to precede him in order to be there on his arrival. He further handed him the necessary passports, and informed him that arrangements had been made for him to be attended by suitable escorts along the road from Naples to Rome. So confident was Murat of the success of his stratagem that he wrote to Pignatelli saying: "The Minister of France *has left* for Rome, together with my Foreign Minister."² Luckily for himself and the French, Durant did not rise to this clumsy bait. He sent word to Gallo that the only passports he required were passports for France, and gave him clearly to understand that he

¹ Note issued by the Government of Naples, January 22, 1814.

² Murat to Pignatelli, January 23, 1814. Naples, *Archivio di Stato*.

would take no notice of the extraordinary request he had received.

Finally, Murat appointed the Queen as Regent, and issued two decrees for the maintenance of public order in his newly acquired territory. But despite these various preparations, despite the official announcements and the promises given to Caroline and Mier, the evening of the 22nd found the King still at Naples. Do what he would, he could not help thinking of what would happen if Bentinck were to refuse to negotiate. He therefore made up his mind to spend the 23rd at Naples, and took advantage of the opportunity to receive a deputation consisting of the principal property-holders in Rome. At last, in the afternoon, news was brought to him that the British ship had returned with Berthemy on board. Berthemy had with him Bentinck's reply in the shape of a letter for Neipperg and another for Gallo. Each made known his Lordship's decision. In order that there might be no delay in the negotiations, he would, he said, take ship for Naples on the 27th, and at Naples he would arrange matters. Murat's anxieties were now dispelled; he could start with an easy mind. Without a moment's delay, therefore, he set out from Naples at five o'clock in the evening in a travelling conveyance drawn by ordinary post-horses.

Joachim reached Rome on the 24th and made a triumphal entry into the city, which was *en fête* to greet him. The Court of Appeal presented an address in which the hope was expressed that the King would restore the glories of ancient Rome. The various corporations came to do homage. After this he went to visit the King of Spain, who received him at the foot of his staircase, and immediately returned the visit.¹ He also sent Romeuf, his aide-de-camp, to suggest to Miollis that he should retire with the French troops on Genoa.

¹ *Monitore* of The Two Sicilies.

Miollis refused, and Romeuf went back again an hour later with another message from the King inquiring whether the Empire and the Kingdom were at enmity, whereupon Miollis replied that the proclamation which had emanated from the King "certainly seemed to betray hostile intentions."¹

Installed at Rome, Joachim, while waiting for Bentinck to fulfil his promise and come to Naples, set to work with Maghella to reorganise the government of the Papal States. Suddenly the good news was brought to him that an armistice had been drawn up and signed by Graham and Berthemey, to whom the King had given full authority to negotiate. Joachim's mind was now at rest; he could set to work in earnest.

The 27th January 1814 was indeed a red-letter day for Murat. His dreams were coming to pass, and, for at least a few days, he was able to look upon himself as the heaven-sent architect of Italian unity. The armistice with England had removed the sole obstacle that had stood betwixt him and the attainment of his designs. From France there was little or nothing to apprehend, particularly as his falsehoods had, for the present at any rate, disarmed the incipient hostility of Eugène and Miollis. Assured of Austria's friendship and Great Britain's neutrality, he deemed that his cause was bound to triumph.

While Joachim's ardent imagination was thus centred on adding to his prestige and extending his dominions, Caroline was fulfilling her duties as Regent with wisdom and moderation. "The Queen," wrote Mier, "who is now in charge of the government, will be much better able to hold her own than the King, and will allow nothing to interfere with the due discharge of the obligations entered into with Austria."² With a cleverness that

¹ Miollis to the Duc de Feltre. Rome, January 25, 1814. *Archives de la Guerre*.

² Mier to Metternich. Quoted by M. Weil.

would have been quite beyond Murat, she boldly requested the Minister of France to come to her before he took his departure. On the night of the 24th Durant was asked to proceed secretly to the Queen's apartment, and there, in an interview which lasted from nine o'clock to midnight, she doubtless unfolded to him the reasons which had dictated her husband's policy and her own. Though every one in Naples knew full well, Durant better than most, that she was irrevocably bound to Austria, she yet essayed to win the sympathies of the French Ambassador, who, she knew, would soon be seeing the Emperor and repeating to him what she had said.

Durant left on the evening of the 25th,¹ and Caroline resumed negotiations with the Allies. On Graham's arrival she at once put him into communication with Berthemey. Next day she sent her husband the armistice signed and duly completed. Two days later Joachim's reply came to hand from Rome, whereupon she commanded the armistice to be made known to all Government officials who had remained in Naples. "I have the honour to inform Your Excellency," wrote Gallo to Pignatelli, "that an armistice was signed on the 26th instant between the land and sea forces of the King and those of His Britannic Majesty, in terms of which there shall be an entire cessation of hostilities between the two powers pending the conclusion of the permanent treaty to be discussed forthwith by plenipotentiaries appointed for the purpose." And Gallo requested the Secretary of State to inform his subordinates.² On the 30th the *Monitore* published the good news to all Naples. Certainly the Queen Regent could not be taxed with dilatoriness. Nor had Murat himself any time to spare if he intended to be beforehand with the Austrians and the English.

¹ Durant to Caulaincourt. Turin, February 11, 1814. *Affaires Étrangères*.

² Gallo to Pignatelli. Naples, January 29, 1814. Naples, *Archivio di Stato*.

On the 27th, therefore, he made ready to leave Rome, and on the 28th he signed a decree appointing Zurlo to the control of the departments of Southern Italy.¹ He then left for Bologna, where his arrival was impatiently awaited. It was truly a triumphal progress that his agents had arranged for him. On the morning of the 30th he arrived at Ancona amidst salvos of artillery fired from the city and the harbour.

Deeming success to be beyond all doubt, and feeling that he could now safely abandon his brother-in-law, he at last threw aside the mask. It was no longer Joachim Napoleon, the Emperor's brother-in-law, and a vassal of the French Empire, that was speaking. It was Joachim, King of Naples, soon to be King of Italy, who for the first time made his accents heard in a proclamation which was to give to his lieutenants the signal for which they had so impatiently waited.

"Soldiers," he said, "so long as it was possible for me to believe that the Emperor Napoleon was fighting to bring peace and glory to France I fought loyally at his side; but now I can deceive myself no longer; I know that the Emperor's sole desire is war.

"I should be doing an injury to the land of my birth, to my Kingdom, and to you, did I not immediately dissociate my troops from his and join the Allies, whose lofty aim it is to restore freedom to the nations and to re-establish the thrones of Europe in all their former dignity.

"I am well aware that attempts are being made to beguile the patriotism of the Frenchmen in my army by voicing false ideas of honour and loyalty; as if there were aught of honour and loyalty in subjecting the world to Napoleon's mad ambition!

"Soldiers, there are now but two banners in Europe. On the one you may read 'Religion, Morality, Justice,

¹ Zurlo to Pignatelli. Naples, *Archivio di Stato*.

Moderation, Law, Peace, and Happiness.' Upon the other, 'Persecution, Insincerity, Tyranny, War, and Sorrow in every home.'

"Make your choice between them.

"JOACHIM."

No sooner had Murat issued his proclamation at Ancona (he had first intended not to publish it till he reached Bologna) than, in accordance with the concerted plan, it was echoed by all his lieutenants in turn. At Modena on the 31st January Carascosa issued an inflammatory appeal,¹ Poerio followed with a call to arms at Ancona, next d'Ambrosio issued general orders from his headquarters at Rimini, then came General Minutolo's address to his soldiers at Florence on the 3rd February and Joseph Lecchi's appeal to the inhabitants of Tuscany on the 5th of the same month. By all of them great homage was done to the Italian people, by all of them the King of Italy was belauded to the skies.

¹ In order not to overload the text of the narrative, it has been considered advisable to reproduce these proclamations in the form of a note.

MODENA, 31st January 1814.

Men of Italy! At last the wished-for hour has come. The cry "Our Country" has united us all beneath the same standard. After so many generations of division, behold the happy day is dawning when, fighting for the same object, defending the same country, striving for the common weal, we have but to gather round the noble king who guarantees us all these benefits to be certain of gaining them and of attaining by victory upon victory to their peaceful possession. Unselfish patriotism, unquestioning confidence in our excellent sovereign King Joachim, who has already brought happiness to the people of Naples, perseverance in the face of all the hardships of a glorious war, such must be our equipment. Then naught shall stay the valour of our onslaught as we fight beneath the leadership of the foremost captain of the age, with our hearts fired by the consciousness that we are battling for the noblest of causes.

Come, then, Men of Italy, come and unite your ranks with ours; abandon those who oppress you. Let not Europe behold so pitiable a spectacle as would be offered by a conflict between the Italians of the South and those

Meanwhile, the hero of the hour, in resplendent majesty, bade farewell to Ancona amid the acclamations of the whole populace and pursued his way in triumph to Bologna. There his entry was marked by a piece of well-rehearsed sensationalism. An officer had arrived in haste to give the prefect orders for the city to be illuminated, and as the shades of evening were beginning to fall Murat appeared with his general staff about him. No sooner was his presence known than several groups of people—who had been observed lingering in the streets on the two preceding days—fell to shouting, “Vive le grand Joachim,” “Vive le roi d’Italie,” to which the Guards

who dwell beyond the Po when a noble summons bids us all unite to fight for honour, happiness, and glory. Will you turn a deaf ear to these appeals? Will you continue to forge the chains which hold you in thrall? Would you prefer slavery to the most entrancing visions that have ever set men’s hearts on fire? Will you too not play your part in bringing to pass this mighty task. . . . ?

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL CARASCOSA.

(Memoria sulla condotta politica e militare tenuta da Gioacchino Murat nel 1814.)

ANCONA, 31st January 1814.

TO THE INHABITANTS OF THE DEPARTMENTS OF SOUTHERN ITALY.

A Treaty of Peace concluded with His Imperial, Royal, and Apostolic Majesty the Emperor of Austria and the Allied Powers has given His Majesty the King of The Two Sicilies temporary possession of the Roman States, Tuscany, and the departments of Southern Italy. In addition to these advantages, the freedom of the seas and the wealth of commerce are guaranteed by an armistice with England.

The inhabitants of so fair a portion of Italy will readily perceive the advantages and expectations to which this novel and remarkable situation gives rise. They will recognise their duty. The King’s fair fame required that he should protect the countries occupied from external aggression, and already his armies, concentrated along the Po, are pushing back the scene of the conflict from these regions. The King’s sense of justice demanded that he should see to the ordering of your internal government, and behold a Minister has taken up his quarters in Rome, and is taking measures for the proper administration of the Finances, of Justice, and the Civil Service. The King’s warm heart compelled him to become the champion of your welfare, and already Royal Commissioners, who proceeded to the spot armed with the

replied, "Vive le roi d'Italie," "Vive Joachim." The King bowed his thanks and passed on in triumph. He had entered at last into possession of his future kingdom, and he readily mistook the police-paid acclamations for the enthusiastic welcome of the entire population.

What a strange contrast is here! While Murat in all his pomp and glory was on the point of crowning himself King of Italy, the Emperor was fighting against overwhelming odds and desperately disputing every inch of ground with the Allies. At Brienne he was handed the letter of the 15th January, in which Murat told him, this time in no doubtful terms, that he had decided to

necessary powers, have inquired into your needs, have taken note of your wishes through the medium of departmental councils, and have suggested valuable improvements.

I am instructed to inform you:

That His Majesty gives his word of honour to protect the Ministers of Public Worship, all public establishments, and the persons and property of private citizens.

That he proclaims and undertakes to protect freedom of maritime trade with friendly and neutral powers, that vacant appointments or such as may become vacant, shall be filled exclusively by yourselves, and, finally, that no new tax will be imposed upon your country. It is, on the contrary, His Majesty's desire to abolish or diminish all such taxes as experience may have proved to be too burdensome.

People of Southern Italy, give up your hearts to gratitude, to those feelings which cannot be evoked to order, but which the King's virtues and good deeds never fail to inspire.

Your political independence (that prime necessity of national existence) will be the handmaid of the zeal and energy with which you will strive to further the aims of His Majesty and the Allied Powers. The moderation of their system, the unselfishness which guides their steps, the wisdom which presides at their deliberations, justify and guarantee your confidence.

GUISEPPE POERIO.

(*Organisation des départements de l'Italie méridionale. Naples. Società Napolitana di Storia Patria.*)

ARMÉE NAPOLITAINE—IITH DIVISION. GENERAL ORDERS.

His Majesty the King of Naples, whose constant care is the welfare of his people, has concluded an armistice with England which at the earliest possible date will be confirmed by a regular treaty of peace. By this measure the ports of the provinces of Italy as far as the Po, provinces which have

play the traitor. Napoleon immediately sent orders to d'Hauterive to forward Durant the decree recalling the French officers from Naples, adding, however, that it was only to be used as a last resource. And that was all. The man who had once controlled the destinies of Europe could do no more. So it was that while the Emperor, vanquished and outworn, was pondering sadly on the glory that had once been his, Murat in the ecstasy of triumph was dreaming of the brilliant days to come.

hitherto been starved, ruined, and downtrodden by the inexorable enactments of tyranny, are once again opened to manufactures, to the arts, and to commerce. The inhabitants of Italy will at length experience, from the advent of the Neapolitan armies upon their soil, the blessings of peace, of tranquillity, and of plenty.

Given at our Headquarters at Rimini, 31st January 1814.

D'AMBROSIO, *Lieutenant-General.*

(*Organisation des départements de Musone, Reno et Rubicon. Naples. Società Napolitana di Storia Patria.*)

FLORENCE, 5th February 1814.

Men of Tuscany. Summoned by His Majesty the King to take up the supreme command of the Tuscan States, we hasten to inform you of our appointment and also to declare to you that the arrival of the King's troops upon your soil need in no wise cause you anxiety. Our sole aim is to restore your independence and your happiness. You desire a government, an Italian government, adapted to your soil, your climate, your habits, and your customs. Your prayers shall be answered. You complain of arbitrary taxes whose proceeds are devoted to the advancement of interests alien to your own; you are grief-stricken at being compelled to see your children depart on distant and interminable campaigns never to see them more. Soon you shall see them, soon you will enjoy the blessings of a lasting peace guaranteed by all the powers of Europe. All governing authority save that which we ourselves have just assumed in the name of our King shall now cease. Henceforth also passions should be still and party strife be laid aside.

LECCHI.

(Quoted by M. Weil.)

CHAPTER XII

THE AWAKENING

Austria and England—Metternich's new proposals—The Austrian ultimatum—Bellegarde's counterblast to Murat's proclamations—Bentinck and the armistice—Murat's wrath—Seeks a *rapprochement* with Eugène—The Emperor of Austria's letter—Interview with Catinelli—Murat's pact with Eugène—Negotiations (17th-27th February)—Murat is furious with Bentinck—Why Murat desired to make friends with the Emperor—His letter to the Emperor—Zucchi and Carascosa confer—Brunetti's proposals miscarry—Eugène writes to Murat (3rd March)—Arrival of Beauffremont—Rupture between Murat and Eugène—The engagement at Reggio—Napoleon's letter to Eugène—Bentinck arrives at Leghorn—His conference with Murat—Murat changes sides—His letter to Eugène—Negotiations—Conference between Zucchi and Carascosa—The débâcle—Caroline—Bentinck—Bellegarde—Arrival of the Pope—Murat forced to abandon Rome and the Papal States—Tuscany restored to the Grand Duke—Murat's last efforts to conciliate Austria—The combat of the 13th April—Balachoff refuses to sign—The Tuscan convention—Austria takes possession of Italy—The King reaches Naples.

WHILE Murat was waiting anxiously for England to signify her assent to his treaty with Austria, his emissaries had proceeded with all haste to the headquarters of the Allies. Journeying by way of Bologna, Menz and Couci had made their way through the French outposts and had at length succeeded in reaching Bâle. Unluckily for the King of Naples, Castlereagh had preceded them by just two or three days. The latter had at once informed Metternich and Hardenberg of his arrival and asked for an appointment for the next day. He was not the sort of man to let the grass grow under his feet, and by the 20th he had obtained all the information he required regarding the policy of the Allies ; on that day he wrote

to Lord Bathurst stating that he had been presented to the Sovereigns and had conversed at length with their respective ministers. The Neapolitan question had formed one of the subjects of discussion. While, however, Metternich explained the position as it then was to the British diplomat, he could scarcely have informed him on the 20th January of the signing of the treaty, since he himself did not become aware of what had taken place at Naples till he had heard what Menz had to say, and at the date in question the bearers of the treaty signed by Murat had not yet made their appearance at headquarters. They probably arrived on the 21st or early on the 22nd, for on that day Castlereagh was informed by Metternich of the signature of the treaty of the 8th January. Castlereagh, with the concurrence of the Austrian Ambassador, immediately sent Bentinck instructions to abstain from further offensive operations against Naples, and enjoined him to urge the King of Sicily to adopt a similar course. He went on to say that as soon as he arrived at the headquarters at Chaumont he would obtain from Lord Aberdeen the correspondence which had taken place between Vienna and St. James's, and advise him how to regulate his future conduct with regard to this important matter.

There was certainly need to act with promptitude, for it was a matter of great importance to the Allies that Murat should not be fettered by any action on the part of the British representative in Sicily. Bentinck was therefore given full leave to sign an armistice pending the receipt of instructions to conclude a formal treaty of peace. The same day Castlereagh officially advised Bathurst of the news that had just come to hand from Metternich and of his preliminary instructions to Bentinck. Having, he said, received official intimation from Prince Metternich that a treaty (of which he sent his Lordship a copy) had been concluded between the Emperor of Austria and

"the person exercising the government of Naples," he had given Lord William Bentinck instructions, which he trusted the Prince Regent would approve, in a dispatch which he was sending that very day. With regard to the treaty itself, however, Castlereagh had some objections to offer. He considered that Murat came off too handsomely, and was anxious to do something for his country's ally, the King of Sicily. "He was desirous of defining the increase of territory promised to Joachim, and wished at the same time to stipulate that King Ferdinand should be provided with a compensation in order, as he put it, that the British Government might be able to accede to the treaty."¹ A fresh instrument was therefore drawn up (the one which was eventually signed on the 12th February), and before quitting Bâle to join the Russian Emperor at Langres, Metternich sent Menz back to Naples on the 23rd January with the revised treaty as well as Castlereagh's letter to Bentinck, which was dated the day before.² This done, the British and Austrian plenipotentiaries set out for Langres, where they arrived on the 26th January at one o'clock in the morning. Metternich immediately on his arrival sent Castlereagh a copy of the second treaty, which, with the British Minister's concurrence, he had ordered to be submitted to Murat, this copy being a reproduction of the one which Menz was conveying to Naples.³

¹ *Minerva Napolitana*.

² Mier to Metternich. Bologna, February 4, 1814.

³ M. Masson, basing his observations on the letter which Castlereagh wrote to Metternich on the 27th January, remarks: "On the 3rd February Bentinck had, therefore, no power to sign an armistice; nay, it is not too much to say that even his instructions of the 27th conferred no such powers upon him, as they distinctly made the signing of the armistice conditional upon the receipt of advice officially intimating that Murat had agreed to the treaty in its amended form. Moreover, these instructions, which were dispatched from Langres at the earliest on the 27th, could not have so much as reached Naples by the 3rd February. In order to shield his subordinate from any censure that might have attached to him for having acted *ultra vires*,



LORD CASTLEREAGH

What time Murat's allotted share was thus being whittled down at the headquarters of the Allies, Murat himself, elated with the triumph of his policy, was setting to work to organise the government of his new departments. "Ever since I left Rome," he wrote to Zurlo from Ancona, "my march has been one long triumphal progress. Everywhere enthusiasm has been at its height. It is of the utmost importance that M(acedonio) should proceed to Trasimeno to set matters on a working basis

Castlereagh had recourse to a ruse, and, assuming that his instructions would be regarded as conveying the requisite authority to Bentinck, dated them the 22nd instead of the 27th, and it was under the former date that they were notified to the English Parliament and published." (*Napoleon et sa famille.*)

Here are two inaccuracies that call for correction. In the first place, there can be no doubt that Castlereagh did write to Bentinck on the 22nd January, since corroboration of the date is to be found in the letter he wrote Bathurst on the same day. "I have," he says, "given instructions to Lord W. Bentinck in a dispatch which I am sending off at the same time as this letter." Besides that, it is possible to follow every step in the course of Castlereagh's dispatch to Bentinck of the 22nd January. Menz set out with it on the 23rd, and handed it over to Mier in the neighbourhood of Ancona on the 2nd February. (Mier to Metternich. Bologna, 4th February.) On the 4th February, Baron de Frolich, who was dispatched by Mier, left for Palermo in the capacity of courier with the letter from Lord Castlereagh to Bentinck. (Mier to Metternich, Bologna, 4th February. Mier to Bentinck, 4th February.)

As regards Castlereagh's letter of the 27th January to Metternich, that constituted an acknowledgment by the former of the receipt of the second draft treaty which the two plenipotentiaries had drawn up in collaboration, and of which Metternich was now sending Castlereagh a copy at the latter's request. Castlereagh's letter reads as follows: "The undersigned has the honour to offer to Prince Metternich his acknowledgments for the copy of the treaty in the form in which it is proposed to stand between His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Austria and the person now exercising the government of Naples."

We now have to consider the second question. What were Bentinck's powers? They were evidently so far from having lapsed (Masson, ix. 311), that Bentinck himself, writing to Aberdeen on the 22nd January 1814, says: "My instructions of the 22nd July empower me to sign an agreement, but on different lines from yours. The lines in question were settled by me with the Prince Hereditary, and provide that an equivalent should be given to Murat." On the 7th August Castlereagh strengthened his agent's hands by authorising him to negotiate on the new basis (confirming Murat in his possession of the

there. You must betake yourself immediately to the departments of Southern Italy; your presence there is absolutely necessary. You will have to make our Neapolitan friends abate some of their ardour, or their excess of zeal will bring all our plans to the ground. I am eagerly waiting for the figures regarding the budget of the Papal States which I asked you to let me have, and also for the instructions for Poerio.”¹

Poerio, as soon as the King had left Ancona, began to busy himself with the work of organisation. His first act was to notify the Prefects of Metauro, Musone, and Tronto that His Majesty the King of the Two Sicilies had taken possession of their departments.² He next appointed a chief commissioner of police, and issued a decree enacting that all trading vessels belonging to the departments of which His Majesty had taken provisional possession should fly the Neapolitan flag and no other. Joachim was anxious to make sure of his position.

Nevertheless the hours of his Italian sovereignty were numbered. On the 31st January, “Monsieur Schinina, having fallen in with His Majesty the King between Naples and Pesaro, gave him an account of the documents

kingdom of Naples), but only in conjunction with Austria. Where, then, do we find the subsequent orders cancelling Bentinck's powers? So sure was Bentinck that he was acting under authority that he himself delegated his powers to Graham, while throughout January 1814 he was writing to Aberdeen and Castlereagh explaining that although he had authority to negotiate with Murat, he did not wish to do so, as he regarded such a proceeding as impolitic. Not until he received Aberdeen's dispatch of the 12th December, practically commanding him to act, did he make up his mind, with extreme reluctance, to set out for Naples, and he was careful to advise Aberdeen (22nd January) and Castlereagh (30th January) of his departure. There is thus no doubt about Bentinck's powers. He received his instructions on the 22nd July. These were confirmed by Castlereagh's letter of the 7th August 1813, and were again referred to in Aberdeen's dispatch of the 12th December.

¹ Murat to Zurlo. Quoted by M. Weil.

² Naples, *Archives de la Societa Napolitana di Storia Patria*.

which Metternich had read over to him.”¹ These documents, which Menz was bearing with him, announced the ruin of Murat’s hopes. His hour of triumph was over. They presaged, moreover, the chastisement that was to overtake him for his betrayal of France. They left him no room for doubt: he now knew how utterly he had been deceived. What, then, did the documents contain?

On the 3rd February Mier, who had left Naples after Graham and Berthemey had signed the armistice of the 26th January, arrived at Bologna. On his way he had met Menz, who had given him Metternich’s dispatch of the 23rd January embodying a fresh draft treaty and sundry instructions.² He had scarcely been at Bologna half-an-hour when Campochiaro came to him and informed him that the King was greatly upset at the non-ratification of the treaty of alliance which had been signed by the Comte de Neipperg, and that he had had immense trouble to set his mind at rest on this point. But firmness and patience on Mier’s part would arrange everything to Austria’s satisfaction. He asked the Ambassador to go and see the King. Ushered into the King’s presence, Mier gave him a general idea of the contents of Metter-

¹ Mier to Metternich. Bologna, February 4, 1814.

² Metternich’s dispatch to Mier, dated Bâle, 23rd January, a document of first-rate importance for this chapter of Murat’s history, is no longer to be found among the *Archives Autrichiennes*. It is possible, however, to obtain an idea of its main purport by taking stock of Mier’s replies and by availing ourselves of collateral documents. Metternich first announced that Menz had arrived. He then informed Mier that he had conferred with Lord Castlereagh with regard to the treaty which Murat had signed on the 8th January, and that Castlereagh had insisted that a definite settlement should be arrived at with respect to the relations of Joachim and Ferdinand. He demanded that Murat should formally renounce all claim upon Sicily, and that he should undertake in a manner no less formal to procure Ferdinand an indemnity for the loss of Naples. Castlereagh further desired that the territorial increase to be granted to Murat should be limited and defined, and that an additional article should be drawn up (the article which on the official document bears the spurious date of the 14th January) indicating precisely the indemnity granted to the King. On this matter Metternich

nich's dispatch, and reserved the full account of the bad news until the next day.

On the morrow Mier gave the assault. "His Majesty," he said, "received me somewhat coldly, and after a few commonplace remarks said that he had been very surprised and pained to learn from M. Schinina of the non-ratification of the treaty of alliance that had been signed by the Comte de Neipperg and of the changes that had been made in it. 'Monsieur de Neipperg,' said Murat, 'had told us what his instructions were, and I do not think that he in any way exceeded them. In view of that, it was scarcely possible for me to doubt that the treaty would be ratified. I did everything that Austria wanted: why, then, make any difficulties in the matter?' 'Your Majesty will see,' I answered, 'that the alterations it has been thought necessary to make relate exclusively to matters of form. The basis of our alliance remains practically unaltered. As regards the additional secret clause guaranteeing Your Majesty an increase of territory calculated on a scale of 400,000 inhabitants, this can be nothing but an unqualified

imparted to Mier "the views of the Allies with regard to European affairs generally and Italy in particular." The plans arranged between the several parties to the coalition "regarding the future reconstruction of Italy involved the reinstatement of the Holy Father in the States of the Church, of the Grand Duke of Wurzburg in Tuscany, of the King of Sardinia in Piedmont, and of the House of Este in their hereditary possessions." Mier would also certainly have been called upon to add that it formed an essential part of the Allies' plan of campaign to summon the inhabitants of these several States to assist in the restoration of their former Sovereigns. He would then have been commanded to inform the King of the alterations that had been made in the treaty as originally drafted. He would have been instructed to tell Murat that the signing of the additional provision was a *sine qua non* of an alliance with Austria. Finally, he would have been requested by Metternich to send on to its destination Castlereagh's dispatch for Lord William Bentinck. (Mier to Metternich, 4th February, Dispatch No. 5; 11th February, Dispatch No. 7; P.S. 2 ad No. 7. Neipperg and Mier to the Duc de Gallo, 10th February, ad P.S. 2 ad No. 7.—*Minerva Napolitana*. Mier to Bentinck, 4th February, ad No 5.)

advantage to Your Majesty. The clause providing for a good military frontier was too vague ; it might have been interpreted to mean very little, and have furnished material later on for unpleasant discussions between the two Courts. Your Majesty now knows for certain what you can rely upon as the reward of the efforts you are about to make for the cause of the Allies ; the territorial acquisition in question will henceforth be guaranteed you by the members of the Coalition. The new form in which our treaty has been drafted was determined upon in conjunction with Lord Castlereagh. He has made additions thereto, and it may to some extent be looked upon as a treaty with England. By reason of the alterations that have now been embodied in the treaty Your Majesty may be assured of the accession of England and the other powers to our treaty of alliance.' The King's answer was that this increase of territory with a population of 400,000 souls was not worth the trouble of a treaty of alliance, that it might be thought by the world in general that this offer alone decided him to act in concert with the Allies. He would rather have nothing, he said, and then, when peace was concluded, if it was desired to grant him an increase, he would be content with whatever it might be decided to give him. He therefore desired that the promise of a good military frontier should be allowed to remain in the treaty without any definite stipulation being made in regard to the matter.

"I contested the King's view of the case as well as the truth of his remarks regarding the alterations made in the treaty. My arguments were based upon the notes and comments you were good enough to send me as well as upon the present position of affairs. I told him that if we had been alone in the matter we should still have insisted on the additional proviso, though without making any change in the text of the treaty as signed,

but that as Lord Castlereagh would have categorically refused to accede to the treaty unless the alterations proposed by him were embodied therein, His Majesty the Emperor Francis considered himself bound to give ear to the extremely just and correct representations of the English Minister, which, as they implied the accession of England to the treaty, would redound to Murat's advantage.

"Seeing that the King was unwilling to entertain the idea of the addition, and that he was apparently absolutely bent on its omission, I told him at last that the additional clause and all the other alterations which we had made in the treaty as signed by the Comte de Neipperg were regarded by Austria and England as absolutely essential and as *conditio sine qua non*, and that unless His Majesty gave his full and unqualified consent thereto the treaty would never be signed and ratified. When I had put the matter thus plainly the King made no further demur, and requested me to bring him the treaty in its revised form next morning."¹

Next day Mier laid the treaty before Campochiaro, who was of opinion that the alterations should be allowed without reserve. As, however, he knew the King was in an unfavourable mood, he begged Mier not to approach him for another hour, so that he should have time to prepare him.

"I found the King calmer than he had been the day before. We read over the new draft together, as well as the remarks, comments, and instructions relating thereto with which Your Highness was good enough to furnish me. He harked back again upon the additional article, but seeing that I firmly adhered to what I had asserted the previous day, namely, that the full and unqualified acceptance of the new treaty was a *conditio sine qua non* of the alliance, he at last said that he un-

¹ Mier to Metternich. Bologna, February 11, 1814.

reservedly agreed to it, and proposed that the new treaty should be signed then and there, for he knew that I had the necessary powers to that effect, and he desired to delegate similar authority to the Duc di Campochiaro. We, however, refused out of consideration for the Duc di Gallo and the Comte de Neipperg. Yet knowing how fickle the King's disposition was, and fearing lest he should go back on his promise, which was only a verbal one, I suggested that he should write an autograph letter to His Majesty the Emperor Francis, and at the same time furnish me with a communication which I could transmit to Lord Bentinck. He agreed, and, with the assistance of the Duc di Campochiaro we proceeded to draw up the documents in question. I next hinted that it would look well if he sent off the letter as quickly as possible, and he decided to dispatch one of his aides-de-camp with it there and then."¹

That very day, in fact, Colonel de Beaufremont set out with Murat's letter for the Emperor of Austria.² Simultaneously Campochiaro sent Mier an official confirmation of Murat's determination to assent to Metternich's conditions, for mere verbal acquiescence was not enough for Austria.

Thus all Murat's hopes vanished into thin air. The kingdom that was to stretch from Messina to the Po, the union of races from which he had expected so much, all the gorgeous dreams that for three years had glittered so alluringly before his eyes, dreams for which he had deserted his Emperor and betrayed the land of his birth, where were they now? Metternich and Castlereagh had shattered them at a blow. The Austrian letter of the 23rd January had been a rude awakening for Murat. King of Naples he was, King of Naples he was to remain, but the chains that bound him to Austria were now heavy

¹ Mier to Metternich. Bologna, February 11, 1814.

² For the text of this letter see page 337.

upon him. Truly it was a cruel sequel to his "triumphal march" from Rome to Ancona, that meeting with Schinina and that interview with Mier at Bologna. To feel that after all he had played the traitor to no purpose, to realise that he was being dragged in captive bonds beside the chariot wheels of the Allies, all this filled Murat with such tempestuous rage that for some ten days after his meeting with Mier he was half inclined to defy the Powers and refuse to relinquish his prey.

However, a succession of events swiftly showed that Austria was thoroughly determined not to tolerate Joachim's encroachments. On the very day that Mier was making havoc of Murat's hopes at Bologna, Bellegarde delivered Austria's counterblast to the "Italian" proclamations in the following terms:—

"While the Emperor of Austria's victorious legions were arriving from Saxony upon your frontiers, His Majesty the King of Naples decided to unite his forces with those of the Allies and to employ all his troops and his great military talents in furthering the cause of peace. We are crossing the Adige, we are coming as friends within the confines of your country. Behold in us your deliverers. We ask nothing save what is indispensably necessary for our progress and subsistence. We come to protect indisputable rights and to re-establish what force and ambition have overthrown. . . .

"To arms then, men of Piedmont! Gather one and all beneath the standards of your King. His courage and his constancy give promise of the return of those brave and happy days which were yours so long beneath the rule of the illustrious house of Savoy.

"Great-hearted Tuscans! For a space our arms have broken the quiet of your peaceful homes; it was but in order to restore that illustrious and paternal government whose absence you unceasingly deplore. Unite your forces with ours, and you will soon behold the return of

that beloved Prince, and in his train Art and Science and the blessings of Peace shall once more come to make their home in your land.

"People of Italy! It is the generous desire of the Allied Princes to rear once again, so far as altered circumstances will permit, the political fabric of Europe upon those time-honoured foundations which for so long were the sources of its happiness and glory.

"You will thus see flourishing once more in your midst that ancient House of Este. . . . The city, doubly immortal, the capital of the whole world, shall cease to be the appanage of an alien Empire, and shall arise in fresh glory as the chief city of Christendom. As your provinces are delivered from the foreign yoke, your government shall be re-established peacefully, without violence and with only such changes as place, circumstances, and your own needs may dictate."¹

On learning of this further confirmation of the set-back to his plans, Murat trembled with anger. "Marshal Bellegarde's proclamation of the 5th February," wrote Mier, "has completely disconcerted, or rather destroyed, the hopes and schemes of the Italian Jacobins for bringing about the union of Italy. The speeches of the King of Naples, the proclamations issued by his generals, the official notices and measures of the organisers of the provinces occupied by his troops, and the state of feeling which prevailed generally among the officers of his army, gave a certain appearance of seriousness to those wild schemes.

¹ Bellegarde's proclamation. Verona, February 4, 1814. Quoted by M. Weil.

It may be inquired how it was that Bellegarde was sufficiently acquainted with the views of the Allies to employ such precise and positive terms in his proclamation. The answer is that when Metternich sent Mier his instructions regarding the future settlement of Italy, he enclosed his dispatch in an envelope with a "flying seal." This enabled Bellegarde to note its contents on the 29th January, when Menz passed through Vicenza. This was how it was that the Marshal was able to make so prompt a reply and to take up a position so strongly opposed to Murat's Italianist proclamation.

Marshal Bellegarde's proclamation, therefore, did not meet with their approval. The Neapolitan Generals and other officers gave free expression to their discontent, and I had a hot discussion with the King." It being impossible to stop the issue of Bellegarde's proclamation, an attempt was made to stop its circulation. Joachim in his fury ordered the printer of it to be imprisoned and his emissaries went about with great zeal tearing it down wherever they saw it placarded.

Baulked of his prey, Murat's fury knew no bounds. Protests and threats had no effect upon him. Bellegarde sent Nugent to the Neapolitan headquarters to serve under Murat; a quasi-military arrangement was made on the 7th February between Nugent and Livron settling the boundaries of the lands to be occupied by the troops, but nothing availed to console Joachim for the defeat of his original plans. Like a wild beast at bay, he was for ever turning back on his tracks, incessantly resolving to hold Italy and set Austria at defiance.

"All the measures and administrative arrangements which are being carried out in the provinces occupied by the Neapolitan troops in general, and particularly in Tuscany, clearly show that the King's intention was to retain them under his control until the restoration of peace, and that he had made up his mind to ignore what I had said to him on the matter when conveying Your Highness's remarks regarding the additional article, remarks in which you adverted to the plans arranged by the Allies for the future settlement of Italy, the re-establishment of the Holy Father, the Grand Duke of Wurzburg, the King of Sardinia, and the House of Este in their possessions. As, moreover, I had definitely told him that it was an essential part of our plan to call upon the people to aid in the restoration of their former sovereigns, I asked the King for an explanation in the matter. After disputes and discussions that

ran into several days, he declared that the administration of the provinces in question was secured to him by the treaty signed by the Comte de Neipperg, that he had already taken possession of them and installed his administrators, and that he considered he might retain them until peace was proclaimed. I thereupon informed him that as soon as M. de Gallo reached Bologna I should address him a note on the subject, and that the matter would have to be put straight before the treaty of alliance was signed."¹

The arrival of Gallo on the 10th February had no soothing effect upon Murat. In fact, the Minister for Foreign Affairs was the bearer of another regrettable piece of intelligence. Bentinck, despite the provisions of the armistice signed by Graham, had refused to conclude a treaty of peace. All he would do was to sign a further armistice. After a series of discussions with King Ferdinand and the Prince Hereditary, Lord William had left Palermo on the evening of the 30th January on board the *America*.² He arrived at Naples during the following night, and saw Graham, who informed him of the agreement signed on the 26th January. Despite the entreaties of Gallo and Neipperg, who begged and prayed him to conclude a treaty of peace, the British representative was inexorable, and absolutely refused to put his hand to anything but a fresh armistice, from which, it is hardly necessary to add, Article II. of Graham's agreement was carefully excluded.

The news of this further reverse was a heavy blow for Murat, and he grew more furious than ever against the Coalition and Bentinck, by the former of whom he was held in check and by the latter treated with contempt. Yet what could he do, bound to them as he was hand and foot?

¹ Mier to Metternich. Bologna, February 11, 1814.

² Bentinck to Castlereagh. Palermo, January 30, 1814.

As though to complete the King's discomfiture, Mier, faithful to his word, had an interview with Neipperg immediately on the latter's arrival at the Court of Naples. He gave him full particulars of Murat's attempted defiance of Austria, and both of them drew up and sent to Gallo the Note with which Mier had threatened the King. It ran as follows :—

“ The undersigned Ministers Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Emperor of Austria hasten to communicate to His Excellency Monsieur le Duc di Gallo a copy of the Treaty of Alliance signed at Naples under date 11th January last with the alterations and additions which have been deemed necessary, and to which His Neapolitan Majesty gave his full and unqualified assent in the autograph letter which he addressed on this subject to His Majesty the Emperor Francis on the 4th of this month, whereof the final settlement by the respective plenipotentiaries has been delayed solely on account of the absence of Monsieur le Duc di Gallo and the Comte de Neipperg.

“ The Comte de Mier, on arriving at Bologna, submitted the new draft and the additional article to His Majesty the King of Naples and dealt at considerable length with the general outline of the agreement arrived at between the Allies regarding the political settlement of Europe as a whole, with more particular reference to the reinstatement of the Holy Father in the States of the Church, and the restoration of the Grand Duke of Wurzburg to Tuscany, of the King of Sardinia to Piedmont, and of the House of Este to their hereditary possessions. He pointed out to His Majesty that the summoning of the inhabitants of these various States to assist in bringing about the return of their former rulers was an integral part of the Coalition programme, the deputations from all parts of the country leaving no room for doubt regarding the state of public opinion on

the matter. It would therefore follow that in adopting an opposite line of conduct the King would not only be acting in contrariety to the intentions of the Allies, but would be placing an obstacle in the way of their accession to our treaty and to our ratification of the same.

“His Majesty the King of Naples, by giving his unqualified assent to the various modifications introduced into the existing treaty after consultation with the British Cabinet, and by giving due consideration to the point of view of the allied powers, may rest assured that no difficulties will be offered to the ratification of the treaty, and, in order that the active co-operation of the Neapolitan forces with Austria . . . should not be delayed by the formalities attendant upon the exchange of these ratifications, His Majesty the Emperor of Austria has, pending the dispatch of the treaty in its regular form, sent to His Neapolitan Majesty a preliminary but perfectly binding ratification in the form of an autograph letter, a plan which has of late years been very generally followed in transactions between the Allies.

“The undersigned urge His Excellency the Duc di Gallo to conclude without further delay the treaty of alliance between the two Courts, and express the hope that His Majesty will henceforth allow nothing to interfere with the active and vigorous co-operation of his army in order to attain the object set forth in the treaty, the stipulations in favour of the King of Naples being dependent upon the complete fulfilment of his obligations in this respect.”¹

On receiving the Note of the Austrian plenipotentiaries, following as it did so hard on the bad news brought by Gallo, the King had an attack of fever similar to those which the Emperor's comminatory epistles had formerly been wont to bring upon him. On the morning of the 11th, while his Minister was

¹ Neipperg and Mier to the Duc di Gallo. Bologna, February 10, 1814.

arguing desperately with the two Austrians and doing his utmost, in accordance with Joachim's instructions, to avoid the necessity of making an official reply to the Note of the previous day, the King was obliged to take to his bed, and would see neither Gallo, who was waiting for further orders, nor Catinelli, who had arrived with a message from Bentinck.

On the morrow, however, beaten and broken, Murat gave way on every point, and to the Note that had been presented by Neipperg and Mier, Gallo made the following reply :

" The undersigned, Minister for Foreign Affairs to His Majesty the King of Naples, duly submitted to the King his Master the Note presented on the 10th instant by the plenipotentiaries of His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary and Bohemia.

" He is now commanded to state in reply that the King, having already informed His Majesty the Emperor of Austria in an autograph letter of the 5th February of his willingness to agree to the alterations proposed by His Imperial Majesty to the treaty signed by their respective representatives on the 11th January, and of his desire to give His Majesty the Emperor by such assent a further proof of his unlimited confidence, he has now instructed the undersigned to accept without reserve all the suggested alterations, and to sign a new treaty under the same date embodying all the modifications agreed upon.

" The King also consents that, in view of the circumstances, the ratification of the treaty about to be signed should be made in the first instance by autograph letters of the two Sovereigns pending the dispatch of the formal ratifications by the respective Chancelleries, which dispatch shall take place at the earliest possible moment.

" The King's own preliminary ratification has already been forwarded to His Majesty the Emperor in a letter

of the 5th February. His Majesty therefore in his turn eagerly awaits the autograph letter from His Majesty the Emperor and King which his plenipotentiaries promised, as long ago as the 4th, to present within a few days' time, the understanding that such a letter would be forthcoming having alone enabled the King to agree to the alterations put forward and to send his autograph ratification to His Imperial Majesty.

"The moment the King receives the promised ratification, the moment he formally becomes an integral member of the Coalition, he will hasten to act in accordance with the views and principles set forth by the Austrian plenipotentiaries regarding the political settlement of Italy and Europe in general.

"GALLO."¹

That same night the second treaty was signed. Murat's fate was now in Austria's hands. Metternich's agents raised the pæan of victory. "The undersigned," they wrote to the Chancellor, "beg to send your Highness, by the hands of the Count de Schonfeldt, the new treaty of alliance that has been concluded with the Court of Naples. The same was signed yesterday evening, having been drawn up in the new form and with the alterations which your Highness deemed necessary. To these alterations the King of Naples has given his unqualified assent, not only in the autograph letter which he has dispatched to our august Sovereign, but also in answer to a Note which we deemed it incumbent upon us to address to the Duc di Gallo before proceeding to

¹ Gallo to Neipperg and Mier. Bologna, February 12, 1814. This contradicts the following assertion by M. Masson:—"Since Bellegarde issued his proclamation he had got a drubbing at the Mincio, and had grown more prudent. Murat had not signed the declaration which Neipperg and Mier were anxious to get from him, and he considered that his hands were free." (*Napoléon et sa famille.*)

sign the treaty, and whereto he made a satisfactory reply."¹

In the document he had just signed Murat had practically renounced all claim to the throne of Italy. He now knew what Austria meant—he realised how completely Metternich had fooled him with his promise of a good military frontier. "400,000 souls," forsooth! A beggarly pittance "that wasn't worth putting down in a treaty!" And being thus utterly taken in, being compelled to give up all idea of the throne of Italy, he came to hate Austria—to look on her as an enemy much rather than an ally. Insatiably ambitious still, he must needs find something to satisfy his hunger for greatness. Metternich had cheated him; why should he not cheat Metternich? To Napoleon therefore he decided to turn once more, and even when he put his hand to the new treaty, Murat had it in mind to throw over Austria for France.

Even before the 12th February he was attempting to renew relations with France, though one would have thought that his Bologna proclamation had severed them for ever. Certainly there would have been no attempt to renew them had Austria adhered to the treaty of the 8th January. But on the 31st January Murat met Schinina on the road to Ancona, and Schinina's disconcerting news caused him, figuratively speaking, to face to the right-about. Austria wanted to carry the curtailment process too far, to pare away his position a little too much, and therefore he would apply to France. This step was rendered the more easy as General Giffenga had acquainted Eugène with the King's plans, and Eugène, on the 28th January, had sent Joachim a letter which, though expressing surprise at his line of conduct, concluded in the following terms: "Your Majesty has said—and I place absolute reliance

¹ Neipperg and Mier to Metternich. Bologna, February 13, 1814.

on your royal word—that you will carry out no offensive movement against the Imperial forces under my command without giving me full and sufficient warning.”¹ On receipt of this letter Murat, who in the meantime had seen Schinina, immediately reopened communications with Eugène. “I received Your Imperial Highness’s letter yesterday on the road to Ancona. I again repeat my promise not to commence hostilities without giving you due warning, and I earnestly pray that peace, of which the world is so sorely in need, may come and spare me the pain of entering into conflict with Your Imperial Highness’s troops—with my own countrymen. Remember me to the Emperor, my dear Eugène: tell him of my grief—I weep as I pen these words.”

It was time for him to make professions of loyalty and tenderness towards the Emperor, for his need was the measure of his affection. On the 4th February Corner brought Joachim’s letter to Eugène. The Viceroy, far from suspecting the profound revulsion which Schinina’s communication had caused in the mind of Murat, supposed that his views were still the same, and that “he had not yet decided upon war.” Joachim was anxious to assure him that he need apprehend nothing from him, and messages for Eugène were dispatched in hot haste. First of all there was Carascosa, who availed himself of the opportunity offered by a reconnoitring movement before Reggio to send a letter from the King to the Viceroy. A few days later a Neapolitan officer came to seek out the Viceroy. “As soon,” says Eugène, “as the King of Naples knew that I had won the battle of the Mincio, he sent an officer to me with friendly overtures. I immediately deputed Bataille to arrange matters. It would be a first-rate thing for me if I could prevail on him to declare for us.”

On the other hand, Murat, now that he was coquetting

¹ The Viceroy to Murat. Verona, January 28, 1814.

with Eugène, would pay no heed to Bellegarde's advances, and though he had sent him word that he was prepared to give him his active support, this was merely an official promise indited under constant pressure from Mier, and he made up his mind that he would not fulfil it. He secretly gave orders of the most definite description that the Austrians were on no account to be permitted to pass his outposts. Relying on the assistance of the King of Naples, Bellegarde joined battle with Eugène by the Mincio, and on the very morning of the conflict urged him to send his Neapolitan divisions to Nugent's support. The summons was made in vain; not a man stirred, and to Murat's inaction Eugène was indebted for his partial success. But when Gallo and Neipperg arrived at Bologna, when it became painfully certain that Bentinck would not enter into negotiations for peace, when the joint efforts of Neipperg and Mier constrained him to assent to Austria's views and to sign the new treaty, and, above all, when Pignatelli-Strongoli arrived on the scene, the King found himself obliged to come to heel.

On the 14th February, two days after the second treaty had been signed, Pignatelli appeared with the famous letter from the Austrian Emperor, the letter for which Joachim, Mier, and Neipperg had been unceasingly clamouring. Just at the moment Joachim would perhaps have been quite content to do without it, but as he had promised Mier to act as soon as he received the letter, as he had complained in every one's hearing of the time it took to obtain a reply,¹ as he had pledged his word to give Austria his active support as soon as he himself knew how he stood, he was bound to do something, though he determined that that something should not exceed the minimum. Very loth to use the sword, he deemed it enough to employ the pen, and sent orders

¹ Wilson, *Private Diary of Public Events during 1812, 1813, 1814, &c.*

to General Millet to dispatch to Vignolle, Eugène's Chief of Staff, an official declaration of war. He himself wrote to Bellegarde on the 15th February, saying that he would join him with two divisions when the Austrians had passed the Mincio. The letter was greeted with laughter at the Austrian headquarters.¹ Nevertheless, his position with regard to his allies was strictly correct, and they could find nothing wherewith to reproach him. But they seemed to go out of their way to vex him, to alienate him from their cause. On the 17th February there arrived at the Neapolitan headquarters one Catinelli, who had been sent thither by Bentinck. The latter, being desirous of landing troops at Leghorn, requested that they might make use of Tuscan territory. The King refused. According to him, the Tuscans had begged and prayed him to occupy their country. He had saved it from anarchy, and the inhabitants were well content with his government. He made the most of his rights as first comer, and declared to Catinelli that if Bentinck particularly desired it, he would let him have Leghorn as soon as he had taken it with a portion of the surrounding district. That was as much as he could do. Thereupon the other made reply that "they were *grands seigneurs* enough to have a right to the whole house without being limited to the ground-floor or the entresol."² Knowing that Catinelli was an Italian, Joachim endeavoured to win him over to his cause. He managed to get rid of Mier, who had been present up to that point, and asked why England was so dead against making peace with Naples. If England were willing, Italy might be made a free and united country. "I shall have everything to fear, and my throne will be

¹ "This promise is only conditional, and reminds me of Mrs. Glasse's directions for dressing a dolphin."—Wilson, *Private Diary of Public Events during 1812, 1813, 1814, &c.*

² Catinelli's report to Bentinck. Cited by M. Weil.

very unstable, so long as we are at war with England," said the King. "I shall fight on if I am attacked, and I shall amaze the world, but I shall go under, whereas with England at my back I could resist all the powers of the Continent. I owe a great deal to my people; they love me, and have made sacrifices on my behalf; their welfare I regard as sacred. Italy certainly deserves a better fate than that which Austria has in store for her. Only England can ward off the ill that will certainly befall her. I have a great affection for the Italians. They were of old the foremost race in the world, and they might once more recover their position."¹ Catinelli knew not what reply to make to these overtures. But as long ago as 1813 Bentinck had seen through Murat's designs, and had no intention of engaging in hostilities with Austria for the sake of putting Joachim on the throne of Italy.

Catinelli having taken his departure, the King, who was conscious that Tuscany was slipping through his fingers, and feared that England might play with him as Austria had done, felt less inclination than ever to assist in his own undoing. He immediately ordered Millet to send back Carascosa's troops, and left Nugent unsupported. On the following morning, the 18th, he wrote a letter to Bellegarde in which he gave free vent to his spleen against Bentinck.

"There is another matter I want to discuss with you, a matter which, though of secondary importance, may have a great effect on the ultimate success of the campaign: I mean the co-operation of Lord William Bentinck.

"You told me that you had suggested that he should land his troops at Genoa, and yesterday the Comte de Mier informed Lieutenant-Colonel Catinelli that the English would land at Leghorn. According to Article 4

¹ Catinelli's report to Bentinck.

of the agreement entered into between Lord W. Bentinck and my Minister for Foreign Affairs, it was provided that a military arrangement regarding the co-operation of the English should be agreed upon between the leaders of the Austrian, Neapolitan, and English armies. I shall therefore be unable to regard as valid any arrangement that conflicts with the said agreement, a copy of which is in the hands of the Comte de Neipperg.

“Besides, the support of the English, valuable as it would, be at Genoa, would be useless in Tuscany unless after landing at Leghorn they marched straight away towards the Po. For my part, I adhere to the view that the proper place for the English to land would be between Genoa and Savona.”¹

Such was Murat's state of mind when, the very same day, an envoy arrived from Eugène. The latter, a little taken aback at Murat's declaration of war, considered it advisable to send word to the King of the victories that had been won at Champaubert and Montmirail, and at the same time to attempt to find out what he really intended to do. To this end Corner was dispatched to the Neapolitan headquarters. His stay was brief. On the 18th he saw Murat, who asked for a detailed account of the Emperor's victories, and said that the ratification of his treaty with Austria had not yet arrived. On the 19th he was back again with Eugène giving an account of his mission. Taking his cue from what his envoy told him, the Viceroy forwarded Murat journals giving a full account of Napoleon's victories. Thus friendly relations were resumed. So firm, in fact, was the truce that Murat sent word to Eugène of his slightest movements. Communications of some sort or another were constantly passing between the two headquarters. On the 25th the King, having come to inspect the defence-works on the Po, made it his first care to send a reassur-

¹ Murat to Bellegarde. Modena, February 18, 1814.

ing message to the Viceroy. "The Neapolitan troops will make no move. His mind may be completely at rest on that point;" and, in order that he might be still further reassured, Eugène was informed that, "until further orders, no move would be effected of such a nature as to compel the Viceroy to evacuate his position." These were comforting messages—too comforting, indeed, for Eugène, who knew his Murat, and who, his suspicions aroused by so many marks of friendship, deemed it his duty to keep a more vigilant eye than ever on the Neapolitans.

Joachim had good reasons for smoothing Eugène down and for putting off Bellegarde with prevarications that drove the latter to desperation. The King felt that Bentinck's arrival in Upper Italy would sound the death-knell of his hopes. There is no doubt that Mier's communication of the 4th February at Bologna and the conversations that took place between them during the ensuing week, as well as Neipperg's arrival and the joint note addressed to him by the Austrian plenipotentiaries, had made a deep impression on his mind, and had to a great extent undeceived him; still, these were merely words after all. Nowhere as yet was Murat confronted with an adversary, at least with an adversary drawn up against him in battle array, with muskets and cannon ready to fire, an adversary, in a word, with whom he would have to fight in grim earnest for possession of the coveted lands.

But the whole complexion of affairs might be altered by Bentinck's appearance on the scene. An obstinate determination on his part to maintain his hold on Tuscany might lead to serious consequences. So unwilling was he, however, to relinquish his prey that it had momentarily entered his head to send Gallo to negotiate matters with the Englishman. "The Chevalier Schinina," writes Gallo to Murat, "has just conveyed to me Your Majesty's

instructions. I am ready to start for Leghorn to-morrow with Count Mier if Your Majesty so commands. . . . I beseech Your Majesty to recognise once and for all that nothing in the world will induce Lord Bentinck to abandon his claim to settle the affairs of Tuscany, to proclaim the Grand Duke, and to reinstate him in his dominions ; the task would be easy of execution and is too flattering to Bentinck's vanity. . . .

"Matters are so far advanced that I venture to think Your Majesty's sole means of extricating yourself from an imbroglio that might be fraught with infinitely serious possibilities, is to proclaim the Grand Duke's restoration before the English and Austrians proclaim it for you, and consequently before Lord W. Bentinck and his forces show themselves off Leghorn.

"Your Majesty could have nothing to say against this measure either on military or political grounds, since, having abandoned your claim to Tuscany, no one could more fittingly rule there, from your point of view, than the Archduke Ferdinand. The whole question, therefore, is whether Your Majesty will hand over Tuscany a few weeks sooner or a few weeks later." ¹

Not so ! The question was a weightier one than that. All along Murat had concealed his hand from Gallo, and now once again he had managed to dissemble his real aims. It was no question of a few weeks sooner or later that was tormenting Murat well-nigh to desperation ; it was a question of life or death, of the triumph or ruin of his life-work and his dearest hopes, for Bentinck's appearance would mean the overthrow, the irrevocable overthrow, of all his plans. How could Gallo imagine for a moment that the King would fall in with his proposal to restore Tuscany to the Grand Duke ? He, Gallo, was a diplomat ; let him then examine with a

¹ Gallo to Murat. Bologna, February 23, 1814. Quoted by M. Weil, *Correspondance historique et archéologique*.

diplomat's eye the position of Italy as at the 24th February, and he would see the nature and extent of Murat's expectations. Spread over the whole of Northern Italy, the Neapolitan troops had long been in occupation of the Papal States, Tuscany, Modena, and the Duchy of Parma. Neapolitan administrators were already at work in what had once been the French Departments of Rome, Trasimeno, Metauro, Musone, and Tronto. The French fortresses alone held out, and now, as the result of secret dealings between Fouché and himself, they too were to be delivered into his hands. What the conditions of their surrender might be mattered little to him if surrendered they were. The Austrians expressed amazement that, contrary to all precedent, the capitulating troops were sent home through the enemy's lines still retaining their arms. That was of no moment for Murat, provided that Italy, or as much of Italy as he occupied, were rid of the French troops. On the 15th February the capitulation of Ancona was agreed to, and the fortress was handed over on the 18th. On the 19th the city of Leghorn was surrendered. At Florence the forts of St. John the Baptist and the Belvedere were given up to the Neapolitans. Finally, to put the finishing touch on Joachim's work, Fouché signed the treaty of Lucca, and placed the King in possession of the few remaining places over which the tricolour still floated. By the agreement signed that day Miollis was compelled to quit the Castle of San Angelo, and La Salcette to relinquish Civita Vecchia.

By the morning of the 25th February Italy, right up to the Po, was clear of the French and the Austrians. None but Murat's soldiers lay encamped there, none but Murat was in command. How long the situation would endure none could tell, but it would be no great while. Dark clouds were gathering, and told the King that if he would succeed in his final effort to retain these

lands beneath his sway he had little time to lose. Bentinck was proclaiming far and wide that he was coming to Leghorn; his emissaries were already scouring the country. Bellegarde's proclamation of the 4th February had had a powerful effect on the feelings of the people. Every day the rumours of the Pope's return gathered strength, ditties about his home-coming were in everybody's mouth, and the police had perforce to listen to what they were powerless to suppress.¹

It was, then, necessary to press forward; the sands were running out. What else remained for Murat to do? Merely to turn once again to Napoleon, to ask him yet once more to confirm him in the possession of the lands he had occupied, and then to join hands with Eugène, to unite the forces of Naples and France, and drive the English and the Austrians out of Italy. Murat would then be master of the situation. To propitiate Eugène, he had overwhelmed him with courtesies and attentions. It was important to create a favourable impression in the mind of the Emperor's lieutenant, since through him would probably be negotiated the treaty of the future. But beyond everything Joachim needed troops, for if there was to be war with Austria, war not with the pen this time, but with the sword, the Neapolitan army must needs be reinforced to cope successfully with Bellegarde, and during the period from the 22nd February to the 1st March we have evidence of the great efforts put forth by Murat to organise fresh forces. The idea of so doing had already occurred to him when Austria had compelled him to toe the line on that memorable 4th February. On the 7th he had requested Pepe—a well-known "unionist"—to form an Italian legion.² He now took up the idea again and

¹ Zuccari to Gallo. Rome, February 16, 1814. Naples, *Archivio di Stato*.

² Pepe, *Mémoire*.

developed it as far as he could. On the 22nd February a royal decree granted a general pardon to all refractory recruits and to all deserters under the Italian conscription provided that they presented themselves within a month for service in the departmental guards. Men were beaten up from every possible quarter. The King gave instructions that deserters and all disbanded Italian troops were to be summoned to rejoin the colours. General Pinodo, who was entrusted with this task, was given *carte blanche* to do as best he could in the various departments. Forcible recruiting went on everywhere. The prisons were emptied of their tenants, convicts were given arms, deserters from the Austrian outposts were pressed into the service, and when Nugent demanded that they should be sent back to him, it was alleged that it was their own wish to remain, though, as a matter of fact, their services had been paid for to the tune of two, three, and occasionally four louis per man.¹ An endeavour was made to win over the Military College at Modena, but the tempting offer was not accepted. Never had recruiting been so actively carried on in Italy as at this moment. All these soldiers were to be made into departmental guards, and each department was to have six regiments or thereabouts. Since it was necessary to find leaders for this human herd, which consisted of all the male inhabitants between the ages of seventeen and fifty, the King ordered that the Italian officers who had quitted Eugène's army should be approached in the matter. They were for the most part scattered about the Marches; some few of them had just got as far as Rome. All were apparently waiting to see what line Generals Pino, Mazzuchelli, Zucchi, and Palombini were going to take. They complained that the King had not spoken out plainly enough. They had been waiting for a personal proclamation from the King himself, for a

¹ *Mémoire sulla condotta politica e militare tenuta da Gioacchino Murat.*

frank and emphatic statement of his policy with regard to Italy. Instead of that, they said, he had only spoken through his generals, and what they had said amounted on the whole to very little. However, in spite of their grievances, they agreed to march. Finally Joachim made appeal to the *ban* and *arrière-ban* of Naples. From Bologna, on the 1st March, he signed a decree enacting that the four thousand conscripts of the reserve formed in pursuance of the decree of the 24th December 1813 should be held at the disposal of the Minister for War.

What time these various measures for securing the future independence of Italy were being put into execution, Murat had not been unmindful of Napoleon. By the 28th February he considered his preparations sufficiently advanced to allow him to disclose his aims, and that day he wrote the Emperor a letter, probably the first since his epistle of the 15th January in which he had announced his intention of cutting himself adrift from France.

"Sire," he said, "Your Majesty is beset by dangers. France is threatened in her very capital, and I am not suffered to die for you. I who love you seem to be your foe. Sire, one word from you, and I sacrifice my family and my subjects. Ruin will be my lot, but what matter. I shall have served you, I shall have proved to you that you had no better friend than I. . . . I ask nothing more of you at the moment, provided the Viceroy makes known to you my conduct.

"The tears which fill my eyes forbid me to continue. I am here alone in the midst of strangers. Even my tears I must not suffer to be seen. By this letter I resign my future wholly into your hands. My life is yours. Could you but see me, could you but form an idea of the grief which for two months I have suffered, you would have pity on me. Love me till the end :

never was I worthier your affection. Your friend till death." ¹

All that was merely introductory. Murat, never having had the courage to unburden himself directly to the Emperor concerning the question which he had so much at heart—to wit, the disposal of Italy—bethought himself of a subterfuge, and when sending this letter to the Emperor he dispatched Brunetti, the Secretary to the Italian Legation at Naples, to confer with Eugène. Brunetti's mission was a verbal one (for Murat considered it too dangerous to commit his promises to writing), and it consisted in undertaking on the King's behalf that his troops should abstain from all hostile action against the Imperial forces until His Majesty the Emperor had sent a reply to the overtures that had been made to him. In point of fact, his real task was to request Eugène to transmit to Napoleon the ultimatum which Murat had not dared to send himself. Brunetti accordingly handed the Viceroy a note and begged him, in Joachim's name, to forward it to the Emperor. This note Eugène refers to as a "ridiculous document," and says that it gives an idea of "the madness that had taken hold of the King." ² Had he examined the matter a little more closely he would have perceived that it was but a formal restatement of Joachim's *desiderata*, the division of Italy into two portions, with the Po for boundary and the recognition of himself (Joachim) as King of a free and united Italy. "On these conditions Joachim was ready to declare against the Austrians."

¹ This letter is undated. But the knowledge we have of the negotiations entered into by Murat with the Emperor through Eugène, negotiations to which he refers in the letter itself when he says, "I ask nothing more of you at the moment, provided the Viceroy makes known to you my conduct," enables us to fix the date. The letter was sent to the Emperor the same day that Brunetti set out to visit Eugène. It was intended to serve as an introduction to the proposals which the Viceroy was to convey to the Emperor.

² Eugène to the Emperor. Volta, March 1, 1814. *Archives de la Guerre*.

The "conditions" were certainly rather out of harmony with the "tears" of repentance Murat had spoken of in his letter to his brother-in-law, but that mattered little. The main point was to prevail on the Viceroy to send on his proposals since, for all his effrontery, he had not the face to send them himself.

Zucchi and Carascosa sat down to discuss the said conditions. The Neapolitan general's first step was to ask whether the Viceroy had received due authority from the Emperor to negotiate. Zucchi replied with astonishment that there was no need, since Eugène, the Emperor's lieutenant, was commander-in-chief. Whereupon Carascosa declined to proceed. It therefore became necessary to wait for powers. Murat evidently had not forgotten the manner in which he had been deceived by Austria. He did not mean to be fooled again this time as he had once been fooled by Metternich.

Eugène on his side encouraged the King in his favourable attitude towards France. On the 2nd March Grenier had fought an engagement near Parma and taken the city. Murat was not unconnected with the victory. At the last moment he had given orders to his troops to fall back, and thus left the Austrians to their own devices. It happened that among the prisoners Grenier discovered some sixty Neapolitan soldiers, who were sent back into their own lines with a letter from the Viceroy. "I am now more than ever anxious to know definitely what Your Majesty's intentions are. . . . I must regulate my movements accordingly. . . . I therefore beg you to let me know what I am to hope or fear from your army. I trust that your reply will be a favourable one, and I venture to ask that it shall be explicit. The withdrawal of the Austrians should now permit Your Majesty to listen to the dictates of your interests and your heart."

While this exchange of compliments was taking place

between the two adversaries, Colonel de Beauffremont suddenly arrived at Modena. On the 3rd March he brought the King the eagerly awaited ratification of the Austrian Emperor. Murat's mind was now at rest as far as Austria was concerned, and this occasioned him a certain degree of satisfaction. He was a master of exaggerated statement, and as it was necessary for him to disguise his real intentions beneath a wealth of luxuriant rhetoric and effusive sentiment, he adopted the dithyrambic tone with Mier. "Not until now," he said, "now that its possession has been guaranteed to me by Austria, have I felt certain of my crown. Surely no one else would have done what I have done. Without waiting to be assured of your alliance, beset with misgivings at the non-ratification of our original treaty, I nevertheless threw down the gauntlet to France, drove out her troops and her officials from a part of Italy, lent my support to the operations of your army, though not, it is true, with all the vigour of which I was capable, for I was anxious to husband the strength of my troops. So long as I had no guarantee from you that I and my children should retain the Kingdom of Naples, my sole hope lay in my little army. I should have defended myself to the very last against the whole world had you forsaken me. Now that Naples is secured to me, I can afford to lose my whole army in battling with France, for I have the certainty that I shall return to my country as King and be recognised as such by all the powers of Europe."

This eloquence was intended for the Allies, and it fell pleasantly upon their ears. Not only Mier, but Bellegarde and his staff, were put off the proper scent.¹ But to complete the work of deceit, thoroughly to play the part of the staunch and faithful ally, Murat thought it advisable

¹ Murat joyfully received on the 4th the ratification of his treaty with Austria.—Wilson, *Private Diary*.

to send a letter to Metternich as well. "I feel," he said, "that I must tell you how grateful I am for all your good offices in the negotiations which have just been brought to such a happy issue. Now that Austria is my ally, I can give myself up unreservedly to that feeling of confidence which the integrity of her principles and, above all, the staunchness of her present Sovereign, cannot fail to inspire. I have shown that ambition was not among my motives by accepting an indemnity that was wholly disproportionate to the sacrifices I had agreed to make and to the magnitude of the assistance to be rendered by the army of 50,000 men which I command in person. I shall therefore be fighting for no other object than that of assisting the great allied powers to bring about the restoration of peace, and I only hope that when the work of reorganisation is taken in hand, Europe will be so constituted that peace may find therein a firm and lasting abode.

"The means of force which may be found in the countries that we have occupied must not be left without employment. It would be an easy matter to organise the troops there, but great care must be exercised in order to avoid disquieting public opinion by making too sudden an announcement of approaching changes. What is to become of each country will be determined when peace is made; until that great day arrives we should restrict ourselves to making the people feel that they have been delivered from an unwelcome domination, and that it is their duty to bestir themselves to prevent its return. I could already have raised troops thus in the Papal States and in Tuscany, but I postponed the measure in order to avoid taking any step that had not been agreed on in advance with His Majesty the Emperor of Austria. Nevertheless, I regard such a measure as being one of absolute necessity, and I am about to pave the

way so that if it is to be carried out it may be done without unnecessary delay.

"There is some talk of proclaiming new sovereigns in each country, but apart from the fact that such acts could only take place as a result of the provisions of the treaty of peace, they would have the twofold disadvantage of depriving us of all the resources offered by the said countries and of rendering the government of the new rulers odious by establishing it at a time when the prosecution of the war would make it necessary to impose so many sacrifices on the inhabitants."¹

In thus pledging his word to remain loyal to Austria, Murat was seeking to discount the effect of Bellegarde's reports regarding his organisation of the countries occupied by his troops and the considerable military preparations, which could not have passed unperceived. In advising Metternich that he had taken and would take no steps which had not been agreed on in advance with Austria, he purposely overlooked all the measures to which he had committed himself in February, considering that he would be able to disarm Mier's criticism by telling him that he had been in direct communication with Metternich. He had formerly employed the same tactics with Durant, to whom he used to declare that he had arranged matters with the Emperor.

Such being the state of affairs, it need scarcely astonish us that while on the one hand Murat sent word to Eugène that he was not yet in a position to give him a definite reply about their *entente*, on the other, he gave orders that support was to be given to the Austrians. It seemed to him that in view of his statements to Mier and his promises to Metternich he really ought to make a show of rendering them assistance; to make a show, no more, for, notwithstanding the numerous commands he was

¹ Murat to Metternich, Modena, March 4, 1814. Quoted by M. Lumbroso, *Revue de Paris*.

dictating, Murat thoroughly intended to give the French plenty of warning of the part he intended to play.

It having been decided to attack General Severoli, who was defending Reggio, the King ordered Carascosa to join forces with the Austrians. On the morning of the 7th the combined armies began to advance against the French, but Joachim had taken precautions. From Modena he sent Nugent orders to delay his forward movement on Reggio because he himself proposed to reconnoitre the position in person about noon. He would thus be able to send warning to Severoli and afford him an opportunity to fall back. Unfortunately, Nugent had already begun to move, and it was impossible to carry out the order. As, moreover, the outposts were held by Austrians, Murat's messenger to Severoli was compelled to make a wide detour, and failed to arrive in time to give the necessary warning. The French columns gave way beneath the shock of the attack, Severoli had one of his legs shot away by a cannon-ball, and was obliged to hand over the command to Rambourg. Surrounded and borne down on every side, the French had only death or surrender before them when Murat arrived on the scene and sent Rambourg an offer to suspend hostilities for an hour to allow him to withdraw to Parma. The offer was at once accepted, and "the Austrian troops, who were already in possession of the Parma road, were, to their intense indignation, compelled to retire and allow the enemy to pass by unmolested."¹

It was when the Emperor himself was fighting for very life that he learned how matters had been going in Italy. On the 13th February he had received Fouché's letters. They removed every vestige of hope that Murat would return to his allegiance, and gave unmistakable proof of the "hideous ingratitude" of Caroline and her husband. That very day he determined to break with

¹ *Journal de Nugent*, with Verklein's notes. Quoted by M. Weil.

them. The Neapolitan Ambassador received orders to quit. The French vessels were commanded to attack the Neapolitans. All French subjects in the service of Naples were ordered to return home. The breach seemed final. On the 17th Caulaincourt sent Carignano his passports, and the latter left Paris on the 23rd. But the successes gained at Champaubert and Montmirail altered the Emperor's plans. Victory, it seemed, was about to smile on him once more. Perhaps it might yet be possible to rid France of her foes. However, on the 26th February, when appearances pointed to the probable failure of the Châtillon conferences, the Emperor resolved, with infinite reluctance no doubt, to make advances to Murat. "It appears," he said in a letter to Joseph, "that the King of Naples has not yet had his treaty ratified by the Allies, and I want you to send one of your people to him as quickly as possible. Tell him plainly how iniquitous his conduct has been, and offer your services as mediator in bringing about a reconciliation. Say that there is no other alternative open to him, and that if he rejects it either France or the Allies will bring about his overthrow. I need not go into all you can say now. The English do not even recognise him as a King. Write to the Queen too; tell her that nothing can justify her ingratitude, and that even the Allies are revolted at it. Say that as no battle has yet taken place between the French and Neapolitan troops, all may still be settled, but that there is not a moment to lose. As Fouché is in those parts, you might tell him to associate himself in this affair with your emissary."¹ On receipt of this letter Joseph dispatched Faltpoult, but his mission proved a failure.

On the 12th March the Emperor received Joachim's letter of the 28th February, the proposals which the King had asked Eugène to forward, as well as a letter

¹ *Correspondance*, 21,382.

from Eugène himself. Harsh as Murat's conditions may have been, the Emperor was not in a position to criticise them, far less reject them. However much it galled him to be dictated to by his brother-in-law, he was obliged to bow to the force of circumstances. Napoleon therefore immediately wrote off to Eugène as follows : " I am sending you a copy of an extraordinary letter I have just had from the King of Naples. Seeing that France and I are at death-grips with the assassins, such sentiments are truly inconceivable.

" I have also received your letter and the draft treaty which the King sent you. You regard the idea as madness. Never mind ; send an agent to this most extraordinary of traitors and make a treaty with him in my name. Leave Piedmont and Genoa alone, and split up the rest of Italy into two kingdoms. Arrange that the treaty shall be kept secret until the Austrians have been cleared out of the country, and that twenty-four hours after it has been signed, the King shall declare for France and attack the Austrians. You may go as far as you like in this direction. Seeing how we are situated at present, no effort should be spared to procure the support of the Neapolitans. Later on we can do as we wish, for after such ingratitude and in such circumstances, no obligation is binding."

While Napoleon was thus preparing to tempt fortune for the last time in Italy, trouble had arisen between Eugène and Murat. The Reggio affair, which, despite the King's efforts to avoid a conflict, Eugène persisted in regarding as a breach of faith, had seriously strained their relations. Joachim's subsequent attempt to explain and justify his conduct of the 7th March had proved unavailing, and the Viceroy had determined to have nothing further to do with Murat till some new element entered into the situation. This new element was soon supplied by the arrival of Lord William Bentinck.

On the 28th February Bentinck had left Palermo with the proclamation of the Prince Hereditary of Sicily to the Neapolitans in which that Prince declared that he had in no wise renounced his claim to the crown of Naples. On the 2nd March, Bentinck set foot in Naples. There he found Catinelli, who told him of the result of his mission. Lord William then set out overland for Leghorn, and arrived there on the 8th March. Anxious to avoid all possibility of unpleasantness with him, for the consequences might be serious, Murat gave the most detailed instructions regarding the manner in which Bentinck was to be received ; no courtesy was to be omitted. Lecchi was in command at Leghorn, and it fell to his lot to do the honours and to open the discussion with his redoubtable lordship. The result of the interview was not favourable to the cause of Naples. Bentinck protested against the occupation of Tuscany—he would go into the matter with Murat. To Filangieri, whose ostensible mission was to convey Joachim's salutations, but whose real task was to find out how the land lay, he rapped out the same reply. Lord William looked upon it as a waste of time to enter into discussions with subordinates when he was just about to start for headquarters. This promised trouble.

On the night of the 15th Bentinck was at Reggio. Next morning found him face to face with the King of Naples. He did not beat about the bush. There were three reasons, he said, which compelled him to occupy Tuscany. First of all, there was the safety of his army, then the necessity of securing supplies, and, finally, his Government's dignity ; they did not beg favours. To this Murat's reply was that he had conquered Tuscany, that he had been the first to occupy it, and, further, that Austria herself had consented to that occupation. He had established a civil administration, and his dignity would not permit him to draw back. On these lines the dis-

cussion might have gone on for ever, but the King proposed a concession. The English should have the military command in Tuscany, he would control the civil government, and the whole question should be referred to Lord Castlereagh for decision. Bentinck would not budge an inch, and the interview was barren of result.

Murat came forth boiling with rage. He vowed that he would sooner lose his crown than be dictated to by Bentinck. As, however, he was not anxious to be reduced to that extremity, he decided once again to have recourse to his good friends the French. He therefore dispatched a messenger to Eugène. Cozza was the selected emissary, and the statements he was authorised to let fall—statements that were intended for the Viceroy's ear—showed how anxious Joachim was to resume relations with France. "On several occasions," said Cozza to Zucchi, "I have had the honour to come before you as the spokesman of my King, but never at a juncture so urgent and so grave as the present. On the considerations which I am instructed to lay before you depend the safety and welfare of our Sovereigns and their armies." To have provoked so weighty an utterance, Cozza must have had a more important matter on hand than the transmission of the following commonplace message: "I am sending you some letters from the Queen. I trust you will be so kind as to forward them to their destination. I am grieved, my dear Eugène, that you are so vexed with me and that you have given up sending me the papers. I asked you, too, to give me news of the health of the Emperor and the Vicereine. You are annoyed with me, but I am sure without reason. No one is more sincerely attached to you than I, or more anxious to give you proof of his attachment. Adieu, my dear nephew; be assured of my entire friendship.—Your very affectionate friend,

J. NAPOLEON."¹

¹ Murat to Eugène. Reggio, March 18, 1814. *Affaires Étrangères*.

This missive was to put the Austrians off the scent in case they seized the messenger. The real message was a verbal one. It was to inform Eugène of Murat's ardent desire to come to an arrangement with him, and Cozza was instructed to use language of sufficient plainness and cogency to impress upon the Viceroy that the safety of the two armies was at stake.¹ By a singular and happy coincidence the Neapolitan envoy and the Emperor's letter of the 12th March reached Eugène at the same time. Having received the fullest sanction from Napoleon, nothing now prevented Eugène from entering into negotiations, and he wrote back to Murat as follows :—

"Sire, I have been handed Your Majesty's letter of yesterday, the 18th March, and I hasten to assure you that all the letters you have sent me shall duly reach their destination.

"I have this moment received a letter dated the 12th instant from His Majesty the Emperor giving me permission to come to an arrangement with Your Majesty, and I therefore beg you to appoint some confidential agent for the purpose of discussing the matter. Everything shall be promptly settled. Till then I beg you to

¹ Evidence of Murat's desire to throw off the despotism of Austria and England, and of the persistence with which he pursued his secret ambition, the unification of Italy, whose King he wished to be, is clearly afforded not only by his negotiations with Eugène, but also by a letter he wrote to Fouché on the 18th March, the same date as his letter to the Viceroy. "All the Powers have made proclamations regarding the independence of Italy, and all have insulted the brave Italians, since all desire the restoration of the old dynasties. I alone have as yet said nothing. Beyond all doubt I genuinely desire that union and independence. I alone can reach the ears of the Italians. I should therefore like a proclamation of the independence of Italy, which the Emperor himself must wish to save. Such a proclamation would afford me a pretext for breaking with the Austrians. I should like a few words saying definitely 'My army will co-operate with that Power which is sincerely desirous of securing the independence of Italy and of saving her from the return of the old dynasties.' My troops will do wonders ; they are crying aloud to save Italy."

postpone all operations. I request you to observe the greatest secrecy."¹

Eugène appointed Zucchi to meet Carascosa, and gave him the following instructions:—

1. Piedmont and Genoa were not to be meddled with. The rest of Italy could be split up into two kingdoms.

2. The rights of the Pope as a temporal prince were to be glossed over as lightly as possible. It could be said that whatever happened the Pope would have to return to Rome, but that the nature of his sovereignty would be determined at a later date.

3. An attempt was to be made to prevail on the King of Naples to be satisfied with Tuscany and the three departments recently added to the kingdom.

4. The kingdom of Northern Italy therefore would, apart from the three departments mentioned above, be made up exactly as it was before.

5. An agreement was to be arrived at, even though it meant some further sacrifices, particularly if the two following clauses were agreed to:—

(a) That the treaty should remain secret until the Austrians had been driven back beyond the Isonzo.

(b) That twenty-four hours after the signing of the treaty the King of Naples should declare for France and attack the Austrians.²

Murat's instructions to Carascosa have only survived in fragmentary form. The great thing to be sure of was that the Frenchman's powers were quite in order. The dread of an unratified treaty, of a repetition of his Austrian experience, was decidedly preying on his mind. Article 1 of these instructions, at any rate, was formal. "On and after the date on which the ratifications of

¹ The Viceroy to Murat. Mantua, March 19, 1814. *Affaires Étrangères*.

² Eugène's instructions to Zucchi. Quoted by M. Weil. *Revue d'Histoire moderne et contemporaine*.

the present shall have been exchanged there shall exist an offensive and defensive alliance between the high contracting parties, and they shall mutually undertake to combine their armies in order to expel the foreign troops from Italy."

A conference between Carascosa and Zucchi finally took place at San Giacomo di Po. The Neapolitan desired to see the Emperor's signed instructions; Eugène's representative did not possess them. However, the discussion at last began. Zucchi put forward the Viceroy's proposals; Carascosa restated Murat's customary terms, the terms which he presented to Neipperg, and which he thought for a moment Austria had accepted, the terms which he submitted to Graham and suggested to Metternich, and which he now claimed to impose on the Emperor. They were that Italy was to be divided into two parts. The southern portion, which was to be Joachim's appanage, was to be bounded by the Po and the Taro. The French army was then to be sent back across the Alps. Genoa and Piedmont were to belong to France on condition that the roads across the Alps should be excluded. Zucchi, infuriated at such proposals, broke off the negotiations and hastened to inform Eugène, who was no less indignant than his lieutenant.

Though we may readily understand Eugène's wrath at the claims advanced by Murat, that wrath had no real justification. By instructing Zucchi to curtail Murat's portion and to limit the part he was to play, Eugène himself had departed from the Emperor's plans. In his letter of the 12th he certainly displayed no such restrictive tendencies as were manifested by Eugène a few days later. It was no doubt an immense sacrifice for Napoleon to make, and it is equally certain that he only made it because he was absolutely obliged; nevertheless, having decided that the thing must be done, he did it with that high magnanimity, that lofty

disregard of the nicely calculated less or more which so often characterised his actions. In his letter to Eugène there is no question of cutting Joachim down to this or that, of paring down his portion or making him put up with Tuscany and the three departments. The Emperor knew that the boundary for which Joachim was so anxious was the Po. He did not stop to haggle or quibble, but simply gave him what he wanted. "Split the rest of Italy into two kingdoms"—those were his words. There was no question of driving a hard bargain about a little bit of territory more or less, and, in order that the Viceroy might have a free hand, in order that no unforeseen question should crop up and delay the settlement of the matter—the crisis was urgent—Napoleon told Eugène that "he could go as far as he liked," give Murat everything he asked for, and that, seeing how they were situated, he must spare no effort to bring the affair to a satisfactory conclusion. These powers were obviously as ample as they could possibly be, and if Murat claimed a little more territory than the conscience of the worthy Eugène told him he ought to give him, that was no reason for breaking off negotiations on which the fate of Italy quite possibly depended. No doubt, when Eugène's failure to obey orders drove Murat back into the arms of Austria and England, the issue of the struggle was a foregone conclusion. The act of treason of the 8th January had done its work. The Allies were firmly entrenched in Italy; they had nothing to fear from France. Time was when, if Murat had acted loyally, the situation might have been different, but that time had gone by, and, even if Murat had come to terms with Eugène, it would have had no effect on the course of events; the Fates had worked their will. But although all this is true, it is none the less true that the Viceroy transgressed the Emperor's commands, and for the fact that Murat at this juncture did not decide

once more to throw in his lot with France, Eugène, and none but Eugène, was to blame.

When Murat received the letter requesting him to appoint a plenipotentiary to negotiate with France he was so thoroughly convinced that his plans were at last to be crowned with success that in a momentary access of zeal he made the Duc di Gallo write to Campochiaro ordering him to break off his negotiations with the Allies, and sent a messenger to the Cavaliere di Angelis, acting Foreign Minister at Naples, bidding him delay the publication of the treaty of the 2nd January, which had been sent him for that purpose a few days previously. The Duc di Campochiaro very sensibly refrained from giving effect to this ill-considered injunction, and decided to await the arrival of further orders. As for the Cavaliere di Angelis, he was unable to execute his instructions, because, before the messenger arrived, he had published the treaty, and communicated its terms to the Corps Diplomatique and all the authorities in the kingdom. This meant that the King's last card was in danger of being thrown away, and to prevent that, he brought into play such feeble means as remained to him. He felt that amid the general ruin of his schemes France was his solitary plank of safety. He appears to have sent an emissary—it may have been Livron—to Mantua on the 25th March.¹ Brunetti certainly went there shortly afterwards. Murat was now reduced to desperate shifts. All had forsaken him. French, English, and Austrians alike at last saw clearly the nature of the aims he was

¹ A good deal of uncertainty still hangs about Livron's mission. Some documents would seem to indicate that it followed Carascosa's, which would mean that it took place, as M. Weil points out, between the 25th and 29th March. On the other hand, Livron told Wilson on the 31st March that he had been to Mantua, but that he had been sent there after the arrival of a dispatch informing the King that negotiations for peace had been begun in France. As the aide-de-camp who brought the news to which Livron alludes was at Murat's headquarters on the 6th March, it would thus appear that Livron's mission took place before Carascosa's.

following and refused any longer to play into his hands. His downfall was not far off.

Caroline, ruling in her husband's absence at Naples, was far from sharing his insane ambition of governing Italy, and, in direct opposition to Murat, she had taken active steps to complete the rupture with France. On the 12th February she commanded that all communications should cease between the kingdom of Naples and the French Empire, and ordered that whatever measures were necessitated by a state of war should be carried out.¹

Her mind was thoroughly made up; she would leave her fate in Austria's hands and have nothing to do with Joachim's Utopian dreams. Mier, however, and other people as well, had told her of the King's unsatisfactory behaviour, and she had at first sent him messages counselling submission to Austria's views. All this was

¹ The following are Caroline's letter and the Minister's reply: "Monsieur le ministre, I have just given orders for the taking over of the Principalities of Benevento and Ponte Corvo and the seizure of all French ships of war or trading vessels which are now in our ports or may hereafter enter them. I have also commanded that all the officers and agents of the French Government shall be sent back to Corfu or to France, that all communications shall cease between the kingdom of Naples and the French Empire, and finally that seals shall be affixed to all the chests belonging to the French Government. In advising you of the steps I have taken, it is my desire that you should submit to me whatever other supplementary measures are rendered necessary by the fact that we are in a state of war with France.—CAROLINE. NAPLES, *February 12, 1814.*"

"NAPLES, *February 15, 1814.* Report to Her Majesty the Queen Regent. In fulfilment of the commands which Your Majesty was pleased to give me in your letter of the 12th, I submit to your wise consideration some observations regarding certain steps that may be necessitated by the rupture that has taken place between the kingdom of Naples and the French Empire. It has doubtless not escaped Your Majesty's foresight that an essential measure in the circumstances is the recall of the royal legation in Paris as well as of the Neapolitan consuls in French ports; but Your Majesty no doubt considered that when the Duc di Gallo saw His Majesty the King he would lose no time in sending these agents the necessary instructions in the matter. I can assure Your Majesty that he was already in possession of instructions for dealing with the possible eventuality of an outbreak of war.

"Inasmuch as the French legation and consulate have already left the

trouble thrown away. Joachim, absorbed in his dreams, was deaf to all remonstrances. Vainly did Caroline urge him to attack the Viceroy; she only learned that he was negotiating with him. Not being the sort of woman to display un murmuring acquiescence and being anxious to retain her kingdom, she promptly sent him a comminatory warning. During the night of the 25th March the Comte de Mosbourg and Caracciolo set out from the royal palace at Naples for Joachim's headquarters. They were the bearers of letters and verbal messages of the most forcible description. If the King persisted in his tortuous policy with regard to Austria, if he continued to maintain relations with France, the Queen would leave him—she would sever her destiny from his entirely, and cause the Neapolitan Government to take whatever measures she might deem to be in conformity with the country's real interests. For a moment she thought of going to seek the King in person—she even gave orders on the 1st April for the Duchess di Gallo to accompany

kingdom, I am of opinion that all the State authorities should be informed that they are no longer to recognise the French vice-consuls or consular agents resident in the ports of the kingdom. I need not call Your Majesty's attention to the fact that it is absolutely necessary that the rupture between Naples and France should be notified to the ministers and agents of foreign Powers at Naples, as well as to the Neapolitan ministers and agents at foreign courts. I am convinced that this will have already occurred to the Duc di Gallo. He had prepared for the purpose and submitted to the King for approval a declaration to be published at the same time in the kingdom.

"Your Majesty will in your wisdom decide whether it is advisable to sequester the property in this country assigned to the domain-extraordinary of the French crown as well as the Nuncio's palace, which was the property of the Pope, and which was seized by the French legation when the Roman States were annexed to the French Empire.

"If the measures which have formed the subject of Your Majesty's commands are to be extended to include the kingdom of Italy, the same procedure which Your Majesty may see fit to adopt with regard to the above-mentioned property might also be observed in the case of the Italian legation, which belonged to the former Republic of Venice.—DI ANGELIS." Naples, *Archivio di Stato*.

her ;¹ but illness—or more probably reflection—made her abandon the idea and content herself with waiting to see what came of her messages.

Bentinck was a formidable stumbling-block to the luckless Joachim. After the Reggio conference the two men considered it vain to renew the discussion. It was therefore to Bellegarde that Bentinck betook himself at Verona. After discussing matters for two days with the Marshal, the Englishman, in no satisfied state of mind, ordered Wilson to see Murat and settle the question. "An immediate decision is a *sine qua non* of my remaining here with the expeditionary force." That was Bentinck's last word.

Wilson, who was received by Murat at Bologna, was much struck with his manners and appearance. "Murat's dress was singular. Hair curled in Roman coiffure—two ringlets or what, *à la Parisienne*, are styled 'pensées,' dependent on each shoulder. Blue uniform coat, red pantaloons, yellow shoes, with spurs, sword with three pictures in the handle. His countenance martial, his manners soft, his conversation easy and intelligent." Possibly the irascible Bentinck had not given a flattering description of him. Wilson dined with him, and considered that "the banquet was according to the rules of perfect gastronomy." He was present with the King at a ball, and thought his manners, when he was dancing, very attractive and very unaffected.

But however favourable the impressions of the English General, it was his duty to carry out his instructions. He therefore made an imperative demand for Tuscany, and handed Murat a note in which Bentinck had the effrontery to deliver himself as follows: "It would certainly be inconsistent with the straightforwardness of the undersigned if he refrained from stating as his private opinion that the hopes to which the treaty gave rise

¹ *Diario di Nicola.*

have been but too thoroughly belied." That was too much for Murat. He stopped short, glared at Wilson, handed the note to Gallo, and without another word broke up the conference.

With Eugène turning a deaf ear to his overtures, with Caroline threatening to cast him off, with Bentinck full of suspicion, and telling him so to his face, to whom was he to turn—who would take his part? The Austrians would perhaps have served his purpose had he been on a friendly footing with them, but with the exception of Mier, whose professional duty it was to keep their mutual relations unstrained, the rest had no compunction about blaming his actions. Nugent, later on his inveterate enemy, Bellegarde, who voiced his complaints to the Emperor of Austria, Metternich, who from afar caused it to be said that the King's vacillating conduct was producing the worst possible effect on the Allies—all were against him, all were spying upon him, waiting to entrap him, all knew of his dealings with Eugène. They knew the dates, they knew what resolutions had been adopted. Wilson has it in his diary that on the 24th March some one from Mantua had told them all about the San Giacomo negotiations. He even states what their object was, namely, to create an Italian league to drive the Austrians and the English out of Italy—even to give the French the go-by.¹ Though he went somewhat astray on the last point, he had a fairly accurate idea of what was in Murat's mind. However, something had to be done to settle the Tuscany question; the Muratist confederation must be given its death-blow, and so, at a conference of the Ministers of the various Powers which took place at Bologna, it was decided that Bentinck was to have Leghorn, Pisa, and Viareggio. The Neapolitans were to undertake the administration of the rest of Tuscany. By this concession

¹ Robert Wilson. Private Diary of Events during 1812, 1813, 1814.

to Murat's *amour propre* (he knew very well that his part in the play was over) appearances were saved, and the King, mollified and cowed, resigned himself to everything. He consented to discuss a scheme of operations with Bellegarde, nay, he even went further, and agreed to choose one of three plans without going into the matter at all. He signified his readiness to do anything the Austrian marshal wished, he would fall in with any plan he liked to suggest—he would even serve under his command. What more did they ask of him? Did they wish him to leave the army and go back to Naples, so that they might be quite sure he could work no more mischief? To that too he would consent. Yes, he would hand over his troops to Bellegarde and go home. What cared he? Nothing mattered now. Listless and weary, like a body living on without a soul, he was tasting the bitterness entailed by the irremediable ruin of his hopes. The din of camps, the excitement and bustle of preparing for battle, failed to stir his interest; his thoughts were elsewhere. Hope, and, with hope, all strength of will, had utterly forsaken him.

To complete his overthrow, to quench the last faint gleam of hope in the night of utter despair, there now came upon the scene the last but not the least redoubtable of his foes. Frail and defenceless, without money and without an army, that adversary drew near, and lo, the multitude cast themselves at his feet and strove with one another to kiss the hem of his white robe: Pius VII. was returning from his long exile! From the hour when he had been handed over to the Austrian soldiers, who lined the route in his honour for a distance of about ten kilometres before Parma, his journey had been one long triumphal progress. He begged to be suffered to continue his route without a break; the people would not hear of it. Again and again he was compelled to appear at the windows of the ducal palace that over-

looked the Piazza to bless the surging throng, who sent up deafening shouts of *Evviva il Papa Re!* At length the Pope set out for Bologna. There he met Bentinck, who placed his country's funds at his disposal; there too he saw Joachim, whom he scarcely deigned to notice.

At last came the irremediable catastrophe. Paris was taken; the Allies were masters of France! On the 11th April, at seven in the morning, a messenger arrived post-haste from Turin to bring the news to Murat. But all was not lost. As yet the Allies in Italy were ignorant of the event. There might even yet be time to deceive them—to pose as their trusty ally. At Borgo San Donnino in a conflict with the French troops Murat flung himself strenuously into the fight, astounding Mier and Eckhardt by his prodigies of energy and valour and calling forth the admiration of the Allies. Balachoff, the Russian envoy, alone held aloof and refused to add his voice to the general chorus of praise, nor would he sign the alliance with Joachim, for which he had specially come to Italy. He subsequently stated that had the King marched against the French twenty-four hours earlier he would have put his hand to the treaty.¹ By this crowning effort, this final piece of bluff, Murat's sole idea was to propitiate the Powers by making himself their humble servant. His ambition was dead—dead and cruelly trampled upon. The Pope was back again in Rome; the Austrians were holding the duchy of Modena in the name of its former possessor; Tuscany had to be given up to the Duke of Wurzburg, and the Marquis de Sommariva came in the name of the Allies to take possession of the departments that had formerly composed the kingdom of Italy. But worse was to come. Bellegarde gave the King to understand that he must return home on the 29th April, and while Mier and Gallo were at work settling the respective spheres of operation of the Austrian and Neapolitan

¹ Saint Marsan to King Victor Emmanuel. Vienna, February 17, 1815.

armies, Joachim set out for Naples *via* Ancona, commanding all the Neapolitan employees to follow suit. On the 2nd May, at eleven o'clock in the morning, Murat, in civilian dress, drove through his capital with the Queen and Prince Achilles in an open carriage, and as, with thoughtful and dejected mien, he made his way into his palace, the Emperor too was close at hand, passing on his way to exile, for on the 3rd May, Napoleon set foot on the island of Elba.

CHAPTER XIII

THE FINAL HAZARD

Murat endeavours to propitiate the Allies—Pauline comes to Naples—The arrival of Fesch—Arrangements for the transmission of correspondence—The *Curaçoa* at Naples—Madame Mère goes to Elba—The Caterbi affair—Pauline's departure—Torlonia, Colonna, and Fesch—Letters for Napoleon intercepted—Murat's political position at the 1st January 1815—His relations with the Pope, Austria, England, and France—Napoleon escapes from Elba—Colonna's task—Murat's attitude (5th–10th March)—The arrival of the *Inconstant* at Naples—Murat makes up his mind—Preparations for war (10th–15th March)—News of the Emperor's arrival at Lyons—The King goes to Bologna—Caroline—Murat's advance into Italy—Napoleon's correspondence with Murat—Belliard's mission—Murat flees to France—The mission of Baudus.

AWAKENED from his dream, called back to grim reality, Murat received the news of Napoleon's exile with indifference. He was far too deeply wrapped up in the defeat of his own ambitions to spare any pity for the lot that had befallen his brother-in-law. Compelled to bow before the victors of the hour, his policy now was to propitiate them and to endeavour to obliterate from their minds the regrettable impression produced by his attitude in the recent campaign. His first step was to remove from the public service all those who were not Neapolitans by birth or naturalisation. This was a blow aimed directly at the French employees whom Napoleon's decree of the 6th July 1811 had maintained at Naples in spite of Murat's wishes. A further decree abolished conscription and restored the system of levies. These concessions, ostensibly granted to the Neapolitans, were really intended by Joachim as an earnest of good behaviour to

the Allies. In order to conciliate Bentinck, whom he knew to be a strong supporter of the Sicilian cause, he formally commanded that all vessels arriving in Neapolitan waters from Sicily should be treated with the respect due to the ships of the most friendly Powers, and that trade between Sicily and Naples should be fostered by every means calculated to insure its prosperity.¹

Towards the vanquished one of Elba, Joachim's attitude was markedly different. He was no longer useful, and had therefore to be kept at arm's length. When relations between France and Naples were broken off, the former Neapolitan consul in the island, the Chevalier Cattaneo, had left Porto Ferrajo on the 2nd March and betaken himself to Leghorn to await his Government's instructions.² As no message reached him, he assumed that it was his duty to go back to the island on Napoleon's arrival. On his return he presented himself to General Bertrand, who told him that, although up to the present no communications had taken place with His Majesty the King of Naples, he might continue to discharge his consular functions. This arrangement, however, by no means met with Murat's approval, for he feared that the fact of having a Neapolitan agent in such a position would give umbrage to the Powers. On the 1st June, therefore, Gallo disavowed his subordinate, and sent him an injunction to abstain from discharging any official duties.³

So great was the anxiety at Naples to avoid all intercourse with the island, that when Napoleon wrote to Caroline, asking her to send him "a cook, an upholsterer, some furniture, and books, the Queen excused herself on the grounds that it would not be compatible with the position in which they were personally placed to comply

¹ *Moniteur Universel*.

² Cattaneo to Gallo. Porto Ferrajo, March 2, 1814.

³ Gallo to Cattaneo. - Naples, June 1, 1814.

with these requests.”¹ Such was the footing on which they presumed to treat the Emperor.² This was the official attitude. However, the members of the Imperial family came to take their stand by the fallen Emperor, as of old they had gathered round him in his days of triumph; the adherents of the Napoleonic cause were secretly striving to secure their master’s freedom; then again, Murat was at loggerheads with the Powers. All these causes combined to bring about an improvement in the relations. Soon, too, the Princess Pauline came to throw oil on the troubled waters. Wishing to be near her brother, she decided to go and stay at Naples, and two English vessels went to fetch her. The *Curaçoa*, anchored off Nice, vainly waited for her captain to bring the Princess from Fréjus. The *Undaunted*, which had sailed from Elba on the 17th May, also arrived too late. Pauline had already left on board a Neapolitan frigate, the *Latitia*. Before going on to Naples the vessel called at Elba, where she arrived about the 29th or 30th May. According to the officers of the frigate, Pauline did not go ashore; Napoleon came on board, remained with her two hours in a cabin, and then returned

¹ Mier to Metternich, June 2, 1814. Quoted by M. Weil.

² Murat had no hesitation about writing in gushing terms to the protégés of the Allies. The following is what he said to the King of Spain on the 10th June: “Monsieur mon frère,—The news that Your Catholic Majesty has returned to the bosom of your subjects prompts us to convey to you the satisfaction this happy event has occasioned us. We beg you to accept our heartiest congratulations. The interest we take in all that concerns Your Catholic Majesty should convince you of the sincerity of our sentiments. It is our earnest desire that this memorable epoch should mark the commencement of fresh ties between our respective countries, and that the bonds of friendship and goodwill which have hitherto existed between the Sovereigns of Naples and Spain should be drawn still closer to the mutual welfare of both nations. We shall never cease to hope for the fulfilment of these wishes, as well as for the unbroken prosperity of Your Catholic Majesty and Your Royal Family. Wherefore we pray God, Monsieur mon frère, to have you in His holy keeping.—Your affectionate brother,

“JOACHIM NAPOLEON.”



Joseph F. F.

to the island.¹ From an Austrian account, on the other hand, it would appear that Pauline's stay was of longer duration. All the time she was on the island, however, she was, according to this version of the story, "never able to talk to her brother about what she wished, and she at last gave up the attempt in despair and took her departure."² In any case, her stay on the island was of the briefest.

Yet another member of the Imperial family now came to take up his abode within reach of the Isle of Elba. This was Cardinal Fesch, who had gone to join Madame Mère at the Palazzo Falconieri at Rome, having made up his mind to give his active assistance to Napoleon. He immediately opened a correspondence with the Emperor, whose first commission was of a domestic description. Fesch was directed to send him by the English vessel, the *Curaçoa*, a variety of things, such as "plate, furniture, two thousand hundredweight of wheat, twenty thousand bushels of oats, two thousand ewes, with their complement of rams, twenty milch-cows, fifty orange trees," and so forth. The Cardinal, somewhat in a quandary, informed Murat of these requirements, but he being unable or unwilling to reply, the Queen wrote in his stead. "The present state of affairs," she said, "forbids us to enter into any sort of intercourse with the Isle of Elba. The fate of Naples is still in the balance. Everything leads us to hope that the matter will be satisfactorily settled, but that hope will not be realised unless we proceed with the utmost caution. It pains me a great deal to be obliged to reply to you in this way, but the King's future and that of my children leave me no alternative."³ However, the *Curaçoa* on her way

¹ *Diario di Nicola.*

² Note to Hager. Vienna, July 15, 1814. Quoted by M. Weil. *Joachim Murat, roi de Naples.*

³ Caroline to Fesch, June 25, 1814. Quoted by M. Weil. *Joachim Murat, roi de Naples.*

from France touched at Elba, stayed there twenty-four hours, took up letters from Napoleon to Madame Mère—probably also to Cardinal Fesch—and continued her voyage to Naples, arriving there on the 29th June. Captain Tower, the commander of the *Curaçoa*, seemed by no means harshly disposed towards Napoleon and his family. He invited the King and Queen of Naples to a grand function on board his ship on the 6th July (a proceeding which provoked a remonstrance from the court of Sicily), and offered to make himself the means of communication between Elba and Naples. On the 11th July the Emperor asked Bertrand to find out from Fesch “who could suitably be appointed Consul at Civita Vecchia.” On the 17th he had a reply sent to Lucien thanking him for his letter of the 2nd June and excusing himself for not writing personally on the grounds that he was writing no letters to any one.

Then yet another event occurred to draw the family bonds closer. Madame Mère decided to make her home in Elba, and Napoleon, having made the necessary preparations for receiving her, gave orders to Bertrand on the 24th July to see that the *Abeille* started that night, if the weather permitted, to bring her away from Civita Vecchia. As it turned out, however, the *Abeille* was too late. Campbell, a representative of the British Government, had been to Leghorn waiting for Madame Mère, who arrived from Rome on the 29th July, accompanied by Colonna and Bartolucci, two of Napoleon’s emissaries. On the 2nd August she embarked on an English brig, the *Grasshopper*, with Colonel Campbell, Colonna, and two ladies-in-waiting. The weather was all in their favour, and they succeeded in reaching Elba the same day.

While Madame Mère was sailing away from Leghorn on the *Grasshopper*, the *Abeille*, commanded by Captain Taillade, was just reaching Civita Vecchia. Learning

that his visit there was to no purpose, Taillade, who carried letters for Cardinal Fesch, immediately went on to Rome, whither His Eminence had invited him. The Cardinal was doubtless anxious that Napoleon should be informed about the arrangements made for the transmission of their correspondence, which the Emperor was desirous of entrusting to a safe man at Civita Vecchia, for the Austrian police now began to keep a sharp look-out on all that went on between Elba and the Continent.

Many strange characters now appeared on the scene, who, according to their own account, were acting as confidential messengers between Murat and his brother-in-law. The most recent instance of the kind related to one Caterbi, rather a singular individual whom some people took for an Austrian spy, others for a secret agent of Napoleon's. Whatever he was, he caused enough stir for Joachim to take the alarm and order the following notice to be inserted in the *Monitore*. "The Government has been surprised to hear from Leghorn and Civita Vecchia that certain persons, calling themselves officers in the service of the King of Naples and wearing the decorations of his Royal Order, have appeared in those parts alleging that they had been sent by the Court of Naples to the island of Elba. Though the meaning of this trick should be quite obvious to all, the Minister of Police thinks it as well to state that these individuals do not belong to the kingdom of Naples, that they are quite unknown there, and that they have never been sent on any sort of mission to the island of Elba. This being the case, all local authorities are requested to order the arrest of any persons who give out that they have been sent on any such mission."¹

Perhaps all these official protestations were intended to conceal a substratum of truth. At any rate, there is no doubt that some one—and it may have been Caterbi

¹ *Monitore di Due Sicilie*. August 27, 1814.

himself—conveyed a letter to Napoleon from Murat, since on the 9th September the former wrote to Bertrand saying that he had received a very affectionate epistle from the King of Naples. Certainly, in view of the turn things were taking in Italy Joachim had good reason to seek a reconciliation with his brother-in-law. Everything, indeed, encouraged him to take the step; Napoleon's increasing popularity in Italy, the propaganda that was being carried on in his name as well as the secret liberationist aspirations and agitations of the Italian peoples, who had rudely been compelled to bow the neck once more to a yoke which fifteen years of comparative freedom rendered the more intolerable. As for the kingdom of Naples, relations with the Allies showed little tendency to improve. It did not look as though the Congress was going to decide in favour of the King of Naples. His most formidable antagonists, Consalvi and Talleyrand, were gaining ground every day. Policy therefore rendered it advisable to patch up a peace with the Emperor, who, deposed though he was, still represented an enormous force. To this aim therefore Murat directed his energies. But opportunities for a correspondence which had necessarily to be carried on with secrecy and circumspection were few and far between, and it would have been impossible to come to any practical arrangement had not Joachim by a happy chance encountered a valuable intermediary in the person of Princess Pauline.

Pauline, who was staying for the time being in Naples, was due to join her brother early in September. The *Inconstant*, which was under orders to fetch her, was delayed for sundry reasons, and did not arrive until some time during the first fortnight in October. The officers were presented to Murat, who received them cordially and eagerly questioned them concerning his brother-in-law, asking about his health, and inquiring how he occupied his time and what amusements he had. He was

also anxious to know how many troops he possessed, and how they were made up. On learning from Taillade, the captain of the brig, that he had not more than fifteen hundred men all told, Joachim exclaimed, "Well, that might easily be the nucleus of an army of five hundred thousand." On the 29th October Taillade, who had been decorated with the order of the Two Sicilies, set sail with the Princess, taking with him a letter which he "handed to Napoleon from his brother-in-law."

As to the nature of the messages Pauline bore with her we are reduced to mere conjecture. According to Pons, she advanced matters very considerably. "The Princess Pauline," he says, "had effected a reconciliation between the Emperor Napoleon and King Murat, the result of which was apparently an offensive and defensive alliance in terms of which the island of Elba was ceded to the Two Sicilies. We have had in our possession a letter from the King of Naples in his own handwriting setting forth the various clauses and conditions of this transaction."¹

It is incontestable that from the day of Pauline's arrival at Porto Ferrajo a change did come over the relations between the Emperor and Murat—a change which did not escape the notice of those whose business it was to keep an eye on all that went on in the island of Elba. Austrians, Italians, French alike noted the increased frequency which from this time onward marked the goings and comings between Naples and the island. It was about this time also that Napoleon completed the organisation of his intelligence system. He already had agents at Genoa, by whose means he was able to carry on a private correspondence with the

¹ Pons de l'Herault. *Souvenirs et anecdotes de l'île d'Elbe*. Positive as Pons is on the subject of this treaty between the Emperor and Murat, not the slightest confirmation of the matter is anywhere to be found. It is to be hoped that Murat's letters, now in course of publication, will supply the deficiency.

Empress, and he now established centres all over Italy from which orders and messengers were sent out in all directions. The management of the whole business was in the hands of Fesch, his Minister of Police, who was residing in Rome. He it was who gave orders to the rest, fixed their destinations, collected the news, sent off messengers, and put Murat and Napoleon into communication with each other. He held the power and the purse. Torlonia, the famous Roman banker, managed the Emperor's funds, or rather the funds which Napoleon and others had set aside for the advancement of the Imperial cause in Italy, and Fesch was at liberty to draw on this source for any secret business he had on hand. At Leghorn the Imperial interests were in the hands of Bartolucci, who pitted himself and his men, not unsuccessfully, against the secret service agents of Louis XVIII. under Mariotti. Besides these there were a host of emissaries constantly coming and going, men whose identity was unknown and cannot now be traced, but who all had to take orders from Colonna when any important matter was on hand. Colonna it was who, on a variety of pretexts, went travelling about all over Italy, but especially in Tuscany and the regions adjacent to the Po. He too it was who succeeded in obtaining private information regarding the Congress at Vienna and sent Napoleon the most detailed accounts of its proceedings.

Though these picked agents formed the main body of his intelligence staff, Napoleon counted besides on the various members of his family, who sent him on occasion letters of an interesting character. According to the Austrian police, Murat was not the least assiduous of Napoleon's correspondents, and they stated that an exchange of correspondence between Naples and Porto Ferrajo was of constant, not to say daily, occurrence. Nevertheless, on examination of the various statements

and affirmations, it turned out that no one had any really definite knowledge to go upon. Letters were intercepted, lists of the people who came and went between Elba and the mainland were drawn up, attempts were made to engage the confidence of those who were known to be attached to the Imperial cause—all the thousand and one precautions which misgiving suggests were observed ; but nothing decisively incriminating could be discovered either against Napoleon or against Murat. The baffled detectives were apparently plentifully endowed with the imaginative faculty, for, according to them, there was not a spot on the whole coast, from Naples to Genoa, that was not used as a receiving station for the Emperor's correspondence. As for the rank and file employed in this service, even black men and Turks were said to be included in the number. But wiser heads, less excitable folk, did not attach much importance to these rumours, and Bellegarde in a report which he sent on the 6th August to Metternich, was compelled to admit that, despite all the efforts that had been made, they had not succeeded in bringing anything home to the Emperor.¹

Early in 1815, however, Tiberio Pacca, delegate apostolic of Civita Vecchia and a nephew of the Cardinal of the same name, managed, by having recourse to rather questionable means, to obtain sure proof that correspondence was in progress between Murat and his brother-in-law. In a box dispatched by Cardinal Fesch to Porto Ferrajo he discovered a letter from Joachim to Napoleon and another for Pauline, as well as a note from Fesch himself for Bertrand regarding the affairs of Italy and Europe and the proceedings of the Congress.

To Pauline, Murat expressed the pleasure with which he had learned of her safe arrival and of the improvement her health and spirits had undergone. He was

¹ Bellegarde to Metternich. Milan, August 6, 1814. Quoted by M. Weil.

not, he continued, writing to the Emperor about "affairs," because he knew that the latter still retained some feelings of irritation against him. Although the Emperor had often been unjust towards him, Pauline was requested to tell him that he always had been, and would always continue to be, his friend and the most grateful of his followers. The Empress, he went on, was in good health. Pauline was greatly missed and greatly beloved by his children. The Congress, he said, was hanging fire, but his affairs in Italy had taken a capital turn. Austria appeared to have resolved to maintain her alliance with him, and his supporters were increasing in number. That was all that could be hoped for at the moment.¹

To Napoleon he said that he could not allow the opportunity to go by without sending his remembrances. He had heard from Vienna that the Empress and the King of Rome were in good health. The Queen had quite recently had letters from Her Majesty and Madame de Montesquiou. His children sent their homage. It was, he continued, a considerable time since the Imperial flag had been seen in Neapolitan waters, although it was greatly respected and received with pleasure there. The letter concluded with assurances of his "invariable attachment."²

It was probably to a copy of these letters that the Comte de Polignac was alluding when, on returning a few days later from a mission to Rome, he stated in the presence of the British Ambassador at Florence that he was in possession of letters from Murat to the Emperor and Pauline. Such were the only papers they had been able to discover up to the present.

It was becoming increasingly necessary for Joachim to make friends with the Emperor, for he could now see

¹ Murat to Pauline. Naples, December 26, 1814. Quoted by M. Weil.

² Murat to Napoleon. Naples, December 27, 1814. Quoted by M. Weil.

that serious trouble was brewing between himself and the Allies. The attempts he had made on his return from Northern Italy in May 1814 to insinuate himself into the good graces of Europe had not been successful. He could not advance the claims of Divine Right, nor was he covered by the *principe de la légitimité*. Gradually his adversaries began to gain ground. He had at first endeavoured to exchange courtesies with Sicily, but he had ultimately been forced to forbid his ports to Sicilian vessels. With Austria his relations were becoming every day more strained. At the Congress of Vienna Campochiaro and Cariati had attempted by every means in their power to secure, first of all that Murat should be officially represented at the deliberations, and next, that Austria should give effect to the provisions of the treaty of 1814. But Metternich, influenced by the prayers of the Pope's representative and the importunities of Talleyrand, could make no reply, and carefully abstained from granting to the Neapolitan envoys the support to which Murat was justly laying claim.

As regards Great Britain, though it is true that Joachim was on terms of quite unusual cordiality with certain individual Englishmen, the official relations between the two Governments were still cold and strained. Castlereagh indeed had declared to Murat's ministers that in time England might be able to recognise him as the rightful occupant of the throne of Naples,¹ but of this statement no confirmation had been received. On the 29th December, therefore, Joachim sent Castlereagh an official note, and on the 18th January he resolved that he would write to the Regent himself. In this letter he pointed out the peculiarly anomalous position in which he was placed with regard to England. In the late war British troops had fought and conquered under his leadership, yet now, though peace had been general

¹ *Minerva Napolitana*.

throughout Europe for several months, friendly relations had not formally been established between England and Naples. Though he was himself quite ready to place implicit trust in the promises of the British Government, such an informal arrangement was scarcely satisfactory from the international point of view, and it would be in the interests of both countries if the understanding that existed between them were embodied in a diplomatic instrument drawn up in regular form. After reviewing the circumstances which should lead the Regent to enter into negotiations for the immediate settlement of a treaty of peace and alliance, he concluded as follows: "The people over whom I rule are sensitive and generous; they are deeply attached to me because they know that all my efforts, all my longings, are centred upon their happiness and glory. The love they bear me, the bravery for which they are distinguished, the devotion of which they are capable, render me sufficiently strong to fear no danger so long as they are under arms. But it is not meet that a nation should be perpetually armed. I desire that my people should enjoy the blessings of peace, and that consummation is impossible until the tranquillity of my realm is guaranteed by an alliance with England. To delay this treaty therefore will be to postpone the happiness of five millions of brave Neapolitans.

"Should any unforeseen difficulties prevent Your Royal Highness proceeding as rapidly as I should desire with the negotiations which I propose, I beg that you will send me, in whatever form you may prefer, a definite statement of your intentions with respect to the Court of Naples."¹

It was, however, with his neighbour the Pope that Murat had his most constant and serious difficulties. At the beginning of the year 1815 the protests made

¹ Murat to the Prince Regent of England.

by the Holy See in the matter of the Marches had reached such a point that a rupture was imminent. Zuccari, the Neapolitan Consul, received the following letter from Pacca. "The Cardinal Camerlingo, pro-Secretary of State, has been formally directed by His Holiness to tell you definitely that he is weary of putting up with your behaviour towards his Government. The Holy Father is perfectly well aware that you have set up a secret system of espionage; he is equally cognisant of the leaflets that you have caused to be circulated in Rome and the Roman States with the criminal and dastardly intention of casting a doubt on the lawfulness of his rule. Finally, the Holy Father knows all about your meetings, your speeches, and your letters. His Holiness has commanded me to remind you that as you have no official status in this city, you are liable, in common with every one else, to the regulations of the local police, and any further offences on your part will certainly not escape their vigilance."¹

Such, then, was the situation of Murat with regard to Europe at the beginning of 1815. It was not reassuring. Nowhere could he count on any certain ally. Of the Powers many were secretly, some avowedly, hostile. Metternich, whom he had relied upon to guide the Neapolitan plenipotentiaries through the various diplomatic pitfalls—Metternich, who had undertaken to give the King of Naples the benefit of the sagacity for which he was renowned, was now only casting about for a suitable opportunity to turn against him. Murat, feeling the ground gradually failing beneath his feet, resolved on a decisive course of action. On the 8th February he commanded Gallo to send orders to Campo-chiaro at Vienna to ask Metternich for a formal declaration regarding his rights to the crown of Naples and the relations of the kingdom of Naples with France. Did


¹ Pacca to Zuccari. Rome, December 30, 1814. *Diario di Nicola.*

France mean peace or war? Joachim demanded a definite reply. In the event of a declaration of war with France, he requested Austria's permission to send an army of eighty thousand men across Northern Italy.

Talleyrand promptly seized the opportunity thus offered to persuade Austria to declare against Murat. He easily prevailed upon Metternich, already more than half convinced, to announce in a declaration, which was addressed to Talleyrand as well as to Campochiaro, that Austria would allow no foreign troops to make use of her territory. This declaration was to be supported by the recall of the forces then on the Polish frontier and by their transfer to Italy.¹ Certainly events moved on apace. Campochiaro had acquainted Metternich with the King's views on the 23rd February; on the 25th the Austrian replied with the note to Campochiaro, and on the same day orders were sent off to the Austrian troops. Thus affairs were coming to a head. Nothing was wanting but a suitable opportunity to put a match to the powder, when all Europe was startled as by a clap of thunder—Napoleon had quitted Elba!

On the 5th March official news of the event reached Naples and created immense excitement. There was one man, however, who had been no stranger to Napoleon's resolve. That man was Murat. On the 17th February the Emperor had decided to acquaint Joachim with his plans, and Colonna, who had only just returned from his protracted journey in Italy, was dispatched to Naples with instructions to inform the King that the Emperor had made up his mind to proceed to Paris and drive out the Bourbons, and that he was willing to forget the wrongs he had suffered at the hands of the King, who could now count on his Imperial protection. As soon as he learned that the Emperor had landed in France, Murat was to

¹ Talleyrand to Louis XVIII. Vienna, February 24, 1815. Pallain, *Correspondance de Talleyrand et de Louis XVIII.*



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send a confidential emissary to Vienna and himself inform the Austrian Ambassador at Naples of Napoleon's peaceable intentions. Murat was further to be requested to take up a position with his army on the frontiers of his kingdom, so that in the event of Austria attempting to throw troops into France, the presence of the King of Naples and his sixty thousand men would considerably hamper their movements.¹ Colonna reached Naples on the 1st March totally ignorant "how and when the Emperor designed to act." His instructions were merely to announce the Emperor's intended departure. As to when that intention was to be put into execution he could say nothing, and probably the Emperor did not know himself. Colonna at once sought out Murat, who was thunderstruck at the news. In reply to the King's offer to send ships to the Emperor, Napoleon's envoy stated that his instructions were merely to sign a treaty to relieve the King of Naples of all anxiety, and if the latter considered it expedient to enter into an offensive and defensive alliance, he was empowered to sign such an agreement on the understanding that it was only to become effective when it was found impossible to remain at peace with foreign Powers. Colonna also requested the King to send a small vessel to cruise about off the coast of Provence in order to pick up news. In this manner Joachim would receive rapid and accurate notification of Napoleon's arrival in France and of the subsequent course of events. Murat did not consider it advisable to sign an agreement with Colonna. He wanted fuller and more detailed information concerning the departure of his brother-in-law, to whom, however, he was quite willing to lend a hand. He ordered the Adjutant-General Franceschetti to leave at once for Porto Ferrajo with "a letter of the utmost importance." The seventy-four gunners, the *Capri* and the *Gioacchino*,

¹ L'île d'Elbe et les Cent Jours. *Correspondance*, XXXI.

were ordered to Elba to bring away Madame Mère.¹ To conceal their destination Joachim had given out that the *Capri* was going to join the Neapolitan frigates which had just been dispatched to Ancona.² Thus put off the scent, the Austrian Minister would have no suspicions of the important news that had come to hand or of Franceschetti's mission. Simultaneously with Franceschetti's departure for Elba, the vessel that was to cruise about on the look-out for news of Napoleon's landing set sail for the coast of Provence. The vessel in question was the *Prince Lucien*. She carried twelve guns and a crew of eighty men under the command of M. Pierre Ferreto. On the 3rd March she sailed out of Naples harbour and headed for Toulon and Marseilles. Murat now had nothing to do but await developments.³

He had not long to wait. On the morning of the 5th a courier, dispatched from Rome by the Chevalier

¹ Franceschetti. *Mémoires sur les événements qui ont précédé la mort de Joachim I^{er}, roi des Deux Siciles*.

² Mier to Metternich, Naples, March 9, 1815.

³ It has often been questioned whether Napoleon informed Murat of his departure. Although the Emperor himself indicated the date of Colonna's arrival at Naples as the 1st March it was not supposed that Murat could have known of the event before the 5th. It is undoubtedly true that he did not know the *day* on which Napoleon's departure took place until the 5th March, or possibly the evening of the 4th, but as early as the 1st he had learnt from Colonna that the Emperor *intended* to leave Porto Ferrajo. It may be argued that Napoleon himself assigns two different dates to Colonna's arrival in Naples, viz. the 1st March (*Correspondance* XXXI, 40) and the 4th (*Correspondance* XXXI, 164). But the latter date is erroneous since we have proof that on the 3rd March Murat was ordering the dispatch of a vessel which, in obedience to the instructions brought by Colonna, was to cruise about off the French coast.

⁴ The following occurs in a message sent by Murat to Gallo: "If Questiaux has not already left postpone his departure till to-morrow." This note, which was written on the evening of the 4th, tends to support the idea that at that hour Murat had already received word of Napoleon's departure. This may have been quite possible since, besides such information as private individuals or foreigners may then have had about the matter, the Neapolitan vice-consul at Leghorn had sent off the news on the morning of the 1st

Crivelli the day before, brought word that Napoleon had escaped from Elba. Without losing a moment Murat carried out the first part of the Emperor's proposed plan; he dispatched a confidential messenger to Vienna to make known his peaceable intentions. He sent for Mier, who found him "in a state of great agitation," told him of Napoleon's success and stated that within an hour or two's time he would be sending a messenger to Vienna. "Campochiaro," says Mier, "has orders to declare to our Court that whatever happens the policy of the King of Naples will remain subservient to ours. From this decision he says nothing will make him depart, and he desires to know what procedure we consider it expedient to adopt at the present juncture in order that he may fall in with it. The King once more took occasion to repeat to me how desirous he was of affording the Emperor Francis proofs of his gratitude and affection." The conversation, which took place in the presence of the Queen, lasted for more than two hours, and the King withdrew on word being brought to him that a vessel had arrived from Elba. On board was Mary, Pauline's secretary, with detailed information.

Inasmuch as by assisting Napoleon's designs he would be placing himself on a satisfactory footing with the Allies he hastened to carry out the Emperor's behests and assured them of his pacific intentions. He was too well pleased at finding an opportunity of relieving himself of the crushing and profitless burden of Austrian "protection" to have any hesitation about complying, at all events in spirit, with his brother-in-law's plans. The pacific assurances which he was about to give to Austria at the very same time as witnessed his departure for the frontier with his army in fighting trim, are

March. As the distance between Naples and Leghorn could easily have been covered in four days it would have been quite possible for the King to have received the dispatch on the 4th March.

strikingly reminiscent of his *modus operandi* of 1814 when, desirous of filching Italy from the French, he advanced with his troops, and palming himself off as the ally of France substituted his authority for hers without so much as striking a blow. As Mier remarks with some astonishment, the Emperor's escape from Elba, instead of determining Murat to postpone his intended visit to The Marches, appeared to make him all the more anxious to set out. The Austrian Ambassador was of opinion that the King's state of mind argued that he had plans, but that they were still more or less in the air and that he was waiting to see how Napoleon's adventure was likely to turn out before definitely deciding on a course of action. He would have modified his opinion if he had heard the conversation which took place between Murat and d'Ambrosio on the latter's return from Vienna. "Hurrying along through Northern Italy," writes d'Ambrosio, "I learned when I got to Ferrara that Bonaparte had managed to get away from Elba. Arriving at Ancona, I found my friend Carascosa consumed with patriotic zeal. I prevailed upon him to abate his ardour and see what time brought forth. I next came upon the King's baggage train, which had been sent on to Ancona whither troops were already being dispatched. Certain functionaries, civil and military, had arrived ahead of the King who, they said, would shortly be putting in an appearance with the officers of the royal household.

"At last I reached Naples and at once saw the King. Napoleon's return had completely turned his head. He could now only behold in the Emperor the victor of Marengo, of Jena, Austerlitz, Wagram, and Mojaisk. He gave me no time to say a word about matters at Vienna, but, filled with wrath and hatred against Austria, he exclaimed: 'At last then the hour of vengeance has come.' 'Not so, Sire,' I replied. 'And why not, pray?'

asked he. 'Europe,' I said, 'assembled in congress, will decide what is to be done in regard to Napoleon. The Powers have retained their unanimity of action. The bonds between them have been drawn the closer by their common hatred of French domination. The utmost France, with her lack of horses and war material, can possibly achieve will be to preserve her independence. She can never again destroy the independence of others. Your Majesty will gain nothing from an alliance with the French whose struggle will be for existence and not for glory.' 'What need have I of alliances,' was the King's retort, 'when the Italians hail me as their liberator? I can invade Italy, establish myself on the banks of the Po, throw my army across the river and take Venice by surprise. Beneath my standards I can rally the Piedmontese, sick of the follies of their King; Milan, the latest home of liberal ideas; Venice, still mindful of her ancient glory; Liguria, groaning beneath the Sardinian domination; and the people of Romagna, who are naturally warlike and would readily lend me their support in such an enterprise. As for Austria, will she not soon be called upon to do battle with the French? How then will she be able to meet every necessity and combat every foe at once?' 'Is Your Majesty then ignorant of the forces which Austria has at her disposal? Do you not know that Austria has an army of 450,000 men and twenty-six million inhabitants and that she is most closely allied with England and Russia, and do you forget that before she went to war with France she would necessarily have to pour troops into Italy in order to keep the French beyond the Alps and prevent them from effecting a junction with the forces that will be called upon to fight in Germany? A year ago I was certainly of opinion that Your Majesty should have come to terms with Austria on the banks of the Po after summoning to your side the Italian troops, then

full of patriotic enthusiasm. Your Majesty could then have taken the field with a hundred thousand, perhaps two hundred thousand men. But now how can you hope to succeed with the Pope back again in Rome, with all these princelings who have dragged back the Italian provinces into that condition of sluggishness and stagnation from which, under French rule, they were just beginning to emerge.' The King then said it was useless to enter into further discussion concerning a matter on which his mind was already made up. 'Go,' he concluded, 'and rest after your journey and then make ready to set out. The time for negotiations has passed ; it is now the time to fight.' Here the Queen broke in saying : 'Austria has her fears concerning you, just as she is afraid about what may happen in Italy, but she has no intention of altering the *status quo* or of interfering with our present position unless you put yourself completely in the wrong.' 'Enough of this, exclaimed the King, 'let us change the subject.' Thereupon I took my departure."

As soon as he reached home d'Ambrosio deemed it his duty to send Murat a letter advising him to proceed with caution and see what time brought forth. Next morning he was sent for by the King. "How," exclaimed His Majesty, "could you write me such a letter?" "Sire," answered the General, "you are treading upon a volcano. You have no sure foundation to go upon. I have said so before and I repeat it now." "No," was the King's reply, "we shall win the day. I will appeal to the people of Italy to gather round me at Bologna. You who know all that went on at Vienna, all the promises that have been left unfulfilled, do you not feel the same bitterness that I do?" At this point the arrival of the ministers abruptly cut short the discussion.¹

¹ D'Ambrosio, *Voyage à Vienne en 1815*. *Manuscrit de la Società Napolitana di Storia Patria*.

In these warlike sentiments we can trace the germ of those ideas which found full expression in the proclamation issued from Rimini on the 30th March. Nor did the King fail to suit his actions to his words. On the 6th his saddle-horses were sent off to the Marches, and he himself set about his military preparations with the utmost energy. Not a day passed but he was superintending or taking part in manœuvres and evolutions of one kind or another.¹ On the 7th he issued a decree giving every facility to the Neapolitans in Sicily to come and join the army of Naples. On their arrival they were to be paid the arrears due to them in Sicily.² When sending word of this decision to Desvernois, the general commanding in Calabria, the King naïvely suggested that he should apply to the English for the necessary means of transport.

In the midst of all these events the *Inconstant* sailed into Naples. After landing Napoleon on the coast of Provence she had been sent back to Naples in order to refit, a process which it was pretended could not be carried out in a French port, all of them being still closed against the Emperor. On the 10th March according to the captain's report, the *Inconstant* had arrived at Gaeta, bringing tidings of the happiest description, Napoleon's proclamations and a variety of papers and pamphlets.

On receiving this news Murat could restrain himself no longer. The city was filled with rumours of his immediate departure. To Lucien he wrote off saying: "At last things are going splendidly. I have made up my mind now and I am going to give my support to the cause of the Emperor and of France. I am starting for Ancona at once." Through Lucien he made official application to the Pope for permission to pass through the Papal States, pledging himself to see that order

¹ *Diario di Nicolà.*

² *Moniteur Universel.*

was maintained there.¹ In everything Joachim said he made it quite clear that he intended to put himself at the head of his troops and to assist Napoleon, for whose cause he manifested immense enthusiasm. To Desvernois he sent off five hundred copies of each of the Emperor's two proclamations for distribution in Sicily.²

Nevertheless, Murat had no desire to labour on Napoleon's behalf, and if he decided to make use of the present crisis it was merely because he looked upon it as one chance in a thousand of emancipating himself from Austria's irksome control. As he told d'Ambrosio, he had no need of alliances. His great desire was to resume the programme of 1814, to rouse Italy to action, to defeat the Austrians, and to make himself master of the situation. Since the due execution of this plan demanded that he should be accurately informed as to the state of opinion in the various parts of Italy, he sent for General Filangieri on the 14th March and entrusted him with a mission. Ostensibly he was to go to Milan and confer with Nugent in the matter of Madame Mère's return to Naples, but in reality his duties were to visit Italy and report to the King on the state of public opinion and the extent of the Austrian military preparations. In order, on the other hand, that Napoleon should not suspect any double-dealing, Murat, faithful to his old tactics, wrote him the same day as follows :—

"It was with inexpressible delight that I learned of Your Majesty's debarkation on the shores of your Empire. I should have liked to receive some instructions as to how our movements were to be co-ordinated but doubtless I shall soon get directions on this point. I hasten, however, to inform Your Majesty that my whole army

¹ Weil. *Joachim Murat, roi de Naples.*

² Desvernois, *Mémoires.*

is in motion and that I shall certainly have reached the Po before the end of the month. I intend starting for Ancona in order that I may be better able to keep matters under my control and also be within closer reach of any news Your Majesty may have to send me. Sire, I have never ceased to be your friend. I have only been waiting for a favourable opportunity ; that opportunity has now come, and I am going to prove to you and to Europe that I am worthy of the opinion you hold of me. Had I made this attempt at any other time it would only have meant a useless sacrifice on my part."

This letter was dispatched on the 14th March by Beaufremont,¹ the same Beaufremont that had formerly acted as go-between in Murat's negotiations with Austria. On the 15th a messenger from Genoa² came with startling news to Naples ; Napoleon had passed through the whole of South-Eastern France and had made a triumphal entry first into Grenoble and then into Lyons. This news was fraught with the weightiest consequences, and Murat decided to precipitate his movements. Summoning his Council of State he explained the reasons which were impelling him to march on the Po and, paying no heed to the advice of his ministers who again counselled delay, he at once decided on war. He ordered Zuccari to inform the Papal Government that two Neapolitan divisions would be passing through the Roman States. Zuccari was also to guarantee the safety of the Pope's person and to give a pledge as to the good behaviour of the Neapolitan troops. In the meantime Murat had received advice of certain movements of doubtful friendliness on the part of Bellegarde in the neighbourhood of the Po. He was also aware that two days previously an Austrian colonel had arrived in Naples and he began to feel uneasy. He therefore determined to take the

¹ Caulaincourt to Fesch. Paris, April 8, 1815. *Affaires Étrangères*.

² *L'Île d'Elbe et les Cent Jours*.

offensive, and instructed Gallo to voice his grievances against Austria. Gallo saw Mier in the course of the evening, complained of the visible decline in the warmth of Austria's sympathy, of the lukewarm support she had been giving to Joachim, of the very perfunctory manner in which she had urged his claims for recognition and of the way in which his ministers were spoken about in Vienna. The Congress, he said, would come to an end without Austria having fulfilled any of her promises. Only one inference was possible, and that was that Austria would abandon Naples if matters reached a crisis. Therefore, he concluded, the King was obliged to seek for support elsewhere and avail himself of other means to attain his end.¹

Having taken all necessary measures Murat left Naples at one o'clock in the afternoon of the 17th March in an eight-horse travelling-coach followed by three other carriages and six.² With him went General d'Ambrosio ; Zurlo, Agar, and Gallo were to follow later. Gallo sent a short note to Mier announcing his departure. " Having received the King's commands to attend him on a tour which he has decided to make in the Abruzzi and the Marches, I beg hereby to send you official notification of my departure."

Murat, who had appointed Manhès Governor of Naples with Rosaroll as deputy and had reinstated Maghella in the control of the Police, did not on this occasion entrust the Regency to the Queen. Was it jealousy of Caroline's influence that had led him to forego her assistance? Had any difference of opinion induced him to dissociate his policy from hers? It had certainly seemed as though they had patched up their quarrel, and the Austrian alliance had apparently set the seal on their reconciliation. As a matter of fact it was Caroline this time and

¹ Mier to Metternich. Naples, March 16, 1815.

² *Diario di Nicola.*

not Murat who was the unwilling party. She regarded the whole affair in a totally different light from that in which it presented itself to Murat. As soon as she heard that Napoleon had quitted Elba she expressed her views about the matter with great vehemence to Mier. She declared to him that she was constantly impressing on the King that if ever Napoleon became Emperor of the French again he would once more throw the whole of Europe into the melting pot. She knew him too well to have any doubts on that score. The King, she went on, had a great part to play, and that part was to remain thoroughly loyal to the policy he had adopted and to make his interests coincide as closely as possible with those of Austria. Notwithstanding the fact that she was Napoleon's own sister it was as much as she could do to prevent herself wishing he was dead. Tender feelings truly to entertain towards a brother !¹

Such being Caroline's state of mind it is no wonder that she was grieved at her husband's decision and distressed when she heard of the successes that were falling to the lot of her mar-feast of a brother. Determined to retain Austria's goodwill by hook or by crook, she had quarrels of the most violent description with Murat, quarrels which culminated in a complete rupture between husband and wife. "I found the Queen very much upset," writes Mier, "and in a state of great consternation at all the King had been doing. She repeated what she had already said to me about the matter and assured me that she was doing all she possibly could to prevent the King's departure, for she saw what would come of it. Twice, she continued, he had been on the point of getting into his carriage to leave Naples when she had succeeded in dissuading him from his purpose. To prevail upon him to abandon his journey she had told him that she would not undertake the regency or

¹ Mier to Metternich. Naples, March 9, 1815.

have anything whatever to do with the government in his absence. She vowed that if he went away she would withdraw to Portici and live there in the strictest retirement, that she would not see a single minister or discuss any government matter. This is most embarrassing for the King, since he knows that no one but the Queen is competent to carry on the government in his absence." In the counsel she gave her husband, that wonderful sisterly love of hers is always apparent. "I am advising the King," she said, "that in the event of Austria refusing to acquiesce in the possible successes of Napoleon, he ought to throw in his lot with her and act in full accord with her policy. You see that my own affections and the torture of seeing my family persecuted and overwhelmed with obloquy give place to my duties as a mother and as Queen of Naples. Once indeed I clung to France and to the policy of France till the last extremity because I felt that our welfare demanded it. But events necessitated a change of policy, and I became convinced that our only safety lay in uniting ourselves as closely as possible with Austria. To that conviction I cling with all my heart and soul." ¹ As she said more than once to a man for whom she had a tender spot in her heart, "You would think it sufficient would you not for a peasant of Le Quercy to occupy the fairest throne of Italy. But no, he must needs have the whole peninsula." ²

Such was Caroline's attitude towards her country and her brother. We can readily understand that Murat, at the moment full of zeal for the Emperor (for his policy demanded it), paid not the smallest heed to his wife's admonitions. But, it will be asked, why did Murat rush off headlong towards the Po instead of quietly staying on at Naples till he knew that Napo-

¹ Mier to Metternich. Naples, April 16, 1815.

² Orloff. *Mémoires sur le royaume de Naples.*

leon was back in Paris, till he heard how matters were going to turn out? Was it that he wished to help the Emperor by keeping to the plan that had been agreed upon? That, indeed, was the version he afterwards gave of the matter when he wrote Napoleon from Cannes saying: "You ordered the Duc de Vicenza to write to me, and then added in your own hand, 'I will support you with all the means at my disposal.'" But the plea was impossible and he knew it. A mere reference to the dates is sufficient to put Murat out of court. The letter containing the passage quoted by the King is, as a matter of fact, dated the 29th March, and Joachim set out on his campaign on the 17th. It was on the 30th March, while the first few shots were being exchanged, that the famous proclamation of Rimini was given to the world.

The real truth of the matter is that once again Murat had designed to be beforehand with everybody in the conquest of Italy; that was still his one aim, his one desire. "Courage and fidelity," he cried to the magistrates of Ancona, "these are all I need of you. All I ask of you in order to give Italy her freedom is to stand shoulder to shoulder. The Marches are mine by right of conquest; they are doubly mine because they were promised me by the Allies. Rather than give them up I was, and I still am, resolved to reduce them to ashes. I say to you again, all I ask of you is to be united, to be loyal and to be brave. Italy's only boundaries are the mountains and the sea; I know no other."¹

That was the reason of Murat's haste. The explanation of his ten days' sojourn at Ancona is not to be found as one might imagine in any desire to wait for news from Paris and the Emperor's instructions. He remained there because he wished to rally the Italian people about him and to swell the ranks of his army

¹ English vice-consul at Ancona to Burghersh. Ancona, March 21, 1815.
Quoted by M. Weil. *Joachim Murat, roi de Naples.*

with all those whom he believed were longing to give up everything and follow him. On the 28th March, between Fano and Sinigaglia, he encountered Jérôme who had made good his escape from Trieste. Their conversation was significant. "Ignorant as to the motives of the King's advance," writes Jérôme, "I asked him for an explanation. 'I am at war with Austria,' replied he, 'and hostilities have already begun.' 'You have a treaty with the English then, I suppose?' 'No, but they could not want to throw any obstacle in the way of the independence of Italy, for all Italy has pronounced in my favour.' 'The Emperor then is in Paris and working in conjunction with you, and a French army is coming down over the Alps?' I asked again. 'I do not know,' he answered, 'what the Emperor is doing. I do not know whether he has entered Paris, though that must be so. But if Italy arises *en masse* I shall possess an army of 150,000 men, and with such a force as that I am afraid of nobody.'"¹

In order to obtain a just appreciation of the part played by Napoleon's letters in deciding Murat's course of action we must carefully study the correspondence which took place between the two brothers-in-law as well as the channels by which that correspondence was transmitted. The first communication to reach the King after his departure for the army was the letter, falsely dated the 16th March, which was dispatched by Joseph from Prangins.² It was received by Joachim on the 29th March somewhere between Fano and Pesaro.

¹ *Mémoires du roi Jérôme.*

² There is no doubt that Joseph wrote to Murat because the King certainly received a letter, but it was not the letter of which a *copy* exists at the office of Foreign Affairs. The copy in question runs as follows: "Prangins, March 16, 1815. The Emperor has arrived at Auxonne with all the troops he fell in with on the road, and Marshal Ney, with the troops that were collected at Lons-le-Saulnier, has followed the Emperor. The Bourbons are everywhere in full flight. General Maison, who left Paris with as many

On the 29th March Napoleon wrote Murat as follows :
“ I have arrived ; I have passed through France. The army, the people, those of the country and those of the towns, came out to greet me. On the 20th March I entered Paris at the head of the troops of Essone, troops on whom the King was relying. The King withdrew towards Lille, where he arrived on the 23rd. Next day, seeing that the garrison were determined to refuse admittance to his household and that he was within an ace of being made prisoner, he retired to England. All his family have done the same.

“ The whole of France except Marseilles, of which I have as yet no news, has hoisted the national colours. Everything is going on as well as possible. The old

troops as he could muster on the way, has been deserted and has taken to flight with twenty gendarmes. France is moved by the same unanimous enthusiasm as in '89. To-night the Emperor sleeps at Chalon. He will arrive in Paris with more than a hundred thousand men. I am borne up by the hope of holding aloft the fortunes of our common country and of winning over Austria. As for you, my brother, lend your aid to the noble policy of the country which you have helped to adorn. Such aid, both military and political, it is in your power to render. Now is the time to decide. Speak to Austria by example and by precept. . . .

“ Speak and act as your heart dictates. March up to the Alps but do not pass beyond them. I can promise you happiness because your policy will be in accord with your duty as a Frenchman and as a son of the Revolution owing all to the people and nothing to the principle of Divine Right, nothing to eighteenth-century ideas. Away with the Bourbons. All honour to the men of the Revolution. . . . ” The letter, at all events in this form, could not have been written by Joseph. In the first place he speaks about the Emperor arriving at *Auxonne*, whereas it ought to have been *Auxerre*, as the Emperor did not pass through Auxonne. Now Napoleon was at Auxerre on the 18th March. Secondly, he mentions the flight of the Bourbons and General Maison. But General Maison left Paris on the 20th March at the last moment. Lastly, he states further on that the Emperor would be sleeping that night (the 16th) at Chalon. As a matter of fact it was on the 13th that he passed the night there. It is therefore manifestly impossible that the letter, the original of which is not to be found, should have been sent by Joseph in that form. Either it is a spurious copy or else it contains passages interpolated from other correspondence. In its existing form the letter is in no sense to be relied on and cannot be adduced in support of any argument.

soldiers are flocking in crowds to join their flag, the country districts have decided to make every sacrifice.

"I have an army in Flanders, one in Alsace, one in the Interior, and another in course of formation in Dauphiné. Up to now I am at peace with every one. I will support you to the utmost of my power. I rely on you. As soon as Marseilles hoists the Tricolour send along some vessels so that we can correspond, for I am very much afraid we shall have some difficulty in getting letters through by way of Italy. Send me a minister ; I will send you one of mine on a frigate before long.¹

"I was not sufficiently master of the situation to wait for the ships you sent me, but I thank you none the less for dispatching them. If you send any ships to France with messages for me they should go to Toulon. It is the best and safest place.

"As you may readily imagine I am sincerely anxious to maintain peace. This above everything would guarantee Your Majesty's future. If, however, we are compelled to have recourse to arms I am from this day forth perfectly well prepared to face whatever the future may have in store, and the unanimity with which the people of France have rallied round me makes me confident that I can count on the energetic support of the entire nation.

"The French are willing to make any sacrifice in order to rid themselves forever of the hateful and degrading rule from which they have just been set free, and the one thing men are longing for is to have a government strong enough to give them efficient protection. I am therefore able to look at the future without anxiety. Your Majesty's assistance will add yet further to my confidence. If your affection for me has undergone no

¹ At this point the letter as published in the *Correspondance* comes to an end.

change I shall have the pleasure of proving to you yet once more that you also may ever rely on my friendship." ¹

This letter was first of all entrusted to Monsieur de Beauffremont who had just brought the Emperor the letter which Murat had written on the 14th March. Beauffremont, however, was not to reach his destination. On arriving at Turin he was seized and kept a prisoner for nine days and then compelled to return to France. The 12th April found him back again at Lyons. He had managed to retain possession of his letter though his mission had proved a failure. ²

A second copy was given to Gruchet, a captain in the Neapolitan Royal Guard, who left Paris at the beginning of April, travelling by way of Switzerland; but he was held up at Versoix, not far from Geneva, and forbidden to cross the frontier. He was journeying southwards, hoping to get across the Alps by another pass, when he fell into the hands of the French troops. By order of the general commanding at Antibes he was sent to Fort Carré, from which Caulaincourt obtained his release on the 27th May.

On the 30th March Napoleon was availing himself of yet another means of communication. Thinking that he might make use of the *Prince Lucien*, a Neapolitan vessel which had been waiting in Toulon harbour at least since the 22nd March for the alleged purpose of getting possession of certain belongings of the Queen of Naples, he sent the following message to Decrès: "The Neapolitan schooner at Toulon has come in accordance with arrangements to pick up news. Send three smart officers, one after another at intervals of twenty-

¹ The text of the letter here quoted, of which a part only is printed in the *Correspondance* (No. 21,745), is that of the document preserved at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In that document the date, which is not stated in the *Correspondance*, is given as the 29th March.

² *Moniteur Universel*.

four hours, each with a cipher copy of the letter which will be handed to you by the Minister for Foreign Affairs. These officers will deliver the letter as well as copies of the *Moniteur* from the 20th March to date to the captain of the schooner. One should go *via* Gap, another by way of Arles and the third by the ordinary route. They should all be natives of the district." ¹ On the 1st April Decrès sent word to Caulaincourt that he had received the first of the cipher communications. On the 3rd all three packets had reached Toulon. Notwithstanding these exaggerated precautions this plan proved no less unsuccessful than the first. On the 29th April Decrès wrote Caulaincourt that the scheme had fallen through. "The Neapolitan ship," said he, "which was supposed to pick up your dispatches for the King of Naples at Toulon or Marseilles had already sailed when the papers arrived. They are being returned to me one after another, and I have the honour to forward Your Excellency the first which has reached me. I will do the same with the two that remain as and when they come to hand." ²

On the 30th March Caulaincourt was dispatching messengers to the various courts of Europe bearing a circular letter suspending the representatives of Louis XVIII. from the discharge of their functions. Vanier, who was selected to go to Italy, carried with him packets for the Kingdom of Sardinia, the Papal States, and the Kingdom of Naples. Unfortunately Vanier, who reached Saint-Jean-de-Maurienne on the 3rd April, was shadowed by a company of carabineers as far as Turin, and on arriving there on the 4th was at once conducted back to France without having been able to deliver a solitary dispatch.³

¹ *Correspondance*, 21,744.

² Decrès to Caulaincourt, April 1, 1815.

³ *Moniteur Universel*.

On the 4th April Napoleon forwarded a circular letter to the Sovereigns of Europe announcing his ardent desire for peace, and at the same time his Foreign Secretary dispatched letters to his fellow-ministers in the various courts. Great care was taken not to overlook the King of Naples. On the 5th April, Levecq started for Italy bearing missives from the Emperor for Victor Emmanuel, the Pope, and Murat, as well as communications from Caulaincourt for the Comte de Vallaise, Cardinal Pacca, and Gallo. Attached to Caulaincourt's letter for Gallo was the following private note: "Monsieur le Marquis,—The Emperor was desirous of giving direct expression to His Majesty the King of Naples of the feelings of regard which he entertains towards him. He also wished to make known to him what great importance he attaches to the maintenance of the peaceful conditions now so happily subsisting between the two countries. I have been instructed, Monsieur le Marquis, to send you the Emperor's letter, and to beg Your Excellency to transmit it to His Majesty. It will be found attached to the letter which I now have the honour to write to you."¹ This message, however, was not fated to meet with any better fortune than its forerunners.

Happily for Napoleon, the submission of Marseilles at last enabled him to make free use of the Provençal coast and the sea for the purposes of his correspondence. The moment he became aware that there was a possibility of getting letters through by this route he forwarded the following instructions to Decrès: "Send a dispatch-boat to Naples with copies of all the letters of the Minister for Foreign Affairs. You yourself can get together all the copies of the *Moniteur* that have been issued to date since the 20th March and send them with a letter to the King of Naples in order that he may know the successful

¹ Caulaincourt to Gallo. Paris, April 4, 1815. Naples. *Archives de la Società Napolitana di Storia Patria*.

course events are taking in France.”¹ Caulaincourt therefore collected together the various letters he had written to Gallo, and added to them the following note for Fesch: “I have the honour to inform you that His Majesty has just appointed you his Ambassador Extraordinary to the Holy See. . . . Your Excellency is also accredited for the time being to the King of Naples, to whom the Emperor will send a Minister as soon as communications are possible. You are at liberty, Monsieur le Cardinal, to appoint a Chargé d’Affaires at Naples if you deem it expedient. We take it for granted that the King is aware of the various machinations of which he is the object. He will scarcely have been deceived by Monsieur de Metternich’s fallacious declarations, nor will he suffer himself to be misled by false statements or forged documents. The Emperor is unwilling to sever his cause from the King’s. If the latter’s throne were threatened, the Emperor would make war upon the Allies in order to support him, even though they had no quarrel with France.”²

This letter was included with those which Napoleon was asking to have re-dispatched by boat, and on the 12th April Decrès advised Caulaincourt that he was sending on the packet to the maritime prefect at Toulon. In pursuance of the Emperor’s instructions, he wrote to the King of Naples as follows: “Sire, in obedience to the Emperor’s commands, I am sending a dispatch-boat from Toulon to convey to Your Majesty’s Minister for Foreign Affairs a copy of all the letters written to you by the Emperor’s Foreign Minister.

“The Emperor also bids me do myself the honour of writing to Your Majesty to inform you of the satisfactory position of affairs in France. Your Majesty will find enclosed copies of the *Moniteur* from the 20th March to date.

¹ *Correspondance*, 21,783.

² Caulaincourt to Fesch. Paris, April 8, 1815.

"Your Majesty will learn therefrom that His Majesty has been greeted with the loving welcome of his people and the acclamations of the entire army.

"During the whole of his triumphal progress from the Gulf of Jouan to the Tuileries not a single drop of blood was shed. His Majesty had but to direct his march on Paris, and the few opponents who had pretended to dispute his return fled without waiting for his approach."¹

These letters were conveyed on board the schooner *Biche*, which, after a successful voyage, dropped anchor in Naples harbour on the 21st April.² Dispatched by special messenger to Joachim's army, they were delivered at their respective destinations, and Gallo ultimately wrote to Caulaincourt acknowledging their receipt. "I received," he said, "the letter which Your Excellency did me the honour to write me from Paris under date of the 4th instant, as well as the various papers relating to the auspicious events which have recently taken place in France. In view of the distance which at present separates me from His Majesty the King, who is at the head of his army, I can do no more than hasten to send him the letter from His Majesty the Emperor, as well as Your Excellency's own important communications.

"I am only awaiting His Majesty's instructions in order to reply to Your Excellency, it being impossible for me at the moment to do more than acknowledge receipt of the letters with which you have favoured me."³

These tidings from France became very widely known in Naples, for the *Monitore* of the 22nd April proclaimed the news that the *Biche*, flying the tricolour, had arrived

¹ Decrès to Murat. Paris, April 12, 1815. *Naples, Archives de la Società Napolitana di Storia Patria.*

² *Mémoires du roi Jérôme. Diario di Nicola.*

³ Gallo to Caulaincourt. Ancona, April 24, 1815. *Naples, Archives de la Società Napolitana di Storia Patria.*

from Toulon. The journal gave the most encouraging account of the progress of events in France, stating that the Emperor had written to the King to announce his victorious return, and that Cardinal Fesch had been accredited Minister Plenipotentiary at the court of Naples and at the Holy See.¹

Thus the only way that Napoleon succeeded in transmitting news to Murat was by boat. As a consequence, the King knew nothing officially before the 25th April.

The Emperor did not wait for his brother-in-law's reply before establishing relations with the kingdom of Naples. He hastened to inform his ministers of the terms he was on with Murat, and he also commanded General Grouchy to sketch out a plan for a movement on Mont Cenis which he considered would be a means of affording relief to the King of Naples, who certainly seemed to be coming to blows with Austria. But it was principally from the dispatch of an ambassador—a step which he had promised to take as long ago as the 29th March—that he looked for a really satisfactory re-establishment of relations with Naples. On hearing how matters had been progressing in the south, he wrote to Caulaincourt saying: "Monsieur le duc de Vicenza, Marseilles has submitted; it is therefore necessary that you should see to the immediate dispatch of a Chargé d'Affaires for Constantinople and of a Minister for Naples. If General Belliard cares about the task, he would be the very man for the latter post."² He next sent for Belliard himself in order to sound his feelings. "'My necessities require,' he said, 'that you should be with Murat; he is a friend of yours, and he has great confidence in you. You will be able to help him with your advice. You will be assisting him and at the same time doing me a service. He seems to have attacked the Austrians.'

¹ *Monitore des Deux Siciles*, April 22, 1815.

² *Correspondance*, 21,784.

'So much the worse for him, Sire. If he has done that he is lost,' replied Belliard. 'I am vexed that he has done so,' the Emperor went on. 'I was not anxious for war.' 'It seems to me that it will be difficult to avoid it, Sire,' was Belliard's rejoinder; 'unless you have come to an agreement with Austria.' 'I have not,' said the Emperor. 'Up to the present I have been unable to procure the delivery of any dispatches. Murat has been working for me, and I intend to support him. You must tell him that I am getting together an army on the Piedmont frontier in order to lend him a hand. Murat's dream is to be sovereign of Italy. My own idea is not so much for the union of Italy as for making it into two separate kingdoms divided by the Po. If such a division comes to pass, Murat should have the right bank and I would dispose of the left. With regard to Piedmont and Genoa, which in the interests of France would have to be considered as forming part of the left-bank division, that part of the question could be gone into later on. Anyhow, you will see what can be done when you are on the spot; you have *carte blanche* from me, but start quickly—Murat has need of you.'"¹

These instructions, which gave Belliard similar powers to those which had formerly been conferred on Eugène, show that Napoleon's intentions regarding the territory to be allotted to Murat in Italy had undergone no modification since March 1814. Belliard could not refuse the task, and on the 13th April he was formally appointed the Emperor's envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to the King of Naples. Leaving Paris on the 22nd April, Belliard proceeded to Toulon, where he embarked on the *Dryade*, commanded by Séné, who was under orders to put the Duc de Padua ashore in Corsica. After calling at Bastia and Porto Ferrajo,² the *Dryade*

¹ Belliard, *Mémoires*.

² Belliard to Napoleon. *Archives des Affaires Étrangères*.

was holding on her course when, on the 9th May, somewhere about Ischia, there hove in sight three British men-of-war—a ship of the line, a frigate, and a brig—which immediately began to give chase. While the *Dryade* proceeded to clap on every stitch of canvas in order to give her pursuers the slip, Belliard and his two aides-de-camp got into the ship's dinghy and managed to reach Naples. The same evening he was received in audience by Caroline.¹ The General informed the Queen how favourably the Emperor was disposed towards Naples. Caroline on her side freely voiced her grievances, and lamented that Murat had left against her wishes. Nevertheless the French emissary was received with a good show of welcome, and the official statements which the Queen ordered to be issued to the public were couched in a Francophile tone that had latterly become distinctly unfamiliar. "The tidings brought by General Belliard regarding the condition of France are excellent," wrote Maghella to Desvernois. "The enthusiasm of the army and the attitude of the whole nation are worthy of their chief." Even the *Monitore* published an official announcement of the arrival of "Comte Belliard, envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Emperor of the French, who is proceeding to the King's headquarters." It was evident Mier was no longer on the spot.

Belliard's stay at Naples was of the briefest duration. He left again immediately, and on the evening of the 11th he was with Murat at Castel di Sagro. But instead of the host of eighty thousand men and one hundred pieces of cannon of which the Emperor had told him, he found but the poor, disheartened remnants of an army which now did not number more than eight or nine thousand all told.² After acquainting the King of the

¹ *Mémoires du roi Jérôme.*

² Belliard to Davout. Castel di Sagro, May 12, 1815. Jung, *Lucien Bonaparte et ses Mémoires.*

instructions which he had been commanded to deliver, Belliard told the King how favourably disposed the Emperor was towards him. Murat on his side was anxious to explain the reasons which had led him to attack the Austrians. According to his statement of the case, he had only taken this step at the urgent prompting of the Queen and his advisers. This came as a surprise to Belliard, who had just heard a totally different account of the matter from Caroline. As for Napoleon, Joachim would have it that he was equally culpable. He had only been in such a hurry to commence hostilities because he had received a letter from Joseph written in the Emperor's name. Of his own personal aims, of his infatuation, of his untimely haste to rid himself of the Austrian yoke, of the ambition which had led him on and on until he made his fruitless appeal to the Italian people he said not a word. Joachim had merely acted upon other people's advice; the real culprits were his wife, his brother-in-law, and his advisers. Such was his plea. He added, as though it were hardly worthy of mention, that "he had not obtained from the people of Italy all the support he had a right to look for."¹

Belliard listened to what he had to say, and, being a man of insight, he wrote that "the Emperor ought not to count on any assistance from the King of Naples. The King," he said, "could do absolutely nothing, and would be very fortunate if he succeeded in maintaining his position." In truth the end was approaching. Deserted and betrayed, the King hurried back to Caserta, where he arrived on the 18th May; at eight o'clock in the evening of that day he was in Naples;² on the morrow he was a fugitive. In his flight Murat looked in vain for help or succour. His wife was a hostage in the hands of the Allies, and her family had taken ship to France.

¹ Belliard, *Mémoires*.

² Belliard's report, June 17, 1815. *Affaires Étrangères*.

Jérôme, Fesch, and Madame had indeed already left Naples. After making a fruitless attempt on the 19th April to get away on board a Neapolitan vessel, the *Gioachinno*, which was obliged to put back owing to the heavy weather,¹ they made use of Belliard's ship in order to return to France. On the 13th May the *Dryade*, with all three on board, set sail for the coast of Provence, and at nine o'clock on the morning of the 22nd May their Imperial Highnesses went ashore at the Gulf of Jouan. Madame and Cardinal Fesch proceeded on their journey by easy stages, but Jérôme, who had sent on Fuht, his aide-de-camp, in advance, drove rapidly across France in a carriage belonging to Cavaignac, the ex-Neapolitan official, as whose secretary he described himself, and arrived in Paris on the 27th May.² The Emperor had previously questioned Cavaignac at great length on the subject of Italy, Joachim's army, and the temper of the people,³ and had displayed great anxiety as to Joachim's fate, saying over and over again, "Will he beat the Austrians?" No sooner, then, did Jérôme arrive than he was called upon by the Emperor to discuss the situation.

Jérôme gave him an account of all that had happened up to the time of his departure from Naples, and thus the Emperor learned of the disasters that had befallen the King and of his present desperate plight.⁴

¹ *Mémoires du roi Jérôme. Diario di Nicola.*

² *Moniteur Universel.*

³ *Mémoires d'une inconnue.*

⁴ It was perhaps after his conversation with Jérôme that Napoleon ordered a note to be sent to the Minister for Foreign Affairs regarding the affairs of Naples. It would not be impossible that, after his brother's account of the state of Murat's affairs, of his attempts to gather the Italians round him and to proclaim the independence of the Italian race, Napoleon, furious at finding himself deprived of a support on which he had been counting, sent the following note :—

"The Emperor requires a memorandum regarding the King of Naples, covering all the events of his last campaign (1814) and the injury which he

In no long time Napoleon was to receive tidings of a still more serious and decisive character. Murat had succeeded in reaching Ischia, and, thanks to Manhès, who had allowed him to go on board the *Sainte Catherine*, he arrived without mishap in France. Landing at Cannes on the 25th May, he at once dispatched a messenger to the Emperor asking for orders. While waiting for a reply, he put up with the members of his suite at a little local inn.¹ Murat's emissary informed Napoleon of his master's reverses, of the capitulation of Casa-Lanza, of the King's flight and arrival in France. As the Emperor was by no means anxious to see his brother-in-law, at all events for the present, he decided to send Baudus to him with a message, at the same time dispatching orders to Caulaincourt. "Monsieur Baudus," said he to the latter, "is to leave immediately for the Gulf of Jouan. He is to inform the King of Naples that His Majesty desires him to select an agreeable country residence between Gap and Sisteron, there to remain until the Queen's arrival and until we receive some definite news from Naples. He is to state in language of courteous restraint

inflicted upon France. The Emperor when on the island of Elba received no mark of interest from him, no token of remembrance even. It did not consort with the dignity of the Emperor in his misfortune to make the first advance. The proclamations issued by him caused it to be asked by the people of Bologna and the kingdom of Italy whether their rightful King was dead. This impolitic conduct paralysed the national movement in Italy, the majority of whose inhabitants were at heart loyal to the Emperor, and only viewed this hostile movement with regret. The King having been unable to offer any satisfactory explanation, having even gone so far as to betray his hatred of the Italians who turned a deaf ear to his inducements of 1814, failed on his side, and consequently came to grief . . ." *Correspondance*, 21,809.

If this note was not drawn up immediately after Napoleon's conversation with Jérôme, it could only have been dictated on 1st June, when the Emperor learned of Murat's arrival in France. At any rate, it cannot bear the date, 15th April, which is ascribed to it in the *Correspondance*, but is to be placed somewhere between the 27th May and the 1st June.

¹ Belliard, *Mémoires*. *Mémoires de Robert Guillemaud*.

how greatly the Emperor regrets that the King took the offensive on his own initiative and before any steps had been taken to instruct the loyal subjects of Italy how they were to act.

"The King decided the fate of France a year ago by paralysing the army of Italy, since his action made a difference of sixty thousand men to our disadvantage. It would scarcely be becoming for the King to come to Paris. The Queen should precede him thither, in order that the public may become habituated to his downfall.

"Monsieur Baudus will console him and assure him that the Emperor's recollection of his faults, however grave they may be, is lost in the contemplation of his misfortunes, but that he does not wish him to come to Paris till all matters are finally settled concerning him. These duties have been entrusted to Monsieur Baudus because he is known to be popular with the King. He will correspond directly with the Minister and speak without reserve regarding the King's private and political behaviour.

"Monsieur Baudus, as agent of the Emperor, is to impress upon him that if the Emperor had wished him to march into Italy he would have let him know how to act. He will further observe that proclamations issued from Paris would have produced a totally different effect, that he was responsible for the downfall of France in 1814, that in 1815 he has compromised her position and brought about his own undoing, and that his behaviour in 1814 ruined him in the eyes of the Italians because they saw that he intended to abandon the Emperor's cause." ¹

¹ *Correspondance*, 21,826. The publishers of the *Correspondance* have wrongly dated this letter the 19th April 1815. Baudus's mission could not have taken place at that date since the King was still in Italy. It is very probable that the note in question was dictated by Napoleon on the 1st June, after receipt of Murat's message, and reproduced the day after by Caulaincourt in his instructions to Baudus.

On receipt of the above note Caulaincourt immediately sent instructions to Baudus, those instructions simply being a copy of the Emperor's orders.

Setting out for Cannes, Baudus arrived there on the 9th June and saw Murat—how changed, alas, from the brilliant King of former days! His position was mournful and distressing in the extreme. So low and depressed was he that Baudus requested Caulaincourt to beg the Emperor to send a letter, a remembrance, anything, to lighten the melancholy reflections of the King. As to his financial position, it was apparently more than embarrassed.¹ In view of Baudus's message, Murat decided to look for a country residence, but as he was too deeply consumed with a longing to behold the Queen and his children once more to go far away from the coast while any hope of seeing them remained to him, he resolved to take up his abode near Toulon, and on the 12th, while most of the Parisian papers were announcing his supposed arrival at Compiègne, he was leaving Cannes for a country residence called "Plaisance," belonging to Vice-Admiral Allemand. There, while the brilliant cavalier of days gone by was dragging out a miserable existence, he received a letter from Fouché by the hands of Gruchet, the captain of his Guards, enjoining him to wait patiently until the Emperor should break silence. On the 20th he sent back Gruchet with a letter for the Emperor, probably his last, in which he lamented that he had not been summoned to the army, and reminded him of the letter which he (the Emperor) had commanded Monsieur de Caulaincourt to write to him—that letter at the foot of which he had added in his own hand, "Take the field, and I will support you to the utmost of my power." The King concluded by saying that, having lost his crown for the Emperor, he should deem himself happy if he might shed his last

¹ Caulaincourt to the Emperor. Paris, June 15, 1815. *Affaires Étrangères*.

drop of blood in his service.¹ But this crowning falsehood, these final protestations, availed him not. Napoleon, his heart filled with bitterness against Murat, kept him relentlessly at a distance. Yet in after years at St. Helena he would sometimes regret his harshness, and ask himself whether, if that incomparable *sabreur* had been at hand to lead them, his cavalry might not have forced the British to give way. Meanwhile the Fates were working their will; the destiny of each was being accomplished. The Imperial sun was slowly sinking, soon to be quenched in the hopeless night of Waterloo. Of all the Emperor's mighty power, of all his European domination, of the sway which Murat had once wielded over Naples, of the splendid dreams of Italian sovereignty which had once been his, nothing now remained but two lonely, fallen men, and while the one was holding on his way to his long exile at St. Helena, the other was setting forth to meet his doom at Pizzo.

¹ *Mémoires de Robert Guillemand.*

APPENDIX

TREATY ENTERED INTO AT BAYONNE ON THE 15TH JULY 1808

between

THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON AND THE GRAND DUC
DE BERG ET DE CLEVES

FOR THE CESSION TO PRINCE MURAT OF THE THRONE OF
NAPLES.

HIS Majesty the Emperor of the French being desirous of disposing in favour of his brother-in-law Prince Joachim Napoleon, Grand Duc de Berg et de Cleves, of the crown of the Two Sicilies, ceded to him by his august brother, Joseph Napoleon, at present King of Spain, by the Treaty of Bayonne of the 5th of the present month, His Majesty the Emperor and King, and His Imperial and Royal Highness the Grand Duc, have appointed the following to act as their plenipotentiaries in arranging the conditions relating to the said cession, namely: His Excellency Nompère de Champagny, Minister of Foreign Affairs to His Majesty the Emperor of the French, &c., and His Excellency M. Martius Mastrilli, Marquis de Gallo, Councillor of State and Minister of Foreign Affairs for the Kingdom of Naples, acting on behalf of His Imperial and Royal Highness the Grand Duc de Berg et de Cleves.

The said plenipotentiaries, having satisfied each other as to their full powers, have agreed together on the following articles:—

ARTICLE I.—His Majesty the Emperor and King hands over to His Imperial and Royal Highness the Grand Duc de Berg, his rights in respect of the crown of the Two Sicilies.

ARTICLE II.—His Imperial and Royal Highness shall enjoy

the possession of the same for ever, he and his heirs male, in order of primogeniture, to the exclusion of the females and their descendants for ever.

ARTICLE III.—Nevertheless, if Her Imperial and Royal Highness the Princess Caroline survives her august consort, she shall remain Queen of the Two Sicilies, and she alone shall enjoy the sovereign title and prerogatives thereof, and the same shall be exercised by her in their plenitude. The reason wherefore this single exception is made in the fundamental principle, is that the said Princess, who by means of the present cession, made especially in her favour, places her family upon the throne, must always occupy a rank superior to that of her children.

ARTICLE IV.—In default of legitimate male issue of His Imperial and Royal Highness the Grand Duc de Berg, the crown of the Two Sicilies shall devolve upon His Majesty the Emperor and King, his heirs male and descendants, legitimate or adoptive.

In default of the legitimate male issue, natural or adoptive, of H.M. the Emperor and King, the crown of the Two Sicilies shall belong to the legitimate male descendants of Prince Joseph Napoleon, King of Spain. In default of the legitimate male issue of Prince Joseph Napoleon, the crown of the Two Sicilies shall belong to the legitimate male descendants of Prince Louis Napoleon, King of Holland. In default of legitimate male issue of Prince Louis Napoleon, the crown of the Two Sicilies shall belong to the legitimate male descendants of Prince Jérôme Napoleon, King of Westphalia.

ARTICLE V.—H.I. and R.H. the Grand Duc de Berg shall as King of the Two Sicilies retain the dignity of High Admiral of France, which dignity shall remain vested in the Crown of the Two Sicilies, so long as the order of succession laid down by the present treaty shall continue.

ARTICLE VI.—H.I. and R.H. the Grand Duc de Berg pledges himself alike in his own name and in the name of his successors to the throne of the Two Sicilies, to carry out and uphold the Constitution of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies as laid down by King Joseph and guaranteed by H.M. the Emperor and King, whereof a copy is hereunto annexed.

ARTICLE VII.—H.I. and R.H. the Grand Duc de Berg hands over to H.M. the Emperor and King, for his use and to be disposed of by him as he may think fit, the Grand Duchy of Berg and of Cleves, as it at present exists, with the states thereunto annexed, together with the rights and prerogatives exercised in Germany by His Imperial and Royal Highness. As from the first day of August next the revenues of the Grand Duchy shall belong to His Majesty the Emperor and King, and, in the same manner, all expenses connected with the administration and government of the said Grand Duchy shall likewise become chargeable to him.

ARTICLE VIII.—There shall exist an offensive and defensive league, on sea as well as on land, between H.M. the Emperor of the French and H.M. the King of the Two Sicilies and their successors respectively.

ARTICLE IX.—The contingent to be furnished by H.M. the King of the Two Sicilies in the event of a continental war shall, in terms of the said league, consist of 18,000 infantry, 3000 cavalry, and a train of 25 pieces of horse artillery, with a due proportion of gunners, sappers, and miners. Until the King shall have entered into possession of Sicily, the contingent shall be 16,000 infantry, 2500 cavalry, and 20 pieces of horse artillery. The said troops shall be at full strength when they cross the frontier of Naples.

ARTICLE X.—The said troops, so long as they are in Italy or the other states of H.M. the Emperor, shall be maintained and paid by H.M. the King of the Two Sicilies. Elsewhere the King of the Two Sicilies shall only be responsible for their pay.

ARTICLE XI.—The French troops required to insure the safety of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies shall be paid and maintained by H.M. the King of the Two Sicilies.

Nevertheless, if circumstances require that more than 12 regiments of infantry and 10 squadrons of cavalry should be so employed, then any additional troops shall be paid by H.M. the Emperor, and maintained by H.M. the King of the Two Sicilies. The number of French troops in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies shall be reduced on the King's request, in proportion as the organisation of the Neapolitan

army is perfected and the tranquillity of the country becomes assured.

H.M. the Emperor shall furnish an additional number of troops to His Sicilian Majesty, in accordance with the conditions hereinbefore set forth, if they become necessary in order to attain the object for which the two powers shall have declared war.

ARTICLE XII.—The contingent to be furnished by H.M. the King of the Two Sicilies in the case of a maritime war shall consist of six ships of the line, two carrying 80 guns and four carrying 74 guns ; six frigates, and six brigs or corvettes.

This squadron shall act in conjunction with the French squadron for the defence of the common interests.

To obtain this naval force, the King of the Two Sicilies undertakes to launch each year two ships of the line and two frigates, commencing with the year 1809.

ARTICLE XIII.—When the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies shall have attained to the possession of the naval forces set forth in the preceding article, H.M. the Emperor guarantees peace to the said Kingdom with the States of Barbary ; and in the event of war against any of the said States, H.M. the Emperor shall make common cause with the King of the Two Sicilies and unite his squadrons with the Neapolitan squadron in order that peace may be the more speedily attained.

ARTICLE XIV.—One consequence of the league between the two countries is that the measures taken or hereafter to be taken in France in respect of the blockade of England and the destruction of her commerce, shall be carried out in the States of H.M. the King of the Two Sicilies as soon as notification thereof shall have been given to the Neapolitan Government.

ARTICLE XV.—The present treaty shall remain secret until such time as H.M. the Emperor shall deem it expedient to make it public.

It shall be ratified, and the ratifications thereof shall be exchanged within ten days at the latest.

J. B. NOMPÈRE DE CHAMPAGNY.
Bayonne, 15th July 1808.

LE MARQUIS DE GALLO.

Separate Articles.

ARTICLE I.—On the death of the person vested by H.M. the Emperor in the possession of the Principality of Benevento, H.M. promises, in return for due compensation, to annex the said principality to the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies.

ARTICLE II.—The palaces and estates in the Roman State known as the *biens Farnésiens*, at present in the possession of the Crown of the Two Sicilies, shall be thereunto permanently guaranteed.

ARTICLE III.—H.M. the Emperor and King cedes to their Imperial and Royal Highnesses the Grand Duc and Grande Duchesse de Berg, for their private use and enjoyment, a revenue of 500,000 francs, to be taken from the revenue of one million in landed estates which he reserved to himself in accordance with the statute of the 30th March 1806.

Particulars of the landed estates forming the balance shall be duly set forth, and the said estates placed at the disposal of H.M. the Emperor before the 1st January 1809.

The estates intended to form the six grand fiefs of the Empire instituted by His Majesty under the title of duchies shall likewise, before the same date, be scheduled and placed at His Majesty's disposal, the net revenue of each duchy being fixed at 60,000 francs.

ARTICLE IV. (and last).—Their Imperial and Royal Highnesses the Grand Duc and Grande Duchesse de Berg hand over to H.M. the Emperor and King their Palace in Paris, the house possessed by them at Neuilly, the stud-farm known as the stud-farm of Artois, the La Mothe estates, and, in general, all property possessed by them in France, without exception, together with all furniture, fixtures, &c., in their palaces and houses, all pictures, statues, *objets d'art*, and decorations contained therein, of whatsoever nature they may be.

His Majesty shall enter into possession of the aforesaid property on the 1st August of the present year.

These separate articles shall be ratified, and the ratifications thereof exchanged, at the same time as those of the treaty of this date.


J. B. NOMPÈRE DE CHAMPAGNY.

LE MARQUIS DE GALLO.

Bayonne, 15th July 1808.

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b. 25 Mar. 1707. *Shot* 13 Oct. 1815.
b. 25 Mar. 1782; *m.* 20 Jan. 1800; *d.* 18 May 1839.



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- 1804. French Prince and Imperial Highness, Prince Grand Admiral of France.
- 1805. Italian Prince and Royal Highness.
- 1806. Grand Duke of Cleves and Berg, Member - Sovereign of the Confederation of the Rhine.
- 1808. King of Naples.
- 1810. The Sovereign Principality of Ponte Corvo.

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